Does prospective payment influence quality of care? A systematic review of the literature

In the light of rising health expenditures, the cost-efficient provision of high-quality inpatient care is on the agenda of policy-makers worldwide. In the last decades, prospective payment systems (PPS) for inpatient care were used as an instrument to contain costs and increase transparency of provided services. It is well documented in the literature that prospective payment has an impact on structure and processes of inpatient care. However, less is known about its effect on key outcome indicators of quality of care. In this systematic review, we synthesize evidence from studies investigating how financial incentives induced by PPS affect indicators of outcome quality domains of care, i.e. health status and user evaluation outcomes. We conduct a review of evidence published in English, German, French, Portuguese and Spanish language produced since 1983 and synthesize results of the studies narratively by comparing direction of effects and statistical significance of different PPS interventions. We included 64 studies, where 10 are of high, 18 of moderate and 36 of low quality. The most commonly observed PPS intervention is the introduction of per-case payment with prospectively set reimbursement rates. Abstracting evidence on mortality, readmission, complications, discharge disposition and discharge destination, we find the evidence to be inconclusive. Thus, claims that PPS either cause great harm or significantly improve the quality of care are not supported by our findings. Further, the results suggest that reductions of length of stay and shifting treatment to post-acute care facilities may occur in the course of PPS implementations. Accordingly, decision-makers should avoid low capacity in this area.

Paying for primary care: a cross-sectional analysis of cost and morbidity distributions across primary care payment models in Ontario Canada

Policy-makers desire an optimal balance of financial incentives to improve productivity and encourage improved quality in primary care, while also avoiding issues of risk-selection inherent to capitation-based payment. In this paper we analyze risk-selection in capitation-based payment by using administrative data for patients (n = 11,600,911) who were rostered (i.e., signed an enrollment form, or received a majority of care) with a primary care physician (n = 8621) in Ontario, Canada in 2010/11. We analyze this data using a relative distribution approach and compare distributions of patient costs and morbidity across primary care payment models. Our results suggest a relationship between being in a capitation-based payment scheme and having low cost patients (and presumably healthy patients) compared to fee-for-service physicians. However, we do not have evidence that physicians in capitation-based models are reducing the care they provide to sick and high cost patients. These findings suggest there is a relationship between payment type and risk-selection, particularly for low-cost and healthy patients.

Profit or patients' health benefit? Exploring the heterogeneity in physician altruism

This paper investigates physician altruism toward patients' health benefit using behavioral data from Hennig-Schmidt et al.'s (2011) laboratory experiment. In the experiment, medical students in the role of physicians decide on the provision of medical services. The experimental setup allows us to identify the influence of profits and patients' health benefit on the choice of medical treatment. We estimate physician altruism, the weight individuals attach to patients' health benefit, by fitting mixed logit and multinomial logit regression models to the experimental data. Estimation results provide evidence for physician altruism. We find, however, substantial variation in the degree of physician altruism. We also discuss some implications of our results for the design of physician payment schemes in the light of the theoretical literature.