Ocular biomechanics during improvised explosive device blast: A computational study using eye-specific models

BACKGROUND

Eye injuries comprise 10-13% of civilian improvised explosive device (IED) injuries. The bomb blast wave induces a normal and shear forces on the tissues, causing a large acute IOP elevation. This study calculated the biomechanical stresses and strains in the eye due to IED explosion via eye-specific fluid-structure interaction (FSI) models.

METHODS

Blast occurred at 2, 3, and 4 m from the front and side of the victim and the weights of the IED were 1 and 2 kg. The ground was covered with the deformable soil to mimic the realistic IED explosion condition and reflect the blast wave.

RESULTS

The IOP elevation of ∼6,000-48,000 mmHg was observed in the eyes while the highest IOP was occurred with the IED weight and distance of 2 kg and 2 m (front) and the lowest was occurred with the IED weight and distance of 1 kg and 4 m (side). Our findings suggest the importance of the victim location and orientation concerning the blast wave when it comes to ocular injury assessment. IOP elevation of ∼2900 and ∼2700 mmHg were observed in ∼1.6 ms after the blast for the IEDS weight of 2 kg and a victim distance of 2 m in front and side blasts, respectively, in consistence with the literature. Nonetheless, IOPs were considerably higher after ∼1.6 ms due to the merging of the bomb blast wave and its reflection off the ground.

CONCLUSIONS

The stresses and strains were highest for the frontal blast. Both side and frontal blasts caused higher stresses and strains at the rectus muscle insertions where the sclera is thinnest and prone to rupture. Blast angle has no considerable role in the resultant IOP. Front blast with a heavier IED resulted a higher stresses and deformations in the eye connective tissues compared to the side blast.

Ocular biomechanics due to ground blast reinforcement

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE

Bomb blast injuries exerts a shearing force on the air-tissue interfaces, causing devastating ocular injury from the blast wave. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are usually placed at different heights from the ground to induce more severe injury through ground blast reinforcement (GBR). However, there is still a lack of knowledge of the role of GBR and IED height from the ground on ocular biomechanics, and how they can affect the intraocular pressure (IOP) in the eye. This study aimed to estimate the IOP due to frontal IED explosion at different heights from the ground using a fluid-structure interaction model with and without GBR effects.

METHODS

A 2 kg IED was placed within 5 m of the victim at 5 different heights from the ground, including 0, 0.42, 0.85, 1.27, and 1.70 m. Two different blast formulations were used to simulate the IED explosion: (a) spherical airburst, with no amplification of the initial shock wave due to interaction with the ground-surface, and (b) hemispherical surface-burst, where the initial blast wave is immediately reflected and reinforced by the ground (GBR).

RESULTS

Results revealed that the blast wave due to GBR reaches to the skull prior to the IED blast itself. The GBR also reached to the skull ∼ 0.6 ms earlier when the IED was on the ground compared to the height of 1.70 m. The highest and lowest IOPs of ∼ 17,000 and ∼ 15,000 mmHg were observed at the IED heights of 1.70 and 0 m from the ground considering GBR. However, when the role of the GBR is ignored, IOP of ∼ 9,000 mmHg was observed regardless of the IED height from the ground. The deformation in the apex of the cornea was higher when considering the GBR (∼ 0.75 cm) versus no GBR (∼ 0.65 cm). Considering GBR led to higher stresses and strains in the sclera.

CONCLUSIONS

When the role of GBR was ignored, the results showed similar patterns and magnitudes of stresses and deformations in the skull and eye regardless of the height of the IED from the ground, which was not the case when GBR was considered. The findings of this study suggest the critical role of GBR in ocular blast simulations.

Raman spectroscopy for detection of ammonium nitrate as an explosive precursor used in improvised explosive devices

Raman spectroscopy was evaluated as a sensor for detection of ammonium nitrate (NH₄NO₃, AN), fuel oil (FO), AN-water solutions, and AN- and FO-soil mixtures deposited on materials such as glass, synthetic fabric, cardboard and electrical tape to simulate field conditions of explosives detection. AN is an inorganic oxidizing salt that is commonly used in fertilizers and mining explosives, however, due to its widespread accessibility, AN-based explosives are also utilized for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IED). Pure AN crystals were ground to powder size and deposited on several substrates for Raman analysis, whereas FO was analysed in a quartz cuvette. To simulate field conditions samples of powdered AN, AN-water solutions (0.1% to 10.0% AN w/w), AN-soil (50% to 90% AN w/w) and FO-soil (50% to 75% FO w/w) were prepared and deposited on the clutter materials. Raman spectra were acquired at integration times between 0.1 and 30 s, and 3 replicate Raman measurements were carried out for each sample. The spectral window observed ranged from 300 to 3800 cm^-1. Several characteristic Raman bands were found, namely, at 710 cm^-1 (NO₃^-) and 1040 cm^-1 (NO₃^-) for AN; 1440-1470 cm^-1 (CH) and 2800-3000 cm^-1 (CH) for FO; 3000-3500 cm^-1 (OH) for water; and 615 cm^-1 (CCl), 1254 cm^-1 (CH), 1400 cm^-1 (CH₂) and 1600 cm^-1 (aromatic ring) for polyvinyl chloride (PVC, electrical tape). The effect of the AN concentration and integration time on the total and net Raman intensities, relative standard deviation, signal-to-noise ratio and relative limit of detection was evaluated. The relative limit of detection of AN in water was 0.1% (1 mg/g), and absolute limit of detection was 1.0 μg. The optimum integration time (≈10 s) for the Raman sensor to capture the analyte signals was estimated based on the Raman figures of merit as a function of the integration time.

Identification of the Emplacement of Improvised Explosive Devices by Experienced Mission Payload Operators

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have become one of the deadliest threats to military personnel, resulting in over 50% of American combat casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Identification of IED emplacement is conducted by mission payload operators (MPOs). Yet, experienced MPOs are limited in number, making MPO training a critical intervention. In this article, we implement a Cognitive Engineering Based on Expert Skill methodology to better understand how experienced MPOs identify the emplacement of IEDs for the purposes of improving training. First, expert knowledge was elicited through interviews and questionnaires to identify the types of perceptual cues used and how these cues are cognitively processed. Results indicate that there are many different static and dynamic cues that interact with each other over time and space. Using data from the interviews and questionnaires, an empirically grounded framework is presented that explains the cognitive process of IED emplacement detection. Using the overall findings and the framework, IED emplacement training scenarios were developed and built into a simulation.