Adverse Patient Safety Events During the COVID-19 Epidemic

METHODS

A retrospective descriptive analysis of patient safety events related to COVID-19 was performed on data that were submitted in the Joint Patient Safety Event Reporting System and Root Cause Analysis databases to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety from March 2020 to February 2021. Events were coded for type of event, location, and cause of event.

RESULTS

Delays in care and staff/patients exposed to COVID-19 were the most common types of patient safety events, followed by COVID-19-positive patients eloping, laboratory processing errors, and one wrong procedure. The most frequently cited locations where events took place were emergency departments, medical units, community living centers, and intensive care units. Confusion over procedures, care not provided because of COVID-19, and failure to identify COVID-positive patient before they exposed others to COVID were the most common causes for patient safety events.

DISCUSSION

Our results are similar to other studies of patient safety during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on these results, we recommend the following: (1) focus on patient safety culture, leadership, and governance; (2) proactively develop competency checklists, cognitive aids, and other tools for healthcare staff who are working in new or unfamiliar clinical settings; (3) augment or enhance communication efforts with patient safety huddles or briefings at all levels within a healthcare organization to proactively uncover risk and mitigate fear by explaining changes in policies and procedures; and (4) maximize the use of quality and patient safety experts who are knowledgeable in system and human factor theories as well as change management to assist in redesigning clinical workflows and processes.

Delays in Diagnosis, Treatment, and Surgery: Root Causes, Actions Taken, and Recommendations for Healthcare Improvement

OBJECTIVES

Although patient safety continues to be a priority in the U.S. healthcare system, delays in diagnosis, treatment, or surgery still led to adverse events for patients. The purpose of this study was to review root cause analysis (RCA) reports in the Veterans Health Administration to identify the root causes and contributing factors of delays in diagnosis, treatment, or surgery in an effort to prevent avoidable delays in future care.

METHODS

The RCA reports from Veterans Health Administration hospitals from October 2016 through September 2019 were reviewed and the root causes and contributory factors were identified. These elements were coded by consensus and analyzed using descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

During the 3-year study period, 206 RCAs were identified and 163 were analyzed that were specific to delays in diagnosis, treatment, and surgery. The reports identified 24 delays in diagnosis, 117 delays in treatment, and 22 delays in surgery. Delays occurred most often in outpatient settings.

CONCLUSIONS

Results supported the need for standardization of care processes and procedures, improved communication between and within department personnel, and improved policies and procedures that will be followed as intended. By reviewing adverse events, root causes, and contributing factors identified by local RCA teams, strategies can be developed to reduce delays in diagnosis and treatment of patients and lead to safer care.

Suicide and Suicide Attempts on Veterans Affairs Medical Center Outpatient Clinic Areas, Common Areas, and Hospital Grounds

OBJECTIVES

Few studies have analyzed suicide deaths and attempts occurring outside inpatient units on other hospital locations. We aimed to quantify and analyze suicide deaths and attempts occurring on Department of Veterans Affairs medical center outpatient clinic areas, common areas, and hospital grounds including parking lots to determine whether a relationship with access to mental health care exists and to elucidate potential mitigation strategies.

METHODS

We conducted a retrospective review of patient safety report (n = 3,186), root cause analysis (n = 234), and issue brief (n = 2,064) national databases between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2018, to identify occurrences of suicides and attempts. Correlation between mental health access times and hospital-specific rates of suicides and attempts was assessed. Qualitative analyses of root causes and mitigation strategies were conducted.

RESULTS

Of 192 reports meeting our location criteria, 42 suicides or attempts occurred in outpatient clinic areas, 39 in common spaces, and 111 on outdoor facility areas. Forty-four reports (23%) pertained to suicides, and 148 (77%) pertained to attempts. The predominate methods were death by firearms (64%) and attempt by drug overdose (38%). We identified a weak yet significant relationship between mental health access times for established patients and rates of on-campus suicides and attempts (r = 0.279, P = 0.0013).

CONCLUSIONS

Clinical changes including environmental assessments and interventions, staff training on identifying suicide risk characteristics, policy changes toward improving contraband search techniques, and medications risk assessment, as well as timely access to care may be effective mitigation strategies toward preventing suicides of this nature.

Retained Guidewires in the Veterans Health Administration: Getting to the Root of the Problem

OBJECTIVES

The aims of this study were to investigate the demographics, causes, and contributing factors of retained guidewires (GWs) and to make specific recommendations for their prevention.

METHODS

The Veterans Administration patient safety reporting system database for 2000-2016 was queried for cases of retained GWs (RGWs). Data extracted for each case included procedure location, provider experience, insertion site, urgency, time to discovery, root causes, and corrective actions taken.

RESULTS

There were 101 evaluable cases of RGWs. Resident trainee (36%), critical care unit (38%), femoral vein (44%), and nonemergent placement (79%) were the conditions most frequently associated with a RGW. While discovery occurred almost immediately (30%) or in next 24 hours (31%), there were instances of RGWs found months (2%) or years (3%) later. Common root causes included inexperience (46%), lack of standardization (35%), distractions (25%), and lack of a checklist (23%).

CONCLUSIONS

The results demonstrate the result of human factors-based errors such as posttask completion errors. We recommend human factor-based interventions such as checklists and devices employing forcing functions that do not allow clinicians to complete the insertion process without first removing the GW.

A Review of Adverse Event Reports From Emergency Departments in the Veterans Health Administration

BACKGROUND

Previous work assessing the frequency of adverse events in emergency medicine has been limited. The emergency department (ED) provides an initial point of care for millions of patients. Given the volume of patient encounters and the complexity of medical conditions treated in the ED, it is necessary to determine the system-based issues and associated contributing factors impacting patient safety.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this retrospective study were to use root cause analysis reports of adverse events occurring in Veterans Health Administration EDs to understand the range of events that were happening and to determine the primary causes of these events as well as actions to prevent them.

METHODS

Retrospective safety reports from EDs from Veterans Health Administration medical centers across the nation for a 2-year period (2015-2016) were coded by event type, root cause, and recommended actions.

