Survey of poliovirus antibodies during the final stage of polio eradication in Egypt

BACKGROUND

Egypt provides ideal conditions for poliovirus (PV) transmission (high population density, high contact rates and low sanitation and hygiene in some areas). Despite excellent program performance, wild poliovirus type 1 (PV1) continue to circulate in 2004. To investigate potential causes for the persistence, we conducted a serological study.

METHODS

Seroprevalence surveys were conducted in "polio-endemic" regions (Greater Cairo and Upper Egypt) and in one control region (Lower Egypt) in December 2004. Sera collected from infants aged 6-11 months were tested for antibodies to poliovirus by neutralization assay.

RESULTS

A total of 973 subjects were tested. Seroprevalence to PV type 1 (PV1), PV type 2 (PV2) and PV type 3 (PV3) was 99, 99 and 91%, respectively. Significant variation in PV3 seroprevalence was found (range: 76-100%). Region, density, maternal education, socioeconomic status (SES), stunting and diarrhea were significant risk factors for lower seroprevalence in the univariate analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study suggested that uniformly high immunity levels (>96%) were required to interrupt PV1 transmission in the last remaining reservoirs (last PV1 was isolated in mid-January 2005 in Egypt). It further suggests substantial regional differences in OPV immunogenicity, with rural areas and low SES achieving the lowest seroprevalence to PV3.

Protective efficacy of a monovalent oral type 1 poliovirus vaccine: a case-control study

BACKGROUND

A high-potency monovalent oral type 1 poliovirus vaccine (mOPV1) was developed in 2005 to tackle persistent poliovirus transmission in the last remaining infected countries. Our aim was to assess the efficacy of this vaccine in India.

METHODS

We estimated the efficacy of mOPV1 used in supplementary immunisation activities from 2076 matched case-control pairs of confirmed cases of poliomyelitis caused by type 1 wild poliovirus and cases of non-polio acute flaccid paralysis in India. The effect of the introduction of mOPV1 on population immunity was calculated on the basis of estimates of vaccination coverage from data for non-polio acute flaccid paralysis.

FINDINGS

In areas of persistent poliovirus transmission in Uttar Pradesh, the protective efficacy of mOPV1 was estimated to be 30% (95% CI 19-41) per dose against type 1 paralytic disease, compared with 11% (7-14) for the trivalent oral vaccine. 76-82% of children aged 0-23 months were estimated to be protected by vaccination against type 1 poliovirus at the end of 2006, compared with 59% at the end of 2004, before the introduction of mOPV1.

INTERPRETATION

Under conditions where the efficacy of live-attenuated oral poliovirus vaccines is compromised by a high prevalence of diarrhoea and other infections, a dose of high-potency mOPV1 is almost three times more effective against type 1 poliomyelitis disease than is trivalent vaccine. Achieving high coverage with this new vaccine in areas of persistent poliovirus transmission should substantially improve the probability of rapidly eliminating transmission of the disease.

Mass vaccination campaigns for polio eradication: an essential strategy for success

Effective vaccines against poliomyelitis became available in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Mass campaigns were an integral part of early control efforts. Thereafter, polio vaccines were used largely in routine childhood programs. The resolution in 1988 to eradicate polio globally led to the development of appropriate strategies to achieve this goal, including mass vaccination campaigns (i.e., national immunization days, sub-national immunization days and mop-up activities), to achieve the highest possible coverage in the shortest possible time. Unlike other vaccines, mass campaign use of oral poliovirus vaccine enhances the immunogenicity of this vaccine, primarily due to: (1) the decrease in the prevalence of other enteroviruses that potentially interfere with seroconversion; and (2) the secondary spread of vaccine virus from vaccinees to close contacts, resulting in seroconversion of some unvaccinated contacts. To reach the highest possible coverage, detailed planning, meticulous execution, careful supervision and standardized monitoring are critical. A number of innovative approaches to improve the quality and/or coverage have become the 'standard' of supplemental immunization activities. These mass campaigns have led to dramatic decreases in the incidence of polio. This chapter reviews the scientific, operational and programmatic data on mass campaign use of polio vaccines, and summarize the lessons learnt from implementing the mass vaccination strategies used to eradicate poliomyelitis globally.

