Embodied Perception and the Economy of Action

Action-specific judgment, not perception: Fitts' law performance is related to estimates of target width only when participants are given a performance score

Proponents of the action-specific account of perception and action posit that participants perceive their environment relative to their capabilities. For example, softball players who batted well judge the ball as being larger compared to players who did not hit as well. In the present study, we examined this issue in the context of a well-known speed-accuracy movement task that can be examined in the laboratory, repetitive Fitts aiming. In the Fitts task, a performer moved as quickly and as accurately as possible between two targets, D units of distance apart (between 2.5 and 20.0 cm) and of W width (1.0 cm or less). In the Fitts task, we posited that individuals do not have access to performance quality. Thus, we asked whether individual differences in Fitts task performance was related to perception of target width. If Fitts task performance is related to perception of target width, then the action-specific effect on perception does not require explicit knowledge of performance and, furthermore, these effects reside during on-line visual control of the task. We show that only when subjects were provided with a performance score was there a relation between Fitts task performance and target width judgment error. We interpret this result to mean that action-specific effects do not occur during perceptual processing of the task, but action-specific effects are the result of postperformance evaluation processes.

Is There a Chastity Belt on Perception?

Can one's ability to perform an action, such as hitting a softball, influence one's perception? According to the action-specific account, perception of spatial layout is influenced by the perceiver's abilities to perform an intended action. Alternative accounts posit that purported effects are instead due to nonperceptual processes, such as response bias. Despite much confirmatory research on both sides of the debate, researchers who promote a response-bias account have never used the Pong task, which has yielded one of the most robust action-specific effects. Conversely, researchers who promote a perceptual account have rarely used the opposition's preferred test for response bias, namely, the postexperiment survey. The current experiments rectified this. We found that even for people naive to the experiment's hypothesis, the ability to block a moving ball affected the ball's perceived speed. Moreover, when participants were explicitly told the hypothesis and instructed to resist the influence of their ability to block the ball, their ability still affected their perception of the ball's speed.

Social and Contextual Constraints on Embodied Perception

A number of papers have challenged research on physiological and psychological influences on perception by claiming to show that such findings can be explained by nonperceptual factors such as demand characteristics. Relatedly, calls for separating perception from judgment have been issued. However, such efforts fail to consider key processes known to shape judgment processes: people's inability to report accurately on their judgments, conversational dynamics of experimental research contexts, and misattribution and discounting processes. Indeed, the fact that initially observed effects of embodied influences disappear is predicted by an extensive amount of literature on judgments studied within social psychology. Thus, findings from such studies suggest that the initially presumed underlying processes are at work-namely, functional considerations that are informative in the context of preparing the body for action. In this article, I provide suggestions on how to conduct research on perception within the social constraints of experimental contexts.

Einfühlung as the breath of art: six modes of embodiment

Robert Vischer's concept of Einfühlung, feeling-into, translated as empathy, serves as the departure point for a proposal about viewing art using the body for a non-imitative form of empathy termed a transomatization and for other embodied operations. A transomatization occurs when viewers reinterpret a component or process of their own bodies to serve as a non-imitative stand-in, or correlate, for something outside of the self, specifically, some quality of an art work or its production. This creates an overlap of the self and other that might be experienced subjectively as a feeling of projection, an operation characteristic of empathy. Transomatizations and other embodied experiences are grounded in empathic, intersubjective modes of engaging others that begin in early life. As applications of the proposed concepts, six different embodiments of the viewer's breathing are explored in regard to Friedrich E. Church's 1848 oil painting Morning, Looking East over the Hudson Valley from the Catskill Mountains. Support for elements of the proposed concepts and applications is drawn from research in the biological and social sciences and from first person, embodied accounts of viewing.

Embodiment in a Child-Like Talking Virtual Body Influences Object Size Perception, Self-Identification, and Subsequent Real Speaking

People’s mental representations of their own body are malleable and continuously updated through sensory cues. Altering one’s body-representation can lead to changes in object perception and implicit attitudes. Virtual reality has been used to embody adults in the body of a 4-year-old child or a scaled-down adult body. Child embodiment was found to cause an overestimation of object sizes, approximately double that during adult embodiment, and identification of the self with child-like attributes. Here we tested the contribution of auditory cues related to one’s own voice to these visually-driven effects. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, visual and auditory feedback on one’s own body were varied across conditions, which included embodiment in a child or scaled-down adult body, and real (undistorted) or child-like voice feedback. The results replicated, in an older population, previous findings regarding size estimations and implicit attitudes. Further, although auditory cues were not found to enhance these effects, we show that the strength of the embodiment illusion depends on the child-like voice feedback being congruent or incongruent with the age of the virtual body. Results also showed the positive emotional impact of the illusion of owning a child’s body, opening up possibilities for health applications.