RESULTS

One hundred forty-four cases were included for analysis. The most common adverse events were as follows: delays in care (n = 38, 26.4%), elopements (n = 21, 14.6%), suicide attempts and deaths by suicide (n = 15, 10.4%), inappropriate discharges (n = 15, 10.4%), and errors in following procedures (n = 14, 9.7%). Overall, the most common root cause categories leading to adverse events were knowledge/educational deficits (11.4%), policies/procedures needing improvement (11.1%), and lack of standardized policies/procedures (9.4%).

DISCUSSION

Root cause analysis reports are a useful tool to determine the primary systems-based factors of common adverse events in the ED. Recommendations made in this article for addressing these root causes and potentially ameliorating these events will be useful to EDs and related health systems.

Review of Reported Adverse Events Occurring Among the Homeless Veteran Population in the Veterans Health Administration

BACKGROUND

United States veterans face an even greater risk of homelessness and associated medical conditions, mental health conditions, and fatal and nonfatal overdose as compared with nonveterans. Beginning 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs developed a strategy and allocated considerable resources to address veteran homelessness and the medical conditions commonly associated with this condition.

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to examine the Veterans Health Administration National Center for Patient Safety database for patient safety events in the homeless veteran population to mitigate future risk and inform policy.

METHODS

This was a retrospective, descriptive quality improvement study of reported patient safety events of homeless veterans enrolled in Veterans Health Administration care between January 2012 and August 2020. A validated codebook was used to capture individual patient characteristics, location and type of event, homeless status, and root causes of the events and proposed actions for prevention.

RESULTS

Suicide attempt or death, elopement, delay in care, and unintentional opioid overdose were the most common adverse events reported for this population. Root causes include issues with policies, procedures, and care processes for managing and evaluating homeless patients for the risk of suicidal or overdose behaviors and discharge, poor interdisciplinary communication, and coordination of patient care. Actions included standardization of procedures for discharge, overdose and suicide risk, staff education, and purchasing new equipment.

CONCLUSIONS

Suicide and opioid overdose are the most serious reported health care-related adverse events in the unsheltered homeless veteran population. Failures to recognize homelessness status, communicate status, and coordinate available services are root causes of these events.

Power Failures During Surgery: A 2000-2019 Review of Reported Events in the Veterans Health Administration

OBJECTIVES

The frequency and impact of power failure on surgical care over time in a large integrated healthcare system such as the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is unknown. Reducing the likelihood of harm related to these rare but potential catastrophic events is imperative to ensuring patient safety and high-quality surgical care. This study provides analysis and description of reported power failures during surgery (January 2000-March 2019), in the VHA and their impact.

METHODS

This quality improvement study describes patient safety adverse events related to power failure in the operating room reported by 63 VHA medical centers from the approximately 137 VHAs with a surgical program. Power failure events during surgery reported to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety are analyzed.

RESULTS

The authors identify 20 root cause analyses and 135 safety reports. Most events 36.1% (n = 56) resulted from generator delay, equipment reboot delay 21.9% (n = 34), and equipment backup power failure 13.5% (n = 21). Root causes include issues with backup batteries or equipment, engineering and clinical staff communication, standardized procedures for testing power, backup power delay, electrical circuit issues, documentation, and training. Patient harm occurred in 18% (n = 28) and 3.9% (n = 6) as major or catastrophic.

CONCLUSIONS

Power failure during surgery is associated with major or catastrophic patient harm, though rare. Staff preoccupation with failure, disaster preparedness, and focus on communication has the potential to minimize or avoid patient harm.

Suicide and Suicide Attempts on Hospital Grounds and Clinic Areas

OBJECTIVES

The goal of this study was to describe suicide and suicide attempts that occurred while the patient was on hospital grounds, common spaces, and clinic areas using root cause analysis (RCA) reports of these events in a national health care organization in the United States.

METHOD

This is an observational review of all RCA reports of suicide and suicide attempts on hospital grounds, common spaces, and clinic areas in our system between December 1, 1999, and December 31, 2014. Each RCA report was coded for the location of the event, method of self-harm, if the event resulted in a death by suicide, and root causes.

RESULTS

We found 47 RCA reports of suicide and suicide attempts occurring on hospital grounds, common spaces, or clinic areas. The most common methods were gunshot, overdose, cutting, and jumping, and we have seen an increase in these events since 2011. The primary root causes were breakdowns in communication, the need for improved psychiatric and medical treatment of suicidal patients, and problems with the physical environment.

CONCLUSIONS

Hospital staff should evaluate the environment for suicide hazards, consider prohibiting firearms, assist patients with no appointments, and promote good communication about high-risk patients.

Sharing Lessons Learned to Prevent Adverse Events in Anesthesiology Nationwide

OBJECTIVES

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) lessons learned process for Anesthesia adverse events was developed to alert the field to the occurrences and prevention of actual adverse events. This article details this quality improvement project and perceived impact.

METHODS

As part of ongoing quality improvement, root cause analysis related to anesthesiology care are routinely reported to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety. Since May 2012, the National Anesthesia Service subject matter experts, in collaboration with National Center for Patient Safety, review actual adverse events in anesthesiology and detailed lessons learned are developed. A survey of anesthesiology chiefs to determine perceived usefulness and accessibility of the project was conducted in April 2018.

RESULTS

The distributed survey yielded a response rate of 69% (84/122). Most of those who have seen the lessons learned (85%, 71/84) found them valuable. Ninety percent of those aware of the lessons learned (64/71) shared them with staff and 75% (53/71) reported a changed or reinforced patient safety behavior in their facility. The lessons learned provided 72% (51/71) of chiefs with new knowledge about patient safety and 75% (53/71) gained new knowledge for preventing adverse events.

CONCLUSIONS

This nationwide VHA anesthesiology lessons learned project illustrates the tenets of a learning organization. implementing team and systems-based safeguards to mitigate risk of harm from inevitable human error. Sharing lessons learned provides opportunities for clinician peer-to-peer learning, communication, and proactive approaches to prevent future similar errors.

Root Cause Analysis of Adverse Events Involving Opioid Overdoses in the Veterans Health Administration

OBJECTIVE

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) serves a population with compounding risk factors for opioid misuse, including chronic pain, substance use disorders, and mental health conditions. The objective of this study was to analyze opioid-related adverse events and root causes to inform mitigation strategies associated with opioid prescribing and administration.

