Confidence as a metacognitive contributor to and consequence of misinformation experiences

Exposures to inaccurate information can lead people to become confused about what is true, to doubt their understandings, and to rely on the ideas later. Recent work has begun to investigate the role of metacognition in these effects. We review research foregrounding confidence as an exemplar metacognitive contributor to misinformation experiences. Miscalibrations between confidence about what one knows, and the actual knowledge one possesses, can help explain why people might hold fast to misinformed beliefs even in the face of counterevidence. Miscalibrations can also emerge after brief exposures to new misinformation, allowing even obvious inaccuracies to influence subsequent performance. Evidence additionally suggests confidence may present a useful target for intervention, helping to encourage careful evaluation under the right conditions.

I know It's false, but I keep thinking as if it were true: A replication study of Johnson and Seifert's (1994) continued influence effect

False Information (FI) is a critical societal issue, made even more pressing by our inability to mitigate its influence through correction. Researchers Johnson and Seifert (1994, Experiment 1A) penned a seminal paper on this "Continued Influence Effect" (CIE), which they observed in English-speaking participants. In their experiments, one group read a text containing FI that was later retracted (FI group), while another read the same text without FI (control group). Interestingly, even after receiving corrections, participants who read the FI were more likely than their peers to form FI-related inferences about the text. To the best of our knowledge, this finding has never been successfully directly replicated. Given the current replicability crisis plaguing the human sciences, the influence of culture on CIE and the importance of Johnson and Seifert's paradigm in this literature, the reassessment of their findings within a non-English-speaking population appears crucial. The present research investigated the direct replicability of their study with a French-speaking sample, comparing the inferences drawn by an FI group (n = 21) to those made by a control group (n = 23). The results confirm those of the original study, supporting the validity of Johnson and Seifert's paradigm (1994) and extending its applicability to a French-speaking population.

Detecting falsehood relies on mismatch detection between sentence components

How do people process and evaluate falsehood of sentences? Do people need to compare presented information with the correct answer to determine that a sentence is false, or do they rely on a mismatch between presented sentence components? To illustrate, when confronted with the false sentence 'trains run on highways', does one need to know that trains do not run on highways or does one need to know that trains run on tracks to reject the sentence as false? To investigate these questions, participants were asked to validate sentences that were preceded by images (Experiments 1-3) conveying a truth-congruent or a falsehood-congruent component of the sentence (e.g., an image of tracks/highway preceding the sentence 'trains run on tracks/highways') or by words (Experiment 4) that were either sentence-congruent, truth-congruent, or both (e.g., the word 'train/tracks' preceding the sentence 'trains run on tracks/highways'). Results from four experiments showed that activating sentence-congruent concepts facilitates validation for both false and true sentences but that activating truth-congruent concepts did not aid the validation of false sentences. The present findings suggest that a detection of falsehood relies on a mismatch detection between sentence's components, rather than on the activation of true content in the context of a particular sentence.

From Conversations to Digital Communication: The Mnemonic Consequences of Consuming and Producing Information via Social Media

Social media has become one of the most powerful and ubiquitous means by which individuals curate, share, and communicate information with their friends, family, and the world at large. Indeed, 90% of the American adolescents are active social media users, as well as 65% of American adults (Perrin, 2015; see also Duggan & Brenner, 2013). Despite this, psychologists are only beginning to understand the mnemonic consequences associated with social media use. In this article, we will distill this nascent literature by focusing on two primary factors: the type of information (personal vs. public) and the role (producer vs. consumer) individuals play when engaging with social media. In particular, we will highlight research examining induced forgetting for personal information as well as false memories and truthiness for public information. We will end by providing some tentative conclusions and a discussion of areas in need of additional research that will provide a more holistic understanding of the mnemonic consequences associated with social media use.