Development and consideration of global policies for managing the future risks of poliovirus outbreaks: insights and lessons learned through modeling

The success of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative promises to bring large benefits, including sustained improvements in quality of life (i.e., cases of paralytic disease and deaths avoided) and costs saved from cessation of vaccination. Obtaining and maintaining these benefits requires that policymakers manage the transition from the current massive use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to a world without OPV and free of the risks of potential future reintroductions of live polioviruses. This article describes the analytical journey that began in 2001 with a retrospective case study on polio risk management and led to development of dynamic integrated risk, economic, and decision analysis tools to inform global policies for managing the risks of polio. This analytical journey has provided several key insights and lessons learned that will be useful to future analysts involved in similar complex decision-making processes.

Risks of paralytic disease due to wild or vaccine-derived poliovirus after eradication

After the global eradication of wild polioviruses, the risk of paralytic poliomyelitis from polioviruses will still exist and require active management. Possible reintroductions of poliovirus that can spread rapidly in unprotected populations present challenges to policymakers. For example, at least one outbreak will likely occur due to circulation of a neurovirulent vaccine-derived poliovirus after discontinuation of oral poliovirus vaccine and also could possibly result from the escape of poliovirus from a laboratory or vaccine production facility or from an intentional act. In addition, continued vaccination with oral poliovirus vaccines would result in the continued occurrence of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis. The likelihood and impacts of reintroductions in the form of poliomyelitis outbreaks depend on the policy decisions and on the size and characteristics of the vulnerable population, which change over time. A plan for managing these risks must begin with an attempt to characterize and quantify them as a function of time. This article attempts to comprehensively characterize the risks, synthesize the existing data available for modeling them, and present quantitative risk estimates that can provide a starting point for informing policy decisions.

Risk management in a polio-free world

Inherent in the decision to launch the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1988 was the expectation for many people that immunization against poliomyelitis would eventually simply stop, as had been the case with smallpox following its eradication in 1977. However, the strategies for managing the risks associated with a "polio-free" world must be continuously refined to reflect new developments, particularly in our understanding of the live polioviruses in the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) and in the international approach to managing potential biohazards. The most important of these developments has been the confirmation in 2000 that vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) can circulate and cause polio outbreaks, making the use of OPV after interruption of wild poliovirus transmission incompatible with a polio-free world. A comprehensive strategy has been developed to minimize the risks associated with eventual OPV cessation, centered on appropriate long-term biocontainment of poliovirus stocks (whether for vaccine production, diagnosis, or research), the controlled reintroduction of any live poliovirus vaccine (i.e., from an OPV stockpile), and appropriate use of the inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). Although some aspects of this risk management strategy are still debated, there is wide agreement that no strategy would entirely eliminate the potential risks to a polio-free world. The current strategy for risk management in a polio-free world will continue to evolve with better characterization of these risks and the development of more effective approaches both to reduce those risks and to limit their consequences should they occur.

New Strategies for the Elimination of Polio from India

The feasibility of global polio eradication is being questioned as a result of continued transmission in a few localities that act as sources for outbreaks elsewhere. Perhaps the greatest challenge is in India, where transmission has persisted in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar despite high coverage with multiple doses of vaccine. We estimate key parameters governing the seasonal epidemics in these areas and show that high population density and poor sanitation cause persistence by not only facilitating transmission of poliovirus but also severely compromising the efficacy of the trivalent vaccine. We analyze strategies to counteract this and show that switching to monovalent vaccine may finally interrupt virus transmission.

A vision of a world without polio: The OPV cessation strategy

Once the eradication of wild poliovirus has been confirmed, the public health benefits of routine immunization with OPV will no longer outweigh the burden of disease either due to paralysis caused by OPV (vaccine associated paralytic polio), or by outbreaks caused by circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The eventual cessation of OPV use in routine immunization programmes worldwide will become necessary to assure a lasting eradication of polio. As the world moves towards polio eradication and its certification, preparations are therefore being intensified for OPV cessation, and the risk management framework for safe OPV cessation is being put in place. The framework includes bio-containment of all known poliovirus and potentially infected substances, development of an international stockpile of oral polio vaccine, ensuring a mechanism for continued global surveillance and response for polio after eradication has been certified, and national policies if countries decide to continue vaccinating with inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). It is ironic that the vaccine on which the world has depended for polio eradication will itself become a risk to eradication once the transmission of wild poliovirus has been interrupted. Final preparations for the eventual global and simultaneous cessation of OPV will require the same level of international cooperation and coordination that has brought the world to the verge of polio eradication.