Bioenergetic costs and state influence distance perception

Bioenergetic resources and states have been found to influence visual perception, with greater expected energy expenditure being associated with perceptions of greater distances and steeper slopes. Here we tested whether resting metabolic rate (RMR), which can serve as a proxy for the bioenergetic costs of completing physical activity, is positively correlated with perceived distance. We also tested whether temporarily depleting bioenergetic resources through exercise would result in greater perceived distance. Eighty-two members of the public were recruited at a beach in Weston-super-Mare, UK. Half completed moderate exercise and half acted as controls. They then estimated distance to a set point. Results showed that RMR (computed using a recognized equation) was positively correlated with distance perception, meaning that participants requiring greater energy to traverse a set distance perceived the set point as farther away. In addition, those participants who had their bioenergetic resources temporarily depleted through exercise perceived the set distance as greater, compared to controls. There was no interaction effect between RMR and exercise. To our knowledge, these results are the first to show a relationship between metabolic rate and distance perception, and they contribute to the literature on embodied perception.

Words That Move Us. The Effects of Sentences on Body Sway

According to the embodied cognition perspective, cognitive systems and perceptuo-motor systems are deeply intertwined and exert a causal effect on each other. A prediction following from this idea is that cognitive activity can result in subtle changes in observable movement. In one experiment, we tested whether reading various sentences resulted in changes in postural sway. Sentences symbolized various human activities involving high, low, or no physical effort. Dutch participants stood upright on a force plate, measuring the body center of pressure, while reading a succession of sentences. High physical effort sentences resulted in more postural sway (greater SD) than low physical effort sentences. This effect only showed up in medio-lateral sway but not anterio-posterior sway. This suggests that sentence comprehension was accompanied by subtle motoric activity, likely mirroring the various activities symbolized in the sentences. We conclude that semantic processing reaches the motor periphery, leading to increased postural activity.

Schizophrenia: An Impairment in the Capacity to Perceive Affordances

Phenomenological psychopathologists conceptualize schizophrenia as a self-disorder involving profound distortions of selfhood. For James Gibson, “to perceive the world is to coperceive oneself.” If the sense of self is disturbed in individuals with schizophrenia, this could also lead to disturbances in these individuals’ ability to perceive affordances, environmental properties taken with reference to the perceiver’s action capabilities (e.g., a rigid surface affording ‘walk-on-able,’ chairs ‘sit-on-able,’ and so on). To test this hypothesis, three experiments investigated schizophrenia patients’ affordance perception. Participants were presented with a photo of a common object on the computer and then asked to judge its secondary affordance (a non-designed function) in a two-choice reaction time task in Experiment 1 and in a yes/no task in Experiment 2. Schizophrenia participants performed less accurately and more slowly than controls. To rule out visual impairment as a contributing factor, in Experiment 3, participants identified physical properties (color, shape, material composition) of the objects. Schizophrenia participants were as accurate as controls and responded faster than in the previous experiments. Results suggest that the capacity to perceive affordances is likely impaired in people with schizophrenia, although the capacity to detect the object’s physical properties is kept intact. Inability to perceive affordances, those functionally significant properties of the surrounding environment, may help explain why schizophrenia patients may appear as somewhat detached from the world.

Does grasping capacity influence object size estimates? It depends on the context

Linkenauger, Witt, and Proffitt (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 37(5), 1432–1441, 2011, Experiment 2) reported that right-handers estimated objects as smaller if they intended to grasp them in their right rather than their left hand. Based on the action-specific account, they argued that this scaling effect occurred because participants believed their right hand could grasp larger objects. However, Collier and Lawson (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 43(4), 749–769, 2017) failed to replicate this effect. Here, we investigated whether this discrepancy in results arose from demand characteristics. We investigated two forms of demand characteristics: altering responses following conscious hypothesis guessing (Experiments 1 and 2), and subtle influences of the experimental context (Experiment 3). We found no scaling effects when participants were given instructions which implied the expected outcome of the experiment (Experiment 1), but they were obtained when we used unrealistically explicit instructions which gave the exact prediction made by the action-specific account (Experiment 2). Scaling effects were also found using a context in which grasping capacity could seem relevant for size estimation (by asking participants about the perceived graspability of an object immediately before asking about its size on every trial, as was done in Linkenauger et al., 2011; Experiment 2). These results suggest that demand characteristics due to context effects could explain the scaling effects reported in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger et al. (2011), rather than either hypothesis guessing, or, as proposed by the action-specific account, a change in the perceived size of objects.

Action ability modulates time-to-collision judgments

Time-to-collision (TTC) underestimation has been interpreted as an adaptive response that allows observers to have more time to engage in a defensive behaviour. This bias seems, therefore, strongly linked to action preparation. There is evidence that the observer’s physical fitness modulates the underestimation effect so that people who need more time to react (i.e. those with less physical fitness) show a stronger underestimation effect. Here we investigated whether this bias is influenced by the momentary action capability of the observers. In the first experiment, participants estimated the time-to-collision of threatening or non-threatening stimuli while being mildly immobilized (with a chin rest) or while standing freely. Having reduced the possibility of movement led participants to show more underestimation of the approaching stimuli. However, this effect was not stronger for threatening relative to non-threatening stimuli. The effect of the action capability found in the first experiment could be interpreted as an expansion of peripersonal space (PPS). In the second experiment, we thus investigated the generality of this effect using an established paradigm to measure the size of peripersonal space. Participants bisected lines from different distances while in the chin rest or standing freely. The results replicated the classic left-to-right gradient in lateral spatial attention with increasing viewing distance, but no effect of immobilization was found. The manipulation of the momentary action capability of the observers influenced the participants’ performance in the TTC task but not in the line bisection task. These results are discussed in relation to the different functions of PPS.

Modernizing Relationship Therapy through Social Thermoregulation Theory: Evidence, Hypotheses, and Explorations

In the present article the authors propose to modernize relationship therapy by integrating novel sensor and actuator technologies that can help optimize people's thermoregulation, especially as they pertain to social contexts. Specifically, they propose to integrate Social Thermoregulation Theory (IJzerman et al., 2015a; IJzerman and Hogerzeil, 2017) into Emotionally Focused Therapy by first doing exploratory research during couples' therapy, followed by Randomized Clinical Trials (RCTs). The authors thus suggest crafting a Social Thermoregulation Therapy (STT) as enhancement to existing relationship therapies. The authors outline what is known and not known in terms of social thermoregulatory mechanisms, what kind of data collection and analyses are necessary to better understand social thermoregulatory mechanisms to craft interventions, and stress the need to conduct RCTs prior to implementation. They further warn against too hastily applying these theoretical perspectives. The article concludes by outlining why STT is the way forward in improving relationship functioning.

The Martian: Examining Human Physical Judgments across Virtual Gravity Fields

This paper examines how humans adapt to novel physical situations with unknown gravitational acceleration in immersive virtual environments. We designed four virtual reality experiments with different tasks for participants to complete: strike a ball to hit a target, trigger a ball to hit a target, predict the landing location of a projectile, and estimate the flight duration of a projectile. The first two experiments compared human behavior in the virtual environment with real-world performance reported in the literature. The last two experiments aimed to test the human ability to adapt to novel gravity fields by measuring their performance in trajectory prediction and time estimation tasks. The experiment results show that: 1) based on brief observation of a projectile's initial trajectory, humans are accurate at predicting the landing location even under novel gravity fields, and 2) humans' time estimation in a familiar earth environment fluctuates around the ground truth flight duration, although the time estimation in unknown gravity fields indicates a bias toward earth's gravity.

A dual systems account of visual perception: Predicting candy consumption from distance estimates

A substantial amount of evidence shows that visual perception is influenced by forces that control human actions, ranging from motivation to physiological potential. However, studies have not yet provided convincing evidence that perception itself is directly involved in everyday behaviors such as eating. We suggest that this issue can be resolved by employing the dual systems account of human behavior. We tested the link between perceived distance to candies and their consumption for participants who were tired or depleted (impulsive system), versus those who were not (reflective system). Perception predicted eating only when participants were tired (Experiment 1) or depleted (Experiments 2 and 3). In contrast, a rational determinant of behavior-eating restraint towards candies-predicted eating for non-depleted individuals (Experiment 2). Finally, Experiment 3 established that perceived distance was correlated with participants' self-reported motivation to consume candies. Overall, these findings suggest that the dynamics between perception and behavior depend on the interplay of the two behavioral systems.

Perceptual Inference in Chronic Pain: An Investigation Into the Economy of Action Hypothesis

OBJECTIVE

The experience of chronic pain critically alters one's ability to interact with their environment. One fundamental issue that has received little attention, however, is whether chronic pain disrupts how one perceives their environment in the first place. The Economy of Action hypothesis purports that the environment is spatially scaled according to the ability of the observer. Under this hypothesis it has been proposed that the perception of the world is different between those with and without chronic pain. Such a possibility has profound implications for the investigation and treatment of pain. The present investigation tested the application of this hypothesis to a heterogenous chronic pain population.

METHODS

Individuals with chronic pain (36; 27F) and matched pain-free controls were recruited. Each participant was required to judge the distance to a series of target cones, to which they were to subsequently walk. In addition, at each distance, participants used Numerical Rating Scales to indicate their perceived effort and perceived pain associated with the distance presented.

RESULTS

Our findings do not support the Economy of Action hypothesis: there were no significant differences in distance estimates between the chronic pain and pain-free groups (F1,60=0.927; P=0.340). In addition, we found no predictive relationship in the chronic pain group between anticipated pain and estimated distance (F1,154=0.122, P=0.727), nor anticipated effort (1.171, P=0.281) and estimated distance (F1,154=1.171, P=0.281).

DISCUSSION

The application of the Economy of Action hypothesis and the notion of spatial perceptual scaling as a means to assess and treat the experience of chronic pain are not supported by the results of this study.

Implied motion language can influence visual spatial memory

How do language and vision interact? Specifically, what impact can language have on visual processing, especially related to spatial memory? What are typically considered errors in visual processing, such as remembering the location of an object to be farther along its motion trajectory than it actually is, can be explained as perceptual achievements that are driven by our ability to anticipate future events. In two experiments, we tested whether the prior presentation of motion language influences visual spatial memory in ways that afford greater perceptual prediction. Experiment 1 showed that motion language influenced judgments for the spatial memory of an object beyond the known effects of implied motion present in the image itself. Experiment 2 replicated this finding. Our findings support a theory of perception as prediction.

Are Older Adults Less Embodied? A Review of Age Effects through the Lens of Embodied Cognition

Embodied cognition is a theoretical framework which posits that cognitive function is intimately intertwined with the body and physical actions. Although the field of psychology is increasingly accepting embodied cognition as a viable theory, it has rarely been employed in the gerontological literature. However, embodied cognition would appear to have explanatory power for aging research given that older adults typically manifest concurrent physical and mental changes, and that research has indicated a correlative relationship between such changes. The current paper reviews age-related changes in sensory processing, mental representation, and the action-perception relationship, exploring how each can be understood through the lens of embodied cognition. Compared to younger adults, older adults exhibit across all three domains an increased tendency to favor visual processing over bodily factors, leading to the conclusion that older adults are less embodied than young adults. We explore the significance of this finding in light of existing theoretical models of aging and argue that embodied cognition can benefit gerontological research by identifying further factors that can explain the cause of age-related declines.

It's out of my hands! Grasping capacity may not influence perceived object size

Linkenauger, Witt, and Proffitt (2011) found that the perceived size of graspable objects was scaled by perceived grasping capacity. However, it is possible that this effect occurred because object size was estimated on the same trial as grasping capacity. This may have led to a conflation of estimates of perceived action capacity and spatial properties. In 5 experiments, we tested Linkenauger et al.’s claim that right-handed observers overestimate the grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand, and that this, in turn, leads them to underestimate the size of objects to-be-grasped in their right hand relative to their left hand. We replicated the finding that right handers overestimate the size and grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand. However, when estimates of object size and grasping capacity were made in separate tasks, objects grasped in the right hand were not underestimated relative to those grasped in the left hand. Further, when grasping capacity was physically restricted, observers appropriately recalibrated their perception of their maximum grasp but estimates of object size were unaffected. Our results suggest that changes in action capacity may not influence perceived object size if sources of conflation are controlled for.

The action-specific account of perception suggests that an observer’s capacity for action scales how the environment appears to them and, specifically, how they perceive its spatial properties. However, contrary to the predictions of this account, the results of the present studies suggest that perceived object size is not influenced by either actual or perceived grasping capacity. First, although right handers perceived their right hand to be both larger and to have a greater grasping capacity than their left hand, size estimates for an object were not influenced by which hand was used to grasp that object. Second, in a stronger manipulation, we reduced both the actual and the perceived grasping capacity of one hand by taping its fingers together. Despite this causing a substantial reduction in action capacity, it did not influence estimates of object size. These results show that action capacity and spatial properties can be perceived independently.

Are Effects of Action on Perception Real? Evidence from Transformed Movements

It has been argued that several reported non-visual influences on perception cannot be truly perceptual. If they were, they should affect the perception of target objects and reference objects used to express perceptual judgments, and thus cancel each other out. This reasoning presumes that non-visual manipulations impact target objects and comparison objects equally. In the present study we show that equalizing a body-related manipulation between target objects and reference objects essentially abolishes the impact of that manipulation so as it should do when that manipulation actually altered perception. Moreover, the manipulation has an impact on judgements when applied to only the target object but not to the reference object, and that impact reverses when only applied to the reference object but not to the target object. A perceptual explanation predicts this reversal, whereas explanations in terms of post-perceptual response biases or demand effects do not. Altogether these results suggest that body-related influences on perception cannot as a whole be attributed to extra-perceptual factors.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the inferior frontal cortex affects the "social scaling" of extrapersonal space depending on perspective-taking ability

When we have to judge the distance between another person and an object (social condition), we judge this distance as being smaller compared to judging the distance between two objects (nonsocial condition). It has been suggested that this compression is mediated by the attribution of a motor potential to the reference frame (other person vs. object). In order to explore the neural basis of this effect, we investigated whether the modulation of activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) of the left hemisphere (recruited during visuospatial processes with a social component) changes the way we categorize space in a social compared with a nonsocial condition. We applied transcranial direct current stimulation to the left IFC, with different polarities (anodal, cathodal, and sham) while subjects performed an extrapersonal space categorization task. Interestingly, anodal stimulation of IFC induced an higher compression of space in the social compared to nonsocial condition. By contrast, cathodal stimulation induced the opposite effect. Furthermore, we found that this effect is modulated by interindividual differences in cognitive perspective taking. Our data support the idea that IFC is recruited during the social categorization of space.

The Nature of Self-Regulatory Fatigue and "Ego Depletion": Lessons From Physical Fatigue

Self-regulation requires overriding a dominant response and leads to temporary self-regulatory fatigue. Existing theories of the nature and causes of self-regulatory fatigue highlight physiological substrates such as glucose, or psychological processes such as motivation, but these explanations are incomplete on their own. Historically, theories of physical fatigue demonstrate a similar pattern of useful but incomplete explanations, as recent views of physical fatigue emphasize the roles of both physiological and psychological factors. In addition to accounting for multiple inputs, these newer views also explain how fatigue can occur even in the presence of sufficient resources. Examining these newer theories of physical fatigue can serve as a foundation on which to build a more comprehensive understanding of self-regulatory fatigue that integrates possible neurobiological underpinnings of physical and self-regulatory fatigue, and suggests the possible function of self-regulatory fatigue.

From Savannas to Settlements: Exploring Cognitive Foundations for the Design of Urban Spaces

Urban configurations in developing countries have become the subject of urban design, with good design promoting economic benefits. Yet, the common practice of urban design lacks a principled scientific foundation. In this respect, cognitive neuroscience could provide a unique perspective and potential foundational insights regarding how embodied cognition links configuration with movement. Although the neural networks that underlie navigation abilities in the brain have been extensively studied, the manner in which these networks might best constrain urban configurations has not been examined specifically. Moreover, it remains an open issue whether the neurological development and functional topographies in the brain that could potentially constrain such urban configurations might also replicate the geometric structures of those environments that were the cradle of human evolution. We propose urban grid-form settlement patterns may be a result of the naturally evolved structures of the human brain. We suggest then that a potential agenda for experimentation and debate could focus on neurological underpinnings of movement choices in urban places. Such an agenda would benefit from bridging a gap between C.P. Snow’s two cultures, i.e., among architects and neuroscientists. Here, we provide a perspective to engender such further dialog on the design of embodied urban spaces and the potential neural systems that may constrain their design.

Remember Hard But Think Softly: Metaphorical Effects of Hardness/Softness on Cognitive Functions

Previous studies have found that bodily stimulation, such as hardness biases social judgment and evaluation via metaphorical association; however, it remains unclear whether bodily stimulation also affects cognitive functions, such as memory and creativity. The current study used metaphorical associations between “hard” and “rigid” and between “soft” and “flexible” in Chinese, to investigate whether the experience of hardness affects cognitive functions whose performance depends prospectively on rigidity (memory) and flexibility (creativity). In Experiment 1, we found that Chinese-speaking participants performed better at recalling previously memorized words while sitting on a hard-surface stool (the hard condition) than a cushioned one (the soft condition). In Experiment 2, participants sitting on a cushioned stool outperformed those sitting on a hard-surface stool on a Chinese riddle task, which required creative/flexible thinking, but not on an analogical reasoning task, which required both rigid and flexible thinking. The results suggest the hardness experience affects cognitive functions that are metaphorically associated with rigidity or flexibility. They support the embodiment proposition that cognitive functions and representations can be grounded in bodily states via metaphorical associations.

To work or not to work: Neural representation of cost and benefit of instrumental action

By definition, instrumental actions are performed in order to obtain certain goals. Nevertheless, the attainment of goals typically implies obstacles, and response vigor is known to reflect an integration of subjective benefit and cost. Whereas several brain regions have been associated with cost/benefit ratio decision-making, trial-by-trial fluctuations in motivation are not well understood. We review recent evidence supporting the motivational implications of signal fluctuations in the mesocorticolimbic system. As an extension of "set-point" theories of instrumental action, we propose that response vigor is determined by a rapid integration of brain signals that reflect value and cost on a trial-by-trial basis giving rise to an online estimate of utility. Critically, we posit that fluctuations in key nodes of the network can predict deviations in response vigor and that variability in instrumental behavior can be accounted for by models devised from optimal control theory, which incorporate the effortful control of noise. Notwithstanding, the post hoc analysis of signaling dynamics has caveats that can effectively be addressed in future research with the help of two novel fMRI imaging techniques. First, adaptive fMRI paradigms can be used to establish a time-order relationship, which is a prerequisite for causality, by using observed signal fluctuations as triggers for stimulus presentation. Second, real-time fMRI neurofeedback can be employed to induce predefined brain states that may facilitate benefit or cost aspects of instrumental actions. Ultimately, understanding temporal dynamics in brain networks subserving response vigor holds the promise for targeted interventions that could help to readjust the motivational balance of behavior.

The poverty of embodied cognition

In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in embodied cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a "thought exercise" approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception-action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.

Exposed to events that never happen: Generalized unsafety, the default stress response, and prolonged autonomic activity

Based on neurobiological and evolutionary arguments, the generalized unsafety theory of stress (GUTS) hypothesizes that the stress response is a default response, and that chronic stress responses are caused by generalized unsafety (GU), independent of stressors or their cognitive representation. Three highly prevalent conditions are particularly vulnerable to becoming 'compromised' in terms of GU, and carry considerable health risks: Thus, GUTS critically revises and expands stress theory, by focusing on safety instead of threat, and by including risk factors that have hitherto not been attributed to stress.

Just out of reach: On the reliability of the action-sentence compatibility effect

The action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), a hallmark finding in Embodied Cognition, implicates the motor system in language comprehension. In the ACE, people process sentences implying movement toward or away from themselves, responding with actions toward or away from their bodies. These processes interact, implying a linkage between linguistic and motor systems. From a theoretical perspective, the ACE has been extremely influential, being widely cited evidence in favor of embodied cognition. The present study began as an attempt to extend the ACE in a new direction, but eventually became a series of attempts to simply replicate the effect. Across 8 experiments, I tested whether the ACE extends to a novel mouse-tracking method and/or is susceptible to higher-order cognitive influences. In 3 experiments, attempts were made to "disembody" the ACE by presenting participants' names on the computer screen (as in Markman & Brendl, 2005). In each experiment, the ACE could not be disembodied, because the ACE did not occur. In further experiments, the ACE was not observed in reading times, regardless of response mode (mouse movements vs. button-presses) or stimuli, including those from the original research. Similarly, no ACE was observed in physical movement times. Bayes Factor analyses of the current experiments, and the previous ACE literature, suggest that the evidence for the ACE is generally weak: Many studies considered as positive evidence actually support the null hypothesis, and very few published results offer strong evidence for the ACE. Implications for the embodiment hypothesis are discussed.

Fear Similarly Alters Perceptual Estimates of and Actions over Gaps

Previous research has demonstrated an influence of one's emotional state on estimates of spatial layout. For example, estimates of heights are larger when the viewer is someone typically afraid of heights (trait fear) or someone who, in the moment, is experiencing elevated levels of fear (state fear). Embodied perception theories have suggested that such a change in perception occurs in order to alter future actions in a manner that reduces the likelihood of injury. However, other work has argued that when acting, it is important to have access to an accurate perception of space and that a change in conscious perception does not necessitate a change in action. No one has yet investigated emotional state, perceptual estimates, and action performance in a single paradigm. The goal of the current paper was to investigate whether fear influences perceptual estimates and action measures similarly or in a dissociable manner. In the current work, participants either estimated gap widths (Experiment 1) or were asked to step over gaps (Experiment 2) in a virtual environment. To induce fear, the gaps were placed at various heights up to 15 meters. Results showed an increase in gap width estimates as participants indicated experiencing more fear. The increase in gap estimates was mirrored in participants' stepping behavior in Experiment 2; participants stepped over fewer gaps when experiencing higher state and trait fear and, when participants actually stepped, they stepped farther over gap widths when experiencing more fear. The magnitude of the influence of fear on both perception and action were also remarkably similar (5.3 and 3.9 cm, respectively). These results lend support to embodied perception claims by demonstrating an influence on action of a similar magnitude as seen on estimates of gap widths.

Distance Perception

Distance perception seems to be an incredible achievement if it is construed as being based solely on static retinal images. Information provided by such images is sparse at best. On the other hand, when the perceptual context is taken to be one in which people are acting in natural environments, the informational bases for distance perception become abundant. There are, however, surprising consequences of studying people in action. Nonvisual factors, such as people's goals and physiological states, also influence their distance perceptions. Although the informational specification of distance becomes redundant when people are active, paradoxically, many distance-related actions sidestep the need to perceive distance at all.

The default response to uncertainty and the importance of perceived safety in anxiety and stress: An evolution-theoretical perspective

From a combined neurobiological and evolution-theoretical perspective, the stress response is a subcortically subserved response to uncertainty that is not 'generated' but 'default': the stress response is 'always there' but as long as safety is perceived, the stress response is under tonic prefrontal inhibition, reflected by high vagally mediated heart rate variability. Uncertainty of safety leads to disinhibiting the default stress response, even in the absence of threat. Due to the stress response's survival value, this 'erring on the side of caution' is passed to us via our genes. Thus, intolerance of uncertainty is not acquired during the life cycle, but is a given property of all living organisms, only to be alleviated in situations of which the safety is learned. When the latter is deficient, generalized unsafety ensues, which underlies chronic anxiety and stress and their somatic health risks, as well as other highly prevalent conditions carrying such risks, including loneliness, obesity, aerobic unfitness and old age.

Can you experience 'top-down' effects on perception?: The case of race categories and perceived lightness

A recent surge of research has revived the notion that higher-level cognitive states such as beliefs, desires, and categorical knowledge can directly change what we see. The force of such claims, however, has been undercut by an absence of visually apparent demonstrations of the form so often appealed to in vision science: such effects may be revealed by statistical analyses of observers' responses, but you cannot literally experience the alleged top-down effects yourself. A singular exception is an influential report that racial categorization alters the perceived lightness of faces, a claim that was bolstered by a striking visual demonstration that Black faces appear darker than White faces, even when matched for mean luminance. Here, we show that this visually compelling difference is explicable in terms of purely low-level factors. Observers who viewed heavily blurred versions of the original Black and White faces still judged the Black face to be darker and the White face to be lighter even when these observers could not perceive the races of the faces, and even when they explicitly judged the faces to be of the same race. We conclude that the best subjectively appreciable evidence for top-down influences on perception does not reflect a genuinely top-down effect after all: instead, such effects arise from more familiar (if subtle) bottom-up factors within visual processing.

Discovering your inner Gibson: reconciling action-specific and ecological approaches to perception-action

Both the action-specific perception account and the ecological approach to perception-action emphasize the role of action in perception. However, the action-specific perception account demonstrates that different percepts are possible depending on the perceiver's ability to act, even when the same optical information is available. These findings challenge one of the fundamental claims of the ecological approach--that perception is direct--by suggesting that perception is mediated by internal processes. Here, we sought to resolve this apparent discrepancy. We contend that perception is based on the controlled detection of the information available in a global array that includes higher-order patterns defined across interoceptive and exteroceptive stimulus arrays. These higher-order patterns specify the environment in relation to the perceiver, so direct sensitivity to them would be consistent with the ecological claims that perception of the environment is direct and animal-specific. In addition, the action-specific approach provides further evidence for the theory of affordances, by demonstrating that even seemingly abstract properties of the environment, such as distance and size, are ultimately perceived in terms of an agent's action capabilities.

Mirror, Mirror by the Stairs: The Impact of Mirror Exposure on Stair versus Elevator Use in College Students

Previous research has indicated that self-awareness-inducing mirrors can successfully incite behaviors that align with one's personal values, such as helping others. Other research has found a large discrepancy between the high percentage of young adults who report valuing the healthfulness of physical activity (PA) and the low percentage who actually meet PA participation standards. However, few studies have examined how mirror exposure and both perceived and actual body size influence highly valued PA participation among college students. The present study assessed stair versus elevator use on a western college campus and hypothesized that mirror exposure would increase the more personally healthy transportation method of stair use. In accordance with previous research, it was also hypothesized that males and those with a lower body mass index (BMI) would be more likely to take the stairs, and that body size distorting mirrors would impact the stair-elevator decision. One hundred sixty-seven students (51% male) enrolled in an introductory psychology course were recruited to take a survey about their "transportation choices" at an indoor campus parking garage. Participants were individually exposed to either no mirror, a standard full-length mirror, or a full-length mirror manipulated to make the reflected body size appear either slightly thinner or slightly wider than normal before being asked to go to the fourth floor of the garage for a survey. Participants' choice of floor-climbing method (stairs or elevator) was recorded, and they were administered an Internet-based survey assessing demographic information, BMI, self-awareness, perceived body size, and other variables likely to be associated with stair use. Results from logistic regression analyses revealed that participants who were not exposed to a mirror [odds ratios (OR) = 0.37, 95% CI: 0.14-0.96], males (OR = 0.33, 95% CI: 0.13-0.85), those with lower BMI (OR = 0.84, 95% CI: 0.71-0.99), those with higher exercise participation (OR = 1.09, 95% CI: 1.02-1.18), and those engaging in more unhealthy weight-control behaviors (OR = 1.55, 95% CI: 1.14-2.11) showed increased odds of taking the stairs. Implications and future directions are discussed.

The Influence of Human Body Orientation on Distance Judgments

People maintain larger distances to other peoples' front than to their back. We investigated if humans also judge another person as closer when viewing their front than their back. Participants watched animated virtual characters (avatars) and moved a virtual plane toward their location after the avatar was removed. In Experiment 1, participants judged avatars, which were facing them as closer and made quicker estimates than to avatars looking away. In Experiment 2, avatars were rotated in 30 degree steps around the vertical axis. Observers judged avatars roughly facing them (i.e., looking max. 60 degrees away) as closer than avatars roughly looking away. No particular effect was observed for avatars directly facing and also gazing at the observer. We conclude that body orientation was sufficient to generate the asymmetry. Sensitivity of the orientation effect to gaze and to interpersonal distance would have suggested involvement of social processing, but this was not observed. We discuss social and lower-level processing as potential reasons for the effect.

Infants' grip strength predicts mu rhythm attenuation during observation of lifting actions with weighted blocks

Research has established that the body is fundamentally involved in perception: bodily experience influences activation of the shared neural system underlying action perception and production during action observation, and bodily characteristics influence perception of the spatial environment. However, whether bodily characteristics influence action perception and its underlying neural system is unknown, particularly in early ontogeny. We measured grip strength in 12-month-old infants and investigated relations with mu rhythm attenuation, an electroencephalographic correlate of the neural system underlying action perception, during observation of lifting actions performed with differently weighted blocks. We found that infants with higher grip strength exhibited significant mu attenuation during observation of lifting actions, whereas infants with lower grip strength did not. Moreover, a progressively strong relation between grip strength and mu attenuation during observation of lifts was found with increased block weight. We propose that this relation is attributable to differences in infants' ability to recognize the effort associated with lifting objects of different weights, as a consequence of their developing strength. Together, our results extend the body's role in perception by demonstrating that bodily characteristics influence action perception by shaping the activation of its underlying neural system.

Perceived distance and obesity: It's what you weigh, not what you think

Action abilities are constrained by physical body size and characteristics, which, according to the action-specific account of perception, should influence perceived space. We examined whether physical body size or beliefs about body size affect distance perception by taking advantage of naturally-occurring dissociations typical in people who are obese but believe themselves to weigh less. Normal weight, overweight, and obese individuals made verbal distance estimates. We also collected measures of beliefs about body size and measures of physical body size. Individuals who weighed more than others estimated distances to be farther. Furthermore, physical body weight influenced perceived distance but beliefs about body size did not. The results illustrate that whereas perception is influenced by physical characteristics, it is not influenced by beliefs. The results also have implications for perception as a contributing factor for lifestyle choices: people who weigh more than others may choose to perform less physically demanding actions not as a result of how they perceive their bodies, but as a result of how they perceive the environment.

Awareness Is Not a Necessary Characteristic of a Perceptual Effect: Commentary on Firestone (2013)

Golf holes look larger to golfers who are playing better than others, and hills look steeper to people who are fatigued from a long run-or so claims the action-specific account of perception. According to this account, spatial perception of slant, distance, and size is influenced by the perceiver's ability to perform actions such as walking, throwing, or grasping. This claim is based on empirical findings that observers report hills as steeper, distances as farther, and objects as smaller when they are less capable of acting on the objects. Recently, Firestone (2013) challenged the claim that these reports reflect genuine differences in perception. One argument he levied against a perceptual interpretation is that people are not aware of these perceptual differences related to action, and they should be. Here, I argue that awareness is not a necessary condition for an effect to be perceptual, as evidenced by a lack of awareness in the case of a classic visual illusion. However, to make a strong claim for genuine effects in perception, the action-specific account must specify a perceptual mechanism, and it has yet to do so.

Music for a Brighter World: Brightness Judgment Bias by Musical Emotion

A prevalent conceptual metaphor is the association of the concepts of good and evil with brightness and darkness, respectively. Music cognition, like metaphor, is possibly embodied, yet no study has addressed the question whether musical emotion can modulate brightness judgment in a metaphor consistent fashion. In three separate experiments, participants judged the brightness of a grey square that was presented after a short excerpt of emotional music. The results of Experiment 1 showed that short musical excerpts are effective emotional primes that cross-modally influence brightness judgment of visual stimuli. Grey squares were consistently judged as brighter after listening to music with a positive valence, as compared to music with a negative valence. The results of Experiment 2 revealed that the bias in brightness judgment does not require an active evaluation of the emotional content of the music. By applying a different experimental procedure in Experiment 3, we showed that this brightness judgment bias is indeed a robust effect. Altogether, our findings demonstrate a powerful role of musical emotion in biasing brightness judgment and that this bias is aligned with the metaphor viewpoint.