Brain Activities Show There Is Nothing Like a Real Friend in Contrast to Influencers and Other Celebrities

Especially for young people, influencers and other celebrities followed on social media evoke affective closeness that in their young minds seems real even though it is fake. Such fake friendships are potentially problematic because of their felt reality on the consumer side while lacking any inversely felt true closeness. The question arises if the unilateral friendship of a social media user is equal or at least similar to real reciprocal friendship. Instead of asking social media users for explicit responses (conscious deliberation), the present exploratory study aimed to answer this question with the help of brain imaging technology. Thirty young participants were first invited to provide individual lists including (i) twenty names of their most followed and loved influencers or other celebrities (fake friend names), (ii) twenty names of loved real friends and relatives (real friend names) as well as (iii) twenty names they do not feel any closeness to (no friend names). They then came to the Freud CanBeLab (Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience and Behavior Lab) where they were shown their selected names in a random sequence (two rounds), while their brain activities were recorded via electroencephalography (EEG) and later calculated into event-related potentials (ERPs). We found short (ca. 100 ms) left frontal brain activity starting at around 250 ms post-stimulus to process real friend and no friend names similarly, while both ERPs differed from those elicited by fake friend names. This is followed by a longer effect (ca. 400 ms), where left and right frontal and temporoparietal ERPs also differed between fake and real friend names, but at this later processing stage, no friend names elicited similar brain activities to fake friend names in those regions. In general, real friend names elicited the most negative going brain potentials (interpreted as highest brain activation levels). These exploratory findings represent objective empirical evidence that the human brain clearly distinguishes between influencers or other celebrities and close people out of real life even though subjective feelings of closeness and trust can be similar. In summary, brain imaging shows there is nothing like a real friend. The findings of this study might be seen as a starting point for future studies using ERPs to investigate social media impact and topics such as fake friendship.

Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine

Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling 1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective, (outside view), we propose that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is (no more) than our experience of being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware, and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of their underlying, preceding (causal) biological changes, in the realization that most brain processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness.

Conceptualising Four Categories of Behaviours: Implications for Implementation Strategies to Achieve Behaviour Change

Background: Effectiveness of implementation strategies is influenced by the extent to which they are based on appropriate theories concerning the behaviours that the strategies intend to impact. Effectiveness may be limited simply because the strategies are based on theories that are limited in scope or are derived from partially inaccurate assumptions about the behaviours in question. It may therefore be important to combine insights from various theories to cover the range of influences on the behaviours that will be changed. Aim: This article aims to explore concepts, theories and empirical findings from different disciplines to categorise four types of behaviours and discuss the implications for implementation strategies attempting to change these behaviours. Influences on behaviours: Multilevel influences on behaviours are dichotomized into individual-level and collective-level influences, and behaviours that are guided by conscious cognitive processes are distinguished from those that rely on non-conscious processing. Combining the two dimensions (levels and cognitive modes) creates a 2 x 2 conceptual map consisting of four categories of behaviours. Explicitly conceptualising the levels and cognitive modes is crucial because different implementation strategies are required depending on the characteristics of the behaviours involved in the practise that needs to be changed. Conclusion: The 2 x 2 conceptual map can be used to consider and reflect on the nature of the behaviours that need to be changed, thus providing guidance on the type of theory, model or framework that might be most relevant for understanding and facilitating behaviour change.

Cumulative childhood interpersonal trauma is associated with reduced cortical differentiation between threat and non-threat faces in posttraumatic stress disorder adults

OBJECTIVE

Posttraumatic stress disorder and childhood trauma frequently co-occur. Both are associated with abnormal neural responses to salient emotion stimuli. As childhood trauma is a risk factor for posttraumatic stress disorder, differentiating between their neurophysiological effects is necessary to elucidate the neural pathways by which childhood trauma exposure contributes to increased posttraumatic stress disorder risks.

METHODS

Face-specific N170 evoked response potentials for backward-masked (non-conscious) and conscious threat (fear, angry) and non-threat (happy) faces were measured in 77 adults (18-64 years old, 64% women, 78% right-handed) symptomatic for posttraumatic stress disorder. Differences in N170 peak amplitudes for fear-versus-happy and angry-versus-happy faces at bilateral temporo-occipital (T5, T6) sites were computed. The effect of cumulative exposure to childhood interpersonal trauma, other childhood trauma, adult trauma, depression and posttraumatic stress disorder symptom severity on the N170 response was assessed using hierarchical multiple regression analyses.

