Outcomes of non-COVID-19 critically ill patients during the COVID-19 pandemic : A retrospective propensity score-matched analysis

BACKGROUND

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) disrupts routine care and alters treatment pathways in every medical specialty, including intensive care medicine, which has been at the core of the pandemic response. The impact of the pandemic is inevitably not limited to patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection and their outcomes; however, the impact of COVID-19 on intensive care has not yet been analyzed.

METHODS

The objective of this propensity score-matched study was to compare the clinical outcomes of non-COVID-19 critically ill patients with the outcomes of prepandemic patients. Critically ill, non-COVID-19 patients admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) during the first wave of the pandemic were matched with patients admitted in the previous year. Mortality, length of stay, and rate of readmission were compared between the two groups after matching.

RESULTS

A total of 211 critically ill SARS-CoV‑2 negative patients admitted between 13 March 2020 and 16 May 2020 were matched to 211 controls, selected from a matching pool of 1421 eligible patients admitted to the ICU in 2019. After matching, the outcomes were not significantly different between the two groups: ICU mortality was 5.2% in 2019 and 8.5% in 2020, p = 0.248, while intrahospital mortality was 10.9% in 2019 and 14.2% in 2020, p = 0.378. The median ICU length of stay was similar in 2019: 4 days (IQR 2-6) compared to 2020: 4 days (IQR 2-7), p = 0.196. The rate of ICU readmission was 15.6% in 2019 and 10.9% in 2020, p = 0.344.

CONCLUSION

In this retrospective single center study, mortality, ICU length of stay, and rate of ICU readmission did not differ significantly between patients admitted to the ICU during the implementation of hospital-wide COVID-19 contingency planning and patients admitted to the ICU before the pandemic.

Good emergency management practices: a review of the core principles, with a focus on preparedness

Animal health emergencies can also have serious socio-economic and public health consequences, including impacts on human health, as well as food security and safety. Therefore, policy-makers and advisers should take an active part in the development of emergency management systems. A formally structured animal health emergency management system sets out, in a systematic way, the elements required to achieve the necessary level of preparedness, and provides for planning and implementation of the appropriate actions to be taken in an emergency. Good emergency management practices, as laid down by the Emergency Management Centre for Animal Health (EMC-AH) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, should incorporate all four phases of an animal health event: peacetime (i.e. before the event occurs), alert, emergency and reconstruction. Five actions are implemented before, during and after an animal health event: prepare, prevent, detect, respond and recover. A strategic action plan can be drafted to schedule the activities required to develop the emergency management system and increase a country's level of preparedness, step by step. The EMC-AH aims to support all components of emergency management at the national, regional and international levels along this progressive pathway for emergency preparedness.

[Incident-crisis-disaster. Conceptualizing unusual biological incidents]

Unusual biological threats demand adequate preparedness efforts, as demonstrated, for example, by the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014/2015 and pandemic influenza in 2009/2010. In Germany, responsibilities for such efforts are located in different governmental authorities and differ from state to state. As a result, there are many different preparedness approaches using divergent core terminology.In this article a common definition for the term "unusual biological incident" is proposed. To do so, a literature review as well as semi-structured expert interviews with representatives of central actors in Germany were conducted. The understanding of "unusual biological incident" was not consistent among experts; four approaches to qualify a biological incident as "unusual" were identified. These were merged in a comprehensive system-oriented approach that focuses on the health system's resilience and on shortages of knowledge and material resources during incidents.Based on this approach, we suggest a stage model for the categorization of biological threats as "incident," "crisis," "severe crisis," or "disaster." The need for central coordination is a defining characteristic to qualify a biological incident as "unusual." Based on the identified shortages, the necessary response strategies can be derived.