The effect of performance-based financial incentives on improving health care provision in Burundi: a controlled cohort study

Impact of health system governance on healthcare quality in low-income and middle-income countries: a scoping review

INTRODUCTION

Improving healthcare quality in low-/middle-income countries (LMICs) is a critical step in the pathway to Universal Health Coverage and health-related sustainable development goals. This study aimed to map the available evidence on the impacts of health system governance interventions on the quality of healthcare services in LMICs.

METHODS

We conducted a scoping review of the literature. The search strategy used a combination of keywords and phrases relevant to health system governance, quality of healthcare and LMICs. Studies published in English until August 2023, with no start date limitation, were searched on PubMed, Cochrane Library, CINAHL, Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar and ProQuest. Additional publications were identified by snowballing. The effects reported by the studies on processes of care and quality impacts were reviewed.

RESULTS

The findings from 201 primary studies were grouped under (1) leadership, (2) system design, (3) accountability and transparency, (4) financing, (5) private sector partnerships, (6) information and monitoring; (7) participation and engagement and (8) regulation.

CONCLUSIONS

We identified a stronger evidence base linking improved quality of care with health financing, private sector partnerships and community participation and engagement strategies. The evidence related to leadership, system design, information and monitoring, and accountability and transparency is limited.

Do Incentives Crowd Out Motivation? A Feasibility Study of a Community Vector-Control Campaign in Peru

Incentives are a useful tool in encouraging healthy behavior as part of public health initiatives. However, there remains concern about motivation crowd out-a decline in levels of motivation to undertake a behavior to below baseline levels after incentives have been removed-and few public health studies have assessed for motivation crowd out. Here, we assess the feasibility of identifying motivation crowd out following a lottery to promote participation in a Chagas disease vector control campaign. We look for evidence of crowd out in subsequent participation in the same behavior, a related behavior, and an unrelated behavior. We identified potential motivation crowd out for the same behavior, but not for related behavior or unrelated behaviors after lottery incentives are removed. Despite some limitations, we conclude that motivation crowd out is feasible to assess in large-scale trials of incentives.

No impact of performance-based financing on the availability of essential medicines in Burkina Faso: A mixed-methods study

Access to safe, effective, and affordable essential medicines (EM) is critical to quality health services and as such has played a key role in innovative health system strengthening approaches such as Performance-based Financing (PBF). Available literature indicates that PBF can improve EM availability, but has not done so consistently in the past. Qualitative explorations of the reasons are yet scarce. We contribute to expanding the literature by estimating the impact of PBF on EM availability and stockout in Burkina Faso and investigating mechanisms of and barriers to change. The study used an explanatory mixed methods design. The quantitative study component followed a quasi-experimental design (difference-in-differences), comparing how EM availability and stockout had changed three years after implementation in 12 PBF and in 12 control districts. Qualitative data was collected from purposely selected policy and implementation stakeholders at all levels of the health system and community, using in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, and explored using deductive coding and thematic analysis. We found no impact of PBF on EM availability and stockouts in the quantitative data. Qualitative narratives converge in that EM supply had increased as a result of PBF, albeit not fully satisfactorily and sustainably so. Reasons include persisting contextual challenges, most importantly a public medicine procurement monopoly; design challenges, specifically a disconnect and disbalance in incentive levels between service provision and service quality indicators; implementation challenges including payment delays, issues around performance verification, and insufficient implementation of activities to strengthen stock management skills; and concurrently implemented policies, most importantly a national user fee exemption for children and pregnant women half way through the impact evaluation period. The case of PBF and EM availability in Burkina Faso illustrates the difficulty of incentivizing and effecting holistic change in EM availability in the presence of strong contextual constraints and powerful concurrent policies.

