Barfuss W, Meylahn JM. Intrinsic fluctuations of reinforcement learning promote cooperation.
Sci Rep 2023;
13:1309. [PMID:
36693872 PMCID:
PMC9873645 DOI:
10.1038/s41598-023-27672-7]
[Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/26/2022] [Accepted: 01/05/2023] [Indexed: 01/26/2023] Open
Abstract
In this work, we ask for and answer what makes classical temporal-difference reinforcement learning with [Formula: see text]-greedy strategies cooperative. Cooperating in social dilemma situations is vital for animals, humans, and machines. While evolutionary theory revealed a range of mechanisms promoting cooperation, the conditions under which agents learn to cooperate are contested. Here, we demonstrate which and how individual elements of the multi-agent learning setting lead to cooperation. We use the iterated Prisoner's dilemma with one-period memory as a testbed. Each of the two learning agents learns a strategy that conditions the following action choices on both agents' action choices of the last round. We find that next to a high caring for future rewards, a low exploration rate, and a small learning rate, it is primarily intrinsic stochastic fluctuations of the reinforcement learning process which double the final rate of cooperation to up to 80%. Thus, inherent noise is not a necessary evil of the iterative learning process. It is a critical asset for the learning of cooperation. However, we also point out the trade-off between a high likelihood of cooperative behavior and achieving this in a reasonable amount of time. Our findings are relevant for purposefully designing cooperative algorithms and regulating undesired collusive effects.
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