Delayed matching-to-sample: A tool to assess memory and other cognitive processes in pigeons

Delayed matching-to-sample is a versatile task that has been used to assess the nature of animal memory. Although once thought to be a relatively passive process, matching research has demonstrated considerable flexibility in how animals actively represent events in memory. But delayed matching can also demonstrate how animals fail to maintain representations in memory when they are cued that they will not be tested (directed forgetting) and how the outcome expected can serve as a choice cue. When pigeons have shown divergent retention functions following training without a delay, it has been taken as evidence of the use of a single-code/default coding strategy but in many cases an alternative account may be involved. Delayed matching has also been used to investigate equivalence learning (how animals represent stimuli when they learn that the same comparison response is correct following the presentation of two different samples) and to test for metamemory (the ability of pigeons to indicate that they understand what they know) by allowing animals to decline to be tested when they are uncertain that they remember a stimulus. How animals assess the passage of time has also been studied using the matching task. And there is evidence that when memory for the sample is impaired by a delay, rather than use the probability of being correct for choice of each of the comparison stimuli, pigeons tend to choose based on the overall sample frequency (base-rate neglect). Finally, matching has been used to identify natural color categories as well as dimensional categories in pigeons. Overall, matching to sample has provided an excellent methodology for assessing an assortment of cognitive processes in animals.

Impulsivity affects suboptimal gambling-like choice by pigeons

Pigeons prefer a low-probability, high-payoff but suboptimal alternative over a reliable low-payoff optimal alternative (i.e., one that results in more food). This finding is analogous to suboptimal human monetary gambling because in both cases there appears to be an overemphasis of the occurrence of the winning event (a jackpot) and an underemphasis of losing events. In the present research we found that pigeons chose suboptimally to the degree that they were impulsive as indexed by the steeper slope of the hyperbolic delay-discounting function (i.e., the shorter the delay they would accept in a smaller-sooner/larger-later procedure). These correlational findings have implications for the mechanisms underlying suboptimal choice by humans (e.g., problem gamblers) and they suggest that high baseline levels of impulsivity can enhance acquisition of a gambling habit.

Further investigation of the Monty Hall Dilemma in pigeons and rats

In the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD), three doors are presented with a prize behind one and participants are instructed to choose a door. One of the unchosen doors not containing the prize is revealed, following which the participant can choose to stay with their chosen door or switch to the other one. The optimal strategy is to switch. Herbranson and Schroeder (2010) found that humans performed poorly on this task, whereas pigeons learned to switch readily. We found that pigeons performed only slightly better than humans and that pigeons stayed nearly exclusively when staying and switching were reinforced equally and when staying was the optimal strategy (Stagner et al., 2013b). In Experiment 1 of the present research, rats were trained under these same conditions to observe if possible differences in foraging strategy would influence performance on this task. In Experiment 2, pigeons were trained in an analogous procedure to better compare the two species. We found that both species were sensitive to the overall probability of reinforcement, as both switched significantly more often than subjects that were reinforced equally for staying and switching or reinforced more often for staying. Overall, the two species performed very similarly within the parameters of the current procedure. "This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Tribute to Tom Zentall."

When animals misbehave: analogs of human biases and suboptimal choice

Humans tend to value rewards more if they have had to work hard to obtain them (justification of effort). Similarly they tend to persist in a task even when they would be better off beginning a new one (sunk cost). Humans also often give greater value to objects of good quality than the same objects together with objects of lesser quality (the less is more effect). Commercial gambling (lotteries and slot machines) is another example of suboptimal choice by humans because on average the rewards are less than the investment. In another example of a systematic bias, when humans try to estimate the probability of the occurrence of a low probability event, they often give too much weight to the results of a test, in spite of the fact that the known probability of a false alarm reduces the predictive value of the test (base rate neglect). In each of these examples, we have found that pigeons show a similar tendency to choose suboptimally. When one can show comparable findings of suboptimal choice in animals it suggests that whereas culture may reinforce certain suboptimal behavior, the behavior is likely to result from the overgeneralization of basic behavioral processes or predisposed heuristics that may have been appropriate in natural environments. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: "Tribute to Tom Zentall."

