Thematic roles: Core knowledge or linguistic construct?

Asymmetries in encoding event roles: Evidence from language and cognition

It has long been hypothesized that the linguistic structure of events, including event participants and their relative prominence, draws on the non-linguistic nature of events and the roles that these events license. However, the precise relation between the prominence of event participants in language and cognition has not been tested experimentally in a systematic way. Here we address this gap. In four experiments, we investigate the relative prominence of (animate) Agents, Patients, Goals and Instruments in the linguistic encoding of complex events and the prominence of these event roles in cognition as measured by visual search and change blindness tasks. The relative prominence of these event roles was largely similar-though not identical-across linguistic and non-linguistic measures. Across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks, Patients were more salient than Goals, which were more salient than Instruments. (Animate) Agents were more salient than Patients in linguistic descriptions and visual search; however, this asymmetrical pattern did not emerge in change detection. Overall, our results reveal homologies between the linguistic and non-linguistic prominence of individual event participants, thereby lending support to the claim that the linguistic structure of events builds on underlying conceptual event representations. We discuss implications of these findings for linguistic theory and theories of event cognition.

A universal preference for animate agents in hominids

When conversing, humans instantaneously predict meaning from fragmentary and ambiguous mspeech, long before utterance completion. They do this by integrating priors (initial assumptions about the world) with contextual evidence to rapidly decide on the most likely meaning. One powerful prior is attentional preference for agents, which biases sentence processing but universally so only if agents are animate. Here, we investigate the evolutionary origins of this preference, by allowing chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, human children, and adults to freely choose between agents and patients in still images, following video clips depicting their dyadic interaction. All participants preferred animate (and occasionally inanimate) agents, although the effect was attenuated if patients were also animate. The findings suggest that a preference for animate agents evolved before language and is not reducible to simple perceptual biases. To conclude, both humans and great apes prefer animate agents in decision tasks, echoing a universal prior in human language processing.

The Representation of Giving Actions: Event Construction in the Service of Monitoring Social Relationships

Giving is a unique attribute of human sharing. In this review, we discuss evidence attesting to our species' preparedness to recognize interactions based on this behavior. We show that infants and adults require minimal cues of resource transfer to relate the participants of a giving event in an interactive unit (A gives X to B) and that such an interpretation does not systematically generalize to superficially similar taking events, which may be interpreted in nonsocial terms (A takes X). We argue that this asymmetry, echoed in language, reveals the operations of a mechanism of event construction where participant roles are encoded only when they are crucial to rendering an action teleologically well-formed. We show that such a representation of giving allows people to monitor the direction (who gave to whom) and kind (what was given) of resource transfer within a dyad, suggesting that giving may be interpreted as indicative of a relationship based on long-term balance. As this research suggests, advancing the study of the prelinguistic representation of giving has implications for cognitive linguistics, by clarifying the relation between event participants and syntactic arguments, as well as social cognition, by identifying which kinds of relational inferences people draw from attending to acts of sharing.

What eye and hand movements tell us about expectations towards argument order: An eye- and mouse-tracking study in German

Previous research on real-time sentence processing in German has shown that listeners use the morphological marking of accusative case on a sentence-initial noun phrase to not only interpret the current argument as the object and patient, but also to predict a plausible agent. So far, less is known about the use of case marking to predict the semantic role of upcoming arguments after the subject/agent has been encountered. In the present study, we examined the use of case marking for argument interpretation in transitive as well as ditransitive structures. We aimed to control for multiple factors that could have influenced processing in previous studies, including the animacy of arguments, world knowledge, and the perceptibility of the case cue. Our results from eye- and mouse-tracking indicate that the exploitation of the first case cue that enables the interpretation of the unfolding sentence is influenced by (i) the strength of argument order expectation and (ii) the perceptual salience of the case cue. PsycINFO code: 2720 Linguistics & Language & Speech.

Replication of a single-case design cross-situational statistically based word learning treatment for late talking children

PURPOSE

Late talking children are at risk of ongoing language impairment. This intervention study replicated and extended research based on cross-situational statistical learning principles.

METHOD

Three late talking children (age 24-32 months) were enrolled into the concurrent multiple baseline single-case experimental intervention study. The intervention consisted of 16 sessions over eight/nine weeks, including 10-11 pairs of target and control words (three per session). Children heard the target words a minimum of 64 times per session, in sentences with high linguistic variability in varied play activities.

RESULT

All children increased production of target words and expressive vocabulary, with statistically significant differences between word acquisition in baseline and intervention phases. One of the three children learnt statistically significantly more target words than control words.

