Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans

Emotions and cognition: a new approach to animal welfare

The concept of quality of life in animals is closely associated with the concepts of animal sentience and animal welfare. It reflects a positive approach that inquires what animals like or prefer doing. The assessment of farm animal welfare requires a good understanding of the animals' affective experience, including their emotions. However, affective experience in animals is difficult to measure because of the absence of verbal communication. Recent studies in the field of cognitive psychology have shown that affective experience can be investigated without using verbal communication by examination of the interactions between emotions and cognition. On the one hand, appraisal theories provide a conceptual framework which suggests that emotions in humans are triggered by a cognitive process whereby the situation is evaluated on a limited number of elementary criteria such as familiarity and predictability. We have applied these appraisal theories to develop an experimental approach for studying the elementary criteria used by farm animals to evaluate their environment and the combinations of those criteria that trigger emotions. On the other hand, an increasing body of research, first in humans and then in other animals, suggests that emotions also influence cognitive processes by modifying attention, memory and judgement in a short- or long-term manner. Cognitive processes could therefore be manipulated and measured to provide new insights into how not only emotions but also more persistent affective states can be assessed in animals. Further work based on these cognitive approaches will offer new paradigms for improving our understanding of animal welfare, thus contributing to ‘a life of high quality’ in animals.

Anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism as influences in the quality of life of companion animals

Since animal minds are private, so their perception of their own quality of life (QoL) must be also. Anthropocentrism, the interpretation of reality exclusively in terms of human values and experience, has to be guarded against in any assessment of animal welfare; for domestic pets, misapprehensions about their olfactory and cognitive abilities appear to present the greatest challenge to their welfare. Anthropomorphism, the attribution of human qualities to animals, presents a particular problem when considering companion animals, since most bonds between owners and their pets appear to be based upon a perception of the pet as almost human. Many owners report that their dogs, cats and horses are capable of feeling complex emotions, such as pride and guilt, that require a level of self-awareness that has been difficult to demonstrate even in chimpanzees. Such beliefs appear to contribute to the development of behavioural disorders in pets; for example, clinical experience suggests that the application of punishment by owners who attribute ‘guilt’ to their animals may unwittingly lead to compromised welfare. Anthropomorphic owners are also likely to be poor proxies for reporting their pets' QoL.

Emotion and consciousness

Consciousness and emotion feature prominently in our personal lives, yet remain enigmatic. Recent advances prompt further distinctions that should provide more experimental traction: we argue that emotion consists of an emotion state (functional aspects, including emotional response) as well as feelings (the conscious experience of the emotion), and that consciousness consists of level (e.g. coma, vegetative state and wakefulness) and content (what it is we are conscious of). Not only is consciousness important to aspects of emotion but structures that are important for emotion, such as brainstem nuclei and midline cortices, overlap with structures that regulate the level of consciousness. The intersection of consciousness and emotion is ripe for experimental investigation, and we outline possible examples for future studies.

The debate over dopamine's role in reward: the case for incentive salience

INTRODUCTION

Debate continues over the precise causal contribution made by mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward. There are three competing explanatory categories: 'liking', learning, and 'wanting'. Does dopamine mostly mediate the hedonic impact of reward ('liking')? Does it instead mediate learned predictions of future reward, prediction error teaching signals and stamp in associative links (learning)? Or does dopamine motivate the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli ('wanting')? Each hypothesis is evaluated here, and it is suggested that the incentive salience or 'wanting' hypothesis of dopamine function may be consistent with more evidence than either learning or 'liking'. In brief, recent evidence indicates that dopamine is neither necessary nor sufficient to mediate changes in hedonic 'liking' for sensory pleasures. Other recent evidence indicates that dopamine is not needed for new learning, and not sufficient to directly mediate learning by causing teaching or prediction signals. By contrast, growing evidence indicates that dopamine does contribute causally to incentive salience. Dopamine appears necessary for normal 'wanting', and dopamine activation can be sufficient to enhance cue-triggered incentive salience. Drugs of abuse that promote dopamine signals short circuit and sensitize dynamic mesolimbic mechanisms that evolved to attribute incentive salience to rewards. Such drugs interact with incentive salience integrations of Pavlovian associative information with physiological state signals. That interaction sets the stage to cause compulsive 'wanting' in addiction, but also provides opportunities for experiments to disentangle 'wanting', 'liking', and learning hypotheses. Results from studies that exploited those opportunities are described here.

CONCLUSION

In short, dopamine's contribution appears to be chiefly to cause 'wanting' for hedonic rewards, more than 'liking' or learning for those rewards.

Neuroevolutionary sources of laughter and social joy: modeling primal human laughter in laboratory rats

Rats make abundant 50 kHz ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) when they play and exhibit other positive social interactions. This response can be dramatically increased by tickling animals, especially when directed toward bodily areas toward which animals direct their own play solicitations (e.g., nape of the neck). The analysis of this system indicates that the response largely occurs in positive, playful social situations, and may index willingness for social engagement, similar to human infantile laughter, which may mature into productive adult socio-sexual behaviors. There are now enough formal similarities between rat 50 kHz USVs and human laughter, to realistically hypothesize that they are neurally and functionally homologous at the subcortical level of brain organization. To help contrast this behavior with human laughter, the available evidence concerning neural organization of human laughter is summarized from brain imaging and neuropsychological perspectives. Thus, a study of 50 kHz USVs in rats may offer an animal model for studying some of the fundamental properties of laughter circuitry in humans, and the brain mechanisms that facilitate positive social engagement, in the mammalian brain. It is proposed that further study of this phenomenon may provide a theoretical as well as empirical handle on the sources of social joy within the mammalian brain.

