Cycles and circulation: a theme in the history of biology and medicine

We invite systematic consideration of the metaphors of cycles and circulation as a long-term theme in the history of the life and environmental sciences and medicine. Ubiquitous in ancient religious and philosophical traditions, especially in representing the seasons and the motions of celestial bodies, circles once symbolized perfection. Over the centuries cyclic images in western medicine, natural philosophy, natural history and eventually biology gained independence from cosmology and theology and came to depend less on strictly circular forms. As potent 'canonical icons', cycles also interacted with representations of linear and irreversible change, including arrows, arcs, scales, series and trees, as in theories of the Earth and of evolution. In modern times life cycles and reproductive cycles have often been held to characterize life, in some cases especially female life, while human efforts selectively to foster and disrupt these cycles have harnessed their productivity in medicine and agriculture. But strong cyclic metaphors have continued to link physiology and climatology, medicine and economics, and biology and manufacturing, notably through the relations between land, food and population. From the grand nineteenth-century transformations of matter to systems ecology, the circulation of molecules through organic and inorganic compartments has posed the problem of maintaining identity in the face of flux and highlights the seductive ability of cyclic schemes to imply closure where no original state was in fact restored. More concerted attention to cycles and circulation will enrich analyses of the power of metaphors to naturalize understandings of life and their shaping by practical interests and political imaginations.

Health in the Renaissance

In the Renaissance medicine was still based largely on the works of Galen, but increasingly the Galenic medical paradigm was tested and modified. This was in part the result of new findings in anatomy, in part the result of new reflection on the nature and sources of health. The humanists pointed to cultural and physical factors to account for the flourishing of the human person, though figures such as Cardano continued to work with the Galenic idea of the six non-naturals. Ficino, Francis Bacon, and others proposed that one could preserve health through a “medicine of the mind” that would be grounded partly in an understanding of the states of the body, in part on the mind’s influence on the body. Consideration was also given to defining just what it means to live a flourishing life.

Humans, elephants, diamonds and gold: patterns of intentional design in Girolamo Cardano's natural philosophy

Distancing himself from both Aristotelian and Epicurean models of natural change, and resisting delusions of anthropocentric grandeur, Cardano advanced a theory of teleology centred on the notion of non-human selfhood. In keeping with Plato, he argued that nature was ruled by the mind, meaning by "mind" a universal paragon of intelligibility instantiated through patterns of purposive action ("noetic" teleology). This allowed Cardano to defend a theory of natural finalism in which life was regarded as a primordial attribute of being, already in evidence in the most elementary forms of nature, whose main categories were ability to feign, self-interest, self-preservation and indefinite persistence.

Historia and materia: the philosophical implications of Francis Bacon's natural history

This article examines the philosophical implications underlying Bacon's views on historical knowledge, paying special attention to that variety of historical knowledge described by Bacon as "natural." More specifically, this article explores the interplay of history (historia) and fable (fabula). In the sphere of thought, fabula is the equivalent to materia in nature. Both are described by Bacon as being "versatile" and "pliant." In Bacon's system of knowledge, philosophy, as the domain of reason, starts from historiae and fabulae, once memory and the imagination have fulfilled their cognitive tasks. This means that, for Bacon, there is no such thing as a pure use of reason. He advocates a kind of reason that, precisely because it is involved with matter's inner motions (its "appetites," in Bacon's characteristic language), is constitutively 'impure'. The article shows how the terms historia and fabula cover key semantic areas in defining Bacon's philosophy: historia may mean "history" as well as "story,"fabula "myth" as well "story". In both cases, we can see significant oscillations from a stronger meaning (close to those of matter and nature) to a weaker one (connected to wit and imagination), as if the power of nature decreases moving from histories and myths to stories. On the other hand, there are cases in which Bacon seems to stick to a diachronic view of the meaning of fables and histories, such that the transition from myths to history, especially natural history, is described as a collective effort towards reality and enlightenment.

What ever happened to Francis Glisson? Albrecht Haller and the fate of eighteenth-century irritability

This article investigates the reasons behind the disappearance of Francis Glisson's theory of irritability during the eighteenth century. At a time when natural investigations were becoming increasingly polarized between mind and matter in the attempt to save both man's consciousness and the inert nature of the res extensa, Glisson's notion of a natural perception embedded in matter did not satisfy the new science's basic injunction not to superimpose perceptions and appetites on nature. Knowledge of nature could not be based on knowledge within nature, i.e., on the very knowledge that nature has of itself; or--to look at the same question from the point of view of the human mind--man's consciousness could not be seen as participating in forms of natural selfhood. Albrecht Haller played a key role in this story. Through his experiments, Haller thought he had conclusively demonstrated that the response given by nature when irritated did not betray any natural perceptivity, any inner life, any sentiment interiéur. In doing so, he provided a less bewildering theory of irritability for the rising communities of experimental physiology.