Risk should be objectively defined: comment on Pelé and Sueur

Pelé and Sueur (2013) propose that optimal decisions depend on delay of reinforcement, accuracy (probability or magnitude of reinforcement), and risk. The problem with this model is delay and accuracy are easy to define, but according to Pelé and Sueur the third, risk, depends on the animal's perceived or "interpreted" risk rather than actual (experienced) risk. Thus, choice of the smaller more immediate reward over the larger delayed reward (the delay discounting function) is viewed by the authors as optimal because delay is associated with increased risk (due to potential competition or predation). But perceived risk is assessed by the decision made (e.g., the slope of the discounting function), and since there is virtually no actual risk involved, by default if there is no independent means of measuring risk, according to Pelé and Sueur, all choices can be viewed as optimal. Thus, optimality is an untestable concept. We suggest that risk be defined by the actual risk (given sufficient experience to judge it) and under conditions in which there is no actual risk (or risk is controlled), when animals choose an alternative that provides a lower rate of access to food, that one considers such choice to be suboptimal.

The evolution of self-control

Cognition presents evolutionary research with one of its greatest challenges. Cognitive evolution has been explained at the proximate level by shifts in absolute and relative brain volume and at the ultimate level by differences in social and dietary complexity. However, no study has integrated the experimental and phylogenetic approach at the scale required to rigorously test these explanations. Instead, previous research has largely relied on various measures of brain size as proxies for cognitive abilities. We experimentally evaluated these major evolutionary explanations by quantitatively comparing the cognitive performance of 567 individuals representing 36 species on two problem-solving tasks measuring self-control. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that absolute brain volume best predicted performance across species and accounted for considerably more variance than brain volume controlling for body mass. This result corroborates recent advances in evolutionary neurobiology and illustrates the cognitive consequences of cortical reorganization through increases in brain volume. Within primates, dietary breadth but not social group size was a strong predictor of species differences in self-control. Our results implicate robust evolutionary relationships between dietary breadth, absolute brain volume, and self-control. These findings provide a significant first step toward quantifying the primate cognitive phenome and explaining the process of cognitive evolution.

Suboptimal choice by dogs: when less is better than more

The less is more effect, an example of an affect heuristic, can be shown in humans when they give greater value to a set of six baseball cards in perfect condition, than to the same set of six perfect cards together with three additional cards each with some value but in fair condition. A similar effect has been reported in monkeys which will eat both grapes and cucumbers but prefer grapes, when they prefer a single grape over a single grape plus a slice of cucumber. In the present experiment, we tested the less is more effect with a nonprimate but social species, dogs. We used dogs that would eat a slice of carrot and a slice of cheese but preferred the cheese. When we then gave them a choice between a slice of cheese and a slice of cheese plus a slice of carrot, most dogs preferred the single slice of cheese. Thus, the less is more effect appears to occur in several species.

Six-term transitive inference with pigeons: successive-pair training followed by mixed-pair training

In nonhuman animals, the transitive inference (TI) task typically involves training a series of four simultaneous discriminations involving, for example, arbitrary colors in which choice of one stimulus in each pair is reinforced [+] and choice of the other color is nonreinforced [-]. This can be represented as A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E- and can be conceptualized as a series of linear relationships: A > B > C > D > E. After training, animals are tested on the untrained non-endpoint pair, BD. Preference for B over D is taken as evidence of TI and occurs because B is greater than D in the implied series. In the present study we trained pigeons using a novel training procedure-a hybrid of successive pair training (training one pair at a time) and mixed-pair training (training all pairs at once)-designed to overcome some of the limitations of earlier procedures. Using this hybrid procedure, we trained five premise pairs (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, and E+F-) which allowed us to test three untrained non-endpoint pairs (BD, CE, and BE). A significant TI effect was found for most subjects on at least two out of three test pairs. Different theories of TI are discussed. The results suggest that this hybrid training is an efficient procedure for establishing mixed-pair acquisition and a TI effect.