Polio eradication: interrupting transmission, towards a polio-free world

The polio eradication initiative is in its final phase and new tools have been developed to ensure its completion, including monovalent type 1 and 3 oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) that permit a virus-specific response to endemic and imported poliovirus. After eradication, the public health benefits of routine immunization with OPV will no longer outweigh the burden of disease, either owing to paralysis caused by OPV (vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis) or outbreaks caused by reversion of OPV to neuro-virulent strains (circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses), and discontinuation of OPV use will be mandatory. Prerequisites for safe OPV cessation include biocontainment of all known poliovirus and potentially infected materials; an international stockpile of monovalent OPV and a response capacity. A mechanism is required for continued surveillance of poliomyelitis after eradication has been certified, as well as national policies if countries decide to continue vaccinating using inactivated poliovirus vaccine. It is ironic that the vaccine responsible for polio eradication will itself become a threat to eradication, once polio has been eradicated.

POLICY: OPV Cessation--the Final Step To a "Polio-Free" World

The 20-year, U.S. $4 billion-dollar international effort to eradicate wild polioviruses now includes monovalent oral poliovirus type 1 vaccine (mOPV1), which was first given to 40 million children in India in April 2005. As this vaccine is being introduced to eliminate some of the last poliovirus reservoirs, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative is planning for the eventual synchronized worldwide cessation of the routine use of all oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) because of their capacity to cause, rarely, outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis. This Policy Forum reviews the feasibility and implications of eventually stopping the use of live polio vaccines.

VACCINE-DERIVED POLIOVIRUSES AND THE ENDGAME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL POLIO ERADICATION

As the global eradication of wild poliovirus nears, the World Health Organization (WHO) is addressing challenges unprecedented in public health. The live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), used for more than four decades to interrupt poliovirus transmission, and the vaccine of choice for developing countries, is genetically unstable. Reversion of the small number of substitutions conferring the attenuated phenotype frequently occurs during OPV replication in humans and is the underlying cause of the rare cases of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) in OPV recipients and their close contacts. Whereas VAPP has long been recognized, two other adverse events have been identified more recently: (a) long-term excretion of highly evolved vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) in persons with primary immunodeficiencies, and (b) polio outbreaks associated with circulating VDPVs in areas with low rates of OPV coverage. Developing a posteradication strategy to minimize the risks of VDPV emergence and spread has become an urgent WHO priority.

A dynamic model of poliomyelitis outbreaks: learning from the past to help inform the future

Policy-makers now face important questions regarding the tradeoffs among different strategies for managing poliomyelitis risks after they succeed with polio eradication. To estimate the potential consequences of reintroductions of polioviruses and the resulting outbreaks, the authors developed a dynamic disease transmission model that can simulate many aspects of outbreaks for different posteradication conditions. In this paper, the authors identify the issues related to prospective modeling of future outbreaks using such a model, including the reality that accurate prediction of conditions and associated model inputs prior to future outbreaks remains challenging. The authors explored the model's behavior in the context of three recent outbreaks resulting from importation of poliovirus into previously polio-free countries and found that the model reproduced reported data on the incidence of cases. The authors expect that this model can provide important insights into the dynamics of future potential poliomyelitis outbreaks and in this way serve as a useful tool for risk assessment.

A global call for new polio vaccines

The end is near but eradication will not be as simple as once thought.

By late 2003, poliomyelitis had been eliminated from all but six countries in the world as a result of the World Health Organization's eradication initiative. But a trio of workers based at the Geneva headquarters of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative point out in a Commentary that without new vaccines, the goal of global eradication may be unattainable.

Vaccine policy changes and epidemiology of poliomyelitis in the United States

CONTEXT

The last case of poliomyelitis in the United States due to indigenously acquired wild poliovirus occurred in 1979; however, as a consequence of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use that began in 1961, an average of 9 cases of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) were confirmed each year from 1961 through 1989. To reduce the VAPP burden, national vaccination policy changed in 1997 from reliance on OPV to options for a sequential schedule of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) followed by OPV. In 2000, an exclusive IPV schedule was adopted.

OBJECTIVE

To review the epidemiology of paralytic poliomyelitis and document the association between the vaccine schedule changes and VAPP in the United States.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Review of national surveillance data from 1990 through 2003 for cases of confirmed paralytic poliomyelitis.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Number of confirmed paralytic poliomyelitis cases, including VAPP, and ratio of VAPP cases to number of doses of OPV distributed that occurred before, during, and after implementation of policy changes.