METHODS

The researchers conducted a retrospective analysis of root cause analysis reports of opioid overdose events between August 1, 2012, and September 30, 2019. These adverse events were investigated locally by multidisciplinary hospital teams and reported by VHA facility patient safety managers to the National Center for Patient Safety for further aggregation and analysis. Type of event, location, and root causes were categorized.

RESULTS

Eighty-two adverse event reports were identified. Patients were primarily male with an average age of 61.4 years. Staff medication administration errors were the most common event type (57.3%), with most events resulting from process errors (65.9%) occurring in the health care setting (85.4%). Overall 36 events (43.9%) resulted in major or catastrophic harm. There were 172 root causes identified. The most common root causes were staff not following existing policy or lack of existing hospital policy on opioid management (18.0%); staff lacked training in areas such as managing the use or administration of opioids, correct use of opioid dispensing equipment, and recognition and proper response to an overdose (12.2%); and poor communication of opioid prescribing or administration during handoffs between clinical teams (11.6%). A lack of standardization in processes, training, and policies on opioid prescribing and screening, medication administration, equipment/pumps purchase and use, and contraband searches was a common theme throughout.

CONCLUSION

Errors in prescribing and administration of opioid medication can result in significant harm. A lack of standardized opioid administration practices and training, controlled substance policies, and interdisciplinary communication were frequent factors in adverse opioid events and should be a focus for future prevention.

Delirious Mania: An Approach to Diagnosis and Treatment

The Psychiatric Consultation Service at Massachusetts General Hospital sees medical and surgical inpatients with comorbid psychiatric symptoms and conditions. During their twice-weekly rounds, Dr Stern and other members of the Consultation Service discuss diagnosis and management of hospitalized patients with complex medical or surgical problems who also demonstrate psychiatric symptoms or conditions. These discussions have given rise to rounds reports that will prove useful for clinicians practicing at the interface of medicine and psychiatry.

Retrospective analysis of reported suicide deaths and attempts on veterans health administration campuses and inpatient units

INTRODUCTION

Suicide is the 10th leading cause of death in the USA. Inpatient suicide is the fourth most common sentinel event reported to the Joint Commission. This study reviewed root cause analysis (RCA) reports of suicide events by hospital unit to provide suicide prevention recommendations for each area.

METHODS

This is a retrospective analysis of reported suicide deaths and attempts in the US Veterans Health Administration (VHA) hospitals. We searched the VHA National Center for Patient Safety RCA database for suicide deaths and attempts on inpatient units, outpatient clinics and hospital grounds, between December 1999 and December 2018.

RESULTS

We found 847 RCA reports of suicide attempts (n=758) and deaths (n=89) in VHA hospitals, hanging accounted for 71% of deaths on mental health units and 50% of deaths on medical units. Overdose accounted for 55% of deaths and 68% of attempts in residential units and the only method resulting in death in emergency departments. In VHA community living centres, hanging, overdose and asphyxiation accounted for 64% of deaths. Gunshot accounted for 59% of deaths on hospital grounds and 100% of deaths in clinic areas. All inpatient locations cited issues in assessment and treatment of suicidal patients and environmental risk evaluation.

CONCLUSIONS

Inpatient mental health and medical units should remove anchor points for hanging where possible. On residential units and emergency departments, assessing suicide risk, conducting thorough contraband searches and maintaining observation of suicidal patients is critical. In community living centres, suicidal patients should be under supervision in an environment free of anchor points, medications and means of asphyxiation. Suicide prevention on hospital grounds and outpatient clinics can be achieved through the control of firearms.

Anesthesia Adverse Events Voluntarily Reported in the Veterans Health Administration and Lessons Learned

BACKGROUND

Anesthesia providers have long been pioneers in patient safety. Despite remarkable efforts, anesthesia errors still occur, resulting in complications, injuries, and even death. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center of Patient Safety uses root cause analysis (RCA) to examine why system-related adverse events occur and how to prevent future similar events. This study describes the types of anesthesia adverse events reported in VHA hospitals and their root causes and preventative actions.

METHODS

RCA reports from VHA hospitals from May 30, 2012, to May 1, 2015, were reviewed for root causes, severity of patient outcomes, and actions. These elements were coded by consensus and analyzed using descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

During the study period, 3228 RCAs were submitted, of which 292 involved an anesthesia provider. Thirty-six of these were specific to anesthesia care. We reviewed these 36 RCA reports of adverse events specific to anesthesia care. Types of event included medication errors (28%, 10), regional blocks (14%, 5), airway management (14%, 5), skin integrity or position (11%, 4), other (11%, 4), consent issues (8%, 3), equipment (8%, 3), and intravenous access and anesthesia awareness (3%, 1 each). Of the 36 anesthesia events reported, 5 (14%) were identified as being catastrophic, 10 (28%) major, 12 (34%) moderate, and 9 (26%) minor. The majority of root causes identified a need for improved standardization of processes.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis points to the need for systemwide implementation of human factors engineering-based approaches to work toward further eliminating anesthesia-related adverse events. Such actions include standardization of processes, forcing functions, separating storage of look-alike sound-alike medications, limiting stock of high-risk medication strengths, bar coding medications, use of cognitive aids such as checklists, and high-fidelity simulation.

Assessment of Incorrect Surgical Procedures Within and Outside the Operating Room: A Follow-up Study From US Veterans Health Administration Medical Centers

IMPORTANCE

Reducing wrong-site surgery is fundamental to safe, high-quality care. This is a follow-up study examining 8 years of reported surgical adverse events and root causes in the nation's largest integrated health care system.

OBJECTIVES

To provide a follow-up description of incorrect surgical procedures reported from 2010 to 2017 from US Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical centers, compared with the previous studies of 2001 to 2006 and 2006 to 2009, and to recommend actions for future prevention of such events.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

This quality improvement study describes patient safety adverse events and close calls reported from 86 VHA medical centers from the approximately 130 VHA facilities with a surgical program. The surgical procedures and programs vary in size and complexity from small rural centers to large, complex urban facilities. Procedures occurring between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2017, were included. Data analysis took place in 2018.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

The categories of incorrect procedure types were wrong patient, side, site (including wrong-level spine), procedure, or implant. Events included those in or out of the operating room, adverse events or close calls, surgical specialty, and harm. These results were compared with the previous studies of VHA-reported wrong-site surgery (2001-2006 and 2006-2009).

