Multi-Task Offloading Based on Optimal Stopping Theory in Edge Computing Empowered Internet of Vehicles

Vehicular edge computing is a new computing paradigm. By introducing edge computing into the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), service providers are able to serve users with low-latency services, as edge computing deploys resources (e.g., computation, storage, and bandwidth) at the side close to the IoV users. When mobile nodes are moving and generating structured tasks, they can connect with the roadside units (RSUs) and then choose a proper time and several suitable Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers to offload the tasks. However, how to offload tasks in sequence efficiently is challenging. In response to this problem, in this paper, we propose a time-optimized, multi-task-offloading model adopting the principles of Optimal Stopping Theory (OST) with the objective of maximizing the probability of offloading to the optimal servers. When the server utilization is close to uniformly distributed, we propose another OST-based model with the objective of minimizing the total offloading delay. The proposed models are experimentally compared and evaluated with related OST models using simulated data sets and real data sets, and sensitivity analysis is performed. The results show that the proposed offloading models can be efficiently implemented in the mobile nodes and significantly reduce the total expected processing time of the tasks.

Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing

In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes.