Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances

Free-energy minimization in joint agent-environment systems: A niche construction perspective

The free-energy principle is an attempt to explain the structure of the agent and its brain, starting from the fact that an agent exists (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston et al., 2010). More specifically, it can be regarded as a systematic attempt to understand the 'fit' between an embodied agent and its niche, where the quantity of free-energy is a measure for the 'misfit' or disattunement (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014) between agent and environment. This paper offers a proof-of-principle simulation of niche construction under the free-energy principle. Agent-centered treatments have so far failed to address situations where environments change alongside agents, often due to the action of agents themselves. The key point of this paper is that the minimum of free-energy is not at a point in which the agent is maximally adapted to the statistics of a static environment, but can better be conceptualized an attracting manifold within the joint agent-environment state-space as a whole, which the system tends toward through mutual interaction. We will provide a general introduction to active inference and the free-energy principle. Using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), we then describe a canonical generative model and the ensuing update equations that minimize free-energy. We then apply these equations to simulations of foraging in an environment; in which an agent learns the most efficient path to a pre-specified location. In some of those simulations, unbeknownst to the agent, the 'desire paths' emerge as a function of the activity of the agent (i.e. niche construction occurs). We will show how, depending on the relative inertia of the environment and agent, the joint agent-environment system moves to different attracting sets of jointly minimized free-energy.

Effects of pitch spatial references on players' positioning and physical performances during football small-sided games

The aim of this study was to identify the effects of adding spatial references during football small-sided games in youth players' tactical and physical performance. Twelve under-15 players performed a Gk+ 6v6+ Gk game under two playing conditions: (i) without spatial references (CONTROL condition); (ii) with spatial references, by dividing equally the pitch into three corridors and three sectors (experimental situation, LINES). Players' positional data was used to compute time-motion and tactical-related variables. The results revealed that performance under LINES situation increased the regularity in the zones occupied (~14%, Cohen's d: 0.5; ±0.3; p = 0.003) and in the distance between teammates' dyads (~19%, 0.9; ±0.2; p < 0.001). Oppositely, LINES condition decreased the longitudinal synchronization of players' displacements (0.4; ±0.2; p = 0.002), players' average speed (0.5; ±0.3; p = 0.002) and distance covered at lower (0.9; ±0.3; p < 0.001) and moderate speed (0.5; ±0.3; p < 0.001). Adding spatial references seems to promote a more structured pattern of play and increase positional regularity. However, coaches should be aware that this constraint may decrease the synchronization between players. Overall, these findings may be generalized to most invasion team sports.

Homo faber Revisited: Postphenomenology and Material Engagement Theory

Humans, more than any other species, have been altering their paths of development by creating new material forms and by opening up to new possibilities of material engagement. That is, we become constituted through making and using technologies that shape our minds and extend our bodies. We make things which in turn make us. This ongoing dialectic has long been recognised from a deep-time perspective. It also seems natural in the present in view of the ways new materialities and digital ecologies increasingly envelop our everyday life and thinking. Still the basic idea that humans and things are co-constituted continues to challenge us, raising important questions about the place and meaning of materiality and technical change in human life and evolution. This paper bridging perspectives from postphenomenology and Material Engagement Theory (MET) is trying to attain better understanding about these matters. Our emphasis falls specifically on the human predisposition for technological embodiment and creativity. We re-approach the notion Homo faber in a way that, on the one hand, retains the power and value of this notion to signify the primacy of making or creative material engagement in human life and evolution and, on the other hand, reclaims the notion from any misleading connotations of human exceptionalism (other animals make and use tools). In particular, our use of the term Homo faber refers to the special place that this ability has in the evolution and development of our species. The difference that makes the difference is not just the fact that we make things. The difference that makes the difference is the recursive effect that the things that we make and our skills of making seem to have on human becoming. We argue that we are Homo faber not just because we make things but also because we are made by them.