What happens when performance-based financing meets free healthcare? Evidence from an interrupted time-series analysis

In spite of the wide attention performance-based financing (PBF) has received over the past decade, no evidence is available on its impacts on quantity and mix of service provision nor on its interaction with parallel health financing interventions. Our study aimed to examine the PBF impact on quantity and mix of service provision in Burkina Faso, while accounting for the parallel introduction of a free healthcare policy. We used Health Management Information System data from 838 primary-level health facilities across 24 districts and relied on an interrupted time-series analysis with independent controls. We placed two interruptions, one to account for PBF and one to account for the free healthcare policy. In the period before the free healthcare policy, PBF produced significant but modest increases across a wide range of maternal and child services, but a significant decrease in child immunization coverage. In the period after the introduction of the free healthcare policy, PBF did not affect service provision in intervention compared with control facilities, possibly indicating a saturation effect. Our findings indicate that PBF can produce modest increases in service provision, without altering the overall service mix. Our findings, however, also indicate that the introduction of other health financing reforms can quickly crowd out the effects produced by PBF. Further qualitative research is required to understand what factors allow healthcare providers to increase the provision of some, but not all services and how they react to the joint implementation of PBF and free health care.

Paying for performance to improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries

BACKGROUND

There is growing interest in paying for performance (P4P) as a means to align the incentives of healthcare providers with public health goals. Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care and health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is lacking; this is an update of the 2012 review on this topic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effects of paying for performance on the provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, and 10 other databases between April and June 2018. We also searched two trial registries, websites, online resources of international agencies, organizations and universities, and contacted experts in the field. Studies identified from rerunning searches in 2020 are under 'Studies awaiting classification.'

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized or non-randomized trials, controlled before-after studies, or interrupted time series studies conducted in LMICs (as defined by the World Bank in 2018). P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. To be included, a study had to report at least one of the following outcomes: patient health outcomes, changes in targeted measures of provider performance (such as the delivery of healthcare services), unintended effects, or changes in resource use.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We extracted data as per original review protocol and narratively synthesised findings. We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. Given diversity and variability in intervention types, patient populations, analyses and outcome reporting, we deemed meta-analysis inappropriate. We noted the range of effects associated with P4P against each outcome of interest. Based on intervention descriptions provided in documents, we classified design schemes and explored variation in effect by scheme design.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 59 studies: controlled before-after studies (19), non-randomized (16) or cluster randomized trials (14);  and interrupted time-series studies (9). One study included both an interrupted time series and a controlled before-after study. Studies focused on a wide range of P4P interventions, including target payments and payment for outputs as modified by quality (or quality and equity assessments). Only one study assessed results-based aid. Many schemes were funded by national governments (23 studies) with the World Bank funding most externally funded schemes (11 studies). Targeted services varied; however, most interventions focused on reproductive, maternal and child health indicators. Participants were predominantly located in public or in a mix of public, non-governmental and faith-based facilities (54 studies). P4P was assessed predominantly at health facility level, though districts and other levels were also involved. Most studies assessed the effects of P4P against a status quo control (49 studies); however, some studies assessed effects against comparator interventions (predominantly enhanced financing intended to match P4P funds (17 studies)). Four studies reported intervention effects against both comparator and status quo. Controlled before-after studies were at higher risk of bias than other study designs. However, some randomised trials were also downgraded due to risk of bias. The interrupted time-series studies provided insufficient information on other concurrent changes in the study context. P4P compared to a status quo control For health services that are specifically targeted, P4P may slightly improve health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may also improve service quality overall (low certainty evidence); and probably increases the availability of health workers, medicines and well-functioning infrastructure and equipment (moderate certainty evidence). P4P may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of services (low certainty evidence) and may have few or no distorting unintended effects on outcomes that were not targeted (low-certainty evidence), but few studies assessed these. For secondary outcomes, P4P may make little or no difference to provider absenteeism, motivation or satisfaction (low certainty evidence); but may improve patient satisfaction and acceptability (low certainty evidence); and may positively affect facility managerial autonomy (low certainty evidence). P4P probably makes little to no difference to management quality or facility governance (low certainty evidence). Impacts on equity were mixed (low certainty evidence). For health services that are untargeted, P4P probably improves some health outcomes (moderate certainty evidence); may improve the delivery, use and quality of some health services but may make little or no difference to others (low certainty evidence); and may have few or no distorting unintended effects (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on the availability of medicines and other resources are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). P4P compared to other strategies For health outcomes and services that are specifically targeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may improve service quality (low certainty evidence); and may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of health services and on the availability of equipment and medicines (low certainty evidence). For health outcomes and services that are untargeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes and to the delivery and use of health services (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on service quality, resource availability and unintended effects are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). Findings of subgroup analyses Results-based aid, and schemes using payment per output adjusted for service quality, appeared to yield the greatest positive effects on outcomes. However, only one study evaluated results-based aid, so the effects may be spurious. Overall, schemes adjusting both for quality of service and rewarding equitable delivery of services appeared to perform best in relation to service utilization outcomes.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The evidence base on the impacts of P4P schemes has grown considerably, with study quality gradually increasing. P4P schemes may have mixed effects on outcomes of interest, and there is high heterogeneity in the types of schemes implemented and evaluations conducted. P4P is not a uniform intervention, but rather a range of approaches. Its effects depend on the interaction of several variables, including the design of the intervention (e.g., who receives payments ), the amount of additional funding,  ancillary components (such as technical support) and contextual factors (including organizational context).

