Progress with the regulation of radiation safety during recovery and removal of spent nuclear fuel from the site for temporary storage at Andreeva Bay on the Kola Peninsula

In the 1960s, a shore technical base (STB) was established at Andreeva Bay on the Kola Peninsula, in northwest Russia. The STB maintained nuclear submarines and the nuclear icebreaker fleet, receiving and storing fresh and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) as well as solid and liquid radioactive waste (RW). It was subsequently re-designated as a site for temporary storage (STS) for SNF and RW. Over time, the SNF storage facilities partly lost their containment functions, leading to radioactive contamination of workshops and the site above permitted values. The technological and engineering infrastructure at the site was also significantly degraded as well as the condition of the stored SNF. At present, the STS Andreeva Bay facility is under decommissioning. This paper describes progress with the creation of safe working measures for workers involved in site remediation and SNF recovery operations, including the determination of safe shift times in high radiation areas, as part of overall optimization of safety. Results are presented for the successful application of these measures in the period 2019-2021, during which time significant SNF recovery and removal operations were completed without incident. Significant important experience has been gained to support safe removal of remaining SNF, including the most hazardous degraded fuel, as well as recovery of other higher level RW and decommissioning of the old storage buildings and structures.

Radiation situation dynamics at the Andreeva Bay site for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste over the period 2002-2016

The Coastal Technical Base (CTB) №569 at Andreeva Bay was established in the early 1960s and intended for the refueling of nuclear submarine reactors and temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (RW). In 2001, the base was transferred to the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy and the site remediation began. The paper describes in detail the radiation situation change at the technical site in Andreeva Bay from 2002-2016, the period of preparation for the most critical phase of remedial work: removal of spent fuel assemblies. The analysis of aggregated indicators and data mining were used. The article suggests the best number and location of checkpoints needed to ensure sufficient accuracy of the radiation situation description. The fractal properties of the radiation field are studied using the Hurst index. The relationship between checkpoints was assessed using the method of searching for checkpoint communities. The decrease in the integral of the ambient dose equivalent rate (ADER) at the technical site was evaluated by the method of time series decomposition. Three components of time series were identified: trend, seasonal and residual. The trend of the ADER integral over the technical site is a monotonic decreasing function, where the initial and final values differ tenfold. Taking into account that ¹³⁷Cs dominates the radiation situation on-site, it is clear that the ADER due to the radionuclide decay will have decreased by 1.4 times. It is estimated that only a small proportion of ¹³⁷Cs has migrated off-site. Therefore, approximately a sevenfold decrease in dose rate is mainly due to remediation activities of personnel. During the year, the seasonal component varies the ADER integral by a factor of two, due to snowfall. The residual component reflects the uncertainty of the ADER integral calculation and phases of active SNF and RW management. The methods developed are used to support the optimization of remediation work as well as regulatory supervision of occupational radiation protection.

Radiation safety during remediation of the SevRAO facilities: 10 years of regulatory experience

In compliance with the fundamentals of the government's policy in the field of nuclear and radiation safety approved by the President of the Russian Federation, Russia has developed a national program for decommissioning of its nuclear legacy. Under this program, the State Atomic Energy Corporation 'Rosatom' is carrying out remediation of a Site for Temporary Storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (RW) at Andreeva Bay located in Northwest Russia. The short term plan includes implementation of the most critical stage of remediation, which involves the recovery of SNF from what have historically been poorly maintained storage facilities. SNF and RW are stored in non-standard conditions in tanks designed in some cases for other purposes. It is planned to transport recovered SNF to PA 'Mayak' in the southern Urals. This article analyses the current state of the radiation safety supervision of workers and the public in terms of the regulatory preparedness to implement effective supervision of radiation safety during radiation-hazardous operations. It presents the results of long-term radiation monitoring, which serve as informative indicators of the effectiveness of the site remediation and describes the evolving radiation situation. The state of radiation protection and health care service support for emergency preparedness is characterized by the need to further study the issues of the regulator-operator interactions to prevent and mitigate consequences of a radiological accident at the facility. Having in mind the continuing intensification of practical management activities related to SNF and RW in the whole of northwest Russia, it is reasonable to coordinate the activities of the supervision bodies within a strategic master plan. Arrangements for this master plan are discussed, including a proposed programme of actions to enhance the regulatory supervision in order to support accelerated mitigation of threats related to the nuclear legacy in the area.

3D simulation as a tool for improving the safety culture during remediation work at Andreeva Bay

Andreeva Bay in northwest Russia hosts one of the former coastal technical bases of the Northern Fleet. Currently, this base is designated as the Andreeva Bay branch of Northwest Center for Radioactive Waste Management (SevRAO) and is a site of temporary storage (STS) for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other radiological waste generated during the operation and decommissioning of nuclear submarines and ships. According to an integrated expert evaluation, this site is the most dangerous nuclear facility in northwest Russia. Environmental rehabilitation of the site is currently in progress and is supported by strong international collaboration. This paper describes how the optimization principle (ALARA) has been adopted during the planning of remediation work at the Andreeva Bay STS and how Russian-Norwegian collaboration greatly contributed to ensuring the development and maintenance of a high level safety culture during this process. More specifically, this paper describes how integration of a system, specifically designed for improving the radiological safety of workers during the remediation work at Andreeva Bay, was developed in Russia. It also outlines the 3D radiological simulation and virtual reality based systems developed in Norway that have greatly facilitated effective implementation of the ALARA principle, through supporting radiological characterisation, work planning and optimization, decision making, communication between teams and with the authorities and training of field operators.

Catalytic activity of gold nanoparticles incorporated into modified zeolites

Gold catalysts modified by Fe and Ni and supported on different zeolite matrixes have been studied by TEM, TPR, and catalytic testing. The presence of a metal oxide additive allows stabilizing small gold particles, particularly in the case of Fe. The shape of light-off curves shows two temperature regions of the catalyst activity, a low-temperature range below 250 degrees C and a high-temperature range above 300 degrees C. This situation is explained considering the existence of at least two types of catalytically active sites of gold assigned to gold clusters and gold nanoparticles, respectively, while the ionic state of gold (Au3+) remains inactive. It is shown that interaction of gold with Fe promoter leads to activation of catalysts at low temperature due to a change of electronic state and redox properties of gold. NiO additive cause a similar, but less pronounced effect.