[Recording and reporting adverse reactions in clinical trials. New legal provisions according to the 12th Law Amending the German Drug Law (AMG) and the Ordinance on GCP (GCP-V)]

With the 12th Law Amending the German Drug Law and the Ordinance on GCP (GCPV), new legal provisions for clinical trials came into force in August 2004. These include specific definitions and differentiated reporting obligations affecting investigators, sponsors, authorities and ethics committees concerning pharmacovigilance in clinical trials. The definitions according to section sign3 (6-8) GCP-V make clear that these provisions focus on those adverse events and adverse drug reactions, which are related to investigational medicinal products. In the GCP-V for the first time legally binding provisions for investigators are laid down defining obligations to report all serious adverse events to the sponsor. The sponsor of clinical trials plays a decisive role concerning the evaluation, documentation and reporting to the competent higher authorities, ethics committees and investigators involved in the clinical trial. In the GCP-V different time limits concerning the reporting for sponsors are laid down. The requirements concerning expedited reporting focus on suspected unexpected serious adverse reactions (SUSARs), i. e. those adverse serious reactions, which are not described in the information on the investigational medicinal product. The time limit for reporting SUSARs leading to death or life-threatening SUSARs is 7 days, while for other SUSARs the time limit is 15 days. Besides the responsibilities on expedited reporting the sponsor has to submit a line listing of all serious adverse reactions which occurred during the clinical trial and a report on the safety of the trial subjects on an annual basis or on request. On the European level the harmonisation concerning the provisions on pharmacovigilance in clinical trials according to the Directive 2001/20/EC and the Eudravigilance database should contribute to reach a faster and more effective exchange of safety information related to clinical trials between the different competent authorities of the EU member states.

Von der Schuldfrage zur Fehlerkultur in der Medizin

The number of liability cases but also the size of individual claims due to alleged treatment errors are increasing steadily. Spectacular sentences, especially in the USA, encourage this trend. Wherever human beings work, errors happen. The health care system is particularly susceptible and shows a high potential for errors. Therefore risk management has to be given top priority in hospitals. Preparing the introduction of critical incident reporting (CIR) as the means to notify errors is time-consuming and calls for a change in attitude because in many places the necessary base of trust has to be created first. CIR is not made to find the guilty and punish them but to uncover the origins of errors in order to eliminate them. The Department of Anesthesiology of the University Hospital of Basel has developed an electronic error notification system, which, in collaboration with the Swiss Medical Association, allows each specialist society to participate electronically in a CIR system (CIRS) in order to create the largest database possible and thereby to allow statements concerning the extent and type of error sources in medicine. After a pilot project in 2000-2004, the Swiss Society of Gynecology and Obstetrics is now progressively introducing the 'CIRS Medical' of the Swiss Medical Association. In our country, such programs are vulnerable to judicial intervention due to the lack of explicit legal guarantees of protection. High-quality data registration and skillful counseling are all the more important. Hospital directors and managers are called upon to examine those incidents which are based on errors inherent in the system.

[Approval of clinical trials of immunobiological medicinal products at the Paul Ehrlich Institute]

The GCP Directive 2001/20/EG has been implemented in Germany by the 12th Law Amending the Drug Law of 6 August 2004, thereby introducing new regulations for the performance of clinical trials. The amount of the required documentation has increased, but the assessment and the approval of clinical trials as well as scientific advice procedures (national or by the EMEA) allow the early discussion of many details of the development and the non-clinical and clinical testing of the medicinal product with the experts of the Paul Ehrlich Institute (PEI). This might shorten the times required for later marketing authorisation procedures. To facilitate these new tasks, the PEI has created a new central section "Approval of Clinical Trials", which is responsible for the assessment of the clinical trial applications and will coordinate the procedures within the institute. The main topics of clinical trial applications and the particularities of biological/biotechnological medicinal products such as allergens, blood products, vaccines, sera/mAb and products for cell and gene therapy as well as the differences from chemically defined products are discussed.

HealthConnect and the duty of care: a dilemma for medical practitioners

This article asks whether medical practitioners' duty of care to their patients will encompass participation in the HealthConnect shared electronic records initiative. Medico-legal aspects of the HeathConnect scheme relating to the nature of shared electronic health record summaries (SEHRS) are examined, focusing on their function as an element of patient care and their ultimate purpose. The analysis is based on the premise that an incomplete and hence inaccurate shared electronic health record summary is clinically and legally more perilous than no record at all.

HealthConnect and privacy: a policy conundrum

A shared electronic health record is intrinsically privacy-invasive because it creates a comprehensive record for information-sharing. The author explains the significance of information privacy and why it is that health information warrants special protection. She also provides an overview of the existing regulatory framework and an evaluation of suggested options and proposals for addressing privacy-related issues. Her analysis of suggested consent models suggests that they ultimately involve a trade-off between privacy and the broader benefits promised by HealthConnect and that obtaining the right balance is essential if HealthConnect is to achieve optimal health outcomes.

