What Dynamic Approaches Have Taught Us About Cognition and What They Have Not: On Values in Motion and the Importance of Replicable Forms

Over the past several decades, research in the cognitive sciences has foregrounded the importance of active bodies and their continuous dependence on the changing environment, strengthening the relevance of dynamical models. These models have been steadily developed within the ecological psychology approach to cognition, which arguably contributes to the "ecological turn" we are witnessing today. The embodied and situated nature of cognition, regarded by some as a passing trend, is presently becoming a largely accepted assumption. In this paper, I claim that in light of these developments, ecological psychology, in alliance with related approaches, such as enactivism and interactivism, has the potential to deeply transform our perspectives on cognition and action, restoring their pertinence to humans as persons. However, an important challenge to the realization of this potential has to be noted: neither the mainstream information-processing approach nor the dynamics-oriented perspective on cognition provides an account of how the capacity of humans to use language and think "symbolically" can be derived from the continuous flow of agent-environment interaction. I will attempt to show that posing the "dynamical" and "computational" hypotheses about the nature of cognition as mutually exclusive approaches to cognition results in undesirable reductionism, which makes it difficult to meet this challenge. There are good reasons, advanced over half a century ago by, for example, Michael Polanyi or Howard Pattee, to think that we need complementary descriptions to understand cognizing systems, in order to grasp the fact that they are governed both by physical laws and by emergent historical constraints. Details of such a complementarity-based approach still await elucidation, but some proposed solutions have the potential to ease the tension between the information-processing and dynamical approaches to cognition and to lead to a better understanding of their interrelation.

Do graspable objects always leave a motor signature? A study on memory traces

Several studies have reported the existence of reciprocal interactions between the type of motor activity physically performed on objects and the conceptual knowledge that is retained of them. Whether covert motor activity plays a similar effect is less clear. Certainly, objects are strong triggers for actions, and motor components can make the associated concepts more memorable. However, addition of an action-related memory trace may not always be automatic and could rather depend on 'how' objects are encountered. To test this hypothesis, we compared memory for objects that passive observers experienced as verbal labels (the word describing them), visual images (color photographs) and actions (pantomimes of object use). We predicted that the more direct the involvement of action-related representations the more effective would be the addition of a motor code to the experience and the more accurate would be the recall. Results showed that memory for objects presented as words i.e., a format that might only indirectly prime the sensorimotor system, was generally less accurate compared to memory for objects presented as photographs or pantomimes, which are more likely to directly elicit motor simulation processes. In addition, free recall of objects experienced as pantomimes was more accurate when these items afforded actions performed towards one's body than actions directed away from the body. We propose that covert motor activity can contribute to objects' memory, but the beneficial addition of a motor code to the experience is not necessarily automatic. An advantage is more likely to emerge when the observer is induced to take a first-person stance during the encoding phase, as may happen for objects affording actions directed towards the body, which obviously carry more relevance for the actor.

Illness and disease: an empirical-ethical viewpoint

Background

The concepts of disease, illness and sickness capture fundamentally different aspects of phenomena related to human ailments and healthcare. The philosophy and theory of medicine are making manifold efforts to capture the essence and normative implications of these concepts. In parallel, socio-empirical studies on patients’ understanding of their situation have yielded a comprehensive body of knowledge regarding subjective perspectives on health-related statuses. Although both scientific fields provide varied valuable insights, they have not been strongly linked to each other. Therefore, the article aims to scrutinise the normative-ethical implications of patient perspectives in building a bridge to the empirical ethics debates.

Main text

Three potential fields of tension between the illness and the disease perspective are presented. Consequently, findings from empirical research examining patient perspectives on illness are displayed and the practical implications and associated ethical issues which arise are discussed. This leads to the conclusion that an explicit and elaborate empirical-ethical methodology is needed to deal appropriately with the complex interaction between patients’ views and the medico-professional view of disease. Kon’s four-stage model of normative-empirical collaboration is then applied against the background of empirical data on patient perceptions. Starting from this exemplary approach, the article suggests employing empirical-ethical frameworks for further research on the conceptual and normative issues, as they help to integrate perspectives from the philosophy of medicine with socio-empirical research.

Conclusion

The combination of theoretical and empirical perspectives suggested contributes to a more nuanced discussion of the normative impact of patients’ actual understanding of illness. Further empirical research in this area would profit from explicitly considering potential ethical issues to avoid naturalistic fallacies or crypto-normative conclusions that may compromise healthcare practice. Vice versa, medico-theoretical debates could be enriched by integrating subjective views of those people who are immediately affected.

Arguments for a Phenomenologically Informed Clinical Approach to Autism Spectrum Disorder

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this paper is to provide arguments for a phenomenologically informed clinical approach to autism spectrum disorder (ASD), including a plea for clinical attention to the self in ASD.

METHODS

Central concepts of continental phenomenology, phenomenological psychopathology, and the phenomenological interview are presented, with an emphasis on the potential unifying qualities of an approach which includes the exploration of subjective and intersubjective experience. These phenomenological concepts and methods are contrasted with the current conceptualization of ASD, where the first-person perspective is not in focus.

RESULTS

Contemporary phenomenological papers on ASD address key concepts like intersubjectivity, intercorporeality, and intentionality. However, insights from this theoretical field have not been followed up in clinical research and practice. Consequently, there is (to our knowledge) still a lack of phenomenologically informed clinical explorations of experience of self, others, and the world in ASD.

CONCLUSION

A phenomenologically informed focus on the form and structure of subjective experience, including a focus on self-experience in ASD, can lead to new and important insights in relation to clinical differentiation between ASD and schizophrenia spectrum disorder.