The lived experience of mental disorders in adolescents: a bottom-up review co-designed, co-conducted and co-written by experts by experience and academics

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of mental disorders in adolescents co-designed, co-conducted and co-written by experts by experience and academics. We screened first-person accounts within and outside the medical field, and discussed them in collaborative workshops involving numerous experts by experience - representing different genders, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and continents - and their family members and carers. Subsequently, the material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators. The inner subjective experience of adolescents is described for mood disorders, psychotic disorders, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum disorders, anxiety disorders, eating disorders, externalizing disorders, and self-harm behaviors. The recollection of individuals' past histories also indexes the prodromal (often transdiagnostic) features predating the psychiatric diagnosis. The experience of adolescents with mental disorders in the wider society is described with respect to their family, their school and peers, and the social and cultural context. Furthermore, their lived experience of mental health care is described with respect to receiving a diagnosis of mental disorder, accessing mental health support, receiving psychopharmacological treatment, receiving psychotherapy, experiencing peer support and mental health activism, and achieving recovery. These findings can impact clinical practice, research, and the whole society. We hope that this co-designed, co-conducted and co-written journey can help us maintain our commitment to protecting adolescents' fragile mental health, and can help them develop into a healthy, fulfilling and contributing adult life.

Dysphoria as trans-diagnostic mood symptom and as lived experience. Lessons from prose, poetry and philosophy

This paper attempts to provide a characterisation of it from a first-person perspective of dysphoria, answering the question 'how it feels like to be dysphoric?'. Starting with a definition of emotions as embodied phenomena that provide the person with a felt motivation to move, a rich characterisation of dysphoria is provided centred on the coenesthetic and kinesthetic feelings inherent to this emotion. To fulfil this task, a selected choice of literary, poetic, theatrical and philosophical texts is used to compensate for the quasi-ineffability of the contrasting feelings inherent to dysphoria. Current definitions of dysphoria only highlight the 'negative' side of dysphoria, including irritability, discontent, surrender and interpersonal resentment. A more accurate characterisation necessitates the recognition of the 'positive' side of dysphoria and the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in this emotion. Dysphoric persons feel burdened by a weight that prevents them from moving and simultaneously incites movement. The inertia that accompanies dysphoria is inextricably tied in with a vital urge, however disordered and purposeless. Dysphoria is experienced both as a deadly stagnation and as a chaotic, wild impulse that brings with it an inane aspiration to explore the darkest parts of one's self in search of a glimmer of meaning and authenticity. This characterisation of dysphoria can help to differentiate it from other emotions such as sadness, anger, anxiety and anguish, and thus to identify it more precisely within the spectrum of mood disorders.

Major Depression as a Disorder of the Narrative Self: A Qualitative Study

INTRODUCTION

Abnormal self-experiences are a common feature of major depression despite their absence from current diagnostic manuals. Current diagnostic criteria leave us with an impoverished conception of depressive disorders, and they fail to exploit the diverse experiential alterations that might be useful for understanding and diagnosing patients, and last but not least for explaining the aetiology of these disorders. Although some phenomenological descriptions of abnormal self-experiences in major depression are available, further research is needed to validate these through detailed clinical interviews.

METHODS

To characterize these phenomena in more detail and to verify and consolidate previous accounts, we conducted a qualitative study using the Consensual Qualitative Research method.

RESULTS

Our findings identified three categories of abnormal self-experiences: (1) impossibility to project oneself forward, (2) not recognizing one's self, and (3) losing control on one's self.

CONCLUSION

Before delving into these results, we briefly described how the self is conceptualized in phenomenological psychopathology and explored in the literature on the self-experience in major depression. After discussing our results in the light of recent and contemporary phenomenological literature, we suggest that the inability to recognize otherness as part of oneself - which is the core of depressive experiences - ends in specific symptoms of depersonalization that differ from schizophrenic ones. We conclude that the self-experience, and in particular narrative identity, is central to the development and maintenance of depression.

Psychotic-like anomalous self-experiences in feeding and eating disorders: Their role in eating psychopathology through the mediation of body uneasiness and embodiment and identity disorders

BACKGROUND

Psychotic-like anomalous self-experiences (ASEs) are core and early features of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, which have been recently also postulated to underlie embodiment disturbance in feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). The present study was aimed at investigating the interplay between ASEs and specific psychopathology in FED.

METHODS

Ninety persons with Anorexia Nervosa and 41 with Bulimia Nervosa were evaluated with the inventory of psychotic-like anomalous self-experiences (IPASE), identity and eating disorders (IDEA), body uneasiness test (BUT), and eating disorder examination questionnaire (EDE-Q). The same assessment was performed for 92 subjects recruited from the general population. Structural equation modelling was employed to test the role of embodiment/identity disorders in mediating the relationship between ASEs and ED psychopathology.

RESULTS

Patients with FED displayed high scores on IPASE, comparable with people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. A significant correlation was also demonstrated between IPASE, BUT and EDE-Q. All IPASE domains were strongly related to feeling extraneous from one's own body by IDEA. All IPASE domains demonstrated a high relationship with BUT Depersonalization scale. A strong correlation was also reported between total scores of IPASE and IDEA. The mediation model confirmed that ASEs impact on FED symptomatology through the mediation of both embodiment/identity disorders and body image.

DISCUSSION

Anomalous interoceptive processes may represent the first step of a maladaptive process-impairing embodiment, selfhood, and identity in FED. Assessment of ASEs might be a valid tool to identify an early-shared vulnerability of severe disorders characterized by embodiment alterations.

Images of depression in Charles Baudelaire: clinical understanding in the context of poetry and social history

There is increasing recognition of the importance of the humanities and arts in medical and psychiatric training. We explore the poetry of Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) and its evocations of depression through themes of mood, time and self-consciousness and discuss their relation to images of 'spleen', the 'snuffling clock' and the 'sinister mirror'. Following the literary critical commentaries of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and Jean Starobinski (1920-2019) we identify some of their roots in the poet's experience of the rapid and alienating urbanisation of 19th-century Paris. Appreciation of the rich vocabulary of poetry and the images it generates adds depth to clinical practice by painting vivid pictures of subjective experience, including subjective experience of the 'social' as part of the biopsychosocial constellation.

