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Jiang Y, Schwarz N, Reynolds KJ, Newman EJ. Repetition increases belief in climate-skeptical claims, even for climate science endorsers. PLoS One 2024; 19:e0307294. [PMID: 39110668 PMCID: PMC11305575 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0307294] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2023] [Accepted: 07/02/2024] [Indexed: 08/10/2024] Open
Abstract
Does repeated exposure to climate-skeptic claims influence their acceptance as true, even among climate science endorsers? Research with general knowledge claims shows that repeated exposure to a claim increases its perceived truth when it is encountered again. However, motivated cognition research suggests that people primarily endorse what they already believe. Across two experiments, climate science endorsers were more likely to believe claims that were consistent with their prior beliefs, but repeated exposure increased perceptions of truth for climate-science and climate-skeptic claims to a similar extent. Even counter-attitudinal claims benefit from previous exposure, highlighting the insidious effect of repetition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yangxueqing Jiang
- School of Medicine and Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
| | - Norbert Schwarz
- Mind and Society Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, United States of America
- Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, United States of America
| | - Katherine J. Reynolds
- School of Medicine and Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
- Melbourne Graduate School of Education, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
| | - Eryn J. Newman
- School of Medicine and Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
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Speckmann F, Unkelbach C. Illusions of knowledge due to mere repetition. Cognition 2024; 247:105791. [PMID: 38593568 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105791] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/03/2023] [Revised: 03/24/2024] [Accepted: 04/03/2024] [Indexed: 04/11/2024]
Abstract
Repeating information increases people's belief that the repeated information is true. This truth effect has been widely researched and is relevant for topics such as fake news and misinformation. Another effect of repetition, which is also relevant to those topics, has not been extensively studied so far: Do people believe they knew something before it was repeated? We used a standard truth effect paradigm in four pre-registered experiments (total N = 773), including a presentation and judgment phase. However, instead of "true"/"false" judgments, participants indicated whether they knew a given trivia statement before participating in the experiment. Across all experiments, participants judged repeated information as "known" more often than novel information. Participants even judged repeated false information to know it to be false. In addition, participants also generated sources of their knowledge. The inability to distinguish recent information from well-established knowledge in memory adds an explanation for the persistence and strength of repetition effects on truth. The truth effect might be so robust because people believe to know the repeatedly presented information as a matter of fact.
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Stump A, Voss A, Rummel J. The illusory certainty: Information repetition and impressions of truth enhance subjective confidence in validity judgments independently of the factual truth. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2024; 88:1288-1297. [PMID: 38526581 PMCID: PMC11143013 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-024-01956-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2023] [Accepted: 03/15/2024] [Indexed: 03/26/2024]
Abstract
People not only judge repeatedly perceived information as more likely being true (the so-called truth effect) they also tend to be more confident after judging the validity of repeated information. These phenomena are assumed to be caused by a higher subjective feeling of ease (i.e., fluency) when processing repeated (vs. new) information. Based on the suggestion that a higher number of coherent mental activations is promoting a fluency experience, we argue that besides repetition an already existing information network, that is (nonspecific) prior knowledge, can enhance fluency. Following this argumentation, information repetition as well as the act of judging incoming information as being true (vs. false) should feed into subjective confidence - independently of the factual truth (when judging under uncertainty). To test this, we reanalyzed two published data sets and conducted a new study. In total, participants (N = 247) gave 29,490 truth judgments and corresponding ratings of subjective confidence while attending two judgement phases (i.e., 10 min and 1 week after the exposure phase in each experiment). Results showed that (a) repetition (in 3 of 3 data sets) and (b) impressions of truth (in 2 of 3 data sets) were systematically related to higher subjective confidence. Moreover, we found (c) a significant positive interaction between repetition and impressions of truth after both intervals in all data sets. Our analyses further underline the moderating effect of time: Influences of repetition significantly decreased with increasing time interval. Notably, the factual truth did not systematically affect any of the above reported effects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Annika Stump
- Institute of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany.
