Development and implementation of natural killer cell simultaneous ADCC and direct killing assay

Assays to quantify natural killer (NK) cell killing efficacy have traditionally focused on assessing either direct killing or antibody dependent cell-mediated cytotoxicity (ADCC) independently. Due to the probability that immunotherapeutic interventions affect NK cell-mediated direct killing and NK cell-mediated ADCC differently, we developed an assay with the capacity to measure NK cell-mediated direct killing and ADCC simultaneously with cells from the same human donor. Specifically, this design allows for a single NK cell population to be split into several experimental conditions (e.g., direct killing, ADCC), thus controlling for potential confounders associated with human-to-human variation when assessing immunotherapy impacts. Our Natural Killer cell Simultaneous ADCC and Direct Killing Assay (NK-SADKA) allows researchers to reproducibly quantify both direct killing and ADCC by human NK cells. Furthermore, this optimized experimental design allows for concurrent analysis of the NK cells via flow cytometric immunophenotyping of NK cell populations which will facilitate the identification of relationships between NK cell phenotype and the subsequent killing potential. This assay will be valuable for assessing the broader impact(s) of immunotherapy strategies on both modes of NK cell killing.

Double-Effect Donation or Bodily Respect? A "Third Way" Response to Camosy and Vukov

Is it possible to donate unpaired vital organs, foreseeing but not intending one's own death? We argue that this is indeed psychologically possible, and thus far agree with Charles Camosy and Joseph Vukov in their recent paper on "double effect donation." Where we disagree with these authors is that we see double-effect donation not as a morally praiseworthy act akin to martyrdom but as a morally impermissible act that necessarily disrespects human bodily integrity. Respect for bodily integrity goes beyond avoiding the aim to kill: not all side effects of deliberate bodily interventions can be outweighed by intended benefits for another even if the subject fully consents. It is not any necessary intention to kill or harm another or oneself that makes lethal donation/harvesting illicit but the more immediate intention to accept or perform surgery on an (innocent) person combined with the foresight of lethal harm and no health-related good for him or her. Double-effect donation falls foul of the first condition of double-effect reasoning in that the immediate act is wrong in itself. We argue further that the wider effects of such donation would be socially disastrous and corrupting of the medical profession: doctors should retain a sense of nonnegotiable respect for bodily integrity even when they intervene on willing subjects for the benefit of others. Summary: Lethal organ donation (for example, donating one's heart) is not a praiseworthy but a morally impermissible act. This is not because such donation necessarily involves any aim to kill oneself (if one is the donor) or to kill the donor (if one is the surgeon). Respect for bodily integrity goes beyond avoiding any hypothetical aim to kill or harm oneself or another innocent person. 'Double effect donation' of unpaired vital organs, defended by Camosy and Vukov, is in our view a form of lethal bodily abuse and would also harm the transplant team, the medical profession and society at large.

Targeting the Fetal Body and/or Mother-Child Connection: Vital Conflicts and Abortion

Is the "act itself" of separating a pregnant woman and her previable child neither good nor bad morally, considered in the abstract? Recently, Maureen Condic and Donna Harrison have argued that such separation is justified to protect the mother's life and that it does not constitute an abortion as the aim is not to kill the child. In our article on maternal-fetal conflicts, we agree there need be no such aim to kill (supplementing aims such as to remove). However, we argue that to understand "abortion" as performed only where the death of the child is intended is to define the term too narrowly. Respect for the mother, the fetus, and the bond between them goes well beyond avoiding any such aim. We distinguish between legitimate maternal treatments simply aimed at treating or removing a damaged part of the woman and illegitimate treatments that focus harmfully on the fetal body and its presence within the mother's body. In obstetrics as elsewhere, not all side effects for one subject of intervention can be outweighed by intended benefits for another. Certain side effects of certain intended interventions are morally conclusive.

Summary

How should one respond to "vital conflicts" in pregnancy where the mother's life or health is at risk? We argue that, in addition to avoiding any aim of ending life, one must avoid the similarly unacceptable aims of evicting the baby pre-viability and invading its body, including its placenta, in a lethally harmful way. Even at the cost of real and important benefits for the mother such as increased safety and protection of fertility, we must manage cases always in a way that respects the inviolable bodily rights of both mother and child and crucially, the unique bond between them.