Suboptimal choice by pigeons may result from the diminishing effect of nonreinforcement

Pigeons prefer an alternative that provides them with a stimulus 20% of the time that predicts 10 pellets of food and a different stimulus 80% of the time that predicts 0 pellets, over an alternative that provides them with a stimulus that always predicts 3 pellets of food, even though the preferred alternative provides them with considerably less food. It appears that the stimulus that predicts 10 pellets acts as a strong conditioned reinforcer, despite the fact that the stimulus that predicts 0 pellets occurs 4 times as often. In the present research, we tested the hypothesis that early in training conditioned inhibition develops to the 0-pellet stimulus, but later in training it dissipates. We trained pigeons with a hue as the 10-pellet stimulus and a vertical line as the 0-pellet stimulus. To assess the inhibitory value of the vertical line, we compared responding to the 10-pellet hue with responding to the compound of the 10-pellet hue and the vertical line early in training and once again late in training, using both a within-subject design (Experiment 1) and a between-groups design (Experiment 2). We found that there was a significant reduction in inhibition between the early test (when pigeons chose optimally) and late test (when choice was suboptimal). Thus, the increase in suboptimal choice may result from the decline in inhibition to the 0-pellet stimulus. Implications for human gambling behavior are considered.

Associative concept learning in animals

Nonhuman animals show evidence for three types of concept learning: perceptual or similarity-based in which objects/stimuli are categorized based on physical similarity; relational in which one object/stimulus is categorized relative to another (e.g., same/different); and associative in which arbitrary stimuli become interchangeable with one another by virtue of a common association with another stimulus, outcome, or response. In this article, we focus on various methods for establishing associative concepts in nonhuman animals and evaluate data documenting the development of associative classes of stimuli. We also examine the nature of the common within-class representation of samples that have been associated with the same reinforced comparison response (i.e., many-to-one matching) by describing manipulations for distinguishing possible representations. Associative concepts provide one foundation for human language such that spoken and written words and the objects they represent become members of a class of interchangeable stimuli. The mechanisms of associative concept learning and the behavioral flexibility it allows, however, are also evident in the adaptive behaviors of animals lacking language.

Do Pigeons Gamble? I Wouldn’t Bet Against It

Human gambling generally involves suboptimal choice because the expected return is usually less than the investment. We have found that animals, too, choose suboptimally under similar choice conditions. Pigeons, like human gamblers, show an impaired ability to objectively assess overall probabilities and amounts of reinforcement when a rare, high-value outcome (analogous to a jackpot in human gambling) is presented in the context of more frequently occurring losses. More specifically, pigeons prefer a low-probability, high-reward outcome over a guaranteed low-reward outcome with a higher overall value. Furthermore, manipulations assumed to increase impulsivity (pigeons maintained at higher levels of motivation for food and pigeons housed in individual cages) result in increased suboptimal choice. They do so presumably because they function to increase attraction to the signal for the low-probability, high-reward outcomes rather than consider the more global probability of reinforcement associated with each alternative.

Animals Represent the past and the Future

It has been proposed by some that only humans have the ability to mentally travel back in time (i.e., have episodic memory) and forward in time (i.e., have the ability to simulate the future). However, there is evidence from a variety of nonhuman animals (e.g., primates, dolphins, scrub jays, rats, and pigeons) that they have some ability to recover personal memories of what-where-when an event occurred (an earlier requirement of the ability to recover an episodic memory) and answer unexpected questions (another requirement to distinguish between semantic and episodic memory). Also, perhaps more critically, according to Tulving's more recent definition of mental time-travel, several animals (primates and scrub jays) have been shown to be able to pass the spoon test. That is, they are able to plan for the future. Thus, although humans show an advanced ability to mentally travel backward and forward in time, there is growing evidence that nonhuman animals have some of this capacity as well.

Animals represent the past and the future

It has been proposed by some that only humans have the ability to mentally travel back in time (i.e., have episodic memory) and forward in time (i.e., have the ability to simulate the future). However, there is evidence from a variety of nonhuman animals (e.g., primates, dolphins, scrub jays, rats, and pigeons) that they have some ability to recover personal memories of what-where-when an event occurred (an earlier requirement of the ability to recover an episodic memory) and answer unexpected questions (another requirement to distinguish between semantic and episodic memory). Also, perhaps more critically, according to Tulving’s more recent definition of mental time-travel, several animals (primates and scrub jays) have been shown to be able to pass the spoon test. That is, they are able to plan for the future. Thus, although humans show an advanced ability to mentally travel backward and forward in time, there is growing evidence that nonhuman animals have some of this capacity as well.