RESULTS

Our review produced 483 reports (277 adverse events and 206 close calls). The rate of in-operating room (in-OR) reported adverse events with harm has continued to trend downward from 1.74 to 0.47 reported adverse events with harm per 100 000 procedures between 2000 and 2017 based on 6 591 986 in-OR procedures. When in-OR events were examined by discipline as a rate, dentistry had 1.54, neurosurgery had 1.53, and ophthalmology had 1.06 reported in-OR adverse events per 10 000 cases. The overall VHA in-OR rate for adverse events during 2010 to 2017 was 0.53 per 10 000 procedures based on 3 234 514 in-OR procedures. The most common root cause for adverse events was related to issues in performing a comprehensive time-out (28.4%). In these cases, the time-out either was conducted incorrectly or was incomplete in some way.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Over the period studied, the VHA identified a decrease in the rate of reported adverse events in the OR associated with harm and continued reporting of adverse event close calls. Organizational efforts continue to examine root cause analysis reports, promulgate lessons learned, and enhance policy to promote a culture and behavior that minimizes events and is transparent in reporting occurrences.

Root Cause Analysis of Reported Patient Falls in ORs in the Veterans Health Administration

This quality improvement project describes 22 OR patient falls reported in the Veterans Health Administration between January 2010 and February 2016. Most (n = 15; 68%) involved patient falls from the OR bed. Other patient falls (n = 6; 27%) occurred when the patient was transferred to or from the OR bed, and one fall (5%) occurred at another time. Root causes of the falls included tilting of the OR bed, issues with safety restraints, malfunctioning OR bed or gurney locks, inadequate patient sedation, and poor communication among team members. One fall (5%) resulted in a major injury, four falls (18%) resulted in minor injuries, six falls resulted in no injury, and 11 falls (50%) had no reported outcome. Falls in the OR, although rare, can be injurious. We drafted recommendations based on the root causes that include specific guidance on communication, teamwork, best practices, restraints and equipment, and training.

How Well Do Incident Reporting Systems Work on Inpatient Psychiatric Units?

BACKGROUND

Adverse events and medical errors have been shown to be a persistent issue in health care. However, little research has been conducted regarding the efficacy of incident reporting systems, particularly within an inpatient psychiatry setting.

METHODS

The medical records from a random sample of 40 psychiatric units within Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical centers were screened and evaluated by physicians for 9 types of safety events. The abstracted safety events were then evaluated to assess if they were caused by an error and if they caused harm to the patient. These safety events were then matched to incidents that were reported to the VHA Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), which includes all reported adverse events, close calls, and root cause analyses that occur within the VHA health system.

RESULTS

Overall, 37.4% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 33.5%-41.5%) of safety events detected in the medical record were reported to the AERS. Among the patient safety events identified, the most commonly reported to the AERS were patient falls (52.3%), assaults (46.2%), and elopements (42.3%). Reporting rates increased when the patient safety event resulted in harm to the patient (48.2%; CI = 41.6%-55.0%).

CONCLUSION

The majority of patient safety events that occur on VHA inpatient psychiatric units do not get reported to the VHA's Adverse Event Reporting System. These findings suggest that self-reporting is not a reliable method of tracking patient safety events. Future efforts should target the barriers to inpatient psychiatric reporting and develop mechanisms to overcome these barriers.

An Analysis of Adverse Events in the Rehabilitation Department: Using the Veterans Affairs Root Cause Analysis System

BACKGROUND

Root cause analyses (RCA) are often completed in health care settings to determine causes of adverse events (AEs). RCAs result in action plans designed to mitigate future patient harm. National reviews of RCA reports have assessed the safety of numerous health care settings and suggested opportunities for improvement. However, few studies have assessed the safety of receiving care from physical therapists, occupational therapists, or speech and language pathology pathologists.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study was to determine the types of AEs, root causes, and action plans for risk mitigation that exist within the disciplines of rehabilitation medicine.

DESIGN

This study is a retrospective, cross-sectional review.

METHODS

A national search of the Veterans Health Administration RCA database was conducted to identify reports describing AEs associated with physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech and language pathology services between 2009 and May 2016. Twenty-five reports met the inclusion requirements. The reports were classified by the event type, root cause, action plans, and strength of action plans.

RESULTS

Delays in care (32.0%) and falls (28.0%) were the most common type of AE. Three AEs resulted in death. RCA teams identified deficits regarding policy and procedures as the most common root cause. Eighty-eight percent of RCA reports included strong or intermediate action plans to mitigate risk. Strong action plans included standardizing emergency terminology and implementing a dedicated line to call for an emergency response.

LIMITATIONS

These data are self-reported and only AEs that are scored as a safety assessment code 3 in the system receive a full RCA, so there are likely AEs that were not captured in this study. In addition, the RCA reports are deidentified and so do not include all patient characteristics. As the Veterans Health Administration system services mostly men, the data might not generalize to non-Veterans Health Administration systems with a different patient mix.

CONCLUSIONS

Care provided by rehabilitation professionals is generally safe, but AEs do occur. Based on this RCA review, the safety of rehabilitation services can be improved by implementing strong practices to mitigate risk to patients. Checklists should be considered to aid timely decision making when initiating an emergency response.

Adverse events occurring on mental health units

OBJECTIVE

While the study of suicide on mental health units has a long history, the study of patient safety more generally is relatively new. Our objective was to determine the type and relative frequency of adverse events occurring on Veterans Health Administration (VHA) mental health units; the primary root causes for these events; and make recommendations for abating or mitigating these events.

METHODS

We searched our national database for any reported adverse event that occurred on an inpatient mental health unit between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016. We found 87 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) reports and 9780 safety reports. The safety reports were coded for type of event and the RCAs were further coded for underlying causes and severity.

RESULTS

Of the 87 RCA reports, there were 31suicide attempts, 16 elopements, 10 assaults, 8 events involving hazardous items on the unit, 7 falls, 6 unexpected deaths, 3 overdoses and 6 cases coded as "other". For the 9780 safety reports falls were the most common event, followed by medication events, verbal assaults, physical assaults, medical problems and hazardous items on the unit.

