Lack of evidence for associative learning in pea plants

Extending cognition: a vegetal rejoinder to extensionless thought and to extended cognition

In this paper, we propose a crucial supplement to the framework of plant cognition, namely extending cognition. We argue that plants and other organisms with an open-ended body plan actively extend their cognition when growing tissues or organs. Their cognition expands with their body expansion. After considering the defining features of extending cognition, we present a model where growth, along with aspects of plant physiology (e.g. biochemical exudates), as well as the "negative extension" of growing away from obstacles or stressful environments, are the building blocks for a more refined understanding of plant cognition. We conclude by outlining the general implications of the theory of extending cognition and indicating directions for future research.

The "plant neurobiology" revolution

The 21st-century "plant neurobiology" movement is an amalgam of scholars interested in how "neural processes", broadly defined, lead to changes in plant behavior. Integral to the movement (now called plant behavioral biology) is a triad of historically marginalized subdisciplines, namely plant ethology, whole plant electrophysiology and plant comparative psychology, that set plant neurobiology apart from the mainstream. A central tenet held by these "triad disciplines" is that plants are exquisitely sensitive to environmental perturbations and that destructive experimental manipulations rapidly and profoundly affect plant function. Since destructive measurements have been the norm in plant physiology, much of our "textbook knowledge" concerning plant physiology is unrelated to normal plant function. As such, scientists in the triad disciplines favor a more natural and holistic approach toward understanding plant function. By examining the history, philosophy, sociology and psychology of the triad disciplines, this paper refutes in eight ways the criticism that plant neurobiology presents nothing new, and that the topics of plant neurobiology fall squarely under the purview of mainstream plant physiology. It is argued that although the triad disciplines and mainstream plant physiology share the common goal of understanding plant function, they are distinct in having their own intellectual histories and epistemologies.

A case study of learning in plants: Lessons learned from pea plants

To facilitate the study of learning in plants, we share our experiences of trying to replicate the pea plant experiment of Gagliano et al. In the course of our efforts, we identified 11 issues that must be addressed when attempting to replicate these experiments. The issues range from germination and transplantation of seedlings to experimental design and apparatus issues. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these hurdles.

The creativity of cells: aneural irrational cognition

Evidence of cognition in aneural cells is well-establish in the literature. This paper extends the exploration of the mechanisms of cognition by considering whether or not aneural cells may be capable of irrational cognition, making associations based on coincidental similarities and circumstantial factors. If aneural cells do harness such semiosic qualities, as with higher-level creativity, this might be how they are able to overcome old algorithms and invent tools for new situations. I will look at three examples of irrational learning in aneural systems in terms of semiotics: (1) generalisation in the immune system, based on viral molecular mimicry, whereby immune cells attack the self, which seems to be an overgeneralisation of an icon sign based on mere similarity, not identity, (2) the classical conditioning of pea plants to trope toward wind as a sign of light, which seems to be an association of an index sign based on mere temporal proximity, and (3) a pharmaceutical intervention to prevent pregnancy, using a conjugate to encrypt self with non-self, which seems to be an example of symbol use. We identify irrational cognition easily when it leads to 'wrong' outcomes, but, if it occurs, it may also lead to favourable outcomes and 'creative' solutions.

Learning in Cnidaria: a summary

Based on a systematic literature search, I recently reviewed learning in the phylum Cnidaria, animals possessing a nerve net as a nervous system but no centralized brain. I found abundant evidence of non-associative learning, both habituation and sensitization, but only sparse evidence of associative learning. Only one well-controlled study on classical conditioning in sea anemones provided firm evidence, and no studies firmly supported operant conditioning in Cnidaria, although several provided suggestive evidence. More research on associative learning in this phylum is needed.

Understanding interdisciplinary perspectives of plant intelligence: Is it a matter of science, language, or subjectivity?

BACKGROUND

Evidence suggests that plants can behave intelligently by exhibiting the ability to learn, make associations between environmental cues, engage in complex decisions about resource acquisition, memorize, and adapt in flexible ways. However, plant intelligence is a disputed concept in the scientific community. Reasons for lack of consensus can be traced back to the history of Western philosophy, interpretation of terminology, and due to plants lacking neurons and a central nervous system. Plant intelligence thus constitutes a novel paradigm in the plant sciences. Therefore, the perspectives of scientists in plant-related disciplines need to be investigated in order to gain insight into the current state and future development of this concept.

METHODS

This study analyzed opinions of plant intelligence held by scientists from different plant-related disciplines, including ethnobiology and other biological sciences, through an online questionnaire.

RESULTS

Our findings show that respondents' personal belief systems and the frequency of taking into account other types of knowledge, such as traditional knowledge, in their own field(s) of study, were associated with their opinions of plant intelligence. Meanwhile, respondents' professional expertise, background (discipline), or familiarity with evidence provided on plant intelligence did not affect their opinions.

CONCLUSIONS

This study emphasizes the influential role of scientists' own subjective beliefs. In response, two approaches could facilitate transdisciplinary understanding among scientists: (1) effective communication designed to foster change in agreement based on presented information; and (2) holding space for an interdisciplinary dialogue where scientists can express their own subjectivities and open new opportunities for collaboration.

