Selective Inhibition of Movement

Expectations and violations: delineating the neural network of proactive inhibitory control

The ability to stop a prepared response (reactive inhibition) appears to depend on the degree to which stopping is expected (proactive inhibition). Functional MRI studies have shown that activation during proactive and reactive inhibition overlaps, suggesting that the whole neural network for reactive inhibition becomes already activated in anticipation of stopping. However, these studies measured proactive inhibition as the effect of stop-signal probability on activation during go trials. Therefore, activation could reflect expectation of a stop-signal (evoked by the stop-signal probability cue), but also violation of this expectation because stop-signals do not occur on go trials. We addressed this problem, using a stop-signal task in which the stop-signal probability cue and the go-signal were separated in time. Hence, we could separate activation during the cue, reflecting expectation of the stop-signal, from activation during the go-signal, reflecting expectation of the stop-signal or violation of that expectation. During the cue, the striatum, the supplementary motor complex (SMC), and the midbrain activated. During the go-signal, the right inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and the right inferior frontal cortex (IFC) activated. These findings suggest that the neural network previously associated with proactive inhibition can be subdivided into two components. One component, including the striatum, the SMC, and the midbrain, activated during the cue, implicating this network in proactive inhibition. Another component, consisting of the right IPC and the right IFC, activated during the go-signal. Rather than being involved in proactive inhibition, this network appears to be involved in processes associated with violation of expectations.

Nonselective motor-level changes associated with selective response inhibition: evidence from response force measurements

In the present study, we examined the effects of selective response inhibition on motor production using response force measures within a task that was based on that of Aron and Verbruggen (Psychological Science, 19, 1146-1153, 2008). In each trial, participants were signaled to respond bimanually with the two index fingers or the two middle fingers. After a short delay, a stop signal was sometimes presented, indicating that one of the two finger responses should be withheld. A given response was slowed when the response on the other hand was stopped, replicating a previously observed stopping interference effect. In addition, the given response was also made more forcefully when the response on the other hand was stopped, indicating that the requirement to stop one activated response has global motor-level consequences for other responses that are to be carried out normally.

Electrophysiological Evidence for Different Inhibitory Mechanisms When Stopping or Changing a Planned Response

People are able to adapt their behavior to changing environmental contingencies by rapidly inhibiting or modifying their actions. Response inhibition is often studied in the stop-signal paradigm that requires the suppression of an already prepared motor response. Less is known about situations calling for a change of motor plans such that the prepared response has to be withheld but another has to be executed instead. In the present study, we investigated whether electrophysiological data can provide evidence for distinct inhibitory mechanisms when stopping or changing a response. Participants were instructed to perform in a choice RT task with two classes of embedded critical trials: Stop signals called for the inhibition of any response, whereas change signals required participants to inhibit the prepared response and execute another one instead. Under both conditions, we observed differences in go-stimulus processing, suggesting a faster response preparation in failed compared with successful inhibitions. In contrast to stop-signal trials, changing a response did not elicit the inhibition-related frontal N2 and did not modulate the parietal mu power decrease. The results suggest that compared with changing a response, additional frontal and parietal regions are engaged when having to inhibit a response.

A proactive mechanism for selective suppression of response tendencies

While most research on stopping action examines how an initiated response is stopped when a signal occurs (i.e., reactively), everyday life also calls for a mechanism to prepare to stop a particular response tendency (i.e., proactively and selectively). We hypothesized that human subjects can prepare to stop a particular response by proactively suppressing that response representation in the brain. We tested this by using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation and concurrent electromyography. This allowed us to interrogate the corticomotor excitability of specific response representations even before action ensued. We found that the motor evoked potential of the effector that might need to be stopped in the future was significantly reduced compared with when that effector was at rest. Further, this neural index of proactive and selective suppression predicted the subsequent selectivity with which the behavioral response was stopped. These results go further than earlier reports of reduced motor excitability when responses are stopped. They show that the control can be applied in advance (proactively) and also targeted at a particular response channel (selectively). This provides novel evidence for an active mechanism of suppression in the brain that is setup according to the subject's goals and even before action ensues.