RESULTS

From 1990 through 1999, 61 cases of paralytic poliomyelitis were reported; 59 (97%) of these were VAPP (1 case per 2.9 million OPV doses distributed), 1 case was imported, and 1 case was indeterminate. Thirteen cases occurred during the 1997-1999 transitional policy period and were associated with the all-OPV schedule; none occurred with the IPV-OPV schedule. No cases occurred after the United States implemented the all-IPV policy in 2000. The last imported poliomyelitis case occurred in 1993 and the last case of VAPP occurred in 1999.

CONCLUSION

The change in polio vaccination policy from OPV to exclusive use of IPV was successfully implemented; this change led to the elimination of VAPP in the United States.

Polio control after certification: major issues outstanding

Now that the global eradication of wild poliovirus is almost within sight, planning for the post-certification era is becoming a priority issue. It is agreed that a stockpile of appropriate polio vaccines will need to be established, and a surveillance and response capacity will need to be maintained, in order to protect the world against any possible future outbreaks attributable either to the persistence of wild poliovirus or vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) or to the unintentional or intentional release of poliovirus from a laboratory or vaccine store. Although it has been suggested that the stockpile should consist of monovalent oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV), many questions remain concerning its nature, financing, management, and use--in particular, because of uncertainties over future national vaccination policies, and over the availability of different vaccines, after the certification of wild poliovirus eradication. There are further uncertainties concerning the possible role and efficacy of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) used either routinely or in outbreak control in low-hygiene settings, the potential for rapid geographical spread of polioviruses should an outbreak occur after certification, and the risks inherent in introducing additional oral polio vaccine (OPV) viruses into populations in which the vaccine coverage and prevalence of immunity have declined, and which may thus favour the spread of VDPVs. Given these important gaps in knowledge, no country should discontinue polio vaccination until a coordinated policy for the post-certification era has been developed and the recommended measures have been put in place.

The role of routine polio immunization in the post-certification era

The role of routine vaccination against poliomyelitis for the post-certification era remains an important area for policy decision-making. Two critical decisions need to be taken: first, to continue or discontinue vaccination with the live attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV); and second, if OPV is to be discontinued, whether vaccination with inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) is needed. Four potential vaccination scenarios can be constructed: stop all polio vaccination; continue with current vaccination policies (OPV, IPV, or sequential schedule); discontinue OPV, but continue IPV universally; or discontinue OPV, but continue IPV in selected countries. All possible scenarios require continued investments in a surveillance and response strategy, including a stockpile of polio vaccine. Continuing vaccination would limit the savings that could be applied to the control of other health priorities. This report reviews the key issues associated with each scenario, highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each scenario, and outlines the major challenges for policy decision-making.

Persistence of Vaccine‐Derived Polioviruses among Immunodeficient Persons with Vaccine‐Associated Paralytic Poliomyelitis

To estimate long-term poliovaccine virus persistence among immunodeficient patients with vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (iVAPP), cases reported in the United States during 1975-1997 were reviewed, with subsequent follow-up and virological testing. Six (16.2%) of 37 subjects excreted poliovaccine viruses for > or =6 months. Partial genomic sequencing of their available poliovirus isolates showed considerable divergence from the prototype Sabin strain in all cases. Poliovirus persistence declined over time since the last oral poliovaccine dose: at 6 months, 19.4%; 1 year, 14.3%; 5 years, 4%; and 10 years, 0% (P<.05) of patients. Despite the high prevalence of poliovaccine virus persistence among patients with iVAPP, this group appears to be an unlikely source of poliovirus reintroduction in developed countries because of the rarity and high fatality rate of iVAPP and the possible spontaneous clearance of polioviruses. These results are important for developing "endgame" strategies for the Global Poliomyelitis Eradication Program.

Immunogenicity of measles and rubella vaccines in Oman: a prospective clinical trial

A prospective immunogenicity trial of measles and rubella vaccines was conducted in Oman. Children received measles vaccine at age 9 months and measles-rubella vaccine at age 15 months. Serum specimens were tested for measles-specific IgG and rubella-specific IgG. Of 1025 eligible infants, 881 (86.0%) returned for all five visits and had adequate serum samples for testing. Seroconversion to measles after vaccination at 9 months was 98.1%. At 15 months, 47 (5.3%) of the 881 children were seronegative for measles; of these, 44 (93.6%) seroconverted. At 16 months, 99% of the children seronegative at age 9 months seroconverted after receiving two doses of measles vaccine. At age 15 months, 684 (77.6%) children were seronegative for rubella. Of these, 676 (98.8%) seroconverted by age 16 months. One dose of measles vaccine at age 9 months was highly immunogenic. One dose of measles-rubella vaccine at age 15 months closed the remaining measles immunogenicity gap and resulted in a high rate of rubella seroconversion.