CONCLUSION

The results replicated the findings of previous research for some but not all of the participants, providing individual evidence that this approach has promise as a therapy technique for late talking children.

Electrophysiological hallmarks for event relations and event roles in working memory

The ability to maintain events (i.e., interactions between/among objects) in working memory is crucial for our everyday cognition, yet the format of this representation is poorly understood. The current ERP study was designed to answer two questions: How is maintaining events (e.g., the tiger hit the lion) neurally different from maintaining item coordinations (e.g., the tiger and the lion)? That is, how is the event relation (present in events but not coordinations) represented? And how is the agent, or initiator of the event encoded differently from the patient, or receiver of the event during maintenance? We used a novel picture-sentence match-across-delay approach in which the working memory representation was "pinged" during the delay, replicated across two ERP experiments with Chinese and English materials. We found that maintenance of events elicited a long-lasting late sustained difference in posterior-occipital electrodes relative to non-events. This effect resembled the negative slow wave reported in previous studies of working memory, suggesting that the maintenance of events in working memory may impose a higher cost compared to coordinations. Although we did not observe significant ERP differences associated with pinging the agent vs. the patient during the delay, we did find that the ping appeared to dampen the ongoing sustained difference, suggesting a shift from sustained activity to activity silent mechanisms. These results suggest a new method by which ERPs can be used to elucidate the format of neural representation for events in working memory.

Infants' understanding of the causal power of agents and tools

Tools are objects that are manipulated by agents with the intention to cause an effect in the world. We show that the cognitive capacity to understand tools is present in young infants, even if these tools produce arbitrary, causally opaque effects. In experiments 1-2, we used pupillometry to show that 8-mo-old infants infer an invisible causal contact to account for the-otherwise unexplained-motion of a ball. In experiments 3, we probed 8-mo-old infants' account of a state change event (flickering of a cube) that lies outside of the explanatory power of intuitive physics. Infants repeatedly watched an intentional agent launch a ball behind an occluder. After a short delay, a cube, positioned at the other end of the occluder began flickering. Rare unoccluded events served to probe infants' representation of what happened behind the occluder. Infants exhibited larger pupil dilation, signaling more surprise, when the ball stopped before touching the cube, than when it contacted the cube, suggesting that infants inferred that the cause of the state change was contact between the ball and the cube. This effect was canceled in experiment 4, when an inanimate sphere replaced the intentional agent. Altogether, results suggest that, in the infants' eyes, a ball (an inanimate object) has the power to cause an arbitrary state change, but only if it inherits this power from an intentional agent. Eight-month-olds are thus capable of representing complex event structures, involving an intentional agent causing a change with a tool.

Cognitive Neuroscience Perspectives on Language Acquisition and Processing

The earliest investigations of the neural implementation of language started with examining patients with various types of disorders and underlying brain damage [...].

Compositionality in visual perception

Quilty-Dunn et al.'s wide-ranging defense of the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LoTH) argues that vision traffics in abstract, structured representational formats. We agree: Vision, like language, is compositional - just as words compose into phrases, many visual representations contain discrete constituents that combine in systematic ways. Here, we amass evidence extending this proposal, and explore its implications for how vision interfaces with the rest of the mind.

Is language-of-thought the best game in the town we live?

There are towns in which language-of-thought (LoT) is the best game. But do we live in one? I go through three properties that characterize the LoT hypothesis: Discrete constituents, role-filler independence, and logical operators, and argue that in each case predictions from the LoT hypothesis are a poor fit to actual human cognition. As a hypothesis of what human cognition ought to be like, LoT departs from empirical reality.

The Agent Preference in Visual Event Apprehension

A central aspect of human experience and communication is understanding events in terms of agent ("doer") and patient ("undergoer" of action) roles. These event roles are rooted in general cognition and prominently encoded in language, with agents appearing as more salient and preferred over patients. An unresolved question is whether this preference for agents already operates during apprehension, that is, the earliest stage of event processing, and if so, whether the effect persists across different animacy configurations and task demands. Here we contrast event apprehension in two tasks and two languages that encode agents differently; Basque, a language that explicitly case-marks agents ('ergative'), and Spanish, which does not mark agents. In two brief exposure experiments, native Basque and Spanish speakers saw pictures for only 300 ms, and subsequently described them or answered probe questions about them. We compared eye fixations and behavioral correlates of event role extraction with Bayesian regression. Agents received more attention and were recognized better across languages and tasks. At the same time, language and task demands affected the attention to agents. Our findings show that a general preference for agents exists in event apprehension, but it can be modulated by task and language demands.

