Introduction to an epistemology for analytical psychology in a civilization in transition

This paper explores the epistemological sources of C.G. Jung's psychology over the course of its historical evolution. It considers whether his model should be seen as a scientific-philosophical, artistic, or an ethical-mystical model, or a combination of these; whether epistemological knowledge can come from getting a 'vision of the whole' or 'grasping the particulars thoroughly' (Jung 1939, para. 1012); as well as exploring the philosophers of science with whom Jung's epistemological model best coheres. The paper calls on the work of Joseph Henderson and his concept of the cultural unconscious, as well as exploring the contribution of Brazilian and Latin American civilization to the evolution of analytical psychology.

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"The singular state of the ice". The Cartographic Knowledge of the Whaler William Scoresby. The English whaler William Scoresby, Jr. (1790-1857) made use of his annual voyages to the Greenland Sea for distinguished scientific work, detailed records and the production of amazing maps. Due to his intensive contacts to scientists as Robert Jameson and politicians as Joseph Banks and John Barrow his research achieved a great deal of attention and set a benchmark for at least half a century. Scoresby combined the adventurous world of Arctic fishery with academic sciences. He attained the northernmost point anybody reached in his time, he extended the cartographic knowledge and forced the conquest and utilisation of the oceans for commercial fishing. But his biography enquires also about who got an opportunity for research and for what. Especially it demonstrates the strong impact practical knowledge of a whaler could have on geographic research and Arctic cartography.

Are you afraid of the dark? Notes on the psychology of belief in histories of science and the occult

The popular view of the inherent conflict between science and the occult has been rendered obsolete by recent advances in the history of science. Yet, these historiographical revisions have gone unnoticed in the public understanding of science and public education at large. Particularly, reconstructions of the formation of modern psychology and its links to psychical research can show that the standard view of the latter as motivated by metaphysical bias fails to stand up to scrutiny. After highlighting certain basic methodological maxims shared by psychotherapists and historians, I will try to counterbalance simplistic claims of a ‘need to believe’ as a precondition of scientific open-mindedness regarding the occurrence of parapsychological phenomena by discussing instances revealing a presumably widespread ‘will to disbelieve’ in the occult. I shall argue that generalized psychological explanations are only helpful in our understanding of history if we apply them in a symmetrical manner.

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History and Philosophy of Science. Between Description and Construction. Taking into consideration the huge amount of programs and departments in 'History and Philosophy of Science' (HPS), partly including also technology and sociology of science, the rather weak theoretical conceptualization of this field seems surprising. HPS is conceived of neither as a mere addition of history of science and philosophy of science, nor as a good will parallel action. Therefore, the question arises about the genuine subject and method of this trans- and interdisciplinary field of research and teaching. The recent postulate of an "integrated HPS" indicates the need of a closer and more intrinsic cooperation and interaction between history of science and philosophy of science (covering also the social and cultural sciences) from a theoretical and practical point of view. In addition, there should be no more privileging of any part in this joint scholarly enterprise by overcoming the context of discovery and the context of justification. Some best practices and desiderata are mentioned together with the forgotten history of the philosophy of science itself. Based on the description of the scholarly field an ideal-typical model of HPS is offered.

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Changing Perspectives - From the Experimental to the Technological Turn in History and Philosophy of Science. In the 1960s the philosophy of science was transformed through the encounter with the history of science, resulting in a collaborative venture by the name of "History and Philosophy of Science" (HPS). Philosophy of science adopted ever more regularly the format of the case study to reconstruct certain episodes from the history of science, and historians were mostly interested in the production of scientific knowledge. The so-called "experimental turn" of the 1980s owed to this interaction between philosophy and history. Its guiding question remained quite traditional, however, namely "How do the sciences achieve an agreement between representation and reality?" Only the answers to this question broke with tradition by focusing not on theory but on the role of instruments and experiments. - Roughly 30 years after the experimental turn, another transformative encounter appears to be taking place. HPS is being transformed in the encounter with philosophy of technology. From the point of view of philosophy of technology, the question does not arise whether and how the agreement of mind and world, representation and reality can be achieved. When things are constructed, built or made, human thinking and physical materiality are inseparably intertwined. Instead of seeking to describe a mind-independent reality, technoscientific researchers are working to acquire and demonstrate capabilities of experimental or predictive control. When science is regarded as a kind of technology, a program of study opens up for epistemology and so do avenues for the historiography of science. History of science might now show how the problems and procedures of the sciences arise from and impinge back upon a world that is itself a product of science and technology. It thereby abandons its traditional HPS niche existence and joins forces with environmental history, history of technology, social, labor, and consumer history.

["Wachstum" oder "Revolution"? Ernst Cassirer und die Wissenschaftsgeschichte]

"Growth" or "Revolution"? Ernst Cassirer and History of Science. Ernst Cassirer's contributions to history of science have been long time neglected. The aim of this paper is to show the historical and philosophical framework of Cassirer's engagement in this field, starting from his seminal work about the problem of knowledge in science and philosophy of the modern age. Moreover the author suggests that Cassirer's late studies about Galilei and the origins of mathematical science are of some interest in order to comprehend both his commitment to contemporary history of science (from Burtt to Koyré) and his intellectual heritage for our agendas in a post-Kuhnian era.

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History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Introductory Remarks. This article introduces two special issues of the journal History of Science Reports (Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte) with contributions on the relationships of history and philosophy of science since the seventeenth century. The introduction begins with a brief reminder of Thomas Kuhn's provocative discussion of the relationship in the 1970s, placing it in the context of the debate of the period over whether the foundation of university departments for History and Philosophy of Science in the United States had led to a mere "marriage of convenience" or something more. Following this the paper briefly outlines the transformative impact of the "practical turn" in both philosophy and history of science since the 1990s, and contends that the relationship of history and philosophy of science has nonetheless become increasingly distant over time. This is due in large part to the professionalisation of history of science and to the recent turn to cultural approaches in that field; both trends have led to the adoption of strictly historicist rather than analytical perspectives on knowledge. General historians, too, are paying more attention to the increasing impact of science and technology, but have at most instrumental use for philosophical perspectives. Thus, the distinct possibility arises that the debate between historical and analytical approaches in philosophy of science is becoming a conversation within one discipline rather than a dialogue between two disciplines: what was once a "marriage of convenience"︁ could end in respectful separation or amicable divorce. The article concludes with brief summaries of the articles published in the two special issues, indicating their relations to specific aspects of the broader topic at hand.