CONCLUSIONS

As with medical units, patients on mental health units are at risk for many types of adverse events. The same focus on patient safety is just as important for our mental health patients as for our medical patients. Mental health unit staff should undertake a structured assessment of all risk on their units. This broad approach may be more successful than focusing on a particular event type.

Root Cause Analysis of ICU Adverse Events in the Veterans Health Administration

BACKGROUND

ICUs' provision of complex care for critically ill patients results in an environment with a high potential for adverse events. A study was conducted to characterize adverse events in Veterans Health Administration (VHA) ICUs that underwent root cause analysis (RCA) and to identify the root causes and their recommended actions.

METHODS

This retrospective observational study of RCA reports concerned events that occurred in VHA ICUs or as a result of ICU processes from January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014. The type of event, root causes, and recommended actions were measured.

RESULTS

Some 70 eligible RCAs were identified in 47 of the 120 facilities with an ICU in the VHA system. Delays in care (30.0%) and medication errors (28.6%) were the most common types of events. There were 152 root causes and 277 recommended actions. Root causes often involved rules, policies, and procedure processes (28.3%), equipment/supply issues (15.8%), and knowledge deficits/education (15.1%). Common actions recommended were policy, procedure, and process actions (34.4%) and training/education actions (31.4%). Of the actions implemented, 84.4% had a reported effectiveness of "much better" or "better."

CONCLUSION

ICU adverse events often had several root causes, with protocols and process-of-care issues as root causes regardless of event type. Actions often included standardization of processes and training/education. Several recommendations can be made that may improve patient safety in the ICU, such as standardization of care process, implementation of team training programs, and simulation-based training.

Sustained Effectiveness of the Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist to Decrease Inpatient Suicide

OBJECTIVE

The Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist (MHEOCC) has been reported to be effective in decreasing suicide on inpatient mental health units. The authors sought to examine whether the effect of the MHEOCC was sustained.

METHODS

Root cause analysis reports from all Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals were reviewed to obtain a count of suicides occurring on mental health units from 2000 to 2015. The number of mental health admissions and bed-days of care were obtained for the same period.

RESULTS

The rate of suicide prior to the implementation of the MHEOCC was 4.2 per 100,000 admissions or 2.72 per million bed-days of care. The rate after implementation was .74 per 100,000 admissions or .69 per million bed-days of care. There was no loss of effect in the seven years after implementation.

CONCLUSIONS

The MHEOCC was associated with a sustained reduction in suicides occurring on inpatient mental health units.

Test-retest reliability of the VA National Center for Patient Safety culture questionnaire

RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Patient safety culture may have a significant influence on safety processes and outcomes. Therefore, it is important to have valid tools to measure patient safety culture in order to identify potential levers for cultural change that could improve patient safety. The 65-item Department of Veterans Affairs Patient Safety Culture Survey (VA PSCS) consists of 14 dimensions and is administered biannually to VA employees. Test-retest reliability of the VA PSCS has not been established.

METHODS

We conducted repeated administrations of the VA PSCS among 28 VA employees. We measured intraclass correlation coefficients for each item and dimension.

RESULTS

Test-retest intraclass correlation coefficient values were 0.7 or greater for 13 out of 14 dimensions of the VA PSCS. Employees had difficulty reliably reporting how others feel about patient safety.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, the VA PSCS survey showed adequate test-retest reliability. Items asking what others think or feel showed lower reliability. Further work is needed to better understand the relationship between safety culture, safety processes and safety outcomes.

Flash Burns While on Home Oxygen Therapy: Tracking Trends and Identifying Areas for Improvement

The objective was to analyze reported flash burns experienced by patients on home oxygen therapy (HOT) in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) using a qualitative, retrospective review of VHA root cause analysis reports between January 2009 and November 2015. Of 123 cases of reported adverse events related to flash burns, 100 cases (81%) resulted in injury, and 23 (19%) resulted in death. Although 89% of veterans claimed to have quit smoking (n = 109), 92% (n = 113) of burns occurred as a result of smoking. The most common root cause was risk identification issues. Recommended actions were standardized risk assessment policies, patient education, and the adoption of fire stop valves. Patients with a history of smoking who are on HOT should be considered for fire stop valves and offered consistent counseling and follow-up using a combination of harm reduction and shared decision-making techniques. Standardization of risk identification and documentation is recommended.

Suicide attempts and completions in Veterans Affairs nursing home care units and long-term care facilities: a review of root-cause analysis reports

OBJECTIVE

Suicide was the 10th leading cause of death for Americans in 2010. The suicide rate is highest among men who are aged 75 and older. The prevalence of suicidal behavior in nursing homes and long-term care (LTC) facilities was estimated to be 1%. This study describes the systemic vulnerabilities found after suicidal behavior in LTC facilities as well as steps to decrease or mitigate the risk.

METHOD

This is a retrospective review of root-cause analysis (RCA) reports of suicide attempts and completions between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2013 in the Veterans Health Administration LTC and nursing home care units. The RCA reports of suicide attempts and completions were coded for patient demographics, method of attempt or completion, root causes, and actions developed to address the root cause.

RESULTS

Thirty-five RCA reports were identified. The average age was 65 years, 11 had a previous suicide attempt, and the primary mental health diagnoses were depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and schizophrenia. The primary methods of self-harm were cutting with a sharp object, overdose, and strangulation.

CONCLUSIONS

It is recommended that all staff members are aware of the signs and risk factors for depression and suicide in this population and should systematically assess and treat mental disorders. In addition, LTC facilities should have a standard protocol for evaluating the environment for suicide hazards and use interdisciplinary teams to promote good communication about risk factors identified among patients. Finally, staff should go beyond staff education and policy to make clinical changes at the bedside. Published 2015. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.

Wrong-side thoracentesis: lessons learned from root cause analysis

IMPORTANCE

Despite the recognized value of the Joint Commission's Universal Protocol and the implementation of time-outs, incorrect surgical procedures are still among the most common types of sentinel events and can have fatal consequences.

OBJECTIVES

To examine a root cause analysis database for reported wrong-side thoracenteses and to determine the contributing factors associated with their occurrence.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

We searched the National Center for Patient Safety database for wrong-side thoracenteses performed in ambulatory clinics and hospital units other than the operating room reported from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2011.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Data extracted included patient factors, clinical features, team structure and function, adherence to bottom-line patient safety measures, complications, and outcomes.