From reactive to proactive and selective control: developing a richer model for stopping inappropriate responses

A better understanding of the neural systems underlying impulse control is important for psychiatry. Although most impulses are motivational or emotional rather than motoric per se, it is research into the neural architecture of motor response control that has made the greatest strides. This article reviews recent developments in the cognitive neuroscience of stopping responses. Most research of this kind has focused on reactive control-that is, how subjects stop a response outright when instructed by a signal. It is argued that reactive paradigms are limited as models of control relevant to psychiatry. Instead, a set of paradigms is advocated that begins to model proactive inhibitory control-that is, how a subject prepares to stop an upcoming response tendency. Proactive inhibitory control is generated according to the goals of the subject rather than by an external signal, and it can be selectively targeted at a particular response tendency. This may have wider validity than reactive control as an experimental model for stopping inappropriate responses.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation reveals dissociable mechanisms for global versus selective corticomotor suppression underlying the stopping of action

Stopping an initiated response is an essential function, investigated in many studies with go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms. These standard tests require rapid action cancellation. This appears to be achieved by a suppression mechanism that has "global" effects on corticomotor excitability (i.e., affecting task-irrelevant muscles). By contrast, stopping action in everyday life may require selectivity (i.e., targeting a specific response tendency without affecting concurrent action). We hypothesized that while standard stopping engages global suppression, behaviorally selective stopping engages a selective suppression mechanism. Accordingly, we measured corticomotor excitability of the task-irrelevant leg using transcranial magnetic stimulation while subjects stopped the hand. Experiment 1 showed that for standard (i.e., nonselective) stopping, the task-irrelevant leg was suppressed. Experiment 2 showed that for behaviorally selective stopping, there was no mean leg suppression. Experiment 3 directly compared behaviorally nonselective and selective stopping. Leg suppression occurred only in the behaviorally nonselective condition. These results argue that global and selective suppression mechanisms are dissociable. Participants may use a global suppression mechanism when speed is stressed; however, they may recruit a more selective suppression mechanism when selective stopping is behaviorally necessary and preparatory information is available. We predict that different fronto-basal-ganglia pathways underpin these different suppression mechanisms.

Corticospinal excitability during preparation for an anticipatory action is modulated by the availability of visual information

To intercept rapidly moving objects, people must predict the right time to initiate their actions. The timing of movement initiation in interceptions is thought to be determined when a perceptual variable specifying time to contact reaches a criterion value. If a response needs to be aborted, the performer must make a decision before this moment. It has been recently shown that the minimal time to suppress an anticipatory action takes longer during motion extrapolation than during continuous visual information. In experiment 1, we sought to determine whether or not the availability of visual information would 1) affect the latency to inhibit an anticipatory action, and 2) modulate the level of excitability in the motor cortex (M1). The behavioral results showed that the absence of visual information prolonged the latency to stop the movement as previously reported. The neurophysiological data indicated that corticospinal excitability levels were affected by the availability of visual information. In experiment 2, we sought to verify whether corticospinal excitability levels would also differ between the two visual conditions when the task did not involve response suppression. The results of experiment 2 indicated that excitability levels did not differ between visual conditions. Overall, our findings indicated that the buildup of motor activation can also play a role in determining different latencies to inhibit an anticipatory action. They also suggest that the buildup of motor activation in the corticospinal pathways can be strategically modulated to the requirements of the task during continuous visual information.