Icelandic. Decision of the Supreme Court on the protection of privacy with regard to the processing of Health Sector Databases. Attorney at Law vs The State of Iceland

Mr. R appealed for a decision by the Court to overturn the refusal of the Medical Director of Health to her request that health information in medical records pertaining to herdeceased father should not be entered into the Health Sector Database. Furthermore, she called for recognition of her right to prohibit the transfer of such information into a database. Article 8 of Act No 139/1998 on a Health Sector Database provides for the right of patients to refuse permission, by notification to the Medical Director of Health, for information concerning them to be entered into the Health Sector Database. The Court concluded that R could not exercise this right acting as a substitute of her deceased father, but it was recognised that she might, on the basis of her right to protection of privacy, have an interest in preventing the transfer of health data concerning her father into the database, as information could be inferred from such data relating to the hereditary characteristics of her father which might also apply to herself. It was revealed in the course of proceedings that extensive information concerning people's health is entered into medical records, e.g. medical treatment, life-style and social conditions, employment and family circumstances, together with a detailed identification of the person that the information concerns. It was recognised as unequivocal that the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 71 of the Constitution applied to such information and guaranteed to every person the right to protection of privacy in this respect. The Court concluded that the opinion of the District Court, which, inter alia, was based on the opinion of an assessor, to the effect that so-called one-way encryption could be carried out in such a secure manner that it would be virtually impossible to read the encrypted data, had not been refuted. It was noted, however, that Act No. 139/1998 provides no details as to what information from medical records is required to be encrypted in this manner prior to transfer into the database or whether certain information contained in the medical records will not be transferred into the database. The documents of the case indicate that only the identity number of the patient would be encrypted in the database, and that names, both those of the patient and his relatives, as well as the precise address, would be omitted. It is obvious that information on these items is not the only information appearing in the medical records which could, in certain cases, unequivocally identify the person concerned. Act No. 139/1998 also provides for authorisation to the licensee to process information from the medical records transferred into the database. The Act stipulates that certain specified public entities must approve procedures and process methods and monitor all queries and processing of information in the database. However, there is no clear definition of what type of queries will be directed to the database or in what form the replies to such queries will appear. The Court concluded that even though individual provisions of Act No 139/1998 repeatedly stipulate that health information in the Health Sector Database should be non-personally identifiable, it is far from adequately ensured under statutory law that this stated objective will be achieved. In light of the obligations imposed on the legislature by Paragraph 1 of Article 71 of the Constitution, the Court concluded that various forms of monitoring of the creation and, operation of the database are no substitute in this respect without foundation in definite statutory norms. In light of these circumstances, and taking into account the principles of Icelandic law concerning the confidentiality and protection of privacy, the Court concluded that the right of R in this matter must be recognised, and her court claims, therefore, upheld.

Datenbanken als Grundlage f�r Monitoring-Systeme in der Arzneimittelsicherheit

Clinical trials only allow for a limited assessment of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) due to their restricted number of patients, their short duration, and their narrow inclusion criteria. To assess potential ADRs in the population actually treated after drug approval, different systems for signal generation such as spontaneous reporting systems have been established and are required by drug laws in many countries. As of today epidemiological methods for signal confirmation for rare adverse events or events with long induction periods use record linkage databases such as the United Health Care (Ingenix) in the USA or the practice databases such as the General Practice Research Database in Great Britain. However, this approach also has its limitations. This type of database will be presented in this paper. In addition, databases operated by German public health insurance will be described. The topic of linking different data sources in Germany to support pharmaco-vigilance activities will be addressed.

Children. Toeing the line

The Children Bill says agencies should work together to cover all aspects of children's 'well-being'. Proposed nationwide databases will be able to flag up children 'at risk'. The bill does not detail who can contribute to, or access, the proposed database.

Human genetic databases and liberty

This paper examines an act of the Icelandic Parliament on health-sector databases. Both the legislation itself and the manner in which it was presented by the Government to the Parliament and the general public raise various questions about democratic parliamentary procedures, community consultation, autonomy, privacy, professional confidence, control of health data in hospitals and business relationships between medical doctors and biotechnology corporations. A major question to be asked is: In whose interest is it that such sensitive data are handed over to for-profit corporations? Furthermore, is it within the authority of the legislature to authorize politically appointed boards of health institutes to transfer such data without the direct informed consent of the patient and without the relevant physicians' having a say? Does experience teach us to entrust private companies with sensitive personal data? Should the Government be involved in the research policy-making of the biotechnology companies that have been given access to the genetic data of a population, or should the profit motive be the sole deciding influence? That is, should the interest of the shareholders of the companies prevail over the interest of underprivileged groups who are most in need of new methods or medicine to alleviate their situation due to incurable diseases? Or is the invisible hand of the market the only competent decision-maker? Finally, will the proliferation of databases containing sensitive personal data, such as human genetic data, limit our personal liberty?

Neuroscience data and tool sharing

The requirements for neuroinformatics to make a significant impact on neuroscience are not simply technical--the hardware, software, and protocols for collaborative research--they also include the legal and policy frameworks within which projects operate. This is not least because the creation of large collaborative scientific databases amplifies the complicated interactions between proprietary, for-profit R&D and public "open science." In this paper, we draw on experiences from the field of genomics to examine some of the likely consequences of these interactions in neuroscience. Facilitating the widespread sharing of data and tools for neuroscientific research will accelerate the development of neuroinformatics. We propose approaches to overcome the cultural and legal barriers that have slowed these developments to date. We also draw on legal strategies employed by the Free Software community, in suggesting frameworks neuroinformatics might adopt to reinforce the role of public-science databases, and propose a mechanism for identifying and allowing "open science" uses for data whilst still permitting flexible licensing for secondary commercial research.