Pigeons show near-optimal win-stay/lose-shift performance on a simultaneous-discrimination, midsession reversal task with short intertrial intervals

Discrimination reversal tasks have been used as a measure of species flexibility in dealing with changes in reinforcement contingency. The simultaneous-discrimination, midsession reversal task is one in which one stimulus (S1) is correct for the first 40 trials of an 80-trial session and the other stimulus (S2) is correct for the remaining trials. After many sessions of training with this task, pigeons show a curious pattern of choices. They begin to respond to S2 well before the reversal point (they make anticipatory errors) and they continue to respond to S1 well after the reversal (they make perseverative errors). That is, they appear to be using the passage of time or number of trials into the session as a cue to reverse. We tested the hypothesis that these errors resulted in part from a memory deficit (the inability to remember over the intertrial interval, ITI, both the choice on the preceding trial and the outcome of that choice) by manipulating the duration of the ITI (1.5, 5, and 10 s). We found support for the hypothesis as pigeons with a short 1.5-s ITI showed close to optimal win-stay/lose-shift accuracy.

Contrast and the justification of effort

When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.

Reversal learning in rats (Rattus norvegicus) and pigeons (Columba livia): qualitative differences in behavioral flexibility

Research has shown that pigeons given a simultaneous visually based discrimination reversal, in which a single reversal occurs at the midpoint of each session, consistently show anticipation prior to the reversal as well as perseveration after the reversal, suggesting that they use a less effective cue (time or trial number into the session) than what would be optimal to maximize reinforcement (local feedback from the most recent trials). In the present research, pigeons (Columba livia) and rats (Rattus norvegicus) were tested with a simultaneous spatial discrimination midsession reversal. Pigeons showed remarkably similar errors in anticipation and perseveration as with visual stimuli, thereby continuing to show the suboptimal use of time as a cue, whereas rats showed no anticipatory errors and very few perseverative errors, suggesting that they used local feedback as a cue, thus more nearly optimizing reinforcement. To further test the rats' flexibility, they were then tested with a variable point of reversal and then with multiple points of reversal within a session. Results showed that the rats effectively maximized reinforcement by developing an approximation to a win-stay/lose-shift rule. The greater efficiency shown by rats with this task suggests that they are better able to use the feedback from their preceding choice as the basis of their future choice. The difference in cue preference further suggests a qualitative difference in acquisition of the midsession reversal task between pigeons and rats.

Social facilitation of d-amphetamine self-administration in rats

The link between social influence and drug abuse has long been established in humans. However, preclinical animal models of drug abuse have only recently begun to consider the role of social influence. Since social factors influence the initiation and maintenance of drug use in humans, it is important to include these factors in preclinical animal models. The current study examined the effects of the presence of a social partner on responding for sucrose pellets under various motivational conditions, as well as on d-amphetamine (AMPH) self-administration. Rats were trained to lever press for either sucrose or AMPH (0.01 or 0.1 mg/kg/infusion unit dose). Following response stability, a novel same-sex conspecific was presented in an adjacent compartment separated by a clear divider, and responding for sucrose or AMPH reward was measured. Rats were allowed to restabilize, and subsequently given an additional partner presentation. Presence of the social partner increased responding only during the first pairing with the AMPH 0.1 mg/kg/infusion unit dose, whereas inhibition of responding was observed during the first pairing during access to the 0.01 mg/kg/infusion unit dose. Under free feed conditions, inhibition of sucrose pellet responding was observed in the presence of the social partner, but this effect was attenuated under food restriction. In contrast, the results demonstrate social facilitation of AMPH self-administration at a high unit dose, thus extending the influence of social factors to an operant conditioning task. This model of social facilitation may have important implications as a preclinical model of social influence on drug abuse.