On the role of the striatum in response inhibition

BACKGROUND

Stopping a manual response requires suppression of the primary motor cortex (M1) and has been linked to activation of the striatum. Here, we test three hypotheses regarding the role of the striatum in stopping: striatum activation during successful stopping may reflect suppression of M1, anticipation of a stop-signal occurring, or a slower response build-up.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Twenty-four healthy volunteers underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while performing a stop-signal paradigm, in which anticipation of stopping was manipulated using a visual cue indicating stop-signal probability, with their right hand. We observed activation of the striatum and deactivation of left M1 during successful versus unsuccessful stopping. In addition, striatum activation was proportional to the degree of left M1 deactivation during successful stopping, implicating the striatum in response suppression. Furthermore, striatum activation increased as a function of stop-signal probability and was to linked to activation in the supplementary motor complex (SMC) and right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC) during successful stopping, suggesting a role in anticipation of stopping. Finally, trial-to-trial variations in response time did not affect striatum activation.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

The results identify the striatum as a critical node in the neural network associated with stopping motor responses. As striatum activation was related to both suppression of M1 and anticipation of a stop-signal occurring, these findings suggest that the striatum is involved in proactive inhibitory control over M1, most likely in interaction with SMC and rIFC.

Responding with restraint: what are the neurocognitive mechanisms?

An important aspect of cognitive control is the ability to respond with restraint. Here, we modeled this experimentally by measuring the degree of response slowing that occurs when people respond to an imperative stimulus in a context where they might suddenly need to stop the initiated response compared with a context in which they do not need to stop. We refer to the RT slowing that occurs as the "response delay effect." We conjectured that this response delay effect could relate to one or more neurocognitive mechanism(s): partial response suppression (i.e., "active braking"), prolonged decision time, and slower response facilitation. These accounts make different predictions about motor system excitability and brain activation. To test which neurocognitive mechanisms underlie the response delay effect, we performed two studies with TMS and we reanalyzed fMRI data. The results suggest that the response delay effect is at least partly explained by active braking, possibly involving a mechanism that is similar to that used to stop responses completely. These results further our understanding of how people respond with restraint by pointing to proactive recruitment of a neurocognitive mechanism heretofore associated with outright stopping.

Processing of global and selective stop signals: application of Donders' subtraction method to stop-signal task performance

This paper applied Donders' subtraction method to examine the processing of global and selective stop signals in the stop-signal paradigm. Participants performed on three different versions of the stop task: a global task and two selective tasks. A global task required participants to inhibit their response to a go signal whenever a stop signal was presented (Stop-a task). A selective stop task required participants to inhibit to one stop signal but not to the other (Stop-c task). Another selective stop task required them to inhibit when the response indicated by go and stop signals was the same but not when they were different (Stop-b task). Stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) was shortest for Stop-a and longest for Stop-b, with intermediate values for the Stop-c task. Additional control experiments that manipulated stop probability confirmed the robustness of global and selective stopping latencies even when the stop-signal probability varied. The current findings contribute to the conclusion that Donders' subtraction method provides a useful tool for estimating the durations of subprocesses that together comprise SSRT.

Inhibitory motor control in response stopping and response switching

While much is known about the neural regions recruited in the human brain when a dominant motor response becomes inappropriate and must be stopped, less is known about the regions that support switching to a new, appropriate, response. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging with two variants of the stop-signal paradigm that require either stopping altogether or switching to a different response, we examined the brain systems involved in these two forms of executive control. Both stopping trials and switching trials showed common recruitment of the right inferior frontal gyrus, presupplementary motor area, and midbrain. Contrasting switching trials with stopping trials showed activation similar to that observed on response trials (where the initial response remains appropriate and no control is invoked), whereas there were no regions that showed significantly greater activity for stopping trials compared with switching trials. These results show that response switching can be supported by the same neural systems as response inhibition, and suggest that the same mechanism of rapid, nonselective response inhibition that is thought to support speeded response stopping can also support speeded response switching when paired with execution of the new, appropriate, response.