The primacy of ocular perception: a narrative review on the role of gender identity in eating disorders

BACKGROUND

Phenomenological research has enriched the scientific and clinical understanding of Eating Disorders (ED), describing the significant role played by disorders of embodiment in shaping the lived experience of patients with ED. According to the phenomenological perspective, disorders of embodiment in ED are associated with feelings of alienation from one's own body, determining an excessive concern for external appearance as a form of dysfunctional coping. The purpose of the present narrative review is to address the role of gender identity as a risk factor for EDs in the light of phenomenological approaches.

METHODS

Narrative review.

RESULTS

The current study discusses the interplay between perception, gender identity, and embodiment, all posited to influence eating psychopathology. Internalized concerns for body appearance are described as potentially associated with self-objectification. Furthermore, concerns on body appearance are discussed in relation to gendered social expectations. The current review also explores how societal norms and gender stereotypes can contribute to dysfunctional self-identification with external appearances, particularly through an excessive focus on the optical dimension. The socio-cultural perspective on gender identity was considered as a further explanation of the lived experience of individuals with ED.

CONCLUSIONS

By acknowledging the interplay between these factors, clinicians and researchers can gain a deeper understanding of these disorders and develop more effective interventions for affected individuals.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level V narrative review.

Affective Permeability: On Hysteria and Atmospheres

BACKGROUND

Phenomenological literature has recently given much attention to the concept of atmosphere, which is the pre-individual affective tonality of the intersubjective space. The importance of atmospheres in psychopathology has been described for various disorders, but little is known about the interaction with hysteria. The aim of the present paper was to describe the psychopathology of hysteria from the angle of the phenomenon of atmosphere, focussing on the hysterical person's peculiar "affective permeability".

SUMMARY

Hysterical people have difficulty defining themselves autonomously. As compensation, they adopt models transposed from the external environment such as social gender stereotypes or are influenced by the gaze and desire of others. They also possess a special sensitivity in perceiving the affectivity present in a given social situation, by which they are easily impressed and influenced. Their sensibility to environmental affectivity may allow them to take centre stage, assuming the postures and behaviours that others desire and that they sense by "sniffing" the atmosphere in which the encounter is immersed. Thus, a paradox may take place: sensibility is not mere passivity in hysteria but may become a tool for "riding" the emotional atmosphere and manipulating it.

KEY MESSAGES

Affective permeability to environmental atmospheres and manipulation of the environment are the two sides of the same coin. This overlap of passive impressionability and active manoeuvring is necessary to be grasped in the clinical encounter with hysterical persons not to be submerged by their theatricality, that is, by the hyper-intensive expressivity of their feelings and behaviours.

The lived experience of depression: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of depression, co-written by experts by experience and academics. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of depression, family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The subjective world of depression was characterized by an altered experience of emotions and body (feeling overwhelmed by negative emotions, unable to experience positive emotions, stuck in a heavy aching body drained of energy, detached from the mind, the body and the world); an altered experience of the self (losing sense of purpose and existential hope, mismatch between the past and the depressed self, feeling painfully incarcerated, losing control over one's thoughts, losing the capacity to act on the world; feeling numb, empty, non-existent, dead, and dreaming of death as a possible escape route); and an altered experience of time (experiencing an alteration of vital biorhythms, an overwhelming past, a stagnation of the present, and the impossibility of the future). The experience of depression in the social and cultural context was characterized by altered interpersonal experiences (struggling with communication, feeling loneliness and estrangement, perceiving stigma and stereotypes), and varied across different cultures, ethnic or racial minorities, and genders. The subjective perception of recovery varied (feeling contrasting attitudes towards recovery, recognizing recovery as a journey, recognizing one's vulnerability and the need for professional help), as did the experience of receiving pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and social as well as physical health interventions. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. This journey in the lived experience of depression can also help us to understand the nature of our own emotions and feelings, what is to believe in something, what is to hope, and what is to be a living human being.

Logics of Discovery II: Lessons from Poetry-Parataxis as a Method That Can Complement the Narrative Compulsion in Vogue in Contemporary Mental Health Care

This paper highlights the limitations of narrative logic in mental health care, and in particular of "narrative vigilance"-the tendency to watch over experience via narrativisation, and to tether the concrete particulars of experience to the hypothetical structure of a narrative signification. Narrative logic is grounded in hypotaxis-the syntactic structuring whereby a discourse is characterised by different levels of subordination using linking words that connect, especially in terms of temporal and explanatory consequentiality. I offer an alternative approach based on parataxis-the practice of placing phrases or parts of speech next to each other without subordinating conjunctions. Sentences are juxtaposed without a clear connection; the contrast may generate novel and unexpected combinations between these dissimilar fragments. After distinguishing between parataxis and psychopathological phenomena like disturbances of association, I take inspiration from the work and life of a poet, Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), considered among the greatest. He suffered for half his life from a severe form of mental illness that would perhaps, today, be diagnosed as schizophrenia. In the poems written during his illness, hypotaxis and narrative vigilance seem to blur, and parataxis takes centre stage. The fading of narrative structure in no way coincides with the absence of meaningfulness. Rather, meaningfulness is left to parataxis itself, that is, to the recombining power of words, sentences, and images. Parataxis itself can provide meaningfulness or, at least, provide the soil in which it can germinate. The void of narration opens the door for the fullness of "emergent" connections. In the final part of the paper, with the help of Freud's ideas on the relationship between "analysis" and "synthesis" in psychoanalytic treatment, some implications are derived about the relevance of parataxis to the logics of discovery in psychotherapeutic care, especially that of persons with severe mental conditions.

Phenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care

This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology's two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of "recovery," defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.