Universal Constraints on Linguistic Event Categories: A Cross-Cultural Study of Child Homesign

Languages carve up conceptual space in varying ways-for example, English uses the verb cut both for cutting with a knife and for cutting with scissors, but other languages use distinct verbs for these events. We asked whether, despite this variability, there are universal constraints on how languages categorize events involving tools (e.g., knife-cutting). We analyzed descriptions of tool events from two groups: (a) 43 hearing adult speakers of English, Spanish, and Chinese and (b) 10 deaf child homesigners ages 3 to 11 (each of whom has created a gestural language without input from a conventional language model) in five different countries (Guatemala, Nicaragua, United States, Taiwan, Turkey). We found alignment across these two groups-events that elicited tool-prominent language among the spoken-language users also elicited tool-prominent language among the homesigners. These results suggest ways of conceptualizing tool events that are so prominent as to constitute a universal constraint on how events are categorized in language.

Structural asymmetries in the representation of giving and taking events

Across languages, GIVE and TAKE verbs have different syntactic requirements: GIVE mandates a patient argument to be made explicit in the clause structure, whereas TAKE does not. Experimental evidence suggests that this asymmetry is rooted in prelinguistic assumptions about the minimal number of event participants that each action entails. The present study provides corroborating evidence for this proposal by investigating whether the observation of giving and taking actions modulates the inclusion of patients in the represented event. Participants were shown events featuring an agent (A) transferring an object to, or collecting it from, an animate target (B) or an inanimate target (a rock), and their sensitivity to changes in pair composition (AB vs. AC) and action role (AB vs. BA) was measured. Change sensitivity was affected by the type of target approached when the agent transferred the object (Experiment 1), but not when she collected it (Experiment 2), or when an outside force carried out the transfer (Experiment 3). Although these object-displacing actions could be equally interpreted as interactive (i.e., directed towards B), this construal was adopted only when B could be perceived as putative patient of a giving action. This evidence buttresses the proposal that structural asymmetries in giving and taking, as reflected in their syntactic requirements, may originate from prelinguistic assumptions about the minimal event participants required for each action to be teleologically well-formed.

Subjects are not all alike: Eye-tracking the agent preference in Spanish

Experimental research on argument structure has reported mixed results regarding the processing of unaccusative and unergative predicates. Using eye tracking in the visual world paradigm, this study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by presenting new evidence of the processing distinction between agent and theme subjects. We considered two hypotheses. First, the Unaccusative Hypothesis states that unaccusative (theme) subjects involve a more complex syntactic representation than unergative (agent) subjects. It predicts a delayed reactivation of unaccusative subjects compared to unergatives after the presentation of the verb. Second, the Agent First Hypothesis states that the first ambiguous NP of a sentence will preferably be interpreted as an agent due to an attentional preference to agents over themes. It predicts a larger reactivation of agent subjects than themes. We monitored the time course of gaze fixations of 44 native speakers across a visual display while processing sentences with unaccusative, unergative and transitive verbs. One of the pictures in the visual display was semantically related to the sentential subject. We analyzed fixation patterns in three different time frames: the verb frame, the post-verb frame, and the global post-verbal frame. Results indicated that sentential subjects across the three conditions were significantly activated when participants heard the verb; this is compatible with observing a post-verbal reactivation effect. Time course and magnitude of the gaze-fixation patterns are fully compatible with the predictions made by the Agent First Hypothesis. Thus, we report new evidence for (a) a processing distinction between unaccusative and unergative predicates in sentence comprehension, and (b) an attentional preference towards agents over themes, reflected by a larger reactivation effect in agent subjects.

The evolutionary origins of syntax: Event cognition in nonhuman primates

Languages tend to encode events from the perspective of agents, placing them first and in simpler forms than patients. This agent bias is mirrored by cognition: Agents are more quickly recognized than patients and generally attract more attention. This leads to the hypothesis that key aspects of language structure are fundamentally rooted in a cognition that decomposes events into agents, actions, and patients, privileging agents. Although this type of event representation is almost certainly universal across languages, it remains unclear whether the underlying cognition is uniquely human or more widespread in animals. Here, we review a range of evidence from primates and other animals, which suggests that agent-based event decomposition is phylogenetically older than humans. We propose a research program to test this hypothesis in great apes and human infants, with the goal to resolve one of the major questions in the evolution of language, the origins of syntax.