A new animal welfare concept based on allostasis

Animal welfare is an increasing issue of public concern and debate. As a result, many countries are reconsidering the way animal welfare is embedded in the legislation and rules for housing and care of animals. This requires general agreement of what animal welfare is. Unfortunately, the current science of animal welfare is less scientific than what has been claimed. In our view, it is overly guided by anthropocentric thinking about how animals ought to be handled and neglects the latest concept of physiology: 'The Allostasis Concept'. Allostasis, which means stability through change, has the potential to replace homeostasis as the core model of physiological regulation. Not constancy or freedoms, but capacity to change is crucial to good physical and mental health and good animal welfare. Therefore, not homeostasis but allostasis is at the basis of our new animal welfare concept. This paper is aimed at a broader scientific discussion of animal welfare that includes knowledge from the latest scientific developments in neurobiology and behavioral physiology, and generates views that are extremely relevant for the animal welfare discussion.

Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access

Whether masked words can be processed at a semantic level remains a controversial issue in cognitive psychology. Although recent behavioral studies have demonstrated masked semantic priming for number words, attempts to generalize this finding to other categories of words have failed. Here, as an alternative to subliminal priming, we introduce a sensitive behavioral method to detect nonconscious semantic processing of words. The logic of this method consists of presenting words close to the threshold for conscious perception and examining whether their semantic content modulates performance in objective and subjective tasks. Our results disclose two independent sources of modulation of the threshold for access to consciousness. First, prior conscious perception of words increases the detection rate of the same words when they are subsequently presented with stronger masking. Second, the threshold for conscious access is lower for emotional words than for neutral ones, even for words that have not been previously consciously perceived, thus implying that written words can receive nonconscious semantic processing.

Self-referential processing in our brain--a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self

The question of the self has intrigued philosophers and psychologists for a long time. More recently, distinct concepts of self have also been suggested in neuroscience. However, the exact relationship between these concepts and neural processing across different brain regions remains unclear. This article reviews neuroimaging studies comparing neural correlates during processing of stimuli related to the self with those of non-self-referential stimuli. All studies revealed activation in the medial regions of our brains' cortex during self-related stimuli. The activation in these so-called cortical midline structures (CMS) occurred across all functional domains (e.g., verbal, spatial, emotional, and facial). Cluster and factor analyses indicate functional specialization into ventral, dorsal, and posterior CMS remaining independent of domains. Taken together, our results suggest that self-referential processing is mediated by cortical midline structures. Since the CMS are densely and reciprocally connected to subcortical midline regions, we advocate an integrated cortical-subcortical midline system underlying human self. We conclude that self-referential processing in CMS constitutes the core of our self and is critical for elaborating experiential feelings of self, uniting several distinct concepts evident in current neuroscience.

Interoception in emotional experience

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Many theories of emotion have postulated a close relationship of the feedback of physiological changes and their perception with emotional experience. This paper reviews recent advances in theory and brain-imaging research on this topic of interoception and describes a hypothetical model of the potential mechanisms.

RECENT FINDINGS

Research from patients with spinal-cord injuries and pure autonomic failure suggests that emotion-related peripheral autonomic changes are not necessary for emotional experience. However, in support of a role for centrally integrated feedback from the whole body, imaging studies found that activations in areas commonly associated with interoception and emotion (anterior insula and anterior cingulate) were correlated with individual differences in interoception (heartbeat detection) and trait measures of emotion. Because recent theory distinguishes between two levels of emotional experience (phenomenology and awareness), this paper proposes a hypothetical model of the effects of interoception on phenomenology and awareness. This model classifies interoception into the central representation of feedback from the whole body, the perception of actual physiological changes as well as the perception of illusory changes.

SUMMARY

Consistent with recent theories of emotion, evidence from brain imaging supports the notion that centrally integrated feedback from the whole body plays a role in emotional experience. Because research on neural correlates of emotional experience is at an early stage, the hypothesized model of potential causal links between interoception and emotional experience might serve as a helpful guide to future research.

The neurobiology of positive emotions

Compared to the study of negative emotions such as fear, the neurobiology of positive emotional processes and the associated positive affect (PA) states has only recently received scientific attention. Biological theories conceptualize PA as being related to (i) signals indicating that bodies are returning to equilibrium among those studying homeostasis, (ii) utility estimation among those favoring neuroeconomic views, and (iii) approach and other instinctual behaviors among those cultivating neuroethological perspectives. Indeed, there are probably several distinct forms of positive affect, but all are closely related to ancient sub-neocortical limbic brain regions we share with other mammals. There is now a convergence of evidence to suggest that various regions of the limbic system, including especially ventral striatal dopamine systems are implemented in an anticipatory (appetitive) positive affective state. Dopamine independent mechanisms utilizing opiate and GABA receptors in the ventral striatum, amygdala and orbital frontal cortex are important in elaborating consummatory PA (i.e. sensory pleasure) states, and various neuropeptides mediate homeostatic satisfactions.

Why Does Separation Distress Hurt? Comment on MacDonald and Leary (2005)

Evidence is substantial that separation-distress circuitry in animal models is related intimately to opioid-sensitive pain regulatory systems of the brain. The evidence that basic pain-affect mechanisms are integral to the feelings of defensive fear anxiety and aggression is modest. Although anger and anxiety can be reduced by opiates, the effects are not as robust and specific as those observed with the low doses that quell separation distress. The role of "social pain" may be larger for the affective underpinnings of jealousy, shame, and guilt (all variants of social exclusion and abandonment) than for fear and aggression. Interdisciplinary insights might be facilitated by more forthright analyses of how affective states are created within the brain. This will require better dialogue between behavioral neuroscientists and the rest of psychology interested in foundational psychoevolutionary issues.