Neuroecology beyond the brain: learning in Echinodermata

We propose an expansion of neuroecological comparisons to include the capabilities of brainless and non-neural organisms. We begin this enterprise by conducting a systematic search for studies on learning in echinoderms. Echinodermata are marine invertebrates comprising starfish, brittle stars, sea cucumbers, sea urchins, and sea lilies. Animals in this phylum lack any centralized brain and instead possess diffuse neural networks known as nerve nets. The learning abilities of these animals are of particular interest as, within the bilaterian clade, they are close evolutionary neighbors to chordates, a phylum whose members exhibit complex feats in learning and contain highly specialized brains. The learning capacities and limitations of echinoderms can inform the evolution of nervous systems and learning in Bilateria. We find evidence of both non-associative and associative learning (in the form of classical conditioning) in echinoderms, which was primarily focused on starfish. Additional evidence of learning is documented in brittle stars, sand dollars, and sea urchins. We then discuss the evolutionary significance of learning capabilities without a brain, the presence of embodied cognition across multiple groups, and compare the learning present in echinoderms with the impressive cognitive abilities documented in the oldest linage group within vertebrates (the major group within the phylum of chordates), fish.

Our sisters the plants? notes from phylogenetics and botany on plant kinship blindness

Before the upheaval brought about by phylogenetic classification, classical taxonomy separated living beings into two distinct kingdoms, animals and plants. Rooted in 'naturalist' cosmology, Western science has built its theoretical apparatus on this dichotomy mostly based on ancient Aristotelian ideas. Nowadays, despite the adoption of the Darwinian paradigm that unifies living organisms as a kinship, the concept of the "scale of beings" continues to structure our analysis and understanding of living species. Our aim is to combine developments in phylogeny, recent advances in biology, and renewed interest in plant agency to craft an interdisciplinary stance on the living realm. The lines at the origin of plant or animal have a common evolutionary history dating back to about 3.9 Ga, separating only 1.6 Ga ago. From a phylogenetic perspective of living species history, plants and animals belong to sister groups. With recent data related to the field of Plant Neurobiology, our aim is to discuss some socio-cultural obstacles, mainly in Western naturalist epistemology, that have prevented the integration of living organisms as relatives, while suggesting a few avenues inspired by practices principally from other ontologies that could help overcome these obstacles and build bridges between different ways of connecting to life.

Consciousness and cognition in plants

Unlike animal behavior, behavior in plants is traditionally assumed to be completely determined either genetically or environmentally. Under this assumption, plants are usually considered to be noncognitive organisms. This view nonetheless clashes with a growing body of empirical research that shows that many sophisticated cognitive capabilities traditionally assumed to be exclusive to animals are exhibited by plants too. Yet, if plants can be considered cognitive, even in a minimal sense, can they also be considered conscious? Some authors defend that the quest for plant consciousness is worth pursuing, under the premise that sentience can play a role in facilitating plant's sophisticated behavior. The goal of this article is not to provide a positive argument for plant cognition and consciousness, but to invite a constructive, empirically informed debate about it. After reviewing the empirical literature concerning plant cognition, we introduce the reader to the emerging field of plant neurobiology. Research on plant electrical and chemical signaling can help shed light into the biological bases for plant sentience. To conclude, we shall present a series of approaches to scientifically investigate plant consciousness. In sum, we invite the reader to consider the idea that if consciousness boils down to some form of biological adaptation, we should not exclude a priori the possibility that plants have evolved their own phenomenal experience of the world. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Philosophy > Consciousness Neuroscience > Cognition.

Reconsidering the evidence for learning in single cells

The question of whether single cells can learn led to much debate in the early 20th century. The view prevailed that they were capable of non-associative learning but not of associative learning, such as Pavlovian conditioning. Experiments indicating the contrary were considered either non-reproducible or subject to more acceptable interpretations. Recent developments suggest that the time is right to reconsider this consensus. We exhume the experiments of Beatrice Gelber on Pavlovian conditioning in the ciliate Paramecium aurelia, and suggest that criticisms of her findings can now be reinterpreted. Gelber was a remarkable scientist whose absence from the historical record testifies to the prevailing orthodoxy that single cells cannot learn. Her work, and more recent studies, suggest that such learning may be evolutionarily more widespread and fundamental to life than previously thought and we discuss the implications for different aspects of biology.

Response to comment on 'Lack of evidence for associative learning in pea plants'

In 2016 Gagliano et al. reported evidence for associative learning in plants (Gagliano et al., 2016). A subsequent attempt to replicate this finding by the present author was not successful (Markel, 2020). Gagliano et al. attribute this lack of replication to differences in the experimental set-ups used in the original work and the replication attempt (Gagliano et al., 2020). Here, based on a comparison of the two set-ups, I argue that these differences are unable to explain the lack of replication in Markel, 2020.

Comment on 'Lack of evidence for associative learning in pea plants'

In 2016 we reported evidence for associative learning in plants (Gagliano et al., 2016). In view of the far-reaching implications of this finding we welcome the attempt made by Markel to replicate our study (Markel, 2020). However, as we discuss here, the protocol employed by Markel was unsuitable for testing for associative learning.