Evidence for a Shared Instrument Prototype from English, Dutch, and German

At conceptual and linguistic levels of cognition, events are said to be represented in terms of abstract categories, for example, the sentence Jackie cut the bagel with a knife encodes the categories Agent (i.e., Jackie) and Patient (i.e., the bagel). In this paper, we ask whether entities such as the knife are also represented in terms of such a category (often labeled “Instrument”) and, if so, whether this category has a prototype structure. We hypothesized the Proto‐instrument is a tool: a physical object manipulated by an intentional agent to affect a change in another individual or object. To test this, we asked speakers of English, Dutch, and German to complete an event description task and a sentence acceptability judgment task in which events were viewed with more or less prototypical instruments. We found broad similarities in how English, Dutch, and German partition the semantic space of instrumental events, suggesting there is a shared concept of the Instrument category. However, there was no evidence to support the specific hypothesis that tools are the core of the Instrument category—instead, our results suggest the most prototypical Instrument is the direct extension of an intentional agent. This paper supports theoretical frameworks where thematic roles are analyzed in terms of prototypes and suggests new avenues of research on how instrumental category structure differs across linguistic and conceptual domains.

Mandarin and English Event Cognitive Alignment From Corpus-Based Semantic Fusion Model Perspective

The study explores the fusion of semantic roles and the different semantic fusion types, aiming at establishing a semantic fusion model to explain the cognitive alignment of events in Chinese and English simple sentence constructions containing two verbs. In total, 20,280 simple sentence constructions containing two verbs are collected from Chinese literary works, Peking University Chinese Corpus, and English classic literary works. The semantic fusion in the collected simple sentence constructions containing two verbs is classified into five major semantic fusion categories, which appear with different occurrence frequencies in the two languages. The semantic fusion model of event alignment is comprehensively supported by linguistic research in Chinese and English. From a cognitive linguistic perspective, it is found that the double semantic profiles of the same syntactic element N (noun) make N psychologically activated twice and enable it to enter two processes profiled by the two verbs as a participant. The two processes are combined into one event, which designates a cognitive occurrence of any degree of complexity. N's entry into the two subevents is realized by its double semantic profiles that enable it to fuse two semantic roles into one syntactic element and explain the relationship between N's double syntactic identities and double semantic roles. The semantic fusion model was used to explore event alignment in simple sentence constructions containing two verbs, and it was discovered that the fusion of two semantic roles is universal in languages and is a common psychological and cognitive behavior deeply rooted in the mental conceptualization of language users. The empirical discussion of simple sentence constructions containing two verbs proves that semantic fusion as an important psychological passage in event alignment has solid psychological reality and verifies the applicability of the semantic fusion model in the explanation of event alignment.

The verb-self link: An implicit association test study

Agency is defined as the ability to assign and pursue goals. Given people’s focus on achieving their own goals, agency has been found to be strongly linked to the self. In two studies (N = 168), we examined whether this self–agency link is visible from a linguistic perspective. As the preferred grammatical category to convey agency is verbs, we hypothesize that, in the Implicit Association Test (IAT), verbs (vs. nouns) would be associated more strongly with the self (vs. others). Our results confirmed this hypothesis. Participants exhibited particularly fast responses when reading self-related stimuli (e.g., “me” or “my”) and verb stimuli (e.g., “deflect” or “contemplate”) both necessitated pressing an identical rather than different response keys in the IAT (d = .25). The finding connects two streams of literature—on the link between agency and verbs and on the link between self and agency—suggesting a triad between self, agency, and verbs. We argue that this verb–self link (1) opens up new perspectives for understanding linguistic expressions of agency and (2) expands our understanding of how word choice impacts socio-cognitive processing.

Syntactic and Semantic Influences on the Time Course of Relative Clause Processing: The Role of Language Dominance

We conducted a visual world eye-tracking experiment with highly proficient Spanish-English bilingual adults to investigate the effects of relative language dominance, operationalized as a continuous, multidimensional variable, on the time course of relative clause processing in the first-learned language, Spanish. We found that participants exhibited two distinct processing preferences: a semantically driven preference to assign agency to referents of lexically animate noun phrases and a syntactically driven preference to interpret relative clauses as subject-extracted. Spanish dominance was found to exert a distinct influence on each of these preferences, gradiently attenuating the semantic preference while gradiently exaggerating the syntactic preference. While these results might be attributable to particular properties of Spanish and English, they also suggest a possible generalization that greater dominance in a language increases reliance on language-specific syntactic processing strategies while correspondingly decreasing reliance on more domain-general semantic processing strategies.