Outbreak of poliomyelitis due to type 3 poliovirus, northern India, 1999-2000: injections a major contributing factor

BACKGROUND

A large outbreak of poliomyelitis due to poliovirus type 3 (P3) occurred in India in 1999. This raised concerns about oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) effectiveness, particularly the type 3 component, in preventing clinical disease and offered an opportunity to describe the epidemiology of a P3 outbreak.

METHODS

We reviewed data collected by the National Polio Surveillance Project to describe the outbreak and conducted a case-control study to determine risk factors for the development of paralytic poliomyelitis. The P3 cases with paralysis onset in 2000 were enrolled with four controls per case, matched for age and neighbourhood.

RESULTS

Of 1126 virologically confirmed poliomyelitis cases reported in 1999, 719 (64%) were due to P3. We enrolled 48 (80%) of 60 cases and 175 matched controls. Age (30.6 months, cases versus 30.4 months, controls) and vaccination status (median 5.8 OPV doses, cases versus 6.1 OPV doses, controls) were similar among cases and controls. The only significant difference between the groups was the proportion that received any injection in the last 30 days prior to paralysis onset or the corresponding reference date for controls (35.4% versus 12.3%, adjusted odds ratio [OR] = 3.9, 95% CI: 1.8-12.5).

CONCLUSIONS

Cases and controls had similar vaccination histories. The only significant risk factor for paralytic illness was having received any injection in the 30 days before onset. Our study confirms that injections administered during the poliovirus incubation period can provoke paralytic poliomyelitis. Injections in polio-endemic countries should only be indicated when other therapeutic options have failed or are not available.

Compatible poliomyelitis cases in India during 2000

OBJECTIVE

To describe the characteristics of compatible poliomyelitis cases and to assess the programmatic implications of clusters of such cases in India.

METHODS

We described the characteristics of compatible poliomyelitis cases, identified clusters of compatible cases (two or more in the same district or neighbouring districts within two months), and examined their relationship to wild poliovirus cases.

FINDINGS

There were 362 compatible cases in 2000. The incidence of compatible cases was higher in districts with laboratory-confirmed poliomyelitis cases than in districts without laboratory-confirmed cases. Of 580 districts, 96 reported one compatible case and 72 reported two or more compatible cases. Among these 168 districts with at least one compatible case, 123 had internal or cross- border clusters of compatible cases. In 27 districts with clusters of compatible cases, no wild poliovirus was isolated either in the same district or in neighbouring districts. Three of these 27 districts presented laboratory-confirmed poliomyelitis cases during 2001.

CONCLUSION

Most clusters of compatible cases occurred in districts identified as areas with continuing wild poliovirus transmission and where mopping-up vaccination campaigns were carried out. As certification nears, areas with compatible poliomyelitis cases should be investigated and deficiencies in surveillance should be corrected in order to ensure that certification is justified.

Possible global strategies for stopping polio vaccination and how they could be harmonized

One of the challenges of the polio eradication initiative over the next few years will be the formulation of an optimal strategy for stopping poliovirus vaccination after global certification of polio eradication has been accomplished. This strategy must maximize the benefits and minimize the risks. A number of strategies are currently under consideration, including: (i) synchronized global discontinuation of use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV); (ii) regional or subregional coordinated OPV discontinuation; and (iii) moving from trivalent to bivalent or monovalent OPV. Other options include moving from OPV to global use of IPV for an interim period before cessation of IPV use (to eliminate circulation of vaccine-derived poliovirus, if necessary) or development of new OPV strains that are not transmissible. Each of these strategies is associated with specific advantages (financial benefits for OPV discontinuation) and disadvantages (cost of switch to IPV) and inherent uncertainties (risk of continued poliovirus circulation in certain populations or prolonged virus replication in immunodeficient persons). An ambitious research agenda addresses the remaining questions and issues. Nevertheless, several generalities are already clear. Unprecedented collaboration between countries, regions, and indeed the entire world will be required to implement a global OPV discontinuation strategy Regulatory approval will be needed for an interim bivalent OPV or for monovalent OPV in many countries. Manufacturers will need sufficient lead time to produce sufficient quantities of IPV Finally, the financial implications for any of these strategies need to be considered. Whatever strategy is followed it will be necessary to stockpile supplies of a poliovirus-containing vaccine (most probably all three types of monovalent OPV), and to develop contingency plans to respond should an outbreak of polio occur after stopping vaccination.

