Cao W, Yu J. Evolutionary game analysis of factors influencing green innovation in Enterprises under environmental governance constraints.
Environ Res 2024;
248:118095. [PMID:
38272295 DOI:
10.1016/j.envres.2023.118095]
[Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2023] [Revised: 12/15/2023] [Accepted: 12/31/2023] [Indexed: 01/27/2024]
Abstract
The key to controlling environmental pollution is to promote green innovation in relevant enterprises and achieve a healthy development of the environmental governance system. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental protection enterprises, polluting enterprises, and governments, and conducts in-depth research on the influencing factors that promote green innovation in two types of enterprises. MATLAB software is used to analyze the impact of different degrees of influencing variables on system evolution. It has found that (1) increasing the intensity of environmental governance and the level of innovation subsidies by the government can effectively promote green innovation in both types of enterprises. (2) The varying degrees of innovation compensation from polluting enterprises to environmental protection enterprises have a significant impact on system evolution. (3) The initial intention and population size of two types of enterprise entities will have a significant impact on system evolution. In the initial state, subjects with more green innovation are less willing to change their strategies during the evolution process, while the willingness of the other party to green innovation will be suppressed.
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