Corporate Counterspeech

Are corporations ever morally obligated to engage in counterspeech-that is, in speech that aims to counter hate speech and misinformation? While existing arguments in moral and political philosophy show that individuals and states have such obligations, it is an open question whether those arguments apply to corporations as well. In this essay, I show how two such arguments-one based on avoiding complicity, and one based on duties of rescue-can plausibly be extended to corporations. I also respond to several objections to corporate counterspeech.

Complicity Consciousness: The Dual Practice of Ethnography and Clinical Caregiving in Carceral Settings

Anthropologist-clinicians who engage in both ethnographic inquiry and clinical practice confront methodological, ethical, and epistemological predicaments that can challenge and enhance the moral practice and ethics of care inherent both to healing and to ethnography. Clinician-ethnographers often find themselves practicing within harmful systems that they also critique, such as hospitals or carceral institutions. This paper analyzes the dual practice of obstetrical care and ethnography in a county jail and a county hospital. These intertwined roles involve wrestling with sometimes conflicting vocational and ethical obligations to heal, to protect privacy, to address bodily consequences of systemic oppressions, and to critique the systems that mete human suffering. Developing a consciousness of clinical-ethnographers' complicity, rather than disavowing it, can be aligned with approaches of abolition medicine to reimagine more just forms of healing.

Genome Editing in Livestock, Complicity, and the Technological Fix Objection

Genome editing in livestock could potentially be used in ways that help resolve some of the most urgent and serious global problems pertaining to livestock, including animal suffering, pollution, antimicrobial resistance, and the spread of infectious disease. But despite this potential, some may object to pursuing it, not because genome editing is wrong in and of itself, but because it is the wrong kind of solution to the problems it addresses: it is merely a 'technological fix' to a complex societal problem. Yet though this objection might have wide intuitive appeal, it is often not clear what, exactly, the moral problem is supposed to be. The aim of this paper is to formulate and shed some light on the 'technological fix objection' to genome editing in livestock. I suggest that three concerns may underlie it, make implicit assumptions underlying the concerns explicit, and cast some doubt on several of these assumptions, at least as they apply to the use of genome editing to produce pigs resistant to the Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome and hornless dairy cattle. I then suggest that the third, and most important, concern could be framed as a concern about complicity in factory farming. I suggest ways to evaluate this concern, and to reduce or offset any complicity in factory farming. Thinking of genome editing's contribution to factory farming in terms of complicity, may, I suggest, tie it more explicitly and strongly to the wider obligations that come with pursuing it, including the cessation of factory farming, thereby addressing the concern that technological fixes focus only on a narrow problem.

'I'm trying to tell you this man is dangerous… and no one's listening': family violence, parent-school engagement and school complicity

This paper presents a case study of one mother's experience of engaging with her children's schools after leaving a long-term relationship characterised by years of family violence perpetrated by the children's father. We interviewed Bernadette as part of an ongoing study of parents' experiences of school engagement during family separation and divorce. Her family circumstances and the role the children's schools played in that story merit consideration by educators, school leaders and education policy makers. Informed by theories of everyday cultural practices and sociological studies of gendered power relations in education, we argue that gender politics and organisational strategies for keeping parents 'in their place' can significantly contribute to systemic failures and school cultures that reinscribe the effects of family violence.

Complicity in Harm Reduction

At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label "harm reduction." If harm is bad, as everyone recognizes, then surely reducing it is good. What's the problem? The problem, we submit, is twofold. First, there's more to "harm reduction," as that term is typically used, than simply the reduction of harm. Some of the wariness about harm-reduction programs may result from the nebulous "more." Thus, part of our task is to provide a clear definition of harm reduction. Next, we turn to a second problem: a worry about complicity. Those who object to harm reduction programs fear that participation in such programs would make them complicit in activities they deem immoral. In this paper we argue that this fear is largely unwarranted. We use supervised injection sites (SISs)-safe spaces for the use of risky drugs-as our paradigmatic case of harm reduction. These SISs are generally offered in the hope of reducing harm to both the drug user and the public. For this reason, our analysis focuses on complicity in harm. We draw upon the work of Gregory Mellema as our framework. Mellema offers three ways one can be complicit in harm caused by another: by enabling, facilitating or condoning it. We argue that one who operates an SIS is not complicit in any of these ways, while also laying out the conditions that must be met if one is to argue that harm reduction entails complicity in non-consequentialist wrongdoing.

Conscientious Objection in Medicine: Making it Public

The literature on conscientious objection in medicine presents two key problems that remain unresolved: (a) Which conscientious objections in medicine are justified, if it is not feasible for individual medical practitioners to conclusively demonstrate the genuineness or reasonableness of their objections ("the justification problem")? (b) How does one respect both medical practitioners' claims of conscience and patients' interests, without leaving practitioners complicit in perceived or actual wrongdoing ("the complicity problem")? My aim in this paper is to offer a new framework for conscientious objections in medicine, which, by bringing medical professionals' conscientious objection into the public realm, solves the justification and complicity problems. In particular, I will argue that: (a) an "Uber Conscientious Objection in Medicine Committee" ("UCOM Committee")-which includes representatives from the medical community and from other professions, as well as from various religions and from the patient population-should assess various well-known conscientious objections in medicine in terms of public reason and decide which conscientious objections should be permitted, without hearing out individual conscientious objectors; (b) medical practitioners should advertise their (UCOM Committee preapproved) conscientious objections, ahead of time, in an online database that would be easily accessible to the public, without being required, in most cases, to refer patients to non-objecting practitioners.

The Besançon affective picture set-adult (BAPS-Adult): Development and validation

We developed and validated a new picture database of attachment-related photographs, the BAPS-Adult. Participants (N = 315) rated 256 pictures, according to dimension (valence, arousal, and dominance) using Self-Assessment Manikins (SAM), emotional category (positive, negative, mixed, and neutral) using labels, and discrete emotion (comfort, joy, complicity, distress, horror, and hate) using linear scales. Pictures were then classified into four types, depending on content (distress, comfort, complicity-joy, and neutral). Dimensional ratings of valence, arousal, and dominance, as well as discrete emotion ratings, differed significantly from each other between picture types. The BAPS-Adult is a new, highly discriminated database, allowing researchers to select from a variety of pre-rated, attachment-related pictures.

Cross-border reproductive care for law evasion: should physicians be allowed to help infertility patients evade the law of their own country?

There are fundamental differences between countries with regard to legislation on assisted reproduction. Many infertility patients are looking to evade the law of their own country and make use of reproductive services abroad. The role of the local physician in cross-border reproductive care for law evasion has been characterized as "channeling local patients to foreign medical establishments" and "against the spirit and essence of the law". The logical view is that by supporting CBRC for law evasion, physicians are essentially supporting immoral behavior. We will tackle this position on two levels. First, we will argue that governments should generally be tolerant toward people with different positions on assisted reproduction. Second, we will show that contributing to cross-border reproductive care for law evasion is not necessarily immoral, because the prima facie wrongness of complicity in law evasion can be outweighed by the fact that physicians should act in the best interest of the patient. Several countries have tried to prevent local physicians from helping patients to make use of reproductive services abroad, but they should rather leave it up to the individual physicians to decide whether or not to support a particular patient.