RESULTS

Fourteen cases of wrong-side thoracenteses are identified. Contributing factors included failure to perform a time-out (n=12), missing indication of laterality on the patient's consent form (n=10), absence of a site mark on the patient's skin within the sterile field (n=12), and absent verification of medical images (n=7). Complications included pneumothoraces (n=4), hemorrhage (n=3), and death directly attributable to the wrong-side thoracentesis (n=2). Teamwork and communication failure, unawareness of existing policy, and a deficit in training and education were the most common root causes of wrong-side thoracentesis.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Prevention of wrong-site procedures and accompanying patient harm outside the operating room requires adherence to the Universal Protocol and time-outs, effective teamwork, training and education, mentoring, and patient assessment for early detection of complications. The time-outs provide protected time and place for error detection and recovery.

Root cause analysis of serious adverse events among older patients in the Veterans Health Administration

BACKGROUND

Preventable adverse events are more likely to occur among older patients because of the clinical complexity of their care. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) stores data about serious adverse events when a root cause analysis (RCA) has been performed. A primary objective of this study was to describe the types of adverse events occurring among older patients (age > or = 65 years) in Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. Secondary objectives were to determine the underlying reasons for the occurrence of these events and report on effective action plans that have been implemented in VA hospitals.

METHODS

In a retrospective, cross-sectional review, RCA reports were reviewed and outcomes reported using descriptive statistics for all VA hospitals that conducted an RCA for a serious geriatric adverse event from January 2010 to January 2011 that resulted in sustained injury or death.

RESULTS

The search produced 325 RCA reports on VA patients (age > or = 65 years). Falls (34.8%), delays in diagnosis and/or treatment (11.7%), unexpected death (9.9%), and medication errors (9.0%) were the most commonly reported adverse events among older VA patients. Communication was the most common underlying reason for these events, representing 43.9% of reported root causes. Approximately 40% of implemented action plans were judged by local staff to be effective.

CONCLUSION

The RCA process identified falls and communication as important themes in serious adverse events. Concrete actions, such as process standardization and changes to communication, were reported by teams to yield some improvement. However, fewer than half of the action plans were reported to be effective. Further research is needed to guide development and implementation of effective action plans.

Using a virtual breakthrough series collaborative to reduce postoperative respiratory failure in 16 Veterans Health Administration hospitals

BACKGROUND

The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Virtual Breakthrough Series (VBTS) process was used in an eight-month (June 2011-January 2012) quality improvement (QI) project to improve care related to reducing postoperative respiratory failure. The VBTS collaborative drew on Patient Safety Indicator 11: Postoperative Respiratory Failure Rate to guide changes in care at the bedside.

METHODS

Sixteen Veterans Health Administration hospitals, each representing a regional Veterans Integrated Service Network, participated in the QI project. During the prework phase (initial two months), hospitals formed multidisciplinary teams, selected measures related to their goals, and collected baseline data. The six-month action phase included group conference calls in which the faculty presented clinical background on the topic, discussed evidence-based processes of care, and/or presented content regarding reducing postoperative respiratory failure. During a final, six-month continuous improvement and spread phase, teams were to continue implementing changes as part of their usual processes.

RESULTS

The six most commonly reported interventions to reduce postoperative respiratory failure focused on improving incentive spirometer use, documenting implementation of targeted interventions, oral care, standardized orders, early ambulation, and provider education. A few teams reported reduced ICU readmissions for respiratory failure.

CONCLUSIONS

The VBTS collaborative helped teams implement process changes to help reduce postoperative respiratory complications. Teams reported initial success at implementing site-specific improvements using real-time data. The VBTS model shows promise for knowledge sharing and efficient multifacility improvement efforts, although long-term sustainability and testing in these and other settings need to be examined.

Suicide attempts and completions on medical-surgical and intensive care units

Studies of inpatient suicide attempts and completions on medical-surgical and intensive care units are rare, and there are no large studies in the United States. We reviewed 50 cases, including 45 suicide attempts and 5 completed suicides, that occurred on medical surgical or intensive care units in the Veterans Health Administration between December 1, 1999 and December 31, 2012. The method, location, and the root causes of the events were categorized. The most common methods included cutting with a sharp object, followed by overdose and hanging. Root causes included problems with communication of risk, need for staff education in suicide assessment, and the need for better treatment for depressed and suicidal patients on medical units. Based on these results, we made our recommendations for managing suicidal patients on medical-surgical and intensive care units, including improved education for staff, standardized communication about suicide risk, and clear management protocols for suicidal patients.

The effect of simulation-based crew resource management training on measurable teamwork and communication among interprofessional teams caring for postoperative patients

BACKGROUND

Many adverse events in health care are caused by teamwork and communication breakdown. This study was conducted to investigate the effect of a point-of-care simulation-based team training curriculum on measurable teamwork and communication skills in staff caring for postoperative patients.

METHODS

Twelve facilities involving 334 perioperative surgical staff underwent simulation-based training. Pretest and posttest self-report data included the Self-Efficacy of Teamwork Competencies Scale. Observational data were captured with the Clinical Teamwork Scale.

RESULTS

Teamwork scores (measured on a five-point Likert scale) improved for all eight survey questions by an average of 18% (3.7 to 4.4, p < .05). The observed communication rating (scale of 1 to 10) increased by 16% (5.6 to 6.4, p < .05).

CONCLUSION

Simulation-based team training for staff caring for perioperative patients is associated with measurable improvements in teamwork and communication.

Inpatient suicide on mental health units in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals: avoiding environmental hazards

INTRODUCTION

One thousand five hundred suicides take place on inpatient psychiatry units in the United States each year, over 70% by hanging. Understanding the methods and the environmental components of inpatient suicide may help to reduce its incidence.

METHODS

All Root Cause Analysis reports of suicide or suicide attempts in inpatient mental health units in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals between December 1999 and December 2011 were reviewed. We coded the method of suicide, anchor point and lanyard for cases of hanging, and implement for cutting, and brought together all other reports of inpatient hazards from VA staff for review.

