Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine

Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling 1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective, (outside view), we propose that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is (no more) than our experience of being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware, and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of their underlying, preceding (causal) biological changes, in the realization that most brain processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness.

Spatiotemporal dissociation of brain activity underlying subjective awareness, objective performance and confidence

Despite intense recent research, the neural correlates of conscious visual perception remain elusive. The most established paradigm for studying brain mechanisms underlying conscious perception is to keep the physical sensory inputs constant and identify brain activities that correlate with the changing content of conscious awareness. However, such a contrast based on conscious content alone would not only reveal brain activities directly contributing to conscious perception, but also include brain activities that precede or follow it. To address this issue, we devised a paradigm whereby we collected, trial-by-trial, measures of objective performance, subjective awareness, and the confidence level of subjective awareness. Using magnetoencephalography recordings in healthy human volunteers, we dissociated brain activities underlying these different cognitive phenomena. Our results provide strong evidence that widely distributed slow cortical potentials (SCPs) correlate with subjective awareness, even after the effects of objective performance and confidence were both removed. The SCP correlate of conscious perception manifests strongly in its waveform, phase, and power. In contrast, objective performance and confidence were both contributed by relatively transient brain activity. These results shed new light on the brain mechanisms of conscious, unconscious, and metacognitive processing.

The effects of energy drink in combination with alcohol on performance and subjective awareness

RATIONALE

This study investigated the coadministration of an energy drink with alcohol to study the effects on subjective intoxication and objective performance.

OBJECTIVES

This study aims to evaluate the objective and subjective effects of alcohol versus placebo at two alcohol doses, alone and in combination with an energy drink, in a balanced order, placebo-controlled, double-blind design.

METHODS

Two groups of ten healthy volunteers, mean (SD) age of 24 (6.5), participated in the study. One group consumed energy drink containing 80 mg of caffeine and the other consumed a placebo drink, with both receiving two alcohol doses (0.046 and 0.087% breathalyser alcohol concentration). Tests included breath alcohol assessment, objective measures of performance (reaction time, word memory and Stroop task) and subjective visual analogue mood scales.

RESULTS

Participants showed significantly impaired reaction time and memory after alcohol compared to the no alcohol condition and had poorer memory after the higher alcohol dose. Stroop performance was improved with the energy drink plus alcohol combination compared to the placebo drink plus alcohol combination. Participants felt significant subjective dose-related impairment after alcohol compared to no alcohol. Neither breath alcohol concentration nor the subjective measures showed a significant difference between the energy drink and the placebo energy drink when combined with alcohol.

CONCLUSIONS

Subjective effects reflected awareness of alcohol intoxication and sensitivity to increasing alcohol dose. There were no overall significant group differences for subjective measures between energy drink and placebo groups in the presence of alcohol and no evidence that the energy drink masked the subjective effects of alcohol at either dose.

Conjoint activity of anterior insular and anterior cingulate cortex: awareness and response

There is now a wealth of evidence that anterior insular and anterior cingulate cortices have a close functional relationship, such that they may be considered together as input and output regions of a functional system. This system is typically engaged across cognitive, affective, and behavioural contexts, suggesting that it is of fundamental importance for mental life. Here, we review the literature and reinforce the case that these brain regions are crucial, firstly, for the production of subjective feelings and, secondly, for co-ordinating appropriate responses to internal and external events. This model seeks to integrate higher-order cortical functions with sensory representation and autonomic control: it is argued that feeling states emerge from the raw data of sensory (including interoceptive) inputs and are integrated through representations in conscious awareness. Correspondingly, autonomic nervous system reactivity is particularly important amongst the responses that accompany conscious experiences. Potential clinical implications are also discussed.