Impact of the extension of a performance-based financing scheme to nutrition services in Burundi on malnutrition prevention and management among children below five: A cluster-randomized control trial

Malnutrition is a huge problem in Burundi. In order to improve the health system response, the Ministry of Health piloted the introduction of malnutrition prevention and care indicators within its performance-based financing (PBF) scheme. Paying for units of services and for qualitative indicators is expected to enhance provision and quality of these nutrition services. The objective of this study is to assess the impacts of this intervention, on both child acute malnutrition recovery rates at health centre level and prevalence of chronic and acute malnutrition among children at community level. This study follows a cluster-randomized controlled evaluation design: 90 health centres (HC) were randomly selected for the study, 45 of them were randomly assigned to the intervention and received payment related to their performance in malnutrition activities, while the other 45 constituted the control group and got a simple budget allocation. Data were collected from baseline and follow-up surveys of the 90 health centres and 6,480 households with children aged 6 to 23 months. From the respectively 1,067 and 1,402 moderate and severe acute malnutrition transcribed files and registers, findings suggest that the intervention had a positive impact on moderate acute malnutrition recovery rates (OR: 5.59, p = 0.039 –at the endline, 78% in the control group and 97% in the intervention group) but not on uncomplicated severe acute malnutrition recovery rate (OR: 1.16, p = 0.751 –at the endline, 93% in the control group and 92% in the intervention group). The intervention also had a significant increasing impact on the number of children treated for acute malnutrition. Analyses from the anthropometric data collected among 12,679 children aged 6–23 months suggest improvements at health centre level did not translate into better results at community level: prevalence of both acute and chronic malnutrition remained high, precisely at the endline, acute and chronic malnutrition prevalence were resp. 8.80% and 49.90% in the control group and 8.70% and 52.0% in the intervention group, the differences being non-significant. PBF can contribute to a better management of malnutrition at HC level; yet, to address the huge problem of child malnutrition in Burundi, additional strategies are urgently required.

Effects in spite of tough constraints - A theory of change based investigation of contextual and implementation factors affecting the results of a performance based financing scheme extended to malnutrition in Burundi

BACKGROUND

From January 2015 to December 2016, the health authorities in Burundi piloted the inclusion of child nutrition services into the pre-existing performance-based financing free health care policy (PBF-FHC). An impact evaluation, focused on health centres, found positive effects both in terms of volume of services and quality of care. To some extent, this result is puzzling given the harshness of the contextual constraints related to the fragile setting.

METHODS

With a multi-methods approach, we explored how contextual and implementation constraints interacted with the pre-identified tracks of effect transmission embodied in the intervention. For our analysis, we used a hypothetical Theory of Change (ToC) that mapped a set of seven tracks through which the intervention might develop positive effects for children suffering from malnutrition. We built our analysis on (1) findings from the facility surveys and (2) extra qualitative data (logbooks, interviews and operational document reviews).

