Strategic thinking in the shadow of self-enhancement: Benefits and costs

Using a variant of the hide-and-seek game, we show in three studies that self-enhancement can help or hinder strategic thinking. In this guessing game, one player chooses a number while another player tries to guess it. Each player does this either in a random fashion (throwing a mental die) or by active thinking. The structure of the game implies that guessers benefit from thinking about a number, whereas choosers are disadvantaged. Yet, regardless of their role, respondents prefer to actively think about a number. For choosers, the belief they can outthink the opponent amounts to self-enhancement, whereas for guessers, the same belief can be rationally justified. We discuss the implications of the findings for theories of strategic cognition and applications to real-world contexts.

Measuring Intellectual Curiosity across Cultures: Validity and Comparability of a New Scale in Six Languages

Intellectual curiosity-the tendency to seek out and engage in opportunities for effortful cognitive activity-is a crucial construct in educational research and beyond. Measures of intellectual curiosity vary widely in psychometric quality, and few measures have demonstrated validity and comparability of scores across multiple languages. We analyzed a novel, six-item intellectual curiosity scale (ICS) originally developed for cross-national comparisons in the context of the OECD's Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). Samples from six countries representing six national languages (U.S. Germany, France, Spain, Poland, and Japan; total N = 5,557) confirmed that the ICS possesses very good psychometric properties. The scale is essentially unidimensional and showed excellent reliability estimates. On top of factorial validity, the scale demonstrated strict measurement invariance across demographic segments (gender, age groups, and educational strata) and at least partial scalar invariance across countries. As per its convergent and divergent associations with a broad range of constructs (e.g., Open-Mindedness and other Big Five traits, Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, Job Orientations, and Vocational Interests), it also showed convincing construct validity. Given its internal and external relationships, we recommend the ICS for assessing intellectual curiosity, especially in cross-cultural research applications, yet we also point out future research areas.

Peace in other primates

We elaborate on Glowacki's claim that humans are more capable of establishing peace than other mammals. We present three aspects suggesting caution. First, the social capabilities of nonhuman primates should not be underestimated. Second, the effect of these capabilities on peace establishment is nonmonotonous. Third, defining peace by human-centered values introduces a fallacy.

Similarity and the coordination of ownership

We discuss and expand Boyer's idea of ownership coordination. Interpersonal similarity, we suggest, can moderate the attainment of coordination: Perceived similarity predicts coordination costs, whereas actual similarity dictates coordination success and the severity of illusory assumptions regarding a shared understanding of ownership. The example of similarity highlights the complexity of the social projection process uncritically assumed behind ownership coordination.

Advanced testing of the LoT hypothesis by social reasoning

I elaborate on Quilty-Dunn et al.'s integration of the language-of-thought hypothesis in social reasoning by outlining two discrepancies between the experimental paradigms referred to by the authors and the social world: Self-referential projection and deliberate thinking in experiments. Robust tests of the hypothesis in social reasoning should include observational, natural, and cross-cultural approaches.

More than two intuitions

We consider an underdeveloped feature of De Neys's model. Decisions with multiple intuitions per option are neither trivial to explain nor rare. These decision scenarios are crucial for an assessment of the model's generalizability and adequacy. Besides monitoring absolute differences in intuition strength, the mind might add the strengths of intuitions per choice option, leading to competing and testable hypotheses.

Measuring Six Facets of Curiosity in Germany and the UK: A German-Language Adaptation of the 5DCR and Its Comparability with the English-Language Source Version

The five-dimensional curiosity-scale revised (5DCR) by Kashdan et al. (2020) is the most comprehensive curiosity inventory available to date. 5DCR measures six facets of curiosity with four items each. Here, we present a German-language adaptation of the 5DCR and comprehensively validate this adaptation in a diverse sample of adults from Germany (N = 486). Moreover, we provide new evidence on the original English-language 5DCR in a parallel sample from the UK (N = 483). In both countries, we investigate the six facets' reliability, factorial validity, and convergent and discriminant validity with a large set of individual-differences constructs. In addition, we analyze the measurement invariance of the curiosity facets across the UK and Germany and across socio-demographic subgroups defined by age, sex, and education. Findings demonstrate that the new German-language adaptation of 5DCR and its English-language source version show psychometric properties similar to the original studies by Kashdan et al. (2020) in the United States. All six curiosity facets reach at least partial scalar invariance across cultures, sex, education, and mostly also across age groups. The findings support the six-faceted theory of curiosity and show that 5DCR allows for a valid assessment of curiosity across cultures.

Directing smartphone use through the self-nudge app one sec

Research suggests various associations of smartphone use with a range of physical, psychological, and performance dimensions. Here, we test one sec, a self-nudging app that is installed by the user in order to reduce the mindless use of selected target apps on the smartphone. When users attempt to open a target app of their choice, one sec interferes with a pop-up, which combines a deliberation message, friction by a short waiting time, and the option to dismiss opening the target app. In a field-experiment, we collected behavioral user data from 280 participants over 6 wk, and conducted two surveys before and after the intervention span. one sec reduced the usage of target apps in two ways. First, on average 36% of the times participants attempted opening a target app, they closed that app again after one sec interfered. Second, over the course of 6 wk, users attempted to open target apps 37% less than in the first week. In sum, one sec decreased users' actual opening of target apps by 57% after six consecutive weeks. Afterward, participants also reported spending less time with their apps and indicated increased satisfaction with their consumption. To disentangle one sec's effects, we tested its three psychological features in a preregistered online experiment (N = 500) that measured the consumption of real and viral social media video clips. We found that providing the additional option to dismiss the consumption attempt had the strongest effect. While the friction by time delay also reduced consumption instances, the deliberation message was not effective.

Measuring Growth Mindset

Abstract. A growth mindset is a belief that personal characteristics, specifically intellectual ability, are malleable and can be developed by investing time and effort. Numerous studies have investigated the associations between a growth mindset and academic achievement, and large intervention programs have been established to train adolescents to develop a stronger growth mindset. However, methodological research on the adequacy of the measures used to assess a growth mindset is scarce. In our study, we conducted one of the first comprehensive assessments of the psychometric properties of Dweck’s widely used three-item Growth Mindset Scale in two samples (adolescents aged 14–19 years and adults aged 20–64 years). We test the comparability (i.e., measurement invariance) of the scale across these age groups. Furthermore, using the same two samples, we identified and validated a single-item measure to assess growth mindset in settings with severe time constraints. Results reveal that both the three-item and the single-item scales have acceptable psychometric properties regarding reliability, comparability, and validity. However, the results did not support some of the central tenets of mindset theory, such as that a growth mindset is positively linked to goal regulation and achievement, calling for future research on the criterion validity of a growth mindset.

Emotional Campaigning in Politics: Being Moved and Anger in Political Ads Motivate to Support Candidate and Party

Political advertising to recruit the support of voters is an inherent part of politics. Today, ads are distributed via television and online, including social media. This type of advertisement attempts to recruit support by presenting convincing arguments and evoking various emotions about the candidate, opponents, and policy proposals. We discuss recent arguments and evidence that a specific social emotion, namely the concept kama muta, plays a role in political advertisements. In vernacular language, kama muta is typically labeled as being moved or touched. We compare kama muta and anger theoretically and discuss how they can influence voters’ willingness to support a candidate. We then, for the first time, compare kama muta and anger empirically in the same study. Specifically, we showed American participants short political ads during the 2018 United States midterm election campaigns. All participants saw both kama muta- and anger-evoking ads from both Democratic or Republican candidates. In total, everybody watched eight ads. We assessed participants’ degree of being moved and angered by the videos and their motivation for three types of political support: ideational, financial, and personal. The emotional impact of an ad depended on its perceived source: Participants felt especially angry after watching the anger-evoking ads and especially moved by moving ads if they identified with the political party that had produced the video. Both emotions mediated were associated with increased intentions to provide support. Importantly, if one of the two emotions was evoked, its effect on political support was enhanced if participants identified with the party that had produced the ad. We discuss limitations of the method and implications of the results for future research and practice.

Too Good to be Liked? When and How Prosocial Others are Disliked

Outstandingly prosocial individuals may not always be valued and admired, but sometimes depreciated and rejected. While prior research has mainly focused on devaluation of highly competent or successful individuals, comparable research in the domain of prosociality is scarce. The present research suggests two mechanisms why devaluation of extreme prosocial individuals may occur: they may (a) constitute very high comparison standards for observers, and may (b) be perceived as communal narcissists. Two experiments test these assumptions. We confronted participants with an extreme prosocial or an ordinary control target and manipulated comparative aspects of the situation (salient vs. non-salient comparison, Experiment 1), and narcissistic aspects of the target (showing off vs. being modest, Experiment 2). Consistent with our assumptions, the extreme prosocial target was liked less than the control target, and even more so when the comparison situation was salient (Experiment 1), and when the target showed off with her good deeds (Experiment 2). Implications that prosociality does not always breed more liking are discussed.

A Social Psychological Toolbox for Clinical Psychology

Abstract. Translational science involves the fruitful interplay between basic research paradigms and related fields of application. One promising candidate for such synergy is the relationship between social and clinical psychology. Although the relation is principally bi-directional, such that either discipline can take the role of the basic and the applied science, we take the perspective of transfer from basic social and cognitive social psychology to applications in the clinical realm. Starting from a historical sketch of some of the earliest topics in the interface of both disciplines, we first come to conclude that truly integrative co-theorizing is conspicuously missing. Then, however, we recognize the strong potential for productive collaboration at the pragmatic level of an adaptive research toolbox containing approved methods and compact theoretical tools that carry over between disciplines. We outline the notion of a generic, provisional toolbox as distinguished from a fixed repertoire of established standard procedures. We provide examples of two subsets of tools, methods and logical principles required proper diagnostic reasoning, and theoretically founded influence tools that can enrich the repertoire of therapeutic interventions. Rather than propagating a normatively prescriptive toolbox, we interpret translational science as a pluralistic endeavor, such that different clinicians complete their personalized toolboxes in manifold ways.

Strategic Thinking: A Random Walk Into the Rabbit Hole

At its best, strategic thinking yields an advantage needed to beat an opponent. At the least, it protects the person from exploitation. In four studies, conducted in two countries, we used a simple number-guessing game, in which one respondent wins by guessing the number chosen by another. We show that people generate numbers nonrandomly, and, on the basis of this finding, we predict and find that nonrandom strategic choice is advantageous to the guesser if the chooser does not randomize either. As expected, respondents in the role of the guesser preferred to play a game in which they were to actively think of a number instead of randomizing if the chooser had to think of a number, too. Guessers did not prefer thinking if the chooser selected a number randomly. Having shown these limitations to strategic reasoning, we close with the observation that successful strategic reasoning may – at times – require the breaking of rules and being the first to do so.