Affordance Realization in Climbing: Learning and Transfer

The aim of this study was to investigate how the affordances of an indoor climbing wall changed for intermediate climbers following a period of practice during which hold orientation was manipulated within a learning and transfer protocol. The learning protocol consisted of four sessions, in which eight climbers randomly ascended three different routes of fixed absolute difficulty (5c on the French scale), as fluently as possible. All three routes were 10.3 m in height and composed of 20 hand-holds at the same locations on an artificial climbing wall; only hold orientations were altered: (i) a horizontal-edge route (H) was designed to afford horizontal hold grasping, (ii) a vertical-edge route (V) afforded vertical hold grasping, and (iii), a double-edge route (D) was designed to afford both horizontal and vertical hold grasping. Five inertial measurement units (IMU) (3D accelerometer, 3D gyroscope, 3D magnetometer) were attached to the hip, feet and forearms to analyze the vertical acceleration and direction (3D unitary vector) of each limb and hip in ambient space during the entire ascent. Segmentation and classification processes supported detection of movement and stationary phases for each IMU. Depending on whether limbs and/or hip were moving, a decision tree distinguished four states of behavior: stationary (absence of limb and hip motion), hold exploration (absence of hip motion but at least one limb in motion), hip movement (hip in motion but absence of limb motion) and global motion (hip in motion and at least one limb in motion). Results showed that with practice, the learners decreased the relative duration of hold exploration, suggesting that they improved affordance perception of hold grasp-ability. The number of performatory movements also decreased as performance increased during learning sessions, confirming that participants' climbing efficacy improved as a function of practice. Last, the results were more marked for the H route, while the D route led to longer relative stationary duration and a shorter relative duration of performatory states. Together, these findings emphasized the benefit of manipulating task constraints to promote safe exploration during learning, which is particularly relevant in extreme sports involving climbing tasks.

Behavioral Repertoire Influences the Rate and Nature of Learning in Climbing: Implications for Individualized Learning Design in Preparation for Extreme Sports Participation

Extreme climbing where participants perform while knowing that a simple mistake could result in death requires a skill set normally acquired in non-extreme environments. In the ecological dynamics approach to perception and action, skill acquisition involves a process where the existing repertoire of behavioral capabilities (or coordination repertoire) of a learner are destabilized and re-organized through practice—this process can expand the individuals affordance boundaries allowing the individual to explore new environments. Change in coordination repertoire has been observed in bi-manual coordination and postural regulation tasks, where individuals begin practice using one mode of coordination before transitioning to another, more effective, coordination mode during practice. However, individuals may also improve through practice without qualitatively reorganizing movement system components—they do not find a new mode of coordination. To explain these individual differences during learning (i.e., whether or not a new action is discovered), a key candidate is the existing coordination repertoire present prior to practice. In this study, the learning dynamics of body configuration patterns organized with respect to an indoor climbing surface were observed and the existing repertoire of coordination evaluated prior to and after practice. Specifically, performance outcomes and movement patterns of eight beginners were observed across 42 trials of practice over a 7-week period. A pre- and post-test scanning procedure was used to determine existing patterns of movement coordination and the emergence of new movement patterns after the practice period. Data suggested the presence of different learning dynamics by examining trial-to-trial performance in terms of jerk (an indicator of climbing fluency), at the individual level of analysis. The different learning dynamics (identified qualitatively) included: continuous improvement, sudden improvement, and no improvement. Individuals showing sudden improvement appeared to develop a new movement pattern of coordination in terms of their capability to climb using new body-wall orientations, whereas those showing continuous improvement did not, they simply improved performance. The individual who did not improve in terms of jerk, improved in terms of distance climbed. We discuss implications for determining and predicting how individual differences can shape learning dynamics and interact with metastable learning design.

Sources of Embodied Creativity: Interactivity and Ideation in Contact Improvisation

Drawing on a micro-phenomenological paradigm, we discuss Contact Improvisation (CI), where dancers explore potentials of intercorporeal weight sharing, kinesthesia, touch, and momentum. Our aim is to typologically discuss creativity related skills and the rich spectrum of creative resources CI dancers use. This spectrum begins with relatively idea-driven creation and ends with interactivity-centered, fully emergent creation: (1) Ideation internal to the mind, the focus of traditional creativity research, is either restricted to semi-independent dancing or remains schematic and thus open to dynamic specification under the partner’s influence. (2) Most frequently, CI creativity occurs in tightly coupled behavior and is radically emergent. This means that interpersonal synergies emerge without anybody’s prior design or planned coordination. The creative feat is interpersonally “distributed” over cascades of cross-scaffolding. Our micro-genetic data validate notions from dynamic systems theory such as interpersonal self-organization, although we criticize the theory for failing to explain where precisely this leaves skilled intentionality on the individuals’ part. Our answer is that dancers produce a stream of momentary micro-intentions that say “yes, and”, or “no, but” to short-lived micro-affordances, which allows both individuals to skillfully continue, elaborate, tweak, or redirect the collective movement dynamics. Both dancers can invite emergence as part of their playful exploration, while simultaneously bringing to bear global constraints, such as dance scores, and guide the collective dynamics with a set of specialized skills we shall term emergence management.

Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?)

Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it-the answer is yes. This was my response to a question I was asked to address in a recent AEON piece (https://aeon.co/essays/consciousness-is-not-a-thing-but-a-process-of-inference). What follows is based upon the notes for that essay, with a special focus on self-organization, self-evidencing and self-modeling. I will try to substantiate my (polemic) answer from the perspective of a physicist. In brief, the argument goes as follows: if we want to talk about creatures, like ourselves, then we have to identify the characteristic behaviors they must exhibit. This is fairly easy to do by noting that living systems return to a set of attracting states time and time again. Mathematically, this implies the existence of a Lyapunov function that turns out to be model evidence (i.e., self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (i.e., self-information) in information theory. This means that all biological processes can be construed as performing some form of inference, from evolution through to conscious processing. If this is the case, at what point do we invoke consciousness? The proposal on offer here is that the mind comes into being when self-evidencing has a temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, which grounds inferences about the consequences of my action. On this view, consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-evidencing consequences of what I could do.

A variational approach to niche construction

In evolutionary biology, niche construction is sometimes described as a genuine evolutionary process whereby organisms, through their activities and regulatory mechanisms, modify their environment such as to steer their own evolutionary trajectory, and that of other species. There is ongoing debate, however, on the extent to which niche construction ought to be considered a bona fide evolutionary force, on a par with natural selection. Recent formulations of the variational free-energy principle as applied to the life sciences describe the properties of living systems, and their selection in evolution, in terms of variational inference. We argue that niche construction can be described using a variational approach. We propose new arguments to support the niche construction perspective, and to extend the variational approach to niche construction to current perspectives in various scientific fields.

The Active Inference Approach to Ecological Perception: General Information Dynamics for Natural and Artificial Embodied Cognition

The emerging neurocomputational vision of humans as embodied, ecologically embedded, social agents—who shape and are shaped by their environment—offers a golden opportunity to revisit and revise ideas about the physical and information-theoretic underpinnings of life, mind, and consciousness itself. In particular, the active inference framework (AIF) makes it possible to bridge connections from computational neuroscience and robotics/AI to ecological psychology and phenomenology, revealing common underpinnings and overcoming key limitations. AIF opposes the mechanistic to the reductive, while staying fully grounded in a naturalistic and information-theoretic foundation, using the principle of free energy minimization. The latter provides a theoretical basis for a unified treatment of particles, organisms, and interactive machines, spanning from the inorganic to organic, non-life to life, and natural to artificial agents. We provide a brief introduction to AIF, then explore its implications for evolutionary theory, ecological psychology, embodied phenomenology, and robotics/AI research. We conclude the paper by considering implications for machine consciousness.

Answering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation

The free-energy principle (FEP) is a formal model of neuronal processes that is widely recognised in neuroscience as a unifying theory of the brain and biobehaviour. More recently, however, it has been extended beyond the brain to explain the dynamics of living systems, and their unique capacity to avoid decay. The aim of this review is to synthesise these advances with a meta-theoretical ontology of biological systems called variational neuroethology, which integrates the FEP with Tinbergen's four research questions to explain biological systems across spatial and temporal scales. We exemplify this framework by applying it to Homo sapiens, before translating variational neuroethology into a systematic research heuristic that supplies the biological, cognitive, and social sciences with a computationally tractable guide to discovery.

General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for 'higher' cognition

In this paper, we address the question of how an agent can guide its behavior with respect to aspects of the sociomaterial environment that are not sensorily present. A simple example is how an animal can relate to a food source while only sensing a pheromone, or how an agent can relate to beer, while only the refrigerator is directly sensorily present. Certain cases in which something is absent have been characterized by others as requiring 'higher' cognition. An example of this is how during the design process architects can let themselves be guided by the future behavior of visitors to an exhibit they are planning. The main question is what the sociomaterial environment and the skilled agent are like, such that they can relate to each other in these ways. We argue that this requires an account of the regularities in the environment. Introducing the notion of general ecological information, we will give an account of these regularities in terms of constraints, information and the form of life or ecological niche. In the first part of the paper, we will introduce the skilled intentionality framework as conceptualizing a special case of an animal's informational coupling with the environment namely skilled action. We will show how skilled agents can pick up on the regularities in the environment and let their behavior be guided by the practices in the form of life. This conceptual framework is important for radical embodied and enactive cognitive science, because it allows these increasingly influential paradigms to extend their reach to forms of 'higher' cognition such as long-term planning and imagination.