No-go trials can modulate switch cost by interfering with effects of task preparation

It has recently been shown that the cost associated with switching tasks is eliminated following 'no-go' trials, in which response selection is not completed, suggesting that the switch cost depends on response selection. However, no-go trials may also affect switch costs by interfering with the effects of task preparation that precede response selection. To test this hypothesis we evaluated switch costs following standard go trials with those following two types of non-response trials: no-go trials, for which a stimulus is presented that indicates no response should be made (Experiment 1); and cue-only trials in which no stimulus is presented following the task cue (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that eliminating no-go stimuli would reveal effects of task preparation on the switch cost in cue-only trials. We found no switch cost following no-go trials (Experiment 1), but a reliable switch cost in cue-only trials (i.e., when no-go stimuli were removed; Experiment 2). We conclude that no-go trials can modulate the switch cost, independent of their effect on response selection, by interfering with task preparation, and that the effects of task preparation on switch cost are more directly assessed by cue-only trials.

Voluntary Control of Multisaccade Gaze Shifts During Movement Preparation and Execution

Although the nature of gaze control regulating single saccades is relatively well documented, how such control is implemented to regulate multisaccade gaze shifts is not known. We used highly eccentric targets to elicit multisaccade gaze shifts and tested the ability of subjects to control the saccade sequence by presenting a second target on random trials. Their response allowed us to test the nature of control at many levels: before, during, and between saccades. Although the saccade sequence could be inhibited before it began, we observed clear signs of truncation of the first saccade, which confirmed that it could be inhibited in midflight as well. Using a race model that explains the control of single saccades, we estimated that it took about 100 ms to inhibit a planned saccade but took about 150 ms to inhibit a saccade during its execution. Although the time taken to inhibit was different, the high subject-wise correlation suggests a unitary inhibitory control acting at different levels in the oculomotor system. We also frequently observed responses that consisted of hypometric initial saccades, followed by secondary saccades to the initial target. Given the estimates of the inhibitory process provided by the model that also took into account the variances of the processes as well, the secondary saccades (average latency ∼215 ms) should have been inhibited. Failure to inhibit the secondary saccade suggests that the intersaccadic interval in a multisaccade response is a ballistic stage. Collectively, these data indicate that the oculomotor system can control a response until a very late stage in its execution. However, if the response consists of multiple movements then the preparation of the second movement becomes refractory to new visual input, either because it is part of a preprogrammed sequence or as a consequence of being a corrective response to a motor error.

Somatosensory effects of action inhibition: a study with the stop-signal paradigm

When a weak shock is delivered to the finger immediately before a voluntary movement, or during a delay interval where subjects are prepared to make the movement, shock detection rates worsen progressively as the movement approaches. Further, we previously showed that shock detection improves again if a NoGo signal produces inhibition of a prepared response. Here, we used a somatosensory version of the stop-signal paradigm to investigate inhibitory processing during the 'horserace' period when motor excitation and inhibition processes may be simultaneously active. When subjects made a rapid keypress response to a go-signal, shock detection deteriorated in a time-dependent manner, replicating sensory suppression. However, when go-signals were followed by adaptively delayed stop-signals so that subjects could not inhibit the prepared movement, and made errors of commission, we found a paradoxical brief increase in shock detection performance just after the stop-signal, as if in a NoGo trial. During this brief window, the somatosensory system showed a pattern consistent with motor inhibition, even though the motor system itself was too far advanced in movement execution for action to be inhibited. Most models of stop-signal processing propose a two-horse race between excitation and inhibition, with a winner-takes-all solution. We show that there may be distinct motor and somatosensory races. Moreover, inhibitory processes may lead in the somatosensory race, at least briefly, even when excitatory processes win the motor race.

