Conspiracy beliefs are associated with a reduction in frontal beta power and biases in categorizing ambiguous stimuli

Prior beliefs, such as conspiracy beliefs, significantly influence our perception of the natural world. However, the brain activity associated with perceptual decision-making in conspiracy beliefs is not well understood. To shed light on this topic, we conducted a study examining the EEG activity of believers, and skeptics during resting state with perceptual decision-making task. Our study shows that conspiracy beliefs are related to the reduced power of beta frequency band. Furthermore, skeptics tended to misclassify ambiguous face stimuli as houses more frequently than believers. These results help to explain the differences in brain activity between believers and skeptics, especially in how conspiracy beliefs impact the categorization of ambiguous stimuli.

Cognitive bias in animal behavior science: a philosophical perspective

Emotional states of animals influence their cognitive processes as well as their behavior. Assessing emotional states is important for animal welfare science as well as for many fields of neuroscience, behavior science, and biomedicine. This can be done in different ways, e.g. through assessing animals’ physiological states or interpreting their behaviors. This paper focuses on the so-called cognitive judgment bias test, which has gained special attention in the last 2 decades and has become a highly important tool for measuring emotional states in non-human animals. However, less attention has been given to the epistemology of the cognitive judgment bias test and to disentangling the relevance of different steps in the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This paper sheds some light on both the epistemology of the methods and the architecture of the underlying cognitive abilities of the tested animals. Based on this reconstruction, we propose a scheme for classifying and assessing different cognitive abilities involved in cognitive judgment bias tests.

Effects of contextual information and stimulus ambiguity on overt visual sampling behavior

The sampling of our visual environment through saccadic eye movements is an essential function of the brain, allowing us to overcome the limits of peripheral vision. Understanding which parts of a scene attract overt visual attention is subject to intense research, and considerable progress has been made in unraveling the underlying cortical mechanisms. In contrast to spatial aspects, however, relatively little is understood about temporal aspects of overt visual sampling. At every fixation, the oculomotor system faces the decision whether to keep exploring different aspects of an object or scene or whether to remain fixated to allow for in-depth cortical processing - a situation that can be understood in terms of an exploration-exploitation dilemma. To improve our understanding of the factors involved in these decisions, we here investigate how the level of visual information, experimentally manipulated by scene context and stimulus ambiguity, changes the sampling behavior preceding the recognition of centrally presented ambiguous and disambiguated objects. Behaviorally, we find that context, although only presented until the first voluntary saccade, biases the perceptual outcome and significantly reduces reaction times. Importantly, we find that increased information about an object significantly alters its visual exploration, as evident through increased fixation durations and reduced saccade amplitudes. These results demonstrate that the initial sampling of an object, preceding its recognition, is subject to change based on the amount of information available in the system: increased evidence for its identity biases the exploration-exploitation strategy towards in-depth analyses.