Taekwondo Fighting in Training Does Not Simulate the Affective and Cognitive Demands of Competition: Implications for Behavior and Transfer

Enhancing practice design is critical to facilitate transfer of learning. Considerable research has focused on the role of perceptual information in practice simulation, yet has neglected how affect and cognition are shaped by practice environments and whether this influences the fidelity of behavior (Headrick et al., 2015). This study filled this gap by examining the fidelity of individual (cognition, affect, and actions) and interpersonal behavior of 10 highly skilled Australian Taekwondo athletes fighting in training compared to competition. Interpersonal behavior was assessed by tracking location coordinates to analyze distance-time coordination tendencies of the fighter-fighter system. Individual actions were assessed through notational analysis and approximate entropy calculations of coordinate data to quantify the (un)predictability of movement displacement. Affect and cognition were assessed with mixed-methods that included perceptual scales measuring anxiety, arousal, and mental effort, and post-fight video-facilitated confrontational interviews to explore how affect and cognitions might differ. Quantitative differences were assessed with mixed models and dependent t-tests. Results reveal that individual and interpersonal behavior differed between training and competition. In training, individuals attacked less (d = 0.81, p < 0.05), initiated attacks from further away (d = -0.20, p < 0.05) and displayed more predictable movement trajectories (d = 0.84, p < 0.05). In training, fighters had lower anxiety (d = -1.26, p < 0.05), arousal (d = -1.07, p < 0.05), and mental effort (d = -0.77, p < 0.05). These results were accompanied by changes in interpersonal behavior, with larger interpersonal distances generated by the fighter-fighter system in training (d = 0.80, p < 0.05). Qualitative data revealed the emergence of cognitions and affect specific to the training environment, such as reductions in pressure, arousal, and mental challenge. Findings highlight the specificity of performer-environment interactions. Fighting in training affords reduced affective and cognitive demands and a decrease in action fidelity compared to competition. In addition to sampling information, representative practice needs to consider modeling the cognitions and affect of competition to enhance transfer.

Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition

We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical connectionism and 'simple' embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.

The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle

This work addresses the autonomous organization of biological systems. It does so by considering the boundaries of biological systems, from individual cells to Home sapiens, in terms of the presence of Markov blankets under the active inference scheme-a corollary of the free energy principle. A Markov blanket defines the boundaries of a system in a statistical sense. Here we consider how a collective of Markov blankets can self-assemble into a global system that itself has a Markov blanket; thereby providing an illustration of how autonomous systems can be understood as having layers of nested and self-sustaining boundaries. This allows us to show that: (i) any living system is a Markov blanketed system and (ii) the boundaries of such systems need not be co-extensive with the biophysical boundaries of a living organism. In other words, autonomous systems are hierarchically composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets-all the way down to individual cells, all the way up to you and me, and all the way out to include elements of the local environment.

Trusted strangers: social affordances for social cohesion

How could the paradigm shift towards enactive embodied cognitive science have implications for society and politics? Translating insights form enactive embodied cognitive science into ways of dealing with real-life issues is an important challenge. This paper focuses of the urgent societal issue of social cohesion, which is crucial in our increasingly segregated and polarized Western societies. We use Rietveld's (2016) philosophical Skilled Intentionality Framework and work by the multidisciplinary studio RAAAF to extend Lambros Malafouris' Material Engagement Theory (2013) to the social domain. How could a landscape of social affordances generate change in the behavioral patterns of people from different socio-cultural backgrounds? RAAAF is currently imagining and planning an ambitious intervention in the public domain that could really change existing socio-cultural practices and aims to contribute to social cohesion. An animation film it made introduces a landscape of social affordances. We will present and discuss this Trusted Strangers animation film, which is a thinking model for new public domain all over the world. Tha animation film visualizes how a well-designed landscape of social affordances could invite all sorts of interactions between people from different socio-cultural backgrounds.

