Heads of Worry, Hearts of Joy: Daily Diary Investigations of Self-Location and Well-Being

When people are asked to locate the self, they frequently choose the head and heart regions of the body. These bodily regions, in turn, are linked to an extensive set of metaphors, including those that conceptualize the heart as the locus of authenticity, love, and passion. Based on such considerations as well as frameworks within the self and well-being literatures, four samples of participants in three studies (total N = 527) were asked whether, on particular days, they perceived themselves to be located in their head regions of their bodies or their heart regions. When the self was perceived to be in the heart to a greater extent, participants reported higher levels of affective and eudaimonic well-being, as mediated by processes related to reward perception (Study 1), savoring (Study 2), and social activity (Study 3). In terms of daily experiences, the heart-located self is a happier self.

The (Gami)fictional Ego-Center: Projecting the Location of the Self Into an Avatar

A rich body of research suggests that self-associated stimuli are preferentially processed and therefore responses to such stimuli are typically faster and more accurate. In addition, people have an understanding of what they consider their “Self” and where it is located, namely near the head and upper torso—further boosting the processing of self-related stimuli if they are presented near the felt location of the self. We were interested in whether the same mechanism can be found when people transfer their “Self” into a static avatar. We investigated this in two studies with N = 33 and N = 39 young, healthy adults, respectively. Taken together, the results showed that (i) people indeed show enhanced processing for self-avatar-related stimuli and (ii) that self-associations are stronger if the to-be-associated stimuli are closer to the avatar’s upper torso—suggesting some kind of a projected location of the self in the avatar. This implies that attention is not equally distributed across the avatar. Beyond a theoretical level, this also has implications for practical use. For example, digital games opting for a non-traditional user interface where information is displayed on or in the direct vicinity of the character should take this effect into account when choosing which information to present where (i.e., present the most crucial piece of information close to the self-center of the avatar).

More than skin deep: about the influence of self-relevant avatars on inhibitory control

One important aspect of cognitive control is the ability to stop a response in progress and motivational aspects, such as self-relevance, which may be able to influence this ability. We test the influence of self-relevance on stopping specifically if increased self-relevance enhances reactive response inhibition. We measured stopping capabilities using a gamified version of the stop-signal paradigm. Self-relevance was manipulated by allowing participants to customize their game avatar (Experiment 1) or by introducing a premade, self-referential avatar (Experiment 2). Both methods create a motivational pull that has been shown to increase motivation and identification. Each participant completed one block of trials with enhanced self-relevance and one block without enhanced self-relevance, with block order counterbalanced. In both experiments, the manipulation of self-relevance was effective in a majority of participants as indicated by self-report on the Player-Identification-Scale, and the effect was strongest in participants that completed the self-relevance block first. In those participants, the degree of subjectively experienced that self-relevance was associated with improvement in stopping performance over the course of the experiment. These results indicate that increasing the degree to which people identify with a cognitive task may induce them to exert greater, reactive inhibitory control. Consequently, self-relevant avatars may be used when an increase in commitment is desirable such as in therapeutic or training settings.

Self-Regulation of Seat of Attention Into Various Attentional Stances Facilitates Access to Cognitive and Emotional Resources: An EEG Study

This study provides evidence supporting the operation of a novel cognitive process of a somatic seat of attention, or ego-center, whose somatic location is under voluntary control and that provides access to differential emotional resources. Attention has typically been studied in terms of what it is directed toward, but it can also be associated with a localized representation in the body image that is experienced as the source or seat of attention-an aspect that has previously only been studied by subjective techniques. Published studies of this phenomenon under terms such as egocenter or self-location suggest that the seat of attention can be situated in various ways within the experienced body, resulting in what are here referred to as different attentional stances. These studies also provide evidence that changes in attentional stance are associated with differences in cognitive skill, emotional temperament, self-construal, and social and moral attitudes, as well as with access to certain states of consciousness. In the present study, EEG results from multiple trials of each of 11 specific attentional stances confirmed that patterns of neural activity associated with the voluntarily control of attentional stances can be reliably measured, providing evidence for a differential neural substrate underlying the subjective location of the seat of attention. Additionally, brain activation patterns for the attentional stances showed strong correlations with EEG signatures associated with specific positive emotional states and with arousal, confirming that differential locations of the seat of attention can be objectively associated with different emotion states, as implied in previous literature. The ability to directly manage the seat of attention into various attentional stances holds substantial potential for facilitating access to specific cognitive and emotional resources in a new way.