RESULTS

There were 243 reports of suicide attempts and completions: 43.6% (106) were hanging, 22.6% (55) were cutting, 15.6% (38) were strangulation, and 7.8% (19) were overdoses. Doors accounted for 52.2% of the anchor points used for the 22 deaths by hanging; sheets or bedding accounted for 58.5% of the lanyards. In addition, 23.1% of patients used razor blades for cutting.

CONCLUSIONS

The most common method of suicide attempts and completions on inpatient mental health units is hanging. It is recommended that common lanyards and anchor points be removed from the environment of care. We provide more information about such hazards and introduce a decision tree to help healthcare providers to determine which hazards to remove.

Root cause analysis reports help identify common factors in delayed diagnosis and treatment of outpatients

Delays in diagnosis and treatment are widely considered to be threats to outpatient safety. However, few studies have identified and described what factors contribute to delays that might result in patient harm in the outpatient setting. We analyzed 111 root cause analysis reports that investigated such delays and were submitted to the Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety in the period 2005-12. The most common contributing factors noted in the reports included coordination problems resulting from inadequate follow-up planning, delayed scheduling for unspecified reasons, inadequate tracking of test results, and the absence of a system to track patients in need of short-term follow-up. Other contributing factors were team-level decision-making problems resulting from miscommunication of urgency between providers and providers' lack of awareness of or knowledge about a patient's situation; and communication failures among providers, patients, and other health care team members. Our findings suggest that to support care goals in the Affordable Care Act and the National Quality Strategy, even relatively sophisticated electronic health record systems will require enhancements. At the same time, policy initiatives should support programs to implement, and perhaps reward the use of, more rigorous interprofessional teamwork principles to improve outpatient communication and coordination.

Sharing lessons learned to prevent incorrect surgery

The purpose of this report is to discuss surgical adverse event lessons learned and to recommend action. Examples of incorrect surgical adverse events managed in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) patient safety system and results of a survey regarding the impact of the surgery lessons learned process are provided. The VHA implemented a process for sharing deidentified stories of surgical lessons learned. The cases are in-operating room selected examples from lessons learned from October 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. Examples selected illustrate helpful human factors principles. To learn more about the awareness and impact of the lessons learned, we conducted a survey with Chiefs of Surgery in the VHA. The types of examples of adverse events include wrong eye implants, incorrect nerve blocks, and wrong site excisions of lesions. These are accompanied by human factors recommendations and change concepts such as designing the system to prevent mistakes, using differentiation, minimizing handoffs, and standardizing how information is communicated. The survey response rate was 76 per cent (88 of 132). Of those who had seen the surgical lessons learned (76% [67 of 88]), the majority (87%) reported they were valuable and 85% that they changed or reinforced patient safety behaviors in their facility as a result of surgical lessons learned. Simply having a policy will not ensure patient safety. When reviewing adverse events, human factors must be considered as a cause for error and for the failure to follow policy without assigning blame. VHA surgeons reported that the surgery lessons learned were valuable and impacted practice.

Sharing Lessons Learned to Prevent Incorrect Surgery

The purpose of this report is to discuss surgical adverse event lessons learned and to recommend action. Examples of incorrect surgical adverse events managed in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) patient safety system and results of a survey regarding the impact of the surgery lessons learned process are provided. The VHA implemented a process for sharing deidentified stories of surgical lessons learned. The cases are in-operating room selected examples from lessons learned from October 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. Examples selected illustrate helpful human factors principles. To learn more about the awareness and impact of the lessons learned, we conducted a survey with Chiefs of Surgery in the VHA. The types of examples of adverse events include wrong eye implants, incorrect nerve blocks, and wrong site excisions of lesions. These are accompanied by human factors recommendations and change concepts such as designing the system to prevent mistakes, using differentiation, minimizing handoffs, and standardizing how information is communicated. The survey response rate was 76 per cent (88 of 132). Of those who had seen the surgical lessons learned (76% [67 of 88]), the majority (87%) reported they were valuable and 85% that they changed or reinforced patient safety behaviors in their facility as a result of surgical lessons learned. Simply having a policy will not ensure patient safety. When reviewing adverse events, human factors must be considered as a cause for error and for the failure to follow policy without assigning blame. VHA surgeons reported that the surgery lessons learned were valuable and impacted practice.

Examination of the effectiveness of the Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist in reducing suicide on inpatient mental health units

CONTEXT

Suicide is one of the leading causes of death in the United States. While suicides occurring during psychiatric hospitalization represent a very small proportion of the total number of suicides, these events are highly preventable owing to the controlled nature of the environment. Many methods have been proposed, but no interventions have been tested.

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the effect of identification and abatement of hazards on inpatient suicides in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA).

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PATIENTS

The effect of implementation of a checklist (the Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist) and abatement process designed to remove suicide hazards from inpatient mental health units in all VHA hospitals was examined by measuring change in the rate of suicides before and after the intervention.

INTERVENTION

Implementation of the Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE

The number of completed suicides on inpatient mental health units in VHA hospitals.

RESULTS

Implementation of the Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist was associated with a reduction in the rate of completed inpatient suicide in VHA hospitals nationally. This reduction remained present when controlling for number of admissions (2.64 per 100 000 admissions before to 0.87 per 100 000 admissions after implementation; P < .001) and bed days of care (2.08 per 1 million bed days before to 0.79 per 1 million bed days after implementation; P < .001).

CONCLUSIONS

Use of the Mental Health Environment of Care Checklist was associated with a substantial reduction in the inpatient suicide rate occurring on VHA mental health units. Use of the checklist in non-VHA hospitals may be warranted.

Using root cause analysis to reduce falls with injury in community settings

BACKGROUND

Falls are a common occurrence for older adults living in the community that may lead to physical injury and psychological harm. The US Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) database contains root cause analysis (RCA) reviews that identify falls resulting in injury in the community and subsequent action plans that may be helpful to prevent future falls.

METHODS

A search of the NCPS-database identified RCA reviews where the patient (community-dwelling and long term care elders) fell in the community resulting in moderate to severe injury. Falls occurred in the home, community living center, outpatient clinic, recreational outing, outdoors, or in a vehicle. Thirty-six RCAs from October 2001 through August 2010 were included. Cases were coded on the basis of location of the fall, primary activity of the patient before/during the fall, root causes, action items, outcome measures, and effectiveness of each action.