Exploring the Multi-Layered Affordances of Composing and Performing Interactive Music with Responsive Technologies

The question motivating the work presented here, starting from a view of music as embodied and situated activity, is how can we account for the complexity of interactive music performance situations. These are situations in which human performers interact with responsive technologies, such as sensor-driven technology or sound synthesis affected by analysis of the performed sound signal. This requires investigating in detail the underlying mechanisms, but also providing a more holistic approach that does not lose track of the complex whole constituted by the interactions and relationships of composers, performers, audience, technologies, etc. The concept of affordances has frequently been invoked in musical research, which has seen a “bodily turn” in recent years, similar to the development of the embodied cognition approach in the cognitive sciences. We therefore begin by broadly delineating its usage in the cognitive sciences in general, and in music research in particular. We argue that what is still missing in the discourse on musical affordances is an encompassing theoretical framework incorporating the sociocultural dimensions that are fundamental to the situatedness and embodiment of interactive music performance and composition. We further argue that the cultural affordances framework, proposed by Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) and recently articulated further by Ramstead et al. (2016) in this journal, although not previously applied to music, constitutes a promising starting point. It captures and elucidates this complex web of relationships in terms of shared landscapes and individual fields of affordances. We illustrate this with examples foremost from the first author's artistic work as composer and performer of interactive music. This sheds new light on musical composition as a process of construction—and embodied mental simulation—of situations, guiding the performers' and audience's attention in shifting fields of affordances. More generally, we believe that the theoretical perspectives and concrete examples discussed in this paper help to elucidate how situations—and with them affordances—are dynamically constructed through the interactions of various mechanisms as people engage in embodied and situated activity.

Dynamics of tactical behaviour in association football when manipulating players' space of interaction

The analysis of positional data in association football allows the spatial distribution of players during matches to be described in order to improve the understanding of tactical-related constraints on the behavioural dynamics of players. The aim of this study was to identify how players' spatial restrictions affected the exploratory tactical behaviour and constrained the perceptual-motor workspace of players in possession of the ball, as well as inter-player passing interactions. Nineteen professional outfield male players were divided into two teams of 10 and 9 players, respectively. The game was played under three spatial constraints: a) players were not allowed to move out of their allocated zones, except for the player in possession of the ball; b) players were allowed to move to an adjacent zone, and; c) non-specific spatial constraints. Positional data was captured using a 5 Hz interpolated GPS tracking system and used to define the configuration states of players for each second in time. The configuration state comprised 37 categories derived from tactical actions, distance from the nearest opponent, distance from the target and movement speed. Notational analysis of players in possession of the ball allowed the mean time of ball possession and the probabilities of passing the ball between players to be calculated. The results revealed that the players' long-term exploratory behaviour decreased and their short-term exploration increased when restricting their space of interaction. Relaxing players' positional constraints seemed to increase the speed of ball flow dynamics. Allowing players to move to an adjacent sub-area increased the probabilities of interaction with the full-back during play build-up. The instability of the coordinative state defined by being free from opponents when players had the ball possession was an invariant feature under all three task constraints. By allowing players to move to adjacent sub-areas, the coordinative state became highly unstable when the distance from the target decreased. Ball location relative to the scoring zone and interpersonal distance constitute key environmental information that constrains the players' coordinative behaviour. Based on our results, dynamic overlap is presented as a good option to capture tactical performance. Moreover, the selected collective (i.e. relational) variables would allow coaches to identify the effects of training drills on teams and players' behaviour. More research is needed considering these type variables to understand how the manipulation of constraints induce a more stable or flexible dynamical structure of tactical behaviour.

Embodiment and Schizophrenia: A Review of Implications and Applications

In recent decades, embodiment has become an influential concept in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Embodiment denotes the study of the reciprocal (causal) relationships between mind and body, with the mind not only affecting the body but also vice versa. Embodied cognition comes to the fore in sensorimotor coupling, predictive coding, and nonverbal behavior. Additionally, the embodiment of the mind constitutes the basis of social interaction and communication, as evident in research on nonverbal synchrony and mimicry. These theoretical and empirical developments portend a range of implications for schizophrenia research and treatment. Sensorimotor dysfunctions are closely associated with affective and psychotic psychopathology, leading to altered timing in the processing of stimuli and to disordered appraisals of the environment. Problems of social cognition may be newly viewed as disordered embodied communication. The embodiment perspective suggests novel treatment strategies through psychotherapy and body-oriented interventions, and may ultimately provide biomarkers for diagnosis.