The Autism Rating Scale for Schizophrenia - Revised English Version: An Instrument to Characterize Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders Phenotype

Dis-sociality (DS) reflects the impairment of social experience in people with schizophrenia; it encompasses both negative features (disorder of attunement, inability to grasp the meaning of social contexts, the vanishing of social shared knowledge) and positive features (a peculiar set of values, ruminations not oriented to reality), reflecting the existential arrangement of people with schizophrenia. DS is grounded on the notion of schizophrenic autism as depicted by continental psychopathology. A rating scale has been developed, providing an experiential phenotype. Here we present the Autism Rating Scale for Schizophrenia - Revised English version (ARSS-Rev), developed on the Italian version of the scale. The scale is provided by a structured interview to facilitate the assessment of the phenomena investigated here. ARSS-Rev is composed of 16 distinctive items grouped into 6 categories: hypo-attunement, invasiveness, emotional flooding, algorithmic conception of sociality, antithetical attitude toward sociality, and idionomia. For each item and category, an accurate description is provided. Different intensities of phenomena are assessed through a Likert scale by rating each item according to its quantitative features (frequency, intensity, impairment, and need for coping). The ARSS-Rev has been able to discriminate patients with remitted schizophrenia from euthymic patients with psychotic bipolar disorder. This instrument may be useful in clinical/research settings to demarcate the boundaries of schizophrenia spectrum disorders from affective psychoses.

The Body in Question in the Existence of Hysteric Persons: A Phenomenological Perspective

The concept of hysteria, although apparently surpassed by contemporary nosographic classifications, continues to be talked about. Following Charbonneau's attempt to de-feminize and de-sexualize hysteria, clinical phenomenology can offer a perspective which, freed from stigma and prejudices through the suspension of judgement, allows us to understand hysteria not as a diagnostic category but as an existential position. In this sense, hysteria would be based on a hypo-sufficiency of the embodied self, which is not perceived as solid and continuous and needs external confirmations of its adequacy. According to the optical-coenaesthetic disproportion hypothesis, the hypo-sufficiency of the embodied self originates from the difficulty of experiencing one's body from the first-person perspective and from the consequent use of the gaze of others as a prosthesis to achieve a sense of selfhood and identity. Hysteric persons develop a mode of access to their corporeality mediated by visual representations - hence the theatricalization, centrality, and seductiveness of hysteric persons' behaviour. We suggest to call "figural body" the visual apprehension of one's body which tries to compensate for the weakness of coenaesthetic apprehension of the lived body. Over time, the figural body ends up superimposing itself on the immediate experience of the lived body. Placing itself on a representative register, this image conveys not only individual ghosts but also cultural aspects, social prejudices, gender stereotypes. Thus, the attempt to experience one's own body with the mediation of the other's gaze becomes an involuntary and unaware throwing of oneself into the meshes of representation that are necessarily alienating for the person. Hysterical persons remain stuck in their inability to access an experience of their body that is not figurative, alienating themselves in representations which always come from outside.

THE HETEROGENEITY OF DEPRESSIONS: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

What is commonly referred to as "depression" indicates a heterogeneous complex disorder that includes distinct psychopathological forms. A more accurate classification can be achieved by assessing the individual experiences of depression and tracing back each of these forms to the specific vulnerable structure from which they emerge. Each of these vulnerable forms of existence can be characterized by focusing on their values. I identify four main prototypes. Homo melancholicus is impressive for their over-normality, extreme social adjustment, and conformism; their depressive decomposition is characterized by the experience of loss. The values of homo œconomicus are utility (every action must be directed toward production) and optimization (what costs more than it produces is a dead branch to be cut); their depressive decomposition is marked by insolvency. Homo dissipans' values are excess (feeling animated by an inexhaustible drive to "pour out" of oneself, especially outside the limits of composure and reasonableness) and expenditure (an ethical attitude that gives its approval to excess and to its metamorphic and destructive power); their depressive decomposition is epitomized by inner incoherence and emptiness. The style of homo nevroticus form of existence is subjugated by the condemnation to limitation and the diktat of prohibition; their depressive decomposition is characterized by frustration and demoralization.

Homo dissipans: Excess and Expenditure as Keys for Understanding the Borderline Condition?

This paper sheds light on some aspects of what contemporary clinical theory calls "borderline" condition providing a description of a key figure of late-modern culture that I will call Homo dissipans (from Latin dissipatio, -onis = scattering, dispersion). Homo dissipans is the opposite of Homo œconomicus, the form that "narcissism" takes on in contemporary "achievement society," solely concerned with rational action aimed to utility and production. In order to define Homo dissipans, I follow French philosopher, anthropologist, and novelist Georges Bataille's descriptions of two core phenomena: "excess" and "expenditure." The former can be defined as a surplus of energy that according to Bataille characterizes human existence, animated by a general movement of exudation and dilapidation and an inexhaustible drive to "pour out" of oneself, especially outside the limits of composure and reasonableness. The latter is an ethical attitude which gives its approval to excess and to its metamorphic and destructive power. The Homo dissipans' credo is to profitlessly dissipate the surplus of energy, escape into a world of pure intensities in which all forms - including identity - dissolve and surrender themselves to transformation. I argue that Bataille's ideas about "dissipation" can help us reconsider two features attributed to borderline personality disorder which have been extensively described and sometimes stigmatized - "identity diffusion" and "stable instability" - and to better recognize, understand, and make sense of their phenomenology in the clinical context.

Grounding co-writing: An analysis of the theoretical basis of a new approach in mental health care

This contribution aims to highlight the theoretical and epistemological premises of the co-writing experience, a practice where a clinician and a patient are mutually engaged in jointly or collaboratively writing a narrative related to the patient's experience. Unlike a typical set of therapeutic techniques, co-writing is based on sharing perspectives and meanings about the experience of crisis, recovery, and the therapeutic process. The paper identifies and briefly describes four non-clinical epistemological paradigms on which it is grounded: ethnography, values-based practice, narrative care, and phenomenology. Although they differ in several ways, at the same time, they seem to share some common features that the paper investigates and comments. For clinicians, nurses, researchers and Mental Health Service managers, attention to the users and to the improvement of their active roles represents not only a strategy for the empowerment of results, but also the access door to a different perspective which relies on a renewed conceptualization of the mental disease nature that may lead to overcoming the epistemic asymmetry between the 'expert' and the 'other' in favor of intersubjective dialogue.

Anorexia nervosa as a disorder of the subcortical-cortical interoceptive-self

PURPOSE

Anorexia nervosa (AN) is characterized by a diminished capacity in perceiving the physiological correlates of interoceptive sensations, namely bodily self-consciousness. Given the neural division of self-processing into interoceptive-, exteroceptive- and mental-self, we hypothesize neural deficits in the interoceptive-processing regions in AN.