Representing agents, patients, goals and instruments in causative events: A cross-linguistic investigation of early language and cognition

Although it is widely assumed that the linguistic description of events is based on a structured representation of event components at the perceptual/conceptual level, little empirical work has tested this assumption directly. Here, we test the connection between language and perception/cognition cross-linguistically, focusing on the relative salience of causative event components in language and cognition. We draw on evidence from preschoolers speaking English or Turkish. In a picture description task, Turkish-speaking 3-5-year-olds mentioned Agents less than their English-speaking peers (Turkish allows subject drop); furthermore, both language groups mentioned Patients more frequently than Goals, and Instruments less frequently than either Patients or Goals. In a change blindness task, both language groups were equally accurate at detecting changes to Agents (despite surface differences in Agent mentions). The remaining components also behaved similarly: both language groups were less accurate in detecting changes to Instruments than either Patients or Goals (even though Turkish-speaking preschoolers were less accurate overall than their English-speaking peers). To our knowledge, this is the first study offering evidence for a strong-even though not strict-homology between linguistic and conceptual event roles in young learners cross-linguistically.

The Language Network Is Recruited but Not Required for Nonverbal Event Semantics

The ability to combine individual concepts of objects, properties, and actions into complex representations of the world is often associated with language. Yet combinatorial event-level representations can also be constructed from nonverbal input, such as visual scenes. Here, we test whether the language network in the human brain is involved in and necessary for semantic processing of events presented nonverbally. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants with fMRI while they performed a semantic plausibility judgment task versus a difficult perceptual control task on sentences and line drawings that describe/depict simple agent-patient interactions. We found that the language network responded robustly during the semantic task performed on both sentences and pictures (although its response to sentences was stronger). Thus, language regions in healthy adults are engaged during a semantic task performed on pictorial depictions of events. But is this engagement necessary? In Experiment 2, we tested two individuals with global aphasia, who have sustained massive damage to perisylvian language areas and display severe language difficulties, against a group of age-matched control participants. Individuals with aphasia were severely impaired on the task of matching sentences to pictures. However, they performed close to controls in assessing the plausibility of pictorial depictions of agent-patient interactions. Overall, our results indicate that the left frontotemporal language network is recruited but not necessary for semantic processing of nonverbally presented events.

Speaking for seeing: Sentence structure guides visual event apprehension

Human experience and communication are centred on events, and event apprehension is a rapid process that draws on the visual perception and immediate categorization of event roles ("who does what to whom"). We demonstrate a role for syntactic structure in visual information uptake for event apprehension. An event structure foregrounding either the agent or patient was activated during speaking, transiently modulating the apprehension of subsequently viewed unrelated events. Speakers of Dutch described pictures with actives and passives (agent and patient foregrounding, respectively). First fixations on pictures of unrelated events that were briefly presented (for 300 ms) next were influenced by the active or passive structure of the previously produced sentence. Going beyond the study of how single words cue object perception, we show that sentence structure guides the viewpoint taken during rapid event apprehension.

The communicative importance of agent-backgrounding: Evidence from homesign and Nicaraguan Sign Language

Some concepts are more essential for human communication than others. In this paper, we investigate whether the concept of agent-backgrounding is sufficiently important for communication that linguistic structures for encoding this concept are present in young sign languages. Agent-backgrounding constructions serve to reduce the prominence of the agent - the English passive sentence a book was knocked over is an example. Although these constructions are widely attested cross-linguistically, there is little prior research on the emergence of such devices in new languages. Here we studied how agent-backgrounding constructions emerge in Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) and adult homesign systems. We found that NSL signers have innovated both lexical and morphological devices for expressing agent-backgrounding, indicating that conveying a flexible perspective on events has deep communicative value. At the same time, agent-backgrounding devices did not emerge at the same time as agentive devices. This result suggests that agent-backgrounding does not have the same core cognitive status as agency. The emergence of agent-backgrounding morphology appears to depend on receiving a linguistic system as input in which linguistic devices for expressing agency are already well-established.

Varieties of recollective experience

Four variants on Tulving's "Remember/Know" paradigm supported a tripartite classification of recollective experience in recognition memory into Remembering (as in conscious recollection of a past episode), Knowing (similar to retrieval from semantic memory), and Feeling (a priming-based judgment of familiarity). Recognition-by-knowing and recognition-by-feeling are differentiated by level of processing at the time of encoding (Experiments 1-3), shifts in the criterion for item recognition (Experiment 2), response latencies (Experiments 1-3), and changes in the response window (Experiment 3). False recognition is often accompanied by "feeling", but rarely by "knowing"; d' is higher for knowing than for feeling (Experiments 1-4). Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional study trials, while recognition-by-feeling falls to zero (Experiment 4). In these ways, recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional Remember/Know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering can be distinguished from recognition-without-remembering. Implications are discussed for dual-process theories of memory, and the search for the neural substrates of memory retrieval.