Life-Years & Rationing in the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Critical Analysis

Prominent bioethicists have promoted the preservation of life-years as a rationing strategy in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet the philosophical justification for maximizing life-years is underdeveloped and has a complex history that is not reflected in recent literature. In this article, we offer a critical investigation of the use of life-years, arguing that evidence of public support for the life-years approach is thin and that organ transplantation protocols (heavily cited in pandemic-response protocols) do not provide a precedent for seeking to save the most life-years. We point out that many state emergency-response plans ultimately rejected or severely attenuated the meaning of saving the most life-years, and we argue that philosophical arguments in support of rationing by life-years are remarkably wanting. We conclude by offering a fair alternative that adheres to the standard duties of beneficence, respect for persons, and justice.

It is better to be ignorant of our moral enhancement: A reply to Zambrano

In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet conditions for permissible liberty-restricting public health interventions. Second, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that covert moral bioenhancement undermines autonomy to a greater degree than does overt moral bioenhancement. In this paper, I rebut both of these arguments, then finish by noting important avenues of research that Zambrano's arguments motivate.