RESULTS

T5 N170 peak amplitudes for non-conscious fear-versus-happy faces were inversely related to cumulative childhood interpersonal trauma after accounting for socio-demographic, clinical symptom and other trauma factors. Posttraumatic stress disorder Avoidance was positively associated with N170 peak amplitudes for non-conscious fear-versus-happy faces, primarily due to reduced N170 responsivity to happy faces.

CONCLUSION

Childhood interpersonal trauma exposure is associated with reduced discrimination between fear and happy faces, while avoidance symptom severity is associated with dampened responsivity to automatically processed happy faces in posttraumatic stress disorder adults. Results are discussed in terms of the likely contributions of impaired threat discrimination and deficient reward processing during neural processing of salient emotion stimuli, to increased risks of posttraumatic stress disorder onset and chronicity in childhood interpersonal trauma-exposed adults.

A Double Dissociation between Conscious and Non-conscious Priming of Responses and Affect: Evidence for a Contribution of Misattributions to the Priming of Affect

Studies have demonstrated conscious and non-conscious priming of responses and of affect. Concerning response priming, presenting a target-related (congruent) distractor prior to a target typically facilitates target responses. This facilitation – the response-priming effect – is observed in comparison to a less related (incongruent) distractor. An incongruent distractor would interfere with the required response to the target. This response-priming effect is found with both conscious distractors, of which participants are aware, and non-conscious distractors, of which participants are not aware. In partly related research, distractors have also yielded affective priming effects on the evaluations of task-unrelated neutral symbols that followed the target: In comparison to the congruent condition, participants evaluated a neutral symbol presented after an incongruent distractor-target sequence as more negative. This affective priming effect was sometimes ascribed to the participants’ misattributions of distractor-target conflict to the unrelated neutral symbols. Here, we set out to test this possibility. If the misattribution explanation of affective priming holds true, affective priming would be stronger with non-conscious than with conscious distractors: Mostly the non-conscious distractors would mask distractor-target conflict as the true affect-origin and, therefore, invite participants’ misattribution of the primed affect to the neutral symbol in temporal vicinity. In contrast, only with conscious distractors, participants would be aware of distractor-target conflict as the true affect-origin and should, therefore, be better able to attribute their affective responses to the distractor-target relationship itself. In three experiments, we confirmed this prediction of a stronger affective priming effect in non-conscious than conscious distractor conditions, while at the same time showing conscious response-priming effects to even exceed non-conscious response-priming effects. Together, these results amount to a double dissociation between affective priming, being stronger with unconscious distractors, and response priming, being stronger with conscious distractors. This double dissociation supports the misattribution explanation and makes clear that the amount of distractor-elicited response conflict alone does not account for the amount of affective priming. Moreover, the participants’ unawareness of the distractors is critical for the amount of affective priming of neutral symbols in temporal vicinity.

Attention Orienting in Response to Non-conscious Hierarchical Arrows: Individuals with Higher Autistic Traits Differ in Their Global/Local Bias

One aspect of the social communication impairments that characterize autism spectrum disorder (ASD) include reduced use of often subtle non-verbal social cues. People with ASD, and those with self-reported sub-threshold autistic traits, also show impairments in rapid visual processing of stimuli unrelated to social or emotional properties. Hence, this study sought to investigate whether perceptually non-conscious visual processing is related to autistic traits. A neurotypical sample of thirty young adults completed the Subthreshold Autism Trait Questionnaire and a Posner-like attention cueing task. Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) was employed to render incongruous hierarchical arrow cues perceptually invisible prior to consciously presented targets. This was achieved via a 10 Hz masking stimulus presented to the dominant eye that suppressed information presented to the non-dominant eye. Non-conscious arrows consisted of local arrow elements pointing in one direction, and forming a global arrow shape pointing in the opposite direction. On each trial, the cue provided either a valid or invalid cue for the spatial location of the subsequent target, depending on which level (global or local) received privileged attention. A significant autism-trait group by global cue validity interaction indicated a difference in the extent of non-conscious local/global cueing between groups. Simple effect analyses revealed that whilst participants with lower autistic traits showed a global arrow cueing effect, those with higher autistic traits demonstrated a small local arrow cueing effect. These results suggest that non-conscious processing biases in local/global attention may be related to individual differences in autistic traits.