METHODS

To prove this, we reviewed resting state (rs), task and rest-task studies in AN literature.

RESULTS

Neuronal data demonstrate the following in AN: (i) decreased rs-functional connectivity (rsFC) of subcortical-cortical midline structures (SCMS); (ii) reduced rsFC between medial (default-mode network/DMN and salience network/SN) and lateral (executive-control network/ECN) cortical regions; (iii) decreased rsFC in mainly the regions of the interoceptive-self; (iv) altered activity with overall increased activity in response to sensory/body image stimuli, especially in the regions of the interoceptive-self; (v) lack of a clear task-related distinction between own's and others' body image.

CONCLUSION

These data may indicate that rs-hypoconnectivity between SCMS, as neural correlate of a reduced intero-exteroceptive integration resulting in self-objectification, might be linked to overall increased activity in interoceptive regions during sensory/body image stimuli in AN, engendering an "anxious bodily self."

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

I: Systematic review.

Bridging cognitive, phenomenological and psychodynamic approaches to eating disorders

Cognitive, psychodynamic, and phenomenological scholars converged their attention on abnormal bodily phenomena as the core psychopathological feature of eating disorders (EDs). While cognitive approaches focus their attention on a need for "objective" (i.e., observable, measurable) variables (including behaviours and distorted cognitions), the phenomenological exploration typically targets descriptions of persons' lived experience. According to a new emerging phenomenological perspective, the classic behavioural and cognitive symptoms of EDs should be considered as epiphenomena of a deeper core represented by a disorder of the embodiment. The cognitive-behavioural model is the most studied and, up till now, clinically efficacious treatment for EDs. However, as any coherent and scientifically grounded model, it presents some limitations in its application. Numerous patients report a chronic course, do not respond to treatment and develop a personality structure based on pathological eating behaviours, since "being anorexic" becomes a new identity for the person. Furthermore, the etiopathogenetic trajectory of EDs influences the treatment response: for example, patients reporting childhood abuse or maltreatment respond differently to cognitive-behavioural therapy. To obtain a deeper comprehension of these disorders, it seems important to shift attention from abnormal eating behaviours to more complex and subtle psycho(patho)logical features, especially experiential ones. This characterisation represents the unavoidable premise for the identification of new therapeutic targets and consequently for an improvement of the outcome of these severe disorders. Thus, the present review aims to provide an integrated view of cognitive, psychodynamic, and phenomenological perspectives on EDs, suggesting new therapeutic targets and intervention strategies based on this integrated model. Level of Evidence: Level V.Level of evidence Level V: Opinions of authorities, based on descriptive studies, narrative reviews, clinical experience, or reports of expert committees.

Se-duction is not sex-duction: Desexualizing and de-feminizing hysteria

The psychopathological analysis of hysteria is a victim of narrow conceptualizations. Among these is the inscription of hysteria in the feminine sphere, about body and sexuality, which incentivized conceptual reductionism. Hysteria has been mainly considered a gendered pathology, almost exclusively female, and it has been associated with cultural and/or religious features over time rather than treated as a psychopathological world. Further, hysteria has been dominated by conceptual inaccuracies and indecision, not only in terms of clinical features but also in terms of its definition. For this reason, it seems necessary to “undress” hysteria from this feminization, sexualization, and corporealization with which it has been abundantly clothed over the years. “Undressing” hysteria will make possible a reconfiguring and deconstructing of the explanatory-causal model of Charcot and Freud. However, if we take out this cultural heritage, the stigma accompanying this diagnosis, and the weight of the enormous historical tradition that hysteria carries, the world of hysteria continues to constitute a domain full of complexity and nosographic challenges. Hysteria has been considered a sum of psychological behaviors and states illustrated by drama, mystery, or falsity. The difficulty in understanding the multiple somatic manifestations which characterize this clinical condition created several controversies and much confusion. In the current nosography, the personological component of hysteria has been separated from its symptomatic manifestation, in the Histrionic Personality Disorder and Conversion Disorder categories, respectively. This segmentation by descriptive nosography does contribute to a unitary understanding of the phenomenon and, consequently, of daily clinical practice. Clinical complexity can be grasped and deciphered only if the symptom is inscribed in the patient’s lifeworld and his/her subjective life history. Clinical practice is thus thought of in terms of a structural aggregation of a homogeneous set of phenomena, together constituting a specific way of being in the world. The starting point of this article is the evident modalities characterizing this life-world, taking care not to confuse the point of origin with the point of expression.

Homo œconomicus: A Key for Understanding Late Modernity Narcissism?

This paper describes the form that narcissism takes in contemporary society in the light of Homo œconomicus - a concept developed by philosopher Foucault to describe a key figure of late modernity: the entrepreneur of himself whose core values are utility (every action must be directed towards production) and optimization (what costs more than it produces is a dead branch to be cut). Homo œconomicus is the subject of so-called "achievement society." Its imperative is summed up in the formula "You can!" that generates heavy constraints because it is introjected as "If I can, then I must!," and self-coercion is more fatal than hetero-coercion because no resistance can be put up against oneself. He is also the subject of the "society of the spectacle" in which a part of the world represents itself in front of the rest of the world and shows itself to be superior to it. The spectacle is not simply a set of images, but a type of social relationship between people mediated by images, generating alienation from oneself and from the Other. Using Homo œconomicus as a grid for understanding contemporary pathological forms of narcissism, I describe the values and the life-world of narcissistic persons including the ways they experience time, space, others, and their own body. I finally suggest a therapeutic of this form of existence based on the recognition of its value-structure.

The lived experience of psychosis: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics

Psychosis is the most ineffable experience of mental disorder. We provide here the first co-written bottom-up review of the lived experience of psychosis, whereby experts by experience primarily selected the subjective themes, that were subsequently enriched by phenomenologically-informed perspectives. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of psychosis as well as family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was complemented by semantic analyses and shared across all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The early phases of psychosis (i.e., premorbid and prodromal stages) were found to be characterized by core existential themes including loss of common sense, perplexity and lack of immersion in the world with compromised vital contact with reality, heightened salience and a feeling that something important is about to happen, perturbation of the sense of self, and need to hide the tumultuous inner experiences. The first episode stage was found to be denoted by some transitory relief associated with the onset of delusions, intense self-referentiality and permeated self-world boundaries, tumultuous internal noise, and dissolution of the sense of self with social withdrawal. Core lived experiences of the later stages (i.e., relapsing and chronic) involved grieving personal losses, feeling split, and struggling to accept the constant inner chaos, the new self, the diagnosis and an uncertain future. The experience of receiving psychiatric treatments, such as inpatient and outpatient care, social interventions, psychological treatments and medications, included both positive and negative aspects, and was determined by the hope of achieving recovery, understood as an enduring journey of reconstructing the sense of personhood and re-establishing the lost bonds with others towards meaningful goals. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. Psychosis is one of the most painful and upsetting existential experiences, so dizzyingly alien to our usual patterns of life and so unspeakably enigmatic and human.