FINDINGS

Our results suggest that six constraints have weighted upon the intervention: (1) initial low skills of health workers; (2) unavailability of resources (including nutritional dietary inputs and equipment); (3) payment delays; (4) suboptimal information; (5) restrictions on autonomy; and (6) low intensity of supervision. Together, they have affected the intensity of the intervention, especially during its first year. From our analysis of the ToC, we noted that the positive effects largely occurred as a result of the incentive and information tracks. Qualitative data suggests that health centres have circumvented the many constraints by relying on a community-based recruitment strategy and a better management of inputs at the level of the facility and the patient himself.

CONCLUSION

Frontline actors have agency: when incentives are right, they take the initiative and find solutions. However, they cannot perform miracles: Burundi needs a holistic societal strategy to resolve the structural problem of child malnutrition.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Clinical Trials.gov Identifier: NCT02721160; March 2016 (retrospectively registered).

How does performance-based financing affect the availability of essential medicines in Cameroon? A qualitative study

Performance-based financing (PBF) is being implemented across low- and middle-income countries to improve the availability and quality of health services, including medicines. Although a few studies have examined the effects of PBF on the availability of essential medicines (EMs) in low- and middle-income countries, there is limited knowledge of the mechanisms underlying these effects. Our research aimed to explore how PBF in Cameroon influenced the availability of EMs, and to understand the pathways leading to the experiential dimension related with the observed changes. The design was an exploratory qualitative study. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, using semi-structured questionnaires. Key informants were selected using purposive sampling. The respondents (n = 55) included health services managers, healthcare providers, health authorities, regional drugs store managers and community members. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using qualitative data analysis software. Thematic analysis was performed. Our findings suggest that the PBF programme improved the perceived availability of EMs in three regions in Cameroon. The change in availability of EMs experienced by stakeholders resulted from several pathways, including the greater autonomy of facilities, the enforced regulation from the district medical team, the greater accountability of the pharmacy attendant and supply system liberalization. However, a sequence of challenges, including delays in PBF payments, limited autonomy, lack of leadership and contextual factors such as remoteness or difficulty in access, was perceived to hinder the capacity to yield optimal changes, resulting in heterogeneity in performance between health facilities. The participants raised concerns regarding the quality control of drugs, the inequalities between facilities and the fragmentation of the drug management system. The study highlights that some specific dimensions of PBF, such as pharmacy autonomy and the liberalization of drugs supply systems, need to be supported by equity interventions, reinforced regulation and measures to ensure the quality of drugs at all levels.

Experiences of care in the context of payment for performance (P4P) in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Tanzania is one of many low income countries committed to universal health coverage and Sustainable Development Goals. Despite these bold goals, there is growing concern that the country could be off-track in meeting these goals. This prompted the Government of Tanzania to look for ways to improve health outcomes in these goals and this led to the introduction of Payment for Performance (P4P) in the health sector. Since the inception of P4P in Tanzania a number of impact, cost-effective and process evaluations have been published with less attention being paid to the experiences of care in this context of P4P, which we argue is important for policy agenda setting. This study therefore explores these experiences from the perspectives of health workers, service users and community health governing committee members.

METHODS

A qualitative study design was used to elicit experiences of health workers, health service users and health governing committee members in Rufiji district of the Pwani region in Tanzania. The Payment for Performance pilot was introduced in Pwani region in 2011 and data presented in this article is based on this pilot. A total of 31 in-depth interviews with health workers and 9 focus group discussions with health service users and health governing committee members were conducted. Collected data was analysed through qualitative content analysis.

RESULTS

Study informants reported positive experiences with Payment for Performance and highlighted its potential in improving the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of care (AAAQ). However, the study found that persistent barriers for achieving AAAQ still exist in the health system of Tanzania and these contribute to negative experiences of care in the context of P4P.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that there are a number of positive aspects of care that can be improved by Payment for Performance. However its targeted nature on specific services means that these improvements cannot be generalized at health facility level. Additionally, health workers can go as far as they can in improving health services but some factors that act as barriers as demonstrated in this study are out of their control even in the context of Payment for Performance. In this regard there is need to exercise caution when implementing such initiatives, despite seemingly positive targeted outcomes.

Conditional economic incentives to improve HIV prevention and treatment in low-income and middle-income countries

New and innovative approaches are needed to improve the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of HIV in low-income and middle-income countries. Several trials use conditional economic incentives (CEIs) to improve HIV outcomes. Most CEI interventions use a traditional economic theory approach, although some interventions incorporate behavioural economics, which combines traditional economics with insights from psychology. Incentive interventions that are appropriately implemented can increase HIV testing rates and voluntary male circumcision, and they can improve other HIV prevention and treatment outcomes in certain settings in the short term. More research is needed to uncover theory-based mechanisms that increase the duration of incentive effects and provide strategies for susceptible individuals, which will help to address common constraints and biases that can influence health-related decisions.

Physicians' and nurses' attitudes towards performance-based financial incentives in Burundi: a qualitative study in the province of Gitega

Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) was first implemented in Burundi in 2006 as a pilot programme in three provinces and was rolled out nationwide in 2010. PBF is a reform approach to improve the quality, quantity, and equity of health services and aims at achieving universal health coverage. It focuses on how to best motivate health practitioners.

Objective: To elicit physicians’ and nurses’ experiences and views on how PBF influenced and helped them in healthcare delivery.

Methods: A qualitative cross-sectional study was carried out among frontline health workers such as physicians and nurses. The data was gathered through individual face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 6 physicians and 30 nurses from February to March 2011 in three hospitals in Gitega Province. A simple framework approach and thematic analysis using a combination of manual technique and MAXQDA software guided the analysis of the interview data.

Results: Overall, the interviewees felt that the PBF scheme had provided positive motivation to improve the quality of care, mainly in the structures and process of care. The utilization of health services and the relationship between health practitioners and patients also improved. The salary top-ups were recognized as the most significant impetus to increase effort in improving the quality of care. The small and sometimes delayed financial incentives paid to physicians and nurses were criticized. The findings of this study also indicate that the positive interaction between performance-based incentive schemes and other health policies is crucial in achieving comprehensive improvement in healthcare delivery.

Conclusions: PBF has the potential to motivate medical staff to improve healthcare provision. The views of medical staff and the context of the area of implementation have to be taken into consideration when designing and implementing PBF schemes.

The effect of performance-based financing on maternal healthcare use in Burundi: a two-wave pooled cross-sectional analysis

Background: Several developing countries, especially in Africa, have implemented performance-based financing (PBF) schemes with the aim of improving healthcare provision. PBF was first implemented in Burundi in 2006 as a pilot programme in three provinces and was rolled out nationwide in 2010.

Objective: To enrich existing studies on Burundi in three ways. Firstly, by evaluating the effect of PBF on maternal care at primary and hospital levels; secondly, on the possession of maternity logbooks for maternal care records; and thirdly, how the amount of subsidies influences healthcare outputs.

Design: We used data from repeated cross-sectional surveys in 500 households (intervention group: 225; control group: 275) conducted in 2006 and 2008. A total of 274 women, aged 15–49, who had recently given birth, were interviewed about the use of maternal healthcare and the possession of maternity logbooks. We performed a difference-in-differences analysis using pooled cross-sectional survey data from 2006 and 2008.

Results: We found that PBF is associated with an increased institutional deliveries probability of 39.5 percentage points (p < 0.01) – a relative improvement of 81.8%. Institutional deliveries probability increased significantly only at health centre level by 33.6 percentage points (p < 0.01), a  relative rise of 80.6%. There is an indication of a positive spillover effect of PBF on the possession of maternity logbooks. We found no PBF effect on the number of antenatal care visits and anti-tetanus immunization.

Conclusions: Our findings suggest that institutional delivery highly improved because it came from a low baseline and its unit payment was relatively high, leading health workers to promote its use. The fact that deliveries mainly increased in health centres and not in hospitals may be explained by the context of how health delivery is organized in Burundi. Health policymakers have to determine the appropriate financial incentives that best influence the improvement of each health service.