It Doesn’t Apply to Me, So It Isn’t Real: People Are Likely to Deny Science if It Contradicts Their Personality

When science contradicts people’s experiences, they often deny the science. Psychological science may be particularly prone to denialism because of its relatively high relevance to people’s lives. In two sets of studies ( N = 637 from university students and Mechanical Turk workers), we tested whether perceived and actual incongruence between one’s personality and scientific findings predict psychological discomfort and science denialism. Participants rated the incongruence (subjective incongruence) between their own personality responses and science, as well as their comfort and denial of the science. Those who experienced more subjective incongruence experienced greater discomfort and reported more science denialism. Those whose personality characteristics were objectively incongruent with the science also experienced greater subjective incongruence (all studies), discomfort (Studies 1A, 1B, and 1C), and science denialism (Studies 1A, 1C, and 2B) compared with those with congruent characteristics. Implications regarding denialism of psychological science, and science more broadly, are discussed.

Modeling the subjective perspective of consciousness and its role in the control of behaviours

Consciousness has been hypothesized to operate as a global workspace, which accesses and integrates multimodal information in a uni_ed manner, supports expectation violation monitoring and reduction, and the motivation, programming and control of action. One important yet open issue concerns how the subjective perspective at the core of consciousness, and subjective properties of manifestation of the environment in such perspective as an embodied experience, play a role in such process. We operationalised the concept of subjective perspective using the principles of the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), based on the projective geometrical concept of Field of Consciousness. We show how these principles can account for documented relationships between appraisal and distance as an inverse distance law, yield a generative model of a_ective and epistemic drives based on purely subjective parameters, such as the apparent size of objects, and can be generalised to implement Theory of Mind, in a manner that is consistent with simulation theory. We used simulations of arti_cial agents, based on psychological rationale, to demonstrate how different model parameters could generate a variety of emergent adaptive and maladaptive behaviours that are relevant to developmental and clinical psychology: the ability to be resilient in the face of obstacles through imaginary projections, the emergence of social approach and joint attention behaviours, the ability to take advantage of false beliefs attributed to others, the emergence of avoidance behaviours as observed in social anxiety disorders, the presence of restricted interests as observed in autism spectrum disorders. The simulation of agents was applied to a speci_c robotic context, and agents' behaviours were demonstrated by controlling the corresponding robots. Our results contribute to advance the scienti_c understanding of the causal relationships between core aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness and its functions in human cybernetics.

Shared contributions of the head and torso to spatial reference frames across spatial judgments

Egocentric frames of reference take the body as the point of origin of a spatial coordinate system. Bodies, however, are not points, but extended objects, with distinct parts that can move independently of one another. We recently developed a novel paradigm to probe the use of different body parts in simple spatial judgments, what we called the misalignment paradigm. In this study, we applied the misalignment paradigm in a perspective-taking task to investigate whether the weightings given to different body parts are shared across different spatial judgments involving different spatial axes. Participants saw birds-eye images of a person with their head rotated 45° relative to the torso. On each trial, a ball appeared and participants made judgments either of whether the ball was to the person's left or right, or whether the ball was in front of the person or behind them. By analysing the pattern of responses with respect to both head and torso, we quantified the contribution of each body part to the reference frames underlying each judgment. For both judgment types we found clear contributions of both head and torso, with more weight being given on average to the torso. Individual differences in the use of the two body parts were correlated across judgment types indicating the use of a shared set of weightings used across spatial axes and judgments. Moreover, retesting of participants several months later showed high stability of these weightings, suggesting that they are stable characteristics of people.