The role of embodiment in the treatment of patients with anorexia and bulimia nervosa: a 2-year follow-up study proposing an integration between enhanced cognitive behavioural therapy and a phenomenological model of eating disorders

PURPOSE

Recent studies demonstrated that the embodiment disorder represents a core feature of eating disorders (EDs). The aim of this study was to evaluate the role of its variation as a possible mediator of the efficacy of enhanced cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT-E) on classic ED symptomatology, including body uneasiness.

METHODS

73 patients with anorexia nervosa and 68 with bulimia nervosa were treated with a multidisciplinary approach including CBT-E. Psychometric questionnaires were administered at baseline (T0) and after one (T1) and 2 years (T2) to evaluate general and ED-specific psychopathology, body uneasiness and the embodiment disorder. Data regarding diagnostic crossover and remission were also collected.

RESULTS

Longitudinal analysis showed an improvement of all psychopathological dimensions at T1, which remained stable at T2 (p < 0.05). Remission rate at T2 was 44.7%, and diagnostic crossover occurred in 17.0% of patients. Higher levels of embodiment disorder predicted increased diagnostic instability (OR: 1.80 [1.01-3.20], p = 0.045). The amelioration of the embodiment disorder mediated the decrease in both ED-specific psychopathology (indirect effect: 0.67 [0.46-0.92]) and body uneasiness (indirect effect: 0.43 [0.28-0.59]).

CONCLUSION

For the first time, these findings highlighted the role of the embodiment disorder as a maintaining factor of ED symptomatology, supporting the importance of integrating CBT-E with a phenomenological model of EDs.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level IV, longitudinal observational study (case series).

Abnormal Body Phenomena in Persons with Major Depressive Disorder

BACKGROUND

Depressive disorders, despite being classified as mood or affective disorders, are known to include disturbances in the experience of body, space, time, and intersubjectivity. However, current diagnostic manuals largely ignore these aspects of depressive experience. In this article, we use phenomenological accounts of embodiment as a theoretical foundation for a qualitative study of abnormal body phenomena (ABP) in depressive disorders.

METHODS

550 patients affected by schizophrenic and affective disorders were interviewed in a clinical setting. Interviews sought to uncover the qualitative features of experiences through self-descriptions. Clinical files were subsequently digitized and re-examined using consensual qualitative research.

RESULTS

Ninety-nine out of 100 patients with MDD reported at least one ABP. From cross-analysis of the MDD sample, we obtained 4 general categories of ABP, 3 of which had additional subcategories. The 4 categories include slowed embodied temporality (N = 90), anomalous vital rhythms (N = 82), worries about one's body (N = 22), and body deformation (N = 47).

CONCLUSIONS

The results provide empirical evidence in support of theoretical discussions of embodiment in MDD found in the work of classical and contemporary phenomenologists. The findings also provide nuanced insight into the experience of persons living with MDD. Some categories of ABP, like slowed embodied temporality, can help to finely characterize psychomotor retardation or the so-called "medically unexplained symptoms" (MUS). This fine-tuned characterization can help to connect MUS to neuropsychological and neurobiological (e.g., alterations of interoceptive processes linked to anomalies of the brain resting-state hypothesis) and inflammatory (e.g., studies linking environmental stressors, inflammation mediators, and neurovegetative and affective symptoms) models of MDD. Our results can also support a pathogenic model of MDD, which posits, on the phenomenal level, ABP as the point of departure for the development of secondary symptoms including cognitive elaborations of these, namely, delusions about the body. Moreover, some of the categories, when contrasted with phenomenological qualitative studies of other disorders, provide conceptual resources of differential diagnosis and of identifying a "depressive core syndrome." For example, findings within category 4, deformation of the body, provide resources for using ABP to distinguish between MDD and schizophrenia.

Autism Rating Scale: A New Tool for Characterizing the Schizophrenia Phenotype

Social dysfunctions (SD) are frequently observed in subjects with schizophrenia. Some of these dysfunctions are also observed in other neuropsychiatric disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD), major depression, bipolar disorder, or Alzheimer disease. Recently, a characterization of a specific type of SD in schizophrenia has been proposed, with the concept of dis-sociality, which form the core aspect of "Schizophrenic Autism" (SA). The present study aimed to explore the presence in people with schizophrenia of SA, independent of other autistic traits, which can be often found in schizophrenia and other neurodevelopmental disorders. We used a structured interview-the Autism Rating Scale (ARS), an instrument devised to detect and measure SA. Fifty-one outpatients affected by schizophrenia (26 remitted, SCZ-r) and 28 affected by bipolar disorder type 1, with psychotic features, in the euthymic phase (BD-e) were recruited. Before assessing the specificity for schizophrenia of SA, we tested the internal consistency, the convergent and divergent validity of the ARS in the schizophrenia sample. Specificity was assessed by examining potential differences in ARS scores between SCZ-r and BD-e subjects. ARS showed good internal consistency, as well as convergent and divergent validity. ARS items were more frequently of moderate severity in SCZ-r than in BD-e subjects. This scale can contribute to establish more precise phenomenal boundaries between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and opens up the possibility of identifying a different type of SD in schizophrenia, independent of autistic traits and negative symptoms, which might benefit from different treatments.