The effect of a performance-based financing program on HIV and maternal/child health services in Mozambique-an impact evaluation

Performance-based financing (PBF) is a mechanism by which health providers are paid on the basis of outputs or results delivered. A PBF program was implemented on the provision of HIV, prevention of mother-to child HIV transmission (PMTCT), and maternal/child health (MCH) services in two provinces of Mozambique. A retrospective case-control study design was used in which PBF provinces were matched with control provinces to evaluate the impact of PBF on 18 indicators. Due to regional heterogeneity, we evaluated the intervention sites (North and South) separately. Beginning January 2011, 11 quarters (33 months or 2.75 years) of data from 134 facilities after matching (84 in the North and 50 in the South) were used. Our econometric framework employed a multi-period, multi-group difference-in-differences model on data that was matched using propensity scoring. The regression design employed a generalized linear mixed model with both fixed and random effects, fitted using the seemingly unrelated regression technique. PBF resulted in positive impacts on MCH, PMTCT and paediatric HIV program outcomes. The majority of the 18 indicators responded to PBF (77% in the North and 66% in the South), with at least half of the indicators demonstrating a statistically significant increase in average output of more than 50% relative to baseline. Excluding pregnant women, the majority of adult HIV treatment indicators did not respond to PBF. On average, it took 18 months (six quarters) of implementation for PBF to take effect, and impact was generally sustained thereafter. Indicators were not sensitive to price, but were inversely correlated to the level of effort associated with marginal output. No negative impacts on incentivized indicators nor spill-over effects on non-incentivized indicators were observed. The PBF program in Mozambique has produced large, sustained increases in the provision of PMTCT, paediatric HIV and MCH services. Our results demonstrate that PBF is an effective strategy for driving down the HIV epidemic and advancing MCH care service delivery as compared with input financing alone.

Performance-based financing contributes to the resilience of health services affected by the Liberian Ebola outbreak

Setting: The Liberian counties of Bong, with performance-based financing (PBF) for all 36 public primary-care facilities, and Margibi, with no PBF for its 24 public primary-care facilities. Objective: To compare whether specific maternal and child health indicators changed in the two counties during the pre-Ebola (2013), Ebola (2014) and post-Ebola (2015) disease outbreak periods from July to September each year. Design: This was a cross-sectional study. Results: For pregnant women, the numbers of antenatal visits, intermittent preventive malaria treatments, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) tests and facility-based births with skilled attendants all fell during the Ebola period, with decreases being significantly more marked in Margibi County. Apart from HIV testing, which remained low in both counties, these indicators increased in the post-Ebola period, with increases significantly more marked in Bong than in Margibi. The number of childhood immunisations decreased significantly in Bong in the Ebola period compared with the pre-Ebola period, but increased to above pre-Ebola levels in the post-Ebola period. There were markedly larger decreases in childhood immunisations in Margibi County during the Ebola period, which remained significantly lower in the post-Ebola period compared with Bong County. Conclusion: In a PBF-supported county, selected maternal and childhood health indicators showed less deterioration during Ebola and better recovery post-Ebola than in a non-PBF-supported county.

Payment methods for outpatient care facilities

BACKGROUND

Outpatient care facilities provide a variety of basic healthcare services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation, and are usually the patient's first contact. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status, and a large portion of total health expenditure goes to outpatient healthcare services. Payment method is one of the most important incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpatient care providers.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods on the performance of outpatient care facilities and to analyse the differences in impact of payment methods in different settings.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), 2016, Issue 3, part of the Cochrane Library (searched 8 March 2016); MEDLINE, OvidSP (searched 8 March 2016); Embase, OvidSP (searched 24 April 2014); PubMed (NCBI) (searched 8 March 2016); Dissertations and Theses Database, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); Conference Proceedings Citation Index (ISI Web of Science) (searched 8 March 2016); IDEAS (searched 8 March 2016); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); POPLINE, K4Health (searched 8 March 2016); China National Knowledge Infrastructure (searched 8 March 2016); Chinese Medicine Premier (searched 8 March 2016); OpenGrey (searched 8 March 2016); ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (searched 8 March 2016); World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) (searched 8 March 2016); and the website of the World Bank (searched 8 March 2016).In addition, we searched the reference lists of included studies and carried out a citation search for the included studies via ISI Web of Science to find other potentially relevant studies. We also contacted authors of the main included studies regarding any further published or unpublished work.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for outpatient health facilities. We defined outpatient care facilities in this review as facilities that provide health services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation. We only included methods used to transfer funds from the purchaser of healthcare services to health facilities (including groups of individual professionals). These include global budgets, line-item budgets, capitation, fee-for-service (fixed and unconstrained), pay for performance, and mixed payment. The primary outcomes were service provision outcomes, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, costs for providers, and any adverse effects.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

