Developmental dynamics: toward a biologically plausible evolutionary psychology

Unifying Psychology: Shared Ontology and the Continuum of Practical Assumptions

Critics have described psychology as a science impaired by disunity. The most recent special issue of Review of General Psychology sought to specifically address this concern, seeking perspectives from a wide range of theorists, each of whom offered their tradition's approach to how psychology as a whole may be integrated into a more unified whole. To continue this discussion, this article draws upon examples from the special issue, the disunity crisis literature, and wider writings in the philosophy of science, to explore the theoretical and conceptual divisions that foster ambiguity, confusion, and apparent irreconcilable differences between the disparate fields of psychology. The authors conclude that the majority of contemporary, scientific psychology is oriented toward a shared physical ontology, which can serve as a common grounding point from which the conceptual and theoretical differences of disparate fields may be meaningfully framed and evaluated. To this end, this article proposes that the various research traditions of psychology can be understood through their positions along a continuum of practical assumptions, which embodies the inherent conflict between two scientific priorities: metaphysical certainty (the safe end of the continuum) and practical experimental predictions (the risky end of the continuum). Three theoretical perspectives offered in the unification special issue are examined under this framework: situational realism (a distinctly safe approach), developmental evolutionary psychology (an intermediate approach), and the Tree of Knowledge unified theory (a relatively risky approach). The authors explore how the recommendations of each approach can be seen as a function of its position on the continuum of practical assumptions, and the implications of this understanding for future integrative efforts is discussed.

Coping with complexity: Developmental systems and multilevel analyses in developmental psychopathology

Developmental psychopathology is not characterized by adherence to one specific theory but instead serves as an organizational framework in which research is driven by a number of key assumptions. In the developmental psychopathology approach, two primary assumptions emphasize the importance of systems thinking and the utility of multilevel analyses. As will be illustrated here, these emphases are inextricably linked: a systems approach necessitates a multilevel approach, such that a level of organization must bring coherence to a level of mechanisms. Given this assumption, coming to an integrative understanding of the relation between levels is of central importance. One broad framework for this endeavor is relational developmental systems, which has been proposed by certain theorists as a new paradigm for developmental science. The implications of embracing this framework include the potential to connect developmental psychopathology with other approaches that emphasize systems thinking and that take an integrative perspective on the problem of levels of analysis.

It's all connected: Pathways in visual object recognition and early noun learning

A developmental pathway may be defined as the route, or chain of events, through which a new structure or function forms. For many human behaviors, including object name learning and visual object recognition, these pathways are often complex and multicausal and include unexpected dependencies. This article presents three principles of development that suggest the value of a developmental psychology that explicitly seeks to trace these pathways and uses empirical evidence on developmental dependencies among motor development, action on objects, visual object recognition, and object name learning in 12- to 24-month-old infants to make the case. The article concludes with a consideration of the theoretical implications of this approach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).

Prenatal sensory experience affects hatching behavior in domestic chicks (Gallus gallus) and Japanese quail chicks (Coturnix coturnix japonica)

Species-typical developmental outcomes result from organismic and environmental constraints and experiences shared by members of a species. We examined the effects of enhanced prenatal sensory experience on hatching behaviors by exposing domestic chicks (n = 95) and Japanese quail (n = 125) to one of four prenatal conditions: enhanced visual stimulation, enhanced auditory stimulation, enhanced auditory and visual stimulation, or no enhanced sensory experience (control condition). In general, across species, control embryos had slower hatching behaviors than all other embryos. Embryos in the auditory condition had faster hatching behaviors than embryos in the visual and control conditions. Auditory-visual condition embryos showed similarities to embryos exposed to either auditory or visual stimulation. These results suggest that prenatal sensory experience can influence hatching behavior of precocial birds, with the type of stimulation being a critical variable. These results also provide further evidence that species-typical outcomes are the result of species-typical prenatal experiences.

The origins of variation: evolutionary insights from developmental science

Evidence from contemporary epigenetic research indicates that it is not biologically meaningful to discuss genes without reference to the molecular, cellular, organismal, and environmental context within which they are activated and expressed. Genetic and nongenetic factors, including those beyond the organism, constitute a dynamic relational developmental system. This insight highlights the importance of bringing together genetics, development, and ecology into one explanatory framework for a more complete understanding of the emergence and maintenance of phenotypic stability and variability. In this Chapter, I review some examples of this integrative effort and explore its implications for developmental and evolutionary science, with a particular emphasis on the origins of phenotypic novelty. I argue that developmental science is critical to this integrative effort, in that evolutionary explanation cannot be complete without developmental explanation. This is the case because the process of development generates the phenotypic variation on which natural selection can act.

A Developmental Evolutionary Framework for Psychology

Evolutionary psychology (EP) was founded on the metatheoretical assumptions of the modern (or neo-Darwinian) synthesis of evolutionary biology, which dichotomize internal from external sources of causation. By prioritizing the former, EP has promoted a preformationist view of individual development, which effectively divorces developmental from evolutionary analysis. The authors argue that these assumptions about development are in need of revision in light of recent advances in genomics, epigenetics, and developmental science. The authors outline a developmental evolutionary framework for psychology, a relational metatheory that integrates the study of developmental and evolutionary mechanisms within one explanatory framework. They argue that knowledge of the dynamics of developmental processes are necessary to illuminate mechanisms of evolutionary change and that the psychological sciences, particularly comparative and developmental psychology, are ideally positioned to contribute to this endeavor.

Bridging developmental systems theory and evolutionary psychology using dynamic optimization

Interactions between evolutionary psychologists and developmental systems theorists have been largely antagonistic. This is unfortunate because potential synergies between the two approaches remain unexplored. This article presents a method that may help to bridge the divide, and that has proven fruitful in biology: dynamic optimization. Dynamic optimization integrates developmental systems theorists' focus on dynamics and contingency with the 'design stance' of evolutionary psychology. It provides a theoretical framework as well as a set of tools for exploring the properties of developmental systems that natural selection might favor, given particular evolutionary ecologies. We also discuss limitations of the approach.

Importing the homology concept from biology into developmental psychology

To help introduce the idea of homology into developmental psychology, this article presents some of the concepts, distinctions, and guidelines biologists and philosophers of biology have devised to study homology. Some unresolved issues related to this idea are considered as well. Because homology reflects continuity across time, developmental scientists should find this concept to be useful in the study of psychological/behavioral development, just as biologists have found it essential in the study of the evolution and development of morphological and other characteristics.

Neural reuse in the evolution and development of the brain: evidence for developmental homology?

This article lays out some of the empirical evidence for the importance of neural reuse-the reuse of existing (inherited and/or early developing) neural circuitry for multiple behavioral purposes-in defining the overall functional structure of the brain. We then discuss in some detail one particular instance of such reuse: the involvement of a local neural circuit in finger awareness, number representation, and other diverse functions. Finally, we consider whether and how the notion of a developmental homology can help us understand the relationships between the cognitive functions that develop out of shared neural supports.

Distinct neuropsychological subgroups in typically developing youth inform heterogeneity in children with ADHD

Research and clinical investigations in psychiatry largely rely on the de facto assumption that the diagnostic categories identified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) represent homogeneous syndromes. However, the mechanistic heterogeneity that potentially underlies the existing classification scheme might limit discovery of etiology for most developmental psychiatric disorders. Another, perhaps less palpable, reality may also be interfering with progress-heterogeneity in typically developing populations. In this report we attempt to clarify neuropsychological heterogeneity in a large dataset of typically developing youth and youth with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), using graph theory and community detection. We sought to determine whether data-driven neuropsychological subtypes could be discerned in children with and without the disorder. Because individual classification is the sine qua non for eventual clinical translation, we also apply support vector machine-based multivariate pattern analysis to identify how well ADHD status in individual children can be identified as defined by the community detection delineated subtypes. The analysis yielded several unique, but similar subtypes across both populations. Just as importantly, comparing typically developing children with ADHD children within each of these distinct subgroups increased diagnostic accuracy. Two important principles were identified that have the potential to advance our understanding of typical development and developmental neuropsychiatric disorders. The first tenet suggests that typically developing children can be classified into distinct neuropsychological subgroups with high precision. The second tenet proposes that some of the heterogeneity in individuals with ADHD might be "nested" in this normal variation.

Child development in the context of adversity: experiential canalization of brain and behavior

The authors examine the effects of poverty-related adversity on child development, drawing upon psychobiological principles of experiential canalization and the biological embedding of experience. They integrate findings from research on stress physiology, neurocognitive function, and self-regulation to consider adaptive processes in response to adversity as an aspect of children's development. Recent research on early caregiving is paired with research in prevention science to provide a reorientation of thinking about the ways in which psychosocial and economic adversity are related to continuity in human development.

Evolutionary Systems Theory: A Unifying Meta-Theory of Psychological Science

Psychology is a theoretically heterogeneous discipline seeking a single, cohesive framework to unite the subdisciplines. To address this issue, I propose a hierarchical metatheory of psychological science that synthesizes neo-Darwinian selectionist thinking and dynamic systems theory by organizing evolutionary psychology, evolutionary developmental biology, developmental psychobiology, and the subdisciplines of psychology around four specific, interrelated levels of analysis: functional explanations for evolved, species-typical characteristics; explanations for between-groups differences arising from phylogenetic mechanisms; explanations for individual differences resulting from ontogenetic processes; and mechanistic explanations for real-time phenomena, respectively. Informational exchange between these levels advances their integration and facilitates important innovations, and the nonsubstantive metatheories of general selection and self-organization interpenetrate all four levels to promote consilience. I conclude by discussing the implications of this model for theory and research.

Individual development and evolution: experiential canalization of self-regulation

In this article, we contrast evolutionary and psychobiological models of individual development to address the idea that individual development occurring in prototypically risky and unsupportive environments can be understood as adaptation. We question traditional evolutionary explanations of individual development, calling on the principle of probabilistic epigenesis to suggest that individual development resulting from the combined activity of genes and environments is best understood to precede rather than follow from evolutionary change. Specifically, we focus on the ways in which experience shapes the development of stress response physiology, with implications for individual development and intergenerational transmission of reactive, as opposed to reflective, phenotypes. In doing so, we describe results from several analyses conducted with a longitudinal data set of 1,292 children and their primary caregivers followed from birth. Our results indicate that the effects of poverty on stress response physiology and on the development of the self-regulation of behavior represent instances of the experiential canalization of development with implications for understanding the genesis and "adaptiveness" of risk behavior.

Probabilistic causation and the explanatory role of natural selection

The explanatory role of natural selection is one of the long-term debates in evolutionary biology. Nevertheless, the consensus has been slippery because conceptual confusions and the absence of a unified, formal causal model that integrates different explanatory scopes of natural selection. In this study we attempt to examine two questions: (i) What can the theory of natural selection explain? and (ii) Is there a causal or explanatory model that integrates all natural selection explananda? For the first question, we argue that five explananda have been assigned to the theory of natural selection and that four of them may be actually considered explananda of natural selection. For the second question, we claim that a probabilistic conception of causality and the statistical relevance concept of explanation are both good models for understanding the explanatory role of natural selection. We review the biological and philosophical disputes about the explanatory role of natural selection and formalize some explananda in probabilistic terms using classical results from population genetics. Most of these explananda have been discussed in philosophical terms but some of them have been mixed up and confused. We analyze and set the limits of these problems.

Evolutionary accounts of human behavioural diversity

Human beings persist in an extraordinary range of ecological settings, in the process exhibiting enormous behavioural diversity, both within and between populations. People vary in their social, mating and parental behaviour and have diverse and elaborate beliefs, traditions, norms and institutions. The aim of this theme issue is to ask whether, and how, evolutionary theory can help us to understand this diversity. In this introductory article, we provide a background to the debate surrounding how best to understand behavioural diversity using evolutionary models of human behaviour. In particular, we examine how diversity has been viewed by the main subdisciplines within the human evolutionary behavioural sciences, focusing in particular on the human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology and cultural evolution approaches. In addition to differences in focus and methodology, these subdisciplines have traditionally varied in the emphasis placed on human universals, ecological factors and socially learned behaviour, and on how they have addressed the issue of genetic variation. We reaffirm that evolutionary theory provides an essential framework for understanding behavioural diversity within and between human populations, but argue that greater integration between the subfields is critical to developing a satisfactory understanding of diversity.

Balancing sampling and specialization: an adaptationist model of incremental development

Development is typically a constructive process, in which phenotypes incrementally adapt to local ecologies. Here, we present a novel model in which natural selection shapes developmental systems based on the evolutionary ecology, and these systems adaptively guide phenotypic development. We assume that phenotypic construction is incremental and trades off with sampling cues to the environmental state. We computed the optimal developmental programmes across a range of evolutionary ecological conditions. Using these programmes, we simulated distributions of mature phenotypes. Our results show that organisms sample the environment most extensively when cues are moderately, not highly, informative. When the developmental programme relies heavily on sampling, individuals transition from sampling to specialization at different times in ontogeny, depending on the consistency of their sampled cue set; this finding suggests that stochastic sampling may result in individual differences in plasticity itself. In addition, we find that different selection pressures may favour similar developmental mechanisms, and that organisms may incorrectly calibrate development despite stable ontogenetic environments. We hope our model will stimulate adaptationist research on the constructive processes guiding development.

Environment, genes, and experience: lessons from behavior genetics

The article reviews the theoretical analysis of the problems inherent in studying the environment within behavior genetics across several periods in the development of environmental studies in behavior genetics and proposes some possible alternatives to traditional approaches to studying the environment in behavior genetics. The first period (from the end of the 1920s to the end of the 1970s), when the environment was not actually studied, is called pre-environmental; during this time, the basic principles and theoretical models of understanding environmental effects in behavior genetics were developed. The second period is characterized by the development of studies on environmental influences within the traditional behavior genetics paradigm; several approaches to studying the environment emerged in behavior genetics during this period, from the beginning of the 1980s until today. At the present time, the field is undergoing paradigmatic changes, concerned with methodology, theory, and mathematical models of genotype-environment interplay; this might be the beginning of a third period of development of environmental studies in behavior genetics. In another part, the methodological problems related to environmental studies in behavior genetics are discussed. Although the methodology used in differential psychology is applicable for assessment of differences between individuals, it is insufficient to explain the sources of these differences. In addition, we stress that psychoanalytic studies of twins and their experiences, initiated in the 1930s and continued episodically until the 1980s, could bring an interesting methodology and contribute to the explanation of puzzling findings from environmental studies of behavior genetics. Finally, we will conclude with implications from the results of environmental studies in behavior genetics, including methodological issues.

Realism, Relativism, and Evolutionary Psychology

Against recent attempts to forge a reconciliation between constructionism and realism, I contend that, in psychology at least, stirring up conflict is a more fruitful strategy. To illustrate this thesis, I confront a school of psychology with strong realist leanings, evolutionary psychology, with the relativist critique of realism proposed by Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter. I show that evolutionary psychology employs the kind of “bottomline arguments” that they identify as typical of realist rhetoric. However, it also proposes a modified realism based on a concept of mediation, which accommodates a moderate social constructionism. I argue that there are good reasons to reject such a settlement between realism and constructionism. The theories of emergence that have been developed both in biology and in science and technology studies cast doubt on the view of the brain as a fully specifiable mediator.

Social anxiety in childhood: bridging developmental and clinical perspectives

In this introductory chapter, guided by developmental psychopathology and developmental science as overarching integrative theoretical frameworks, the authors define three constructs related to social anxiety in childhood (behavioral inhibition, anxious solitude/withdrawal, and social anxiety disorder) and analyze commonalities and differences in the content and assessment of these constructs. They then highlight controversies between developmental and clinical approaches to the definition of these constructs, the role of biology in social anxiety, age of onset of social anxiety, information processing biases in social anxiety, heterogeneity in the social and emotional adjustment of socially anxious children, and targets of intervention for childhood social anxiety.

Variability in languages, variability in learning?

In documenting the dizzying diversity of human languages, Evans & Levinson (E&L) highlight the lack of universals. This suggests the need for complex learning. Yet, just as there is no universal structure, there may be no universal learning mechanism responsible for language. Language is a behavior assembled by many processes, an assembly guided by the language being learned.

Psychology and Epigenetics

The Human Genome Project mapped the complete DNA sequence that exists in each human cell, but questions remain about how genes are expressed. Epigenetics is defined as mechanisms of gene expression that can be maintained across cell divisions, and thus the life of the organism, without changing the DNA sequence. Recent research has identified important epigenetic mechanisms that play essential roles in normal and abnormal development. Of special significance for psychology are the findings that environmental and psychosocial factors can change the epigenome. Research also suggests that some experiences and epigenetic changes of an individual can be passed down to more than one generation of descendants. Linkages between epigenetics and psychopathology are emerging that point to new possibilities for conceptualizing, preventing, and treating disorders.

Alimentary Epigenetics: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View of the Perception of Hunger, Thirst and Satiety

Hunger, thirst and satiety have an enormous influence on cognition, behavior and development, yet we often take for granted that they are simply inborn or innate. Converging data and theory from both comparative and human domains, however, supports the conclusion that the phenomena hunger, thirst and satiety are not innate but rather emerge probabilistically as a function of experience during individual development. The metatheoretical perspective provided by developmental psychobiological systems theory provides a useful framework for organizing and synthesizing findings related to the development of the perception of hunger, thirst and satiety, or alimentary interoception. It is argued that neither developmental psychology nor the psychology of eating and drinking have adequately dealt with the ontogeny of alimentary interoception and that a more serious consideration of the species-typical developmental system of food and fluid intake and the many modifications that have been made therein is likely necessary for a full understanding of both alimentary and emotional development.

The Growth of Developmental Thought: Implications for a New Evolutionary Psychology

Evolution has come to be increasingly discussed in terms of changes in developmental processes rather than simply in terms of changes in gene frequencies. This shift is based in large part on the recognition that since all phenotypic traits arise during ontogeny as products of individual development, a primary basis for evolutionary change must be variations in the patterns and processes of development. Further, the products of development are epigenetic, not just genetic, and this is the case even when considering the evolutionary process. These insights have led investigators to reconsider the established notion of genes as the primary cause of development, opening the door to research programs focused on identifying how genetic and non-genetic factors coact to guide and constrain the process of development and its outcomes. I explore this growth of developmental thought and its implications for the achievement of a unified theory of heredity, development, and evolution and consider its implications for the realization of a new, developmentally-based evolutionary psychology.

Representing development: models, meaning, and the challenge of complexity

Neuroconstructivism (Mareschal et al. 2007a) provides a useful framework for how to integrate research from different levels of analysis to model the multidimensional dynamics of development. However, the authors overlook the topic of meaning, a fundamental feature of cognition and subjective experience and also downplay the nonlinear nature of developmental causality. Neuroconstructivism is overly optimistic on the point of how well current computational models can address the challenge of complexity in developmental science.

Face perception in monkeys reared with no exposure to faces

Infant monkeys were reared with no exposure to any faces for 6-24 months. Before being allowed to see a face, the monkeys showed a preference for human and monkey faces in photographs, and they discriminated human faces as well as monkey faces. After the deprivation period, the monkeys were exposed first to either human or monkey faces for a month. Soon after, the monkeys selectively discriminated the exposed species of face and showed a marked difficulty in regaining the ability to discriminate the other nonexposed species of face. These results indicate the existence of an experience-independent ability for face processing as well as an apparent sensitive period during which a broad but flexible face prototype develops into a concrete one for efficient processing of familiar faces.

Neuroconstructivism

Neuroconstructivism is a theoretical framework focusing on the construction of representations in the developing brain. Cognitive development is explained as emerging from the experience-dependent development of neural structures supporting mental representations. Neural development occurs in the context of multiple interacting constraints acting on different levels, from the individual cell to the external environment of the developing child. Cognitive development can thus be understood as a trajectory originating from the constraints on the underlying neural structures. This perspective offers an integrated view of normal and abnormal development as well as of development and adult processing, and it stands apart from traditional cognitive approaches in taking seriously the constraints on cognition inherent to the substrate that delivers it.

Biology as Technology: A Social Constructionist Framework for an Evolutionary Psychology

The analogy between biology and engineering in evolutionary psychology is argued to be insightful but limited. A broader analogy is therefore proposed called “biology as technology.” Biological evolution, that is, is best understood as the design and production of technical systems rather than engineered mechanisms. On that basis, a social constructionist theory of technology is used to found a revised analogy. This theory distinguishes primary instrumentalization processes of functionalization from secondary instrumentalization processes that realize technical systems in surrounding contexts. Using this framework, the revised analogy bridges between adaptationist accounts in standard evolutionary psychology and interactionist accounts critical of standard evolutionary psychology. Implications of this revised analogy for the evolution of mindedness and sociality are identified and discussed.