The Bracketing of Presence: Dematerialization and Disembodiment in Times of Pandemic and of Social Distancing Biopolitics

The purpose of this paper is to help us understand how and why the COVID pandemic, and its associated biopolitics of social distancing, may have affected our relationships with our own bodies and other persons, thus helping to accelerate what might be termed a bracketing of presence that was already well underway in our modern and contemporary social practices. We focus on 3 historical vectors, all rooted in specific technologies, that have profound implications at the levels of our social imaginary and prereflective ways of being: architecture, social media, and medicine. Architecture has progressively eliminated "porosity" between spaces by establishing clear borders between public and private spaces (also within the private ones), thereby contributing to our drive for social distancing. Social media have provided apparatuses that replace intercorporeal encounters with disembodied, virtual interactions mediated by images. Visual experiences that are more embodied, participatory, and "immersed" are replaced by passive forms of "seeing": the other becomes an image for me, and I for the other. The object of medicine has also recently dematerialized with the advent of the new "optical" and "digital" machines of modern medicine, which can operate remotely thanks to an increasingly powerful interface reliant on computational power and the resources of artificial intelligence, thereby dispensing with body-to-body interactions. We offer these reflections as routes to a better understanding of changes that have occurred and are occurring on the planes of both culture and individual psychological existence.

Dear Body… An Explorative Study on Anomalous Bodily Experiences in Persons with Feeding and Eating Disorders

OBJECTIVE

The aim of the study was to provide a qualitative analysis of anomalous bodily experiences (ABEs) of persons affected by feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). In particular, this study aimed to refine the description of bodily experiences in persons with FEDs so as to improve their treatment.

SAMPLING AND METHODS

This is a naturalistic explorative study on a group of 29 patients affected by FED in psychotherapeutic treatment and 12 healthy controls. We asked the participants to write a letter on the way they experience their body. Later, we analysed their letters by means of consensual qualitative research.

RESULTS

All patients (29) reported at least 1 ABE. The main categories identified are (1) body-obstacle (the body interposes between the person and the world); (2) body-tyrant (the body imposes itself on the will of the person); (3) body-hyper-visible (the body is experienced as an exposed object); (4) body-geometric (the body is experienced or associated with a geometric form); and (5) body-numerical (the body is defined by numbers). All these categories are present in the clinical group, and they are absent in the control group.

CONCLUSION

To grasp the experiential nuances of ABEs is relevant to understand the disorder of embodied self-hood and personal identity in these patients and thus to refine clinical treatment.

Sexuality, embodiment and attachment style in anorexia nervosa

PURPOSE

Recent studies hypothesized that sexual dysfunctions represent not just complications of eating disorders (EDs), rather they should be attributed to the core psychopathology of these disorders. Therefore, disorders of the embodiment and insecure attachment may play a role in maintaining an abnormal sexual functioning, given their known relations with core ED features. The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between sexual dysfunctions and both disorders of the embodiment and attachment style in people with anorexia nervosa (AN).

METHODS

111 adult women with AN and 120 healthy subjects completed the Symptom Checklist-90, Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire, Identity and Eating Disorders, Attachment Style Questionnaire and the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire-Short Form.

RESULTS

Patients reported worse scores than controls in all areas assessed. In patients, low sexual desire was found to be associated with general and ED-specific psychopathology, and with disorders of embodiment and attachment style. Sexual dysfunctions had no associations with traumatic experiences. Dietary restriction showed an association with low sexual desire through embodiment disorder and Discomfort with Closeness, as confirmed by the serial mediation model.

CONCLUSION

The present study suggests that disorders of embodiment maintained by pathological eating behaviours have a key role in the development of sexual dysfunctions in EDs, through the compromise of intimacy.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level III, cross-sectional study with comparisons between cases and controls.

Values in persons with borderline personality disorder: their relevance for the therapeutic interview

This is an explorative study on values of 25 patients affected by borderline personality disorder interviewed in a clinical setting (phenomenological-dynamic psychotherapy) and re-classified following Consensual Qualitative Research. We identified three main categories of values: recognition (the importance for attention, acknowledgment, commendation and acceptance by the other), authenticity (the importance of absolute emotional fusion with the other), and immediacy (the importance of instantaneous, hic et nunc satisfaction of one's needs/desires). Each of these values expresses a kind of 'logic', namely the logic of intimacy (the other's closeness as indispensable for defining oneself and establish/reinforce one's selfhood and identity), spontaneity (over-reliance on feelings unrestricted by social norms undermining their intensity), and instantaneity (glorification of 'now-moments'/execration of procrastination draining the vitality of feelings). The borderline person lives an emotional normativity constituted by the intensity of feelings under the spell of a frustrated normativity since they enter into a collision with the hypocrisy of common-sense ethical norms and social rules and conventions, as well as by potential conflicts with the feelings of the other. Acknowledging the values affirmed by borderline persons may help to better understand their condition - that is, to grasp 'what it is like' and make sense of the phenomena that affect them - and particularly to find a logic in their otherwise irrational and incomprehensible self-defeating behavior.

Abnormal bodily experiences detected by Abnormal Bodily Phenomena questionnaire are more frequent and severe in schizophrenia than in bipolar disorder with psychotic features

BACKGROUND

Patients with schizophrenia display experiential anomalies in their feelings and cognitions arising in the domain of their lived body. These abnormal bodily phenomena (ABP) are not part of diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia. One of the reasons is the difficulty to assess specific ABP for schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The present study aimed to explore the presence in patients with schizophrenia of specific ABP.

METHODS

We used a semistructured interview-the Abnormal Bodily Phenomena questionnaire (ABPq), an instrument devised to detect and measure ABP specific to patients with schizophrenia. Fifty-one outpatients affected by schizophrenia and 28 euthymic outpatients affected by bipolar disorder type I with psychotic features (BD-pf-e) were recruited. Before assessing the specificity for schizophrenia of the observed ABP, we tested the internal consistency and the convergent validity of the ABPq in patients with schizophrenia. Specificity was assessed by examining potential differences in ABPq among the patients with schizophrenia in remission (SCZ-r) and BD-pf-e.

RESULTS

The ABPq shows strong internal consistency and convergent validity. As to the specificity, ABP measured by ABPq were more frequent and severe in SCZ-r than in BD-pf-e. In particular, all ABPq dimensions, except "Coherence," had at least mild severity in over 50% of SCZ-r, while dimensions with at least mild severity were observed in 5-10% of the BD-pf-e.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings can contribute to establish more precise phenomenal boundaries between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, to explore the borders between nonpsychotic and psychotic forms of ABP, between ABP and negative and disorganized symptoms, and to enlighten core aspects of schizophrenia.