Mechanisms and Dynamics of Cortical Motor Inhibition in the Stop-signal Paradigm: A TMS Study

The ability to stop ongoing motor responses in a split-second is a vital element of human cognitive control and flexibility that relies in large part on prefrontal cortex. We used the stop-signal paradigm to elucidate the engagement of primary motor cortex (M1) in inhibiting an ongoing voluntary motor response. The stop-signal paradigm taps the ability to flexibly countermand ongoing voluntary behavior upon presentation of a stop signal. We applied single-pulse TMS to M1 at several intervals following the stop signal to track the time course of excitability of the motor system related to generating and stopping a manual response. Electromyography recorded from the flexor pollicis brevis allowed quantification of the excitability of the corticospinal tract and the involvement of intracortical GABABergic circuits within M1, indexed respectively by the amplitude of the motor-evoked potential and the duration of the late part of the cortical silent period (SP). The results extend our knowledge of the neural basis of inhibitory control in three ways. First, the results revealed a dynamic interplay between response activation and stopping processes at M1 level during stop-signal inhibition of an ongoing response. Second, increased excitability of inhibitory interneurons that drives SP prolongation was evident as early as 134 msec following the instruction to stop. Third, this pattern was followed by a stop-related reduction of corticospinal excitability implemented around 180 after the stop signal. These findings point to the recruitment of GABABergic intracortical inhibitory circuits within M1 in stop-signal inhibition and support the notion of stopping as an active act of control.

Reduced basal ganglia function when elderly switch between coordinated movement patterns

Structural and neurochemical changes in frontostriatal circuits are thought to underlie age-related behavioral deficits on cognitive tasks. Here, we test the hypothesis that age-related motor switching deficits are associated with reduced basal ganglia (BG) function. Right-handed volunteers (15 Old, and 15 Young) made spatially and temporally coupled bimanual circular motions during event-related FMRI. A visual cue signaled the right hand to Switch or Continue its circling direction. Switching from mirror symmetric to asymmetric (SW»ASYMM) took longer and resulted in more contralateral (left-) hand disruptions than vice versa. These effects were more pronounced in the elderly, showing that the ability to suppress and flexibly adapt motor behavior (agility) declines with age. For both groups, switching activated the BG and a typical network for task-set implementation, including dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, SMA-proper) and anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus. A region of interest analysis revealed significantly reduced SW»ASYMM activation in bilateral subthalamic nucleus and right globus pallidus, only in the elderly. Age-related behavioral deficits may be related to inefficient recruitment of cortico-BG loops to suppress undesired movements. The elderly may use an alternative strategy to select the required movement pattern as indicated by increased activation of prefrontal cortex.

Modulation of motorcortical excitability by methylphenidate in adult voluntary test persons performing a go/nogo task

This study investigated the interaction between motorcortical excitability (short interval cortical inhibition, intracortical facilitation and long interval cortical inhibition), different requirement conditions [choice reaction test (CRT), attention/go/nogo], and their pharmacological modulation by methylphenidate (MPH) in normal healthy adults (n = 31) using a transcranial magnetic stimulation paradigm. MPH was administered in a dosage of 1 mg/kg body weight, maximum 60 mg. Additionally, serum level and clearance of MPH were controlled. The statistical analysis of variance revealed a significant three-way interaction of 2 (MPH) x 3 (CRT) x 6 (ISI) predicting motor evoked potential amplitudes (P = 0.032, MPH none and full dose, n = 31). In order to compare effects of dosage an additional between-subjects factor (half vs. full MPH dose) was introduced. None of the interactions involving this between-subject factor reached statistical significance. Exploring interactions with MPH only, a 3 (MPH none, half and full dose) x 3 (CRT) x 6 (ISI) analysis of variance revealed significant two-way interactions for MPH x ISI (P = 0.040) and condition x ISI (P < 0.001, n = 18). Effects observed for MPH were strongest on facilitatory processes, weaker for intracortical inhibition. In sum, MPH seems to interact via striato-thalamo-cortical pathways with original motorcortical processes (ISI), to a lesser extent with task-dependent or behavioral parameters (CRT).