Situating the Embodied Mind in a Landscape of Standing Affordances for Living Without Chairs: Materializing a Philosophical Worldview

Sitting too much is unhealthy, but a widespread habit in many societies. Realizing behavioral change in this area is hard. Our societies promote being seated via the way its places are structured: they are filled with chairs for example. How can we make healthier environments that invite people to move around more? This article shows how philosophical research in the area of embodied/enactive cognitive science let to a built vision for the office of the future, of 2025. Multidisciplinary studio RAAAF [Rietveld Architecture-Art-Affordances] and visual artist Barbara Visser built this world without chairs, titled The End of Sitting. This large rock-like landscape integrates many affordances for standing. Affordances are the possibilities for action provided by the environment. This landscape of standing affordances allows people to work standing while being supported by the material structure of the environment. This unorthodox working landscape is both an enactive art installation and the materialization of a philosophical worldview that understands people as embodied minds situated in a landscape of affordances. It stimulates reflection on the way built environments can naturally invite more active and healthy behavior.

Designing Affordances for Health-Enhancing Physical Activity and Exercise in Sedentary Individuals

Ideas in ecological dynamics have profound implications for designing environments that offer opportunities for physical activity (PA), exercise and play in sedentary individuals. They imply how exercise scientists, health professionals, planners, designers, engineers and psychologists can collaborate in co-designing environments and playscapes that facilitate PA and exercise behaviours in different population subgroups. Here, we discuss how concepts in ecological dynamics emphasise the person-environment scale of analysis, indicating how PA environments might be (re)designed into qualitative regions of functional significance (affordances) that invite health-enhancing behaviours according to individuals' capacities and skills (effectivities).

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing ("prediction-signal", "error-signal", "prior", "likelihood", and "posterior probability"). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the 'representation wars'; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak's IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.

Foregrounding Sociomaterial Practice in Our Understanding of Affordances: The Skilled Intentionality Framework

Social coordination and affordance perception always take part in concrete situations in real life. Nonetheless, the different fields of ecological psychology studying these phenomena do not seem to make this situated nature an object of study. To integrate both fields and extend the reach of the ecological approach, we introduce the Skilled Intentionality Framework that situates both social coordination and affordance perception within the human form of life and its rich landscape of affordances. We argue that in the human form of life the social and the material are intertwined and best understood as sociomateriality. Taking the form of life as our starting point foregrounds sociomateriality in each perspective we take on engaging with affordances. Using ethnographical examples we show how sociomateriality shows up from three different perspectives we take on affordances in a real-life situation. One perspective shows us a landscape of affordances that the sociomaterial environment offers. Zooming in on this landscape to the perspective of a local observer, we can focus on an individual coordinating with affordances offered by things and other people situated in this landscape. Finally, viewed from within this unfolding activity, we arrive at the person's lived perspective: a field of relevant affordances solicits activity. The Skilled Intentionality Framework offers a way of integrating social coordination and affordance theory by drawing attention to these complementary perspectives. We end by showing a real-life example from the practice of architecture that suggests how this situated view that foregrounds sociomateriality can extend the scope of ecological psychology to forms of so-called "higher" cognition.

From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications-with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation-to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of 'body-representations', and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal 'representations' arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind.

Emergence of Exploratory, Technical and Tactical Behavior in Small-Sided Soccer Games when Manipulating the Number of Teammates and Opponents

The effects that different constraints have on the exploratory behavior, measured by the variety and quantity of different responses within a game situation, is of the utmost importance for successful performance in team sports. The aim of this study was to determine how the number of teammates and opponents affects the exploratory behavior of both professional and amateur players in small-sided soccer games. Twenty-two professional (age 25.6 ± 4.9 years) and 22 amateur (age 23.1 ± 0.7 years) male soccer players played three small-sided game formats (4 vs. 3, 4 vs. 5, and 4 vs. 7). These trials were video-recorded and a systematic observation instrument was used to notate the actions, which were subsequently analyzed by means of a principal component analysis and the dynamic overlap order parameter (measure to identify the rate and breadth of exploratory behavior on different time scales). Results revealed that a higher the number of opponents required for more frequent ball controls. Moreover, with a higher number of teammates, there were more defensive actions focused on protecting the goal, with more players balancing. In relation to attack, an increase in the number of opponents produced a decrease in passing, driving and controlling actions, while an increase in the number of teammates led to more time being spent in attacking situations. A numerical advantage led to less exploratory behavior, an effect that was especially clear when playing within a team of seven players against four opponents. All teams showed strong