| | - Andreas Voss
- Institute of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Jan Rummel
- Institute of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany
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Riesthuis P, Woods J. "That's just like, your opinion, man": the illusory truth effect on opinions. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2024; 88:284-306. [PMID: 37300704 PMCID: PMC10257371 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-023-01845-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2023] [Accepted: 05/22/2023] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
With the expanse of technology, people are constantly exposed to an abundance of information. Of vital importance is to understand how people assess the truthfulness of such information. One indicator of perceived truthfulness seems to be whether it is repeated. That is, people tend to perceive repeated information, regardless of its veracity, as more truthful than new information, also known as the illusory truth effect. In the present study, we examined whether such effect is also observed for opinions and whether the manner in which the information is encoded influenced the illusory truth effect. Across three experiments, participants (n = 552) were presented with a list of true information, misinformation, general opinion, and/or social-political opinion statements. First, participants were either instructed to indicate whether the presented statement was a fact or opinion based on its syntax structure (Exp. 1 & 2) or assign each statement to a topic category (Exp. 3). Subsequently, participants rated the truthfulness of various new and repeated statements. Results showed that repeated information, regardless of the type of information, received higher subjective truth ratings when participants simply encoded them by assigning each statement to a topic. However, when general and social-political opinions were encoded as an opinion, we found no evidence of such effect. Moreover, we found a reversed illusory truth effect for general opinion statements when only considering information that was encoded as an opinion. These findings suggest that how information is encoded plays a crucial role in evaluating truth.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul Riesthuis
- Leuven Institute of Criminology, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium.
- Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, Netherlands.
| | - Josh Woods
- Faculty of Psychology, Grand View University, Des Moines, IA, USA
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O’Donnell R, Chan JCK, Foster JL, Garry M. Experimental and meta-analytic evidence that source variability of misinformation does not increase eyewitness suggestibility independently of repetition of misinformation. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1201674. [PMID: 37691811 PMCID: PMC10492197 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1201674] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Accepted: 07/25/2023] [Indexed: 09/12/2023] Open
Abstract
Considerable evidence has shown that repeating the same misinformation increases its influence (i.e., repetition effects). However, very little research has examined whether having multiple witnesses present misinformation relative to one witness (i.e., source variability) increases the influence of misinformation. In two experiments, we orthogonally manipulated repetition and source variability. Experiment 1 used written interview transcripts to deliver misinformation and showed that repetition increased eyewitness suggestibility, but source variability did not. In Experiment 2, we increased source saliency by delivering the misinformation to participants via videos instead of written interviews, such that each witness was visibly and audibly distinct. Despite this stronger manipulation, there was no effect of source variability in Experiment 2. In addition, we reported a meta-analysis (k = 19) for the repeated misinformation effect and a small-scale meta-analysis (k = 8) for the source variability effect. Results from these meta-analyses were consistent with the results of our individual experiments. Altogether, our results suggest that participants respond based on retrieval fluency rather than source-specifying information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rachel O’Donnell
- Memory, Law, and Education Laboratory, Psychology Department, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, United States
| | - Jason C. K. Chan
- Memory, Law, and Education Laboratory, Psychology Department, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, United States
| | - Jeffrey L. Foster
- Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Maryanne Garry
- School of Psychology, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
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Pillai RM, Fazio LK, Effron DA. Repeatedly Encountered Descriptions of Wrongdoing Seem More True but Less Unethical: Evidence in a Naturalistic Setting. Psychol Sci 2023; 34:863-874. [PMID: 37428445 DOI: 10.1177/09567976231180578] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/11/2023] Open
Abstract
When news about moral transgressions goes viral on social media, the same person may repeatedly encounter identical reports about a wrongdoing. In a longitudinal experiment (N = 607 U.S. adults from Mechanical Turk), we found that these repeated encounters can affect moral judgments. As participants went about their lives, we text-messaged them news headlines describing corporate wrongdoings (e.g., a cosmetics company harming animals). After 15 days, they rated these wrongdoings as less unethical than new wrongdoings. Extending prior laboratory research, these findings reveal that repetition can have a lasting effect on moral judgments in naturalistic settings, that affect plays a key role, and that increasing the number of repetitions generally makes moral judgments more lenient. Repetition also made fictitious descriptions of wrongdoing seem truer, connecting this moral-repetition effect with past work on the illusory-truth effect. The more times we hear about a wrongdoing, the more we may believe it-but the less we may care.