Vaccination coverage of foreign-born children 19 to 35 months of age: findings from the National Immunization Survey, 1999-2000

OBJECTIVE

To compare coverage estimates of foreign-born children 19 to 35 months old with those of US-born children of the same age group.

METHODS

The National Immunization Survey is a multistage, random-digit dialing survey designed to measure vaccination coverage estimates of US children 19 to 35 months old. Data from 1999-2000 were combined to permit comparison of vaccination coverage among foreign- and US-born children.

RESULTS

Foreign-born and US-born children 19 to 35 months of age had comparable 3:3:1 series coverage (3 or more doses of diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine [DTP/DTaP/DT], 3 or more doses of poliovirus vaccine, and 1 or more doses of measles-containing vaccine), the standard in most countries. However, coverage for a US standard, 4:3:1:3 series (4 or more doses of DTP/DTaP/DT, 3 or more doses of poliovirus vaccine, 1 or more doses of measles-containing vaccine, and an adequate number of Haemophilus influenzae type b [Hib] doses based on age at first dose) was lower among foreign-born children because of markedly lower Hib cover and marginally lower DTP/DTaP/DT coverage. In addition, hepatitis B coverage was markedly lower in foreign-born children.

CONCLUSION

Lower vaccination coverage among foreign-born children, especially against Hib and hepatitis B, is of concern because foreign-born children often live in households and communities characterized by more intense exposure to these diseases, and many originate from countries with much higher prevalence rates of these diseases than the United States. The differences in Hib and hepatitis B coverage suggest a need for increased culturally competent public health immunization interventions to increase coverage among foreign-born children.

Vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis in India during 1999: decreased risk despite massive use of oral polio vaccine

OBJECTIVE

Vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) is a rare but serious consequence of the administration of oral polio vaccine (OPV). Intensified OPV administration has reduced wild poliovirus transmission in India but VAPP is becoming a matter of concern.

METHODS

We analysed acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance data in order to estimate the VAPP risk in this country. VAPP was defined as occurring in AFP cases with onset of paralysis in 1999, residual weakness 60 days after onset, and isolation of vaccine-related poliovirus. Recipient VAPP cases were a subset with onset of paralysis between 4 and 40 days after receipt of OPV.

FINDINGS

A total of 181 AFP cases met the case definition. The following estimates of VAPP risk were made: overall risk, 1 case per 4.1 to 4.6 million OPV doses administered; recipient risk,1 case per 12.2 million; first-dose recipient risk, 1 case per 2.8 million; and subsequent-dose recipient risk, 1 case per 13.9 million.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of data from a highly sensitive surveillance system the estimated VAPP risk in India is evidently lower than that in other countries, notwithstanding the administration of multiple OPV doses to children in mass immunization campaigns.

Persistence of vaccine-derived poliovirus following a mass vaccination campaign in Cuba: implications for stopping polio vaccination after global eradication

BACKGROUND

With substantial progress made toward polio eradication, developing the appropriate strategy for discontinuing global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after global eradication becomes increasingly important. At issue is the theoretical risk of independent circulation of potentially virulent OPV-derived strains. Because Cuba uses OPV only in mass campaigns, it represents an ideal site to assess vaccine-derived poliovirus persistence.

METHODS

Infants born after the 1997 biannual mass campaigns were evaluated for past (neutralizing antibody) or current (virus excretion) evidence of vaccine-derived poliovirus exposure. We obtained sera and/or stool specimens from 861 infants; a second serum from 218 infants.

RESULTS

All stool specimens were poliovirus negative. Of 762 infants, 113 (14.8%) had initially detectable poliovirus type 1 antibody, 193 (25.3%) type 2, and 94 (12.3%) type 3. A precipitous antibody decline occurred in initially positive sera.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results suggest that in a country with high population immunity, vaccine-derived virus is unlikely to establish ongoing circulation.