The effectiveness of exercise intervention on inhibitory control in children with developmental coordination disorder: using a visuospatial attention paradigm as a model

Children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) have been demonstrated to show a deficit of inhibitory control in volitional shifts of attention. The aim of this study was to use ecological intervention to investigate the efficacy of table-tennis training on treating both problems with attentional networks and motor disorder in children with DCD. Forty-three children aged 9-10 years old were screened using the Movement Assessment Battery for Children and divided into DCD (n=27) and typically developing (TD, n=16) groups. Children with DCD were then quasi-randomly assigned to either a DCD-training group who underwent a ten-week table-tennis training program with a frequency of 3 times a week or a DCD non-training group. Before and after training, the capacity of inhibitory control was examined with the endogenous Posner paradigm task for DCD and TD groups. Table-tennis training resulted in significant improvement of cognitive and motor functions for the children with DCD. The study demonstrated that exercise intervention employed within the school setting can benefit the inhibitory control and motor performance in children with DCD. However, future research efforts should continue to clarify whether the performance gains could be maintained over time.

Having a goal to stop action is associated with advance control of specific motor representations

An important aspect of cognitive control consists in the ability to stop oneself from making inappropriate responses. In an earlier study we demonstrated that there are different mechanisms for stopping: global and selective [Aron, A. R., Verbruggen, F. (2008). Stop the presses: Dissociating a selective from a global mechanism for stopping. Psychological Science, 19(11) 1146-1153]. We argued that participants are more likely to use a global mechanism when speed is of the essence, whereas they are more likely to use a selective mechanism when they have foreknowledge of which response tendency they may need to stop. Here we further investigate the relationship between foreknowledge and selective stopping. In Experiment 1 we adapted the earlier design to show that individual differences in recall accuracy for the stopping goal correlate with the selectivity of the stopping. This confirms that encoding and using a foreknowledge memory cue is a key enabler for a selective stopping mechanism. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), to test the hypothesis that foreknowledge "sets up" a control set whereby control is applied onto the response representation that may need to be stopped in the future. We applied TMS to the left motor cortex and measured motor evoked potentials (MEPs) from the right hand while participants performed a similar behavioral paradigm as Experiment 1. In the foreknowledge period, MEPs were significantly reduced for trials where the right hand was the one that might need to be stopped relative to when it was not. This shows that having a goal of what response may need to be stopped in the future consists in applying advance control onto a specific motor representation.

Coding of visual space during motor preparation: Approaching objects rapidly modulate corticospinal excitability in hand-centered coordinates

Defensive behaviors, such as withdrawing your hand to avoid potentially harmful approaching objects, rely on rapid sensorimotor transformations between visual and motor coordinates. We examined the reference frame for coding visual information about objects approaching the hand during motor preparation. Subjects performed a simple visuomanual task while a task-irrelevant distractor ball rapidly approached a location either near to or far from their hand. After the distractor ball appearance, single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation were delivered over the subject's primary motor cortex, eliciting motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in their responding hand. MEP amplitude was reduced when the ball approached near the responding hand, both when the hand was on the left and the right of the midline. Strikingly, this suppression occurred very early, at 70-80 ms after ball appearance, and was not modified by visual fixation location. Furthermore, it was selective for approaching balls, since static visual distractors did not modulate MEP amplitude. Together with additional behavioral measurements, we provide converging evidence for automatic hand-centered coding of visual space in the human brain.

Stop and Go: The Neural Basis of Selective Movement Prevention

Converging lines of evidence show that volitional movement prevention depends on the right prefrontal cortex (PFC), especially the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Selective movement prevention refers to the rapid prevention of some, but not all, movement. It is unknown whether the IFG, or other prefrontal areas, are engaged when movement must be selectively prevented, and whether additional cortical areas are recruited. We used rapid event-related fMRI to investigate selective and nonselective movement prevention during performance of a temporally demanding anticipatory task. Most trials involved simultaneous index and middle finger extension. Randomly interspersed trials required the prevention of one, or both, finger movements. Regions of the right hemisphere, including the IFG, were active for selective and nonselective movement prevention, with an overlap in the inferior parietal cortex and the middle frontal gyrus. Selective movement prevention caused a significant delay in movement initiation of the other digit. These trials were associated with activation of the medial frontal cortex. The results provide support for a right-hemisphere network that temporarily “brakes” all movement preparation. When movement is selectively prevented, the supplementary motor cortex (SMA/pre-SMA) may participate in conflict resolution and subsequent reshaping of excitatory drive to the motor cortex.