At least two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the comparisons and outcomes and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different categories of outcomes. We used a fixed-effect model for meta-analysis within a study if a study included more than one indicator in the same category of outcomes. We used a random-effects model for meta-analysis across studies. If the data for meta-analysis were not available in some studies, we calculated the median and interquartile range. We reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative change for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 21 studies from Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States of health facilities providing primary health care and mental health care. There were three kinds of payment comparisons. 1) Pay for performance (P4P) combined with some existing payment method (capitation or different kinds of input-based payment) compared to the existing payment methodWe included 18 studies in this comparison, however we did not include five studies in the effects analysis due to high risk of bias. From the 13 studies, we found that the extra P4P incentives probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treatments (adjusted RR median = 1.095, range 1.01 to 1.17; moderate-certainty evidence), and probably led to little or no difference in adherence to quality assurance criteria (adjusted percentage change median = -1.345%, range -8.49% to 5.8%; moderate-certainty evidence). We also found that P4P incentives may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services (adjusted RR median = 1.01, range 0.96 to 1.15; low-certainty evidence) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol (adjusted RR = 1.01, range 0.98 to 1.04; low-certainty evidence). 2) Capitation combined with P4P compared to fee-for-service (FFS)One study found that compared with FFS, a capitated budget combined with payment based on providers' performance on antibiotic prescriptions and patient satisfaction probably slightly reduced antibiotic prescriptions in primary health facilities (adjusted RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.96; moderate-certainty evidence). 3) Capitation compared to FFSTwo studies compared capitation to FFS in mental health centres in the United States. Based on these studies, the effects of capitation compared to FFS on the utilisation and costs of services were uncertain (very low-certainty evidence).

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Our review found that if policymakers intend to apply P4P incentives to pay health facilities providing outpatient services, this intervention will probably lead to a slight improvement in health professionals' use of tests or treatments, particularly for chronic diseases. However, it may lead to little or no improvement in patients' utilisation of health services or health outcomes. When considering using P4P to improve the performance of health facilities, policymakers should carefully consider each component of their P4P design, including the choice of performance measures, the performance target, payment frequency, if there will be additional funding, whether the payment level is sufficient to change the behaviours of health providers, and whether the payment to facilities will be allocated to individual professionals. Unfortunately, the studies included in this review did not help to inform those considerations.Well-designed comparisons of different payment methods for outpatient health facilities in low- and middle-income countries and studies directly comparing different designs (e.g. different payment levels) of the same payment method (e.g. P4P or FFS) are needed.

Implementation research to improve quality of maternal and newborn health care, Malawi

Objective

To evaluate the impact of a performance-based financing scheme on maternal and neonatal health service quality in Malawi.

Methods

We conducted a non-randomized controlled before and after study to evaluate the effects of district- and facility-level performance incentives for health workers and management teams. We assessed changes in the facilities’ essential drug stocks, equipment maintenance and clinical obstetric care processes. Difference-in-difference regression models were used to analyse effects of the scheme on adherence to obstetric care treatment protocols and provision of essential drugs, supplies and equipment.

Findings

We observed 33 health facilities, 23 intervention facilities and 10 control facilities and 401 pregnant women across four districts. The scheme improved the availability of both functional equipment and essential drug stocks in the intervention facilities. We observed positive effects in respect to drug procurement and clinical care activities at non-intervention facilities, likely in response to improved district management performance. Birth assistants’ adherence to clinical protocols improved across all studied facilities as district health managers supervised and coached clinical staff more actively.

Conclusion

Despite nation-wide stock-outs and extreme health worker shortages, facilities in the study districts managed to improve maternal and neonatal health service quality by overcoming bottlenecks related to supply procurement, equipment maintenance and clinical performance. To strengthen and reform health management structures, performance-based financing may be a promising approach to sustainable improvements in quality of health care.