Abnormal Space Experiences in Persons With Schizophrenia: An Empirical Qualitative Study

Abnormal space experience (ASE) is a common feature of schizophrenia, despite its absence from current diagnostic manuals. Phenomenological psychopathologists have investigated this experiential disturbance, but these studies were typically based on anecdotal evidence from limited clinical interactions. To better understand the nature of ASE in schizophrenia and attempt to validate previous phenomenological accounts, we conducted a qualitative study of 301 people with schizophrenia. Clinical files were analyzed by means of Consensual Qualitative Research, an inductive method for analyzing descriptions of lived experience. Our main findings can be summed up as follows: (1) ASEs are a relevant feature in schizophrenia (70.1% of patients reported at least 1 ASE). (2) ASE in schizophrenia are characterized by 5 main categories of phenomena (listed from more represented to less represented): (a) experiences of strangeness and unfamiliarity (eg "Everything appeared weird. Face distorted, world looks terrible, nasty"); (b) experiences of centrality/invasion of peripersonal space (eg "Handkerchief on scaffolding: message telling him something"); (c) alteration of the quality of things (eg "Buildings leaning down"); (d) alteration of the quality of the environment (eg "Person sitting six feet away seemed to be at an infinite distance"); and (e) itemization and perceptive salience (eg "All patients [in ward] have bright eyes"). (3) ASEs are much more frequent in acute (91.9%) than in chronic (28.15%) schizophrenia patients. Moreover, our findings further empirical support for phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia, including those developed by Jaspers, Binswanger, Minkowski, and Conrad, among others and provide the background for translational research.

The disorder of lived corporeality: A possible link between attachment style and eating disorder psychopathology

Introduction

According to the trans-diagnostic perspective, disturbances in eating patterns of eating disorders (EDs) are considered as epiphenomena secondary to the patient's overvaluation of his/her body shape and weight.

Objectives

The phenomenological theory states that the main feature of ED psychopathology is a disturbance in the way affected persons experience their own body (embodiment). Insecure attachment may promote the development of unstable self-identity leading to use body weight as a source of self-definition.

Aims

The aim of our study was to assess the role of embodiment impairments in the relationships between attachment stiles and ED psychopathology.

Methods

One hundred twelve ED patients and 108 healthy subjects filled in the Identity and Eating Disorders (IDEA) questionnaire, which assesses embodiment and personal identity abnormalities, the eating disorder inventory-2 (EDI-2) and the experiences in close relationships (ECR) scale, which defines attachment styles.

Results

ED patients showed IDEA, EDI-2 and ECR scores significantly higher than controls. Significant correlations between IDEA scores, insecure attachment and almost all EDI-2 sub-item scores emerged in ED patients but not in controls. IDEA total score mediated the relationship between avoidant attachment and EDI-2 interoceptive awareness.

Conclusions

These findings demonstrate that in ED patients insecure attachment is correlated to disorder of identity and lived corporeality that, in turn, mediates the association between attachment and a specific ED psychopathological trait. Therefore, we suppose that early relationships, through the development of disturbances in identity and embodiment, lead to altered perception of bodily signals and deranged discrimination of one's emotions, which could contribute to EDs.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

Abnormal Bodily Phenomena in First Episode Psychosis: A Preliminary Exploratory Cohort Study

Schizophrenia patients frequently display an array of abnormal bodily phenomena (ABPs). There is literature to suggest that the presence of ABPs may be representative of a fundamental disruption of the embodied and prereflexive state of selfhood and hence be relevant for the development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. ABPs have been considered as trait features of vulnerability to psychosis and may have value as potential markers for early detection, target symptoms for prevention and predictors of clinical outcomes. This longitudinal cohort study aimed to explore: (1) the prevalence of ABPs in first episode psychosis, (2) their longitudinal stability, (3) how ABPs compare with data from patients with enduring psychosis, and (4) how aspects of disorders of self-experience (DSEs) and ABPs and the corresponding instruments relate to each other. Sixteen patients were recruited from an early intervention in psychosis service. They were assessed with a series of structured and semi-structured interviews at point of entry, after 6 months and 12 months of follow-up. A variety of ABPs and DSEs were displayed in all study subjects, associated with high levels of core psychotic symptoms and reduced with treatment over time. Compared with findings of both acute and chronic schizophrenia patients, the prevalence of ABPs seems to be representative of severity and acuteness of the illness. Two factors were identified with stable trait characteristics and might be of predictive value for the course of the illness. Further studies with bigger samples are needed to further test the value of ABPs as early markers of detection and predictors of clinical course. The association between DSEs and ABPs warrants further investigation.

The Pathogenic and Therapeutic Potential of the Gaze of the Other in the Clinic of "Eating Disorders"

Building on the optical-coenaesthetic disproportion model of so-called eating disorders, this paper provides a framework for the psychotherapy of people affected by these conditions. This model characterizes "eating disorders" as disorders of embodiment and identity, where a sense of unfamiliarity with one's own flesh, experienced as shifting and incomprehensible, leads to an impairment in the constitution of the Self and thus of one's own identity. Since there is a deficit of the coenaesthetic experience of the embodied Self, greater importance is assumed by body perception conveyed from without. To these persons, their corporeality is principally given as a body-object "to be seen" from a third-person perspective, rather than as a body-subject "to be felt" from a first-person perspective. The Other's look serves as an optical prosthesis to cope with dis-coenaesthesia and as a device through which these persons can define themselves. They are unable to accept the hiatus between "being a body" and "having a body," constitutively present in every human being, forcibly trying to recouple it, and finally ending up objectifying themselves to succeed. The external foundation of the Self thus takes the form of a constriction one can never be completely free of. Psychotherapy should thus accompany persons affected by eating disorders in their encounter with the miscarried dialectic between feeling oneself from within and seeing oneself from without through the gaze of the Other, so keenly feared by people desperately in search of self-control. Tactfully, the clinician accompanies the patient in taking a stance towards her symptom as the outcome of this miscarried dialectics, which is one premise for overcoming it. The clinician's gaze becomes the herald of recognition, allowing the patient to feel accepted in terms of her individuality. Feeling themselves touched by a gaze that waives its alienating potential in order to signify acceptance reactivates the identity-forming dialectics. Their body is thus revealed as the receiver of gazes, but also rediscovers its own possibility for self-determination starting out from these gazes. This intersubjective resonance between the clinician's gaze and the patient reactivates the identity-making dialectics between body-subject and body-object, creating the relational premises for overcoming the symptom.

