Eleven strategies for making reproducible research and open science training the norm at research institutions

Reproducible research and open science practices have the potential to accelerate scientific progress by allowing others to reuse research outputs, and by promoting rigorous research that is more likely to yield trustworthy results. However, these practices are uncommon in many fields, so there is a clear need for training that helps and encourages researchers to integrate reproducible research and open science practices into their daily work. Here, we outline eleven strategies for making training in these practices the norm at research institutions. The strategies, which emerged from a virtual brainstorming event organized in collaboration with the German Reproducibility Network, are concentrated in three areas: (i) adapting research assessment criteria and program requirements; (ii) training; (iii) building communities. We provide a brief overview of each strategy, offer tips for implementation, and provide links to resources. We also highlight the importance of allocating resources and monitoring impact. Our goal is to encourage researchers - in their roles as scientists, supervisors, mentors, instructors, and members of curriculum, hiring or evaluation committees - to think creatively about the many ways they can promote reproducible research and open science practices in their institutions.

On the interdependence of post-error control and memory

Post-error cognitive control processes are evident in post-error slowing (PES) and post-error increased accuracy (PIA). A recent theory (Wessel, 2018) proposes that post-error control disrupts not only ongoing motor activity but also current task-set representations, suggesting an interdependence of post-error control and memory. In 2 experiments, we directly tested this interdependence using response repeat/switch targets. As participants' memory of the previously-given response determined their next response, we predicted that participants would not show post-error performance improvements, or may even exhibit decrements (memory obstruction hypothesis). In line with a weak version of the memory obstruction hypothesis, participants' performance did not improve post-error regardless of preparation time across several measures (intertrial interval 500 ms-3000 ms). This could not alternatively be explained by a lack in post-error processing or error awareness. Thus, our results suggest an interdependence of memory and cognitive control in post-error processing, and we offer a novel way of directly assessing this interdependence using response repeat/switch targets. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Learning to expect and monitor the future: How fast do anticipatory saccades toward future action consequences emerge?

When an action contingently yields the same effect, we form bidirectional action-effect associations that allow us to anticipate the effects of our actions. Importantly, our eyes already move toward the expected future location of our actions' effects in anticipation of them, that is, we perform anticipatory saccades. These anticipatory saccades are linked to a proactive effect-monitoring process that prepares the comparison of expected and actual effect. However, how fast such anticipatory saccades emerge (i.e., how fast learning leads to monitoring) is unknown. To address this question, correct left/right responses were followed by a visual effect either on the same side (response-effect compatible) or on the opposite side (response-effect incompatible). In Experiment 1, action-effect compatibility switched after sequences of four, eight, or 12 trials (randomly allocated; partly predictable environment). In Experiment 2, random trials (two to seven) separated sequences of three, five, or seven experimental trials. Again, action-effect compatibility switched after a sequence of trials and sequences were randomly allocated (unpredictable environment). In both experiments, participants started to perform anticipatory saccades toward future effects after experiencing a new action-effect mapping once/twice (response-effect compatible/incompatible). That is, a single to two action-effect (re-)learning instances were sufficient to develop action-effect associations that trigger attentional shifts toward the expected future consequences of our actions (i.e., monitoring processes), whereas influences on action selection are only observed after a substantially larger number of (re-)learning instances. These results suggest that monitoring processes modulate the expression of action-effect associations in action planning based on observed action-effect contingencies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Only time will tell the future: Anticipatory saccades reveal the temporal dynamics of time-based location and task expectancy

Humans form associations between time intervals and subsequent events and thus develop time-based expectancies that enable time-based action preparation. For instance, when each of two foreperiods (short vs. long) is frequently paired with one specific task (e.g., number magnitude judgment vs. number parity judgment) and infrequently with the alternative task, participants are faster to respond to frequent rather than infrequent foreperiod-task combinations. Here, we investigated the time course of time-based task expectancy by measuring eye movements toward a left and right target location. Foreperiods predicted target locations with 100% validity and tasks with 90% validity. In 2 experiments, without having any explicit knowledge about the foreperiod-location or foreperiod-task contingencies, participants first moved their eyes to the location associated with the short foreperiod and then looked toward the location of the long foreperiod (if no stimulus had been presented after the short foreperiod had passed). That is, they proactively moved their eyes to optimize perception in line with the specific time and location they expected an event to occur at. Importantly, these eye movements reflected not only time-based location expectations, but also time-based task expectations. We discuss new insights in time-based expectancy and its temporal dynamics obtained from anticipatory eye movements and highlight spontaneous eye movements as a window into cognitive processes that cannot be assessed via behavioral response measures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Memories of control: One-shot episodic learning of item-specific stimulus-control associations

The repeated pairing of a particular stimulus with a specific cognitive control process, such as task switching, can bind the two together in memory, resulting in the formation of stimulus-control associations. These bindings are thought to guide the context-sensitive application of cognitive control, but it is not presently known whether such stimulus-control associations are only acquired through slow, incremental learning or could also be mediated by episodic memories of a single experience, so-called one-shot learning. Here, we tested this episodic control-binding hypothesis by probing whether a single co-occurrence of a stimulus and the control process of task switching would lead to significant performance benefits (reduced task switch cost) when that stimulus later re-occurred under the same as opposed to different control demands. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that item-specific stimulus-control associations can be formed based on a single exposure, providing the first strong evidence for episodic memory guidance of cognitive control.

Execution-based and verbal code-based stimulus-response associations: proportion manipulations reveal conflict adaptation processes in item-specific priming

Stimulus-response (S-R) associations consist of two independent components: Stimulus-classification (S-C) and stimulus-action (S-A) associations. Here, we examined whether these S-C and S-A associations were modulated by cognitive control operations. In two item-specific priming experiments, we systematically manipulated the proportion of trials in which item-specific S-C and/or S-A mappings repeated or switched between the single encoding (prime) and single retrieval (probe) instance of each stimulus (i.e., each stimulus appeared only twice). Thus, we assessed the influence of a list-level proportion switch manipulation on the strength of item-specific S-C and S-A associations. Participants responded slower and committed more errors when item-specific S-C or S-A mappings switched rather than repeated between prime and probe (i.e., S-C/S-A switch effects). S-C switch effects were larger when S-C repetitions rather than switches were frequent on the list-level. Similarly, S-A switch effects were modulated by S-A switch proportion. Most importantly, our findings rule out contingency learning and temporal learning as explanations of the observed results and point towards a conflict adaptation mechanism that selectively adapts the encoding and/or retrieval for each S-R component. Finally, we outline how cognitive control over S-R associations operates in the context of item-specific priming.

The power of words: On item-specific stimulus-response associations formed in the absence of action

Research on stimulus-response (S-R) associations as the basis of behavioral automaticity has a long history. Traditionally, it was assumed that S-R associations are formed as a consequence of the (repeated) co-occurrence of stimulus and response, that is, when participants act upon stimuli. Here, we demonstrate that S-R associations can also be established in the absence of action. In an item-specific priming paradigm, participants either classified everyday objects by performing a left or right key press (task-set execution) or they were verbally presented with information regarding an object's class and associated action while they passively viewed the object (verbal coding). Both S-R associations created by task-set execution and by verbal coding led to the later retrieval of both the stimulus-action component and the stimulus-classification component of S-R associations. Furthermore, our data indicate that both associations created by execution and by verbal coding are temporally stable and rather resilient against overwriting. The automaticity of S-R associations formed in the absence of action reveals the striking adaptability of human action control. (PsycINFO Database Record

A look into the future: Spontaneous anticipatory saccades reflect processes of anticipatory action control

According to ideomotor theory, human action control uses anticipations of one's own actions' future consequences, that is, action effect anticipations, as a means of triggering actions that will produce desired outcomes (e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Using the response-effect compatibility paradigm (Kunde, 2001), we demonstrate that the anticipation of one's own manual actions' future consequences not only triggers appropriate (i.e., instructed) actions, but simultaneously induces spontaneous (uninstructed) anticipatory saccades to the location of future action consequences. In contrast to behavioral response-effect compatibility effects that have been linked to processes of action selection and action planning, our results suggest that these anticipatory saccades serve the function of outcome evaluation, that is, the comparison of expected/intended and observed action outcomes. Overall, our results demonstrate the informational value of additionally analyzing uninstructed behavioral components complementary to instructed responses and allow us to specify essential mechanisms of the complex interplay between the manual and oculomotor control system in goal-directed action control. (PsycINFO Database Record