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Affiliation(s)
- Raunak M Pillai
- Department of Psychology and Human Development, Vanderbilt University
| | - Lisa K Fazio
- Department of Psychology and Human Development, Vanderbilt University
| | - Daniel A Effron
- Organisational Behaviour Subject Area, London Business School
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Yacoby A, Reggev N, Maril A. Lack of source memory as a potential marker of early assimilation of novel items into current knowledge. Neuropsychologia 2023; 185:108569. [PMID: 37121268 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108569] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2022] [Revised: 04/05/2023] [Accepted: 04/23/2023] [Indexed: 05/02/2023]
Abstract
In daily life, humans process a plethora of new information that can be either consistent (familiar) or inconsistent (novel) with prior knowledge. Over time, both types of information can integrate into our accumulated knowledge base via distinct pathways. However, the mnemonic processes supporting the integration of information that is inconsistent with prior knowledge remain under-characterized. In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the initial assimilation of novel items into the semantic network. Participants saw three repetitions of adjective-noun word pairs that were either consistent or inconsistent with prior knowledge. Twenty-four hours later, they were presented with the same stimuli again while undergoing fMRI scans. Outside the scanner, participants completed a surprise recognition test. We found that when the episodic context associated with initially inconsistent items was irretrievable, the neural signature of these items was indistinguishable from that of consistent items. In contrast, initially inconsistent items with accessible episodic contexts showed neural signatures that differed from those associated with consistent items. We suggest that, at least one day post encoding, items inconsistent with prior knowledge can show early assimilation into the semantic network only when their episodic contexts become inaccessible during retrieval, thus evoking a sense of familiarity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Amnon Yacoby
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Niv Reggev
- Department of Psychology and the School of Brain Sciences and Cognition, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel
| | - Anat Maril
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel; Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.
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Lacassagne D, Béna J, Corneille O. Is Earth a perfect square? Repetition increases the perceived truth of highly implausible statements. Cognition 2022; 223:105052. [PMID: 35144111 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105052] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2021] [Revised: 01/28/2022] [Accepted: 01/29/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
A single exposure to statements is typically enough to increase their perceived truth. This Truth-by-Repetition (TBR) effect has long been assumed to occur only with statements whose truth value is unknown to participants. Contrary to this hypothesis, recent research has found that statements contradicting participants' prior knowledge (as established from a first sample of participants) show a TBR effect following their repetition (in a second, independent sample of participants). As for now, however, attempts at finding a TBR effect for blatantly false (i.e., highly implausible) statements have failed. Here, we reasoned that highly implausible statements such as Elephants run faster than cheetahs may show repetition effects, provided a sensitive truth measure is used and statements are repeated more than just once. In a preregistered experiment, participants judged on a 100-point scale the truth of highly implausible statements that were either new to them or had been presented five times before judgment. We observed an effect of repetition: repeated statements were judged more true than new ones, although all judgments were judged below the scale midpoint. Exploratory analyses additionally show that about half the participants showed no or even a reversed effect of repetition. The results provide the first empirical evidence that repetition can increase perceived truth even for highly implausible statements, although not equally so for all participants and not to the point of making the statements look true.
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Pillai RM, Fazio LK. The effects of repeating false and misleading information on belief. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2021; 12:e1573. [PMID: 34423562 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1573] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/28/2020] [Revised: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 07/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
False and misleading information is readily accessible in people's environments, oftentimes reaching people repeatedly. This repeated exposure can significantly affect people's beliefs about the world, as has been noted by scholars in political science, communication, and cognitive, developmental, and social psychology. In particular, repetition increases belief in false information, even when the misinformation contradicts prior knowledge. We review work across these disciplines, identifying factors that may heighten, diminish, or have no impact on these adverse effects of repetition on belief. Specifically, we organize our discussion around variations in what information is repeated, to whom the information is repeated, how people interact with this repetition, and how people's beliefs are measured. A key cross-disciplinary theme is that the most influential factor is how carefully or critically people process the false information. However, several open questions remain when comparing findings across different fields and approaches. We conclude by noting a need for more interdisciplinary work to help resolve these questions, as well as a need for more work in naturalistic settings so that we can better understand and combat the effects of repeated circulation of false and misleading information in society. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Lisa K Fazio
- Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, USA
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