Interoception and embodiment in patients with bilateral vestibulopathy

There are tight functional and anatomical links between the vestibular and interoceptive systems, and both systems have shown to fundamentally underlie emotional processes and our sense of a bodily self. Yet, nothing is known about how long-term bilateral vestibulopathy (BVP) influences interoception and its relation to embodiment and the sense of self. We thus compared cardiac interoceptive accuracy, confidence in the performance, and general body awareness in 25 BVP patients and healthy controls using a heartbeat tracking task, self-reports about interoceptive awareness, as well as measures of self-localization and of self-body closeness. Results showed no difference between patients and controls regarding interoceptive accuracy, confidence and body awareness, suggesting that long-term BVP does not influence cardiac interoception. Patients and controls did not differ either regarding self-location and self-body closeness. However, in our overall sample of patients and controls, we found that interoceptive accuracy increased with perceived self-body closeness, suggesting that anchoring the self to the body is generally linked with better cardiac interoception. This result is in line with previous suggestions of an important contribution of interoception to the sense of embodiment.

Measuring perceived self-location in virtual reality

Third-person perspective full-body illusions (3PP-FBI) enable the manipulation, through multisensory stimulation, of perceived self-location. Perceived self-location is classically measured by a locomotion task. Yet, as locomotion modulates various sensory signals, we developed in immersive virtual reality a measure of self-location without locomotion. Tactile stimulation was applied on the back of twenty-five participants and displayed synchronously or asynchronously on an avatar's back seen from behind. Participants completed the locomotion task and a novel mental imagery task, in which they self-located in relation to a virtual ball approaching them. Participants self-identified with the avatar more during synchronous than asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in both tasks. This was accentuated for the mental imagery task, showing a larger self-relocation toward the avatar, together with higher reports of presence, bi-location and disembodiment in the synchronous condition only for the mental imagery task. In conclusion, the results suggest that avoiding multisensory updating during walking, and using a perceptual rather than a motor task, can improve measures of illusory self-location.

Effects of Mindfulness Meditation on Self-Transcendent States: Perceived Body Boundaries and Spatial Frames of Reference

Objectives

Mindfulness training is believed to encourage self-transcendent states, but little research has examined this hypothesis. This study examined the effects of mindfulness training on two phenomenological features of self-transcendence: 1) perceived body boundary dissolution, and 2) more allocentric spatial frames of reference.

Methods

A sample of healthy, young adults (n=45) were randomized to five sessions of mindfulness training or an active listening control condition.

Results

Results indicated mindfulness training decreased perceived body boundaries (F _4,172=6.010, p<.001, η ²=.12) and encouraged more allocentric frames of reference (F _4,168=2.586, p=.039, η ²=.06). The expected inverse relationship was observed between perceived body boundaries and allocentric frames of reference ((β=-.58, p=.001)), and path analysis revealed the effect of mindfulness training on allocentric frames of reference was mediated by decreased perceived body boundaries (β=.24, se=.17, CI: 0.11 to 0.78).

Conclusions

Taken together, study results suggest that mindfulness training alters practitioners' experience of self, relaxing the boundaries of the self and extending the spatial frame of reference further beyond the physical body. Future studies are needed to explore the psychophysiological changes that co-occur with phenomenological reports of self-transcendence and the behavioral consequences following self-transcendent experiences.

The natural egocenter: An experimental account of locating the self

A lot of research suggests that people have an understanding of what they consider their 'self' and where it is located, namely near the head and upper torso. We assess whether these interpretations of the location of the self, which are based on subjective ratings, can be confirmed with an objective measure. Therefore, we used a paradigm in which neutral stimuli are associated with the self and a prioritization of the newly self-associated stimuli is interpreted as an integration of the stimuli into the self. Remarkably, only when the to-be-associated stimuli were presented close to the head and upper torso they were integrated and prioritized, but not when the stimuli were presented far away from these regions. The results indicate an influence of the distance between to-be-associated stimuli and the head/upper torso, thereby suggesting an implicit location of the self in this area, which does not depend on external beliefs.