RESULTS

Sixty-seven root causes resulting in 59 actions were identified from the RCA reports. Falls most frequently occurred in the patient's home (41.7%). The most common activities the individual was engaged in during a fill included getting up from the bed or chair/wheelchair (22.2%), walking (22.2%), and transportation in a wheelchair van (14.8%). Although many actions yielded improved outcomes, the only action that was significantly associated with improvement was changes made to the environment (p = .028). setting activity

CONCLUSIONS

The and surrounding fallsthat occur in the that occur in the community and that result in moderate to serious injury were identified along with the events' root causes. The extremely limited number of reports suggests that there may be missed opportunities to conduct an RCA for adverse events that occur among community-dwelling and long term care elders.

Using root cause analysis to reduce falls with injury in the psychiatric unit

OBJECTIVE

The objective was to identify how falls on psychiatric units occur, the underlying root causes and effective action plans to reduce falls and injuries.

METHODS

A search of the Veterans Health Administration National Center for Patient Safety database was conducted to identify root cause analysis (RCA) reviews where a fall was sustained by a patient on a psychiatric unit. Seventy-five RCAs from January 2000 to March 2010 were included.

RESULTS

One hundred and thirty-eight actions were identified from the RCA reports. The most common activities the individual was engaged in during a fall included getting up from a bed, chair or wheelchair (21.3%); walking/running (10.7%); bathroom related (9.9%) or behavior related (9.9%). The most common root causes were environmental hazards (11.2%), poor communication of fall risk (8.9%), lack of suitable equipment (8.9%) and need for improvement of the current system for falls assessment (8.9%). Staff education (19.9%), development of tools to improve falls documentation (17.0%) and providing falls prevention equipment (14.2%) were the most frequent actions taken.

CONCLUSIONS

The results describe the location, activity and root causes surrounding falls that occur in psychiatric units resulting in injury, and provide some suggestions on how to implement a successful action plan.

Association between implementation of a medical team training program and surgical morbidity

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether there is an association between the Veterans Health Administration Medical Team Training (MTT) program and surgical morbidity.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

A retrospective health services study was conducted with a contemporaneous control group. Outcome data were obtained from the Veterans Health Administration Surgical Quality Improvement Program. The analysis included aggregated measures representing 119,383 sampled procedures from 74 Veterans Health Administration facilities that provide care to veterans.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

The primary outcome measure was the rate of change in annual surgical morbidity rate 1 year after facilities enrolled in the MTT program as compared with 1 year before and compared with the non-MTT program sites.

RESULTS

Facilities in the MTT program (n = 42) had a significant decrease of 17% in observed annual surgical morbidity rate (rate ratio, 0.83; 95% CI, 0.79-0.88; P = .01). Facilities not trained (n = 32) had an insignificant decrease of 6% in observed morbidity (rate ratio, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.86-1.05; P = .11). After adjusting for surgical risk, we found a decrease of 15% in morbidity rate for facilities in the MTT program and a decrease of 10% for those not yet in the program. The risk-adjusted annual surgical morbidity rate declined in both groups, and the decline was 20% steeper in the MTT program group (P = .001) after propensity-score matching. The steeper decline in annual surgical morbidity rates was also observed in specific morbidity outcomes, such as surgical infection.

CONCLUSION

The Veterans Health Administration MTT program is associated with decreased surgical morbidity.

Improving perceptions of teamwork climate with the Veterans Health Administration medical team training program

There are differences between nurse and physician perceptions of teamwork. The purpose of this study was to determine whether these differences would be reduced with medical team training (MTT). The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire was administered to nurses and physicians working in the operating rooms of 101 consecutive hospitals before and at the completion of an MTT program. Responses to the 6 teamwork climate items on the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire were analyzed using nonparametric testing. At baseline, physicians had more favorable perceptions on teamwork climate items than nurses. Physicians demonstrated improvement on all 6 teamwork climate items. Nurses demonstrated improvement in perceptions on all teamwork climate items except "Nurse input is well received." Physicians still had a more favorable perception than nurses on all 6 teamwork climate items at follow-up. Despite an improvement in perceptions by physicians and nurses, baseline nurse-physician differences persisted at completion of the Veterans Health Administration MTT Program.

Changing perceptions of safety climate in the operating room with the Veterans Health Administration medical team training program

Perceptions of organizational commitment to safety differ between the operating rooms in high- and medium-complexity facilities of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The purpose of this study was to see whether medical team training (MTT) reduced this difference. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire was administered before and at the completion of a MTT program. The study population consisted of respondents working in the operating room. Responses to the 7 safety climate items were analyzed using nonparametric tests. Before MTT, respondents working at medium-complexity facilities had more favorable perceptions of knowledge of proper channels and encouragement by colleagues to report safety concerns than respondents who work at high-complexity facilities. At completion, there was no difference in perceptions between respondents working at high- and medium-complexity facilities for these items. The VHA MTT program improved perceptions at both high- and medium-complexity facilities and eliminated differences present at baseline.

Systemic vulnerabilities to suicide among veterans from the Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts: review of case reports from a National Veterans Affairs Database

While suicide among recently returned veterans is of great concern, it is a relatively rare occurrence within individual hospitals and clinics. Root cause analysis (RCA) generates a detailed case report that can be used to identify system-based vulnerabilities following an adverse event. Review of a national database of RCA reports may identify common vulnerabilities and assist in the development of more robust prevention strategies. Our objective was to identify and compare common themes among reports of suicide among veterans of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) in the Veterans Affairs system. Common themes among root causes of suicide as identified in RCA reports were collected and compared as the primary outcome--systematic vulnerabilities. Actions recommended within the reports were coded as the secondary outcome--prevention strategies. Fifty-one RCA reports of OIF/OEF suicides were identified by our search. Coding generated 16 common categories among 132 root causes, and 13 categories among 108 recommended actions. Assessment of suicidal risk, coordination of care, timely access to care, and communication among providers were the most common root causes. Actions identified by RCA teams to reduce suicide included improving referral processes, staff education in suicide assessment, and follow-up with suicidal veterans. Review of multiple RCA reports can identify organizational vulnerabilities detected at the local level that may be applicable system wide. Attention to improving suicide assessment, coordination of care, and timely access may have the largest impact on reducing suicide among OIF/OEF veterans.