Response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm

Response inhibition is a hallmark of executive control. The concept refers to the suppression of actions that are no longer required or that are inappropriate, which supports flexible and goal-directed behavior in ever-changing environments. The stop-signal paradigm is most suitable for the study of response inhibition in a laboratory setting. The paradigm has become increasingly popular in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and psychopathology. We review recent findings in the stop-signal literature with the specific aim of demonstrating how each of these different fields contributes to a better understanding of the processes involved in inhibiting a response and monitoring stopping performance, and more generally, discovering how behavior is controlled.

Stop the Presses

How does one control an inappropriate tendency? Many studies have investigated this question by measuring the speed with which subjects stop an initiated response. Yet the rapid stopping of an initiated response is apparently underpinned by a neurocognitive mechanism that has global effects on multiple tendencies. This limits such studies as models of cognitive control because they do not explain the selectivity of control over particular tendencies that is apparent in everyday life. We hypothesized that subjects employ a selective stopping mechanism when they have foreknowledge of which response to stop, but employ a global stopping mechanism when they do not have such foreknowledge. Comparing foreknowledge and noforeknowledge conditions, we show that when subjects have foreknowledge, stopping is indeed more selective, as evidenced by less of an effect on the concurrent execution of an alternative response; however, stopping is also slower when subjects have foreknowledge. Thus, selective and global mechanisms of stopping can be dissociated. We suggest that the selective mechanism is used when people maintain the goal of controlling particular responses, whereas the global mechanism is used when it is essential to stop quickly.

Warning Signals Induce Automatic EMG Activations and Proactive Volitional Inhibition: Evidence From Analysis of Error Distribution in Simple RT

Typical simple reaction-time (RT) paradigms usually include a warning signal followed by a variable foreperiod before the presentation of a reaction stimulus. Most current interpretations suggest that the warning stimulus alerts the organism and so results in faster processing of either the sensory or motor components of the task. In this study, electromyography (EMG) was used to detect both covert and overt motor errors in a simple warned RT task. Results show that warning signals may trigger automatic motor activations that are likely to cause false alarms. Distribution analysis reveals that 77% of all errors detected with EMG are erroneous responses to the warning signal. Accordingly, we propose that movement triggering needs to be temporarily inhibited before the stimulus to prevent premature responses during the foreperiod. This proactive inhibition would be responsible for a paradoxical increase in RT for conditions with short foreperiods compared with control conditions in which no warning signal is presented. These results call for a reassessment of the theoretical framework used to interpret the effects of warning signals.

The internal structure of stopping as revealed by a sensory detection task

An important aspect of everyday behaviour is the ability to cancel a prepared movement. In Experiment 1, subjects prepared a response, and then either executed it in response to a subsequent Go signal, or cancelled the movement if a NoGo signal occurred. Subjects had to detect weak shocks, which were delivered after the signals on some trials. Results were compared to a prior instruction condition in which subjects knew at the start of the trial if they should move or not. We found that detection rates on move trials were lower than on non-move trials, consistent with sensory suppression. There was no difference between conditions in detection for move trials. However, detection rates for non-move trials were significantly lower in the NoGo than in the prior instruction condition, suggesting an element of sensory suppression associated with actions, which are prepared, but then inhibited before execution. In Experiment 2, the delay between the NoGo signal and shock was varied. Detection rates improved monotonically as the interval increased from 0 up to 200 ms. The recovery from sensory suppression offers a new way of measuring the processes triggered by a NoGo signal. Our results suggest that when a prepared movement is inhibited the dismantling of the sensory consequences of the motor command takes at least 200 ms.