Digital Phenotyping: Ethical Issues, Opportunities, and Threats

This paper explores the potential threats of digital phenotyping and the ways it may redesign our body experience and conceptualization. We argue that technology in digital medicine, and in psychiatry in particular, is not merely an extrinsic device to achieve improvements in knowledge, diagnosis, and treatment of diseases; rather, it intrinsically and unavoidably implies potential effects on what it is to be a human person, namely the embodiment and relatedness in human affairs, and not only in the clinical setting. Last but not least, digital phenotyping may improve prediction of abnormal behaviour, but not improve its causal explanation or psychological understanding.

The Role of the Embodiment Disturbance in the Anorexia Nervosa Psychopathology: A Network Analysis Study

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is characterized by body image distortion. From a phenomenological perspective, body image disturbance has been associated with a more profound disturbance encompassing disorders of the way persons experience their own body. The aim of this study was to disentangle the complex dynamics that connect the experience of one’s own body and self-identity to the psychopathological features of AN by applying a network analysis. Fifty-seven patients with AN restrictive subtype and 27 with AN binge–purging subtype participated in the study. Eating Disorders Inventory-2 and Identity and Eating Disorders subscores, measuring the embodiment dimensions, were included in the network. Two of the main dimensions of embodiment—feeling extraneous from one’s own body and feeling oneself through objective measures—were the nodes with the highest strength together with interoceptive awareness (IA). IA was a node included in several pathways connecting embodiment dimensions with most of the AN psychopathological dimensions. The centrality of the embodiment disorder suggests the importance of considering the body image disturbance in people with AN as resulting from their difficulty in experiencing inner states and as a tool to build its own self. This assumption may orient therapeutic interventions.

The PHD Method for Psychotherapy: Integrating Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Psychodynamics

This paper, endorsing the dialogical perspective in psychotherapy, provides a synopsis of the PHD psychotherapy method, based on the integration of phenomenology, hermeneutics and psychodynamics. The first section covers the background knowledge required for PHD psychotherapy, consolidating and extending three basic concepts: life-world (the originary domain of a person's experience), dialectical principle (psychopathological symptoms are the result of a disproportion between the occurrence of alterity and the person's capacity to make sense of it), dialogical principle (individual human consciousness is inherently dialogical since it is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other). The second section describes the know-how or practical implementation of these principles, including (1) the phenomenological unfolding (P) of the patient's experiences, which equips the clinician and patient with a systematic knowledge of the abnormal phenomena that affect the patient and are part of her life-world; (2) the hermeneutic moment (H), which focuses on the patient's default interpretation of her experiences and then encourages her to actively take a different perspective towards her experiences, aiming at the resignification of these experiences in order to restore a sense of agency or responsibility; (3) the (psycho-)dynamic moment (D), which aims to contextualize the patient's psychopathological experiences and position-taking within the personal life-history in which they are embedded, and to trace back psychopathological symptoms to the limit-situation from which they emerge. The final section discusses the "something more" or knowing how-to-be that is required of a clinician who aims to apply this therapeutic method; it includes a concise discussion of how psychotherapeutic dialogue is a kind of practice that moves in unpredictable directions to experience something new for both partners.

The Optical-Coenaesthetic Disproportion Hypothesis of Feeding and Eating Disorders in the Light of Neuroscience

This article builds on and extends the 'optical-coenaesthetic disproportion' (OCDisp) hypothesis of feeding and eating disorders (FEDs) matching data obtained through clinical research with laboratory evidence from neuroscience and neuropsychological studies. The OCDisp hypothesis, developed through the assessment in clinical setting of bodily experience using the IDentity and EAting (IDEA) disorder questionnaire, argues that in persons with FED the internal perception of one's embodied self (i.e., coenaesthesia) is deeply affected (their possibility to feel themselves is weakened or threatened by coenaesthopathic and emotional paroxysms; their bodily feelings are discontinuous over time), and as a compensation to it, these persons experience their own body as an object that is looked at by others. To FED persons, their body is principally given to them as an object 'to be seen.' The other's look serves as an optical prosthesis to cope with hypo- and dis-coenaesthesia and as a device through which persons with FED can define themselves and attenuate the anxiety produced by the conflicts between being-oneself and being-for-others. After describing the OCDisp hypothesis, we will gather evidence supporting it with neuroscience studies on FED. Our focus will be on data pointing to dampened multisensory integration of interoceptive and esteroceptive signals, demonstrating a predominance of the visual afferents toward signals arising within the body. In the final part of the article, we will show consistencies but also draw distinctions between our clinical hypothesis and neuroscience-based data and hypotheses and draft a potential agenda for translational research inspired by these.

New Perspectives in Phenomenological Psychopathology: Its Use in Psychiatric Treatment

Phenomenological psychopathology is a body of scientific knowledge on which the clinical practice of psychiatry is based since the first decades of the twentieth century, a method to assess the patient's abnormal experiences from their own perspective, and more importantly, a science responsible for delimiting the object of psychiatry. Recently, the frontiers of phenomenological psychopathology have expanded to the productive development of therapeutic strategies that target the whole of existence in their actions. In this article, we present an overview of the current state of this discipline, summing up some of its key concepts, and highlighting its importance to clinical psychiatry today. Phenomenological psychopathology understands mental disorders as modifications of the main dimensions of the life-world: lived time, lived space, lived body, intersubjectivity, and selfhood. Psychopathological symptoms are the expression of a dialectical modification of the proportions of certain domains of the life-world or of the lived experience. The far-reaching relevance of the concepts of proportion and dialectics for the clinical agenda is explored. The article presents two contemporary models for clinical practice based on phenomenological psychopathology: Dialectical-proportional oriented approach and Person-centered dialectic approach (P.H.D. method). The main characteristics of these approaches are considered, as well as the new perspectives they bring to the challenges of psychiatric care in the twentieth-first century.