Artificial womb technology, pregnancy, and EU employment rights

This article considers challenges for the European Union (EU) maternity and pregnancy rights framework when faced with advances in reproductive technology. Specifically, we consider how the introduction of the 'artificial womb' technology, an alternative to bodily gestation, would impact the availability of rights that exist under the maternity and discrimination framework. Employment rights in the EU context have already been confronted by the challenges of advancements in reproduction. We use the case law on in vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy as a baseline for unpacking the challenges that 'artificial wombs' will bring. This analysis of the legal framework on maternity rights and sex discrimination will highlight potential avenues for integrating this technology and ensuring the continuation of rights for those opting for it. We advocate against the stratification of maternity and pregnancy rights based on the reproductive and gestational choices made by the pregnant person.

Abortion & 'artificial wombs': would 'artificial womb' technology legally empower non-gestating genetic progenitors to participate in decisions about how to terminate pregnancy in England and Wales?

'Artificial womb' technology is highly anticipated for the benefits it might have as an alternative to neonatal intensive care and for pregnant people. In the bioethical literature, it has been suggested that such technology will force us to rethink the ethics of abortion. Some scholars have suggested that a pregnant person may be entitled to end a pregnancy but, with the advent of ectogestation, they may not be unilaterally entitled to opt for an abortion where the other genetic progenitor does not agree. Following two high-profile cases in England and Wales in the late 70s and 80s, English law is clear that genetic progenitors who do not gestate have no say in abortion decisions. It might be argued, however, that ectogestation casts doubt on the exclusion of all claims by genetic progenitors. In this article, I assess what a legal challenge to a decision to opt for abortion might look like with the advent of this technology, by examining whether genetic progenitors have the locus standi or grounds to seek an injunction to prevent abortion. I argue that such a challenge is unlikely to be successful.

Artificial womb technology and clinical translation: Innovative treatment or medical research?

In 2017 and 2019, two research teams claimed 'proof of principle' for artificial womb technology (AWT). AWT has long been a subject of speculation in bioethical literature, with broad consensus that it is a welcome development. Despite this, little attention is afforded to more immediate ethical problems in the development of AWT, particularly as an alternative to neonatal intensive care. To start this conversation, I consider whether experimental AWT is innovative treatment or medical research. The research-treatment distinction, pervasive in regulation worldwide, is intended to isolate research activities and subject them to a greater degree of oversight. I argue that there is a tendency in the literature to conceptualize AWT for partial ectogenesis as innovative treatment. However, there are sufficiently serious ethical concerns with experimental AWT that mean that it must not be first used on humans on the basis that it is a 'beneficial treatment'. First, I outline the prospects for translation of AWT animal studies into treatment for human preterms. Second, I challenge the conceptualizations of experimental AWT as innovative treatment. It must be considered medical research to reflect the investigatory nature of the process and guarantee sufficient protections for subjects. Identifying that AWT is research is crucial in formulating further ethico-legal questions regarding the experimental use of AWT. Third, I demonstrate that clinical trials will be a necessary part of the clinical translation of AWT because of requirements laid out by regulators. I consider the justification for clinical trials and highlight some of the crucial ethical questions about the conditions under which they should proceed.

Is 'viability' viable? Abortion, conceptual confusion and the law in England and Wales and the United States

In this paper, I explore how viability, meaning the ability of the fetus to survive post-delivery, features in the law regulating abortion provision in England and Wales and the USA. I demonstrate that viability is formalized differently in the criminal law in England and Wales and the USA, such that it is quantified and defined differently. I consider how the law might be applied to the examples of artificial womb technology and anencephalic fetuses. I conclude that there is incoherence in the meaning of viability and argue that it is thus a conceptually illegitimate basis on which to ground abortion regulation. This is both because of the fluidity of the concept and because how it has been thus far understood in the law is unsupported by medical realities. Furthermore, it has the effect of heavily diluting pregnant people's rights with overly moralistic limitations on access to healthcare.