Somatosensory Loss Influences the Adoption of Self-Centered Versus Decentered Perspectives

The body and the self are commonly experienced as forming a unity. Experiencing the external world as distinct from the self and the body strongly relies on adopting a single self-centered perspective which results in integrating multisensory sensations into one egocentric body-centered reference frame. Body posture and somatosensory representations have been reported to influence perception and specifically the reference frame relative to which multisensory sensations are coded. In the study reported here, we investigated the role of somatosensory and visual information in adopting self-centered and decentered spatial perspectives. Two deafferented patients who have neither tactile nor proprioceptive perception below the head and a group of age-matched control participants performed a graphesthesia task, consisting of the recognition of ambiguous letters (b, d, p, and q) drawn tactilely on head surfaces. To answer which letter was drawn, the participants can adopt either a self-centered perspective or a decentered one (i.e., centered on a body part or on an external location). The participants' responses can be used, in turn, to infer the way the left-right and top-bottom letters' axes are assigned with respect to the left-right and top-bottom axes of their body. In order to evaluate the influence of body posture, the ambiguous letters were drawn on the participants' forehead, left, and right surfaces of the head, with the head aligned or rotated in yaw relative to the trunk. In order to evaluate the role of external information, the participants completed the task with their eyes open in one session and closed in another one. The results obtained in control participants revealed that their preferred perspective varied with body posture but not with vision. Different results were obtained with the deafferented patients who overall do not show any significant effect of their body posture on their preferred perspective. This result suggests that the orientation of their self is not influenced by their physical body. There was an effect of vision for only one of the two patients. The deafferented patients rely on strategies that are more prone to interindividual differences, which highlights the crucial role of somatosensory information in adopting self-centered spatial perspectives.

Implied tactile motion: Localizing dynamic stimulations on the skin

We report two experiments designed to investigate how the implied motion of tactile stimuli influences perceived location. Predicting the location of sensory input is especially important as far as the perception of, and interaction with, the external world is concerned. Using two different experimental approaches, an overall pattern of localization shifts analogous to what has been described previously in the visual and auditory modalities is reported. That is, participants perceive the last location of a dynamic stimulus further along its trajectory than is objectively the case. In Experiment 1, participants judged whether the last vibration in a sequence of three was located closer to the wrist or to the elbow. In Experiment 2, they indicated the last location on a ruler attached to their forearm. We further pinpoint the effects of implied motion on tactile localization by investigating the independent influences of motion direction and perceptual uncertainty. Taken together, these findings underline the importance of dynamic information in localizing tactile stimuli on the skin.

Where am I in virtual reality?

It is currently not well understood whether people experience themselves to be located in one or more specific part(s) of their body. Virtual reality (VR) is increasingly used as a tool to study aspects of bodily perception and self-consciousness, due to its strong experimental control and ease in manipulating multi-sensory aspects of bodily experience. To investigate where people self-locate in their body within virtual reality, we asked participants to point directly at themselves with a virtual pointer, in a VR headset. In previous work employing a physical pointer, participants mainly located themselves in the upper face and upper torso. In this study, using a VR headset, participants mainly located themselves in the upper face. In an additional body template task where participants pointed at themselves on a picture of a simple body outline, participants pointed most often to the upper torso, followed by the (upper) face. These results raise the question as to whether head-mounted virtual reality might alter where people locate themselves making them more "head-centred".

Dissociating contributions of head and torso to spatial reference frames: The misalignment paradigm

When we represent someone's view of a scene as egocentrically structured, where do we represent the origin of the reference frame? By analysing responses in a spatial perspective-taking task as a function of spatial location with respect to both head and torso, we isolated the respective contribution of each part to spatial judgments. Both the head and the torso contributed to judgements, though with greater contributions from the torso. A second experiment manipulating visual contrast of the torso showed that this does not reflect low-level differences in visual salience between body parts. Our results demonstrate that spatial perspective-taking relies on a weighted combination of reference frames centred on different parts of the body.

Not That Heart-Stopping After All: Visuo-Cardiac Synchrony Does Not Boost Self-Face Attribution

Recent experimental evidence and theoretical models suggest that an integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals underlies several key aspects of the bodily self. While it has been shown that self-attribution of both the hand and the full-body are altered by conflicting extero-exteroceptive (e.g. visuo-tactile) and extero-interoceptive (e.g. visuo-cardiac) information, no study has thus far investigated whether self-attribution of the face might be altered by visuo-cardiac stimulation similarly to visuo-tactile stimulation. In three independent groups of participants we presented ambiguous (i.e. morphed with a stranger's face) self-faces flashing synchronously or asynchronously with the participants’ heartbeat. We then measured the subjective percentages of self-face attribution of morphed stimuli. To control for a potential effect of visuo-cardiac synchrony on familiarity, a task assessing the attribution of a familiar face was introduced. Moreover, different durations of visuo-cardiac flashing and different degrees of asynchronicity were used. Based on previous studies showing that synchronous visuo-cardiac stimulation generally increases self-attribution of the full-body and the hand, and that synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation increases self-face attribution, we predicted higher self-face attribution during the synchronous visuo-cardiac flashing of the morphed stimuli. In contrast to this hypothesis, the results showed no difference between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation on self-face attribution in any of the three studies. We thus conclude that visuo-cardiac synchrony does not boost self-attribution of the face as it does that of hand and full-body.

Dynamic vibrotactile warning signals for frontal collision avoidance: towards the torso versus towards the head

Three experiments were conducted to assess the effectiveness of dynamic vibrotactile warning signals with different spatial patterns and to compare dynamic towards-torso and towards-head vibrotactile warnings in a simulated driving task. The results revealed that embedding additional stimuli between the participant's hands and waist in the towards-torso cues (Experiment 1) and increasing the spatial distance between adjacent stimuli in the towards-head cues (Experiment 2) did not result in any further benefits in braking response times (BRTs). The triple towards-head cues resulting from the sequential operation of three pairs of stimuli on the torso gave rise to a significant advantage over the static cues; however, it did not outperform the dynamic towards-torso cues with just two pairs of stimuli. Taken together, these results demonstrated the promise of dynamic vibrotactile warnings (especially, the towards-torso warnings) in terms of the future design of more effective rear-end collision warnings.

PRACTITIONER SUMMARY

Three experiments assessed the effectiveness of dynamic towards-torso and towards-head vibrotactile warning signals in a simulated driving task. The results demonstrated the promise of dynamic vibrotactile warnings (especially, the towards-torso vibrotactile warnings) in terms of the future design of more effective frontal collision warnings.

I think, therefore I am? Examining conceptions of the self, soul, and mind

In order to delineate among conceptions of the self, soul, and mind, participants reported where they believe these entities are located in the body and provided definitions of each entity. Results indicated that most people consider the self, soul, and mind localized in specific regions in the body. In contrast to previous research, however, some participants reported that the self is not centralized in one location. Participants tended to locate the self and mind in the head and the soul in the chest. The self and mind were commonly defined in mental terms and the soul as one's essence. These results suggest that people tend to distinguish the soul from the mind, both in how they define each entity and where they locate them in the body. Although some people locate the soul in the same region as the self, most people more closely align the mind with the self.

Where exactly am I? Self-location judgements distribute between head and torso

I am clearly located where my body is located. But is there one particular place inside my body where I am? Recent results have provided apparently contradictory findings about this question. Here, we addressed this issue using a more direct approach than has been used in previous studies. Using a simple pointing task, we asked participants to point directly at themselves, either by manual manipulation of the pointer whilst blindfolded or by visually discerning when the pointer was in the correct position. Self-location judgements in haptic and visual modalities were highly similar, and were clearly modulated by the starting location of the pointer. Participants most frequently chose to point to one of two likely regions, the upper face or the upper torso, according to which they reached first. These results suggest that while the experienced self is not spread out homogeneously across the entire body, nor is it localised in any single point. Rather, two distinct regions, the upper face and upper torso, appear to be judged as where "I" am.