Don't be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions

The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that prima facie look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conception by suggesting that the existing analyses of the phenomenon overlook a non-obvious category of hearers whom the speakers of bald-faced lies intend to deceive. Those hearers are institutions represented by the people involved, such as courts or secret police. We also criticize two recent rival accounts (Jessica Keiser's and Daniel Harris's) that attempt to save the traditional conception by saying that some bald-faced lies are not assertions, because they are conventional-rather than illocutionary-speech acts.

Emotions and ethics: How emotions sensitize perceptions of the consequences for self and others to motivate unethical behavior

In this work, we suggest that emotions differentiated by cognitive appraisals may promote self-concern or other-concern that alter the utilitarian calculus of weighing the harm and benefits associated with moral decision-making. We introduce the Emotions and Ethics Framework to elucidate the intrapsychic effect of emotion on deception. When emotions promote self-concern, individuals are more likely engage in selfish deception. By contrast, when emotions promote other-concern, individuals are more likely to exhibit honesty. Furthermore, we extrapolate our theoretical model to consider how felt emotions influence different types of deception: selfish lies, prosocial lies, spiteful lies, and pareto lies. Finally, we theorize about the interpersonal effect of emotional expressions on deception, suggesting that the ethical consequences of emotion contagion and reverse-appraisal processes are distinct.

Older adults are more approving of blunt honesty than younger adults: a cross-cultural study

Research has explored age-related and cultural differences in moral evaluations of dishonesty; however, this has not yet been examined in an aging context. The present study provided a novel account of how younger and older adults (in Canada, Singapore, and China; N = 401) morally evaluate adults' truths and lies in antisocial, modesty, and politeness settings. Participants completed a questionnaire assessing how acceptable it is for adults to tell the truth or a lie in given social scenarios, and they reported on their levels of collectivism and individualism. In all countries, older adults provided more favorable evaluations to blunt and immodest truths than younger adults did. Compared with younger adults, older adults provided harsher evaluations to Polite Lies (in Canada and China) and Modesty Lies (in Canada and Singapore). Thus, there may be an age-related increase in the acceptability of direct honesty over good-intentioned lies, and this age effect is somewhat stable across cultures. Older adults were also more lenient in evaluations of an antisocial lie to conceal an affair compared to younger adults. Overall, adults in China tended to rate lies less negatively, and their greater levels of collectivism mediated their greater approval of polite lies. The present results demonstrate that evaluations of (dis)honesty differ as a function of age and culture and these results can assist in developing a more complete lifespan model of the morality of dishonesty.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-03785-6.

Truth-default theory and the psychology of lying and deception detection

Truth-default theory offers an account of human deceptive communication where people are honest unless they have a motive to deceive and people passively believe others unless suspicion and doubt are actively triggered. The theory is argued to account for wide swings in vulnerability to deception in different types of situations in and out of the lab. Three moderators are advanced to account for differential vulnerability to political misinformation and disinformation. Own belief congruity, social congruence, and message repetition are argued to combine to affect the probability that implausible and refutable false information is accepted as true.

How Do Adolescents Manage Information in the Relationship with Their Parents? A Latent Class Analysis of Disclosure, Keeping Secrets, and Lying

The use of disclosure and concealment strategies by adolescents in the relationship with their parents may have important implications for their adjustment. Few studies of adolescents' information management have taken a person-centered approach, yet it is a useful way to understand variations in how they regulate information shared with their parents. This study explored adolescents' information management constellations with their mothers and fathers, and how these patterns differ in terms of perceived need-supportive parenting, autonomous reasons for disclosure, and problematic alcohol use. Three hundred thirty-two Swiss adolescents (45% female; M_age = 15.01 years) reported information management strategies used with each parent (disclosure, keeping secrets, lying), perceptions of maternal and paternal need-supportive parenting (involvement, autonomy support, structure), autonomous reasons for disclosure, and problematic alcohol use. Latent class analyses revealed three classes: Reserved (37%), Communicators (36%), and Deceptive (27%). Comparisons across classes showed that adolescents in the Communicators class reported the highest levels of parental involvement and autonomy support, as well as autonomous reasons for disclosure. Adolescents in the Deceptive class reported the lowest levels of parental involvement and autonomy support, as well as autonomous reasons for disclosure. Associations between classes and problematic alcohol use were also found, such that the likelihood of problem drinking was greater for adolescents in the Deceptive class. These findings underscore the importance of continued information sharing with both parents, and underline how a need-supportive parenting context may encourage adolescents to talk voluntarily.

Neural responses of in-group "favoritism" and out-group "discrimination" toward moral behaviors

People hate being deceived. However, what would it be if lies come from in-group members compared with that from out-group members? In the current Electroencephalography (EEG) study, we recruited thirty-six participants to play a modified estimator and advisor game to investigate the mental and neural processes to lies and truth conveyed by in-group and out-group members. At the behavioral level, lies are less morally acceptable, arose less positive emotion, and made participants distribute less money to the advisor in a dictator game. Meanwhile, participants liked the in-group university more than the out-group university and they thought they were more similar to in-group members than to out-group members. However, there were no significant interactions of group type (i.e., in-group and out-group) and message type (i.e., lies and truth) in the aforementioned behavioral assessments. At the neural level, significant interaction effects were found in the parietal N1 and P3 amplitude. More importantly, no significant N1 and P3 amplitude differences between in-group lies and truth were found, while outgroup lies elicited larger P3 amplitude than outgroup truth and out-group truth elicited larger N1 amplitude than outgroup lies. What's more, P3 amplitude differences between lies vs. truth positively correlated with fairness scores only in the in-group condition but not in the out-group condition. Current study showed that the P3 component was sensitive in capturing subtle differences when participants were processing different types of lies and truth that could not be captured by behavioral measurements. Besides, the fairness trait modulated the in-group bias related P3 patterns. The current study provides insight into the neurobiological mechanism underlying the mental process of in-group and out-group lies and truth, and suggests individuals' tendency of general in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination toward moral behaviors.

Lies that feel honest: Dissociating between incentive and deviance processing when evaluating dishonesty

This study investigated neural responses to evaluations of lies made by others. Participants learned about other individuals who were instructed to privately roll a die twice and report the outcome of the first roll to determine their pay (with higher rolls leading to higher pay). Participants evaluated three types of outcomes: honest reports, justifiable lies (reporting the second outcome instead of the first), or unjustifiable lies (reporting a different outcome than both die rolls). Evaluating lies relative to honest reports was associated with increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula and lateral prefrontal cortex. Moreover, justifiable lies were associated with even stronger activity in the dorsal ACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared to unjustifiable lies. These activities were more pronounced for justifiable lies where the deviance from the real outcome was larger. Together, these findings have implications for understanding how humans judge misconduct behavior of others.