The Gender Gaps in Time-Use Within Italian Households During 2002–2014

How are Italian parents sharing family duties when they are both working full-time? We estimate gender gaps in the allocation of time by young Italian couples with children and document their trends over the years 2002–2014, disentangling time use on weekdays and weekend days. We show that the gaps in time devoted to Market work and Household work have narrowed over the years 2002–2014, while the gap in Basic childcare and Leisure remained almost constant. But the negative gap (females-males) in Market work shrunk much more than the positive gap in Household work (46% against 25%) The best-case scenario for gender parity is the one in which partners share similar work responsibilities and are relatively young; however, we show that family duties remain heavily unbalanced across gender in this sample. In 2014, full-time working mothers devote to Total work (paid and unpaid) 11 h per week more and to Leisure 9.7 h per week less than their partners. On the positive side, the gender gap in Quality childcare exhibits a reversed sign, which is driven by fathers’ engagement on weekend days.

Research funding and price negotiation for new drugs

This paper analyzes the negotiation process, which leads to basic research funding and price setting for new drugs in regulated health insurance markets. Its results bring answers to the following questions: Should basic research be privately funded, publicly funded, or produced by an independent lab? Under which conditions is public integration of basic research efficient? How do pharmaceutical prices respond to different organizations of basic research? We show that efficiency and prices are higher when basic research is integrated in the firm that commercializes the drug as compared with independent basic research. In both organizations, the higher the negotiation power of the research labs relative to the one of the public health authority is, the higher the prices and the efficiency are. We thereby confirm the traditional trade-off between price containment and dynamic efficiency. We identify one important exception to this trade-off. Indeed, public integration of basic research can result in lowest prices and highest efficiency, as compared with the other possible organizations, in particular when basic and applied research are highly complementary.

Competition and screening with motivated health professionals

Two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue. The non-profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers. In equilibrium, when both hospitals are active, the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability-neutral. Allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar. The non-profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for-profit one.

Human health care and selection effects. Understanding labor supply in the market for nursing

The aim of this paper is to study (adverse) selection in a labor supply model where potential applicants are characterized by different vocational levels and skills. We look at how the composition of the pool of active workers changes as the wage rate increases. Contrary to what would expect, average productivity does not necessarily increase monotonically in the wage rate. We identify conditions in which a wage increase reduces the average productivity and/or average vocation of active workers. Our results help understand the potential impact of wage increases as a policy designed to resolving shortages in the labor market for nurses.

Price vs. quantity in health insurance reimbursement

While "integrated" systems regulate the quantity of health services, "Bismarckian" systems regulate their price. This paper compares the consumers' allocations implemented within the two reimbursement systems. In the model, illness has a negative impact on labor productivity while public insurance is financed through income tax. Consumers have private information with respect to a parameter which can be interpreted as heterogeneity either in intensity of their preferences for treatment or in the type of illness. The social planner may be constrained to adopt uniform insurance plans, or may be free to choose self selecting plans. The analysis of uniform plans shows that Bismarckian systems dominate integrated systems from the social welfare point of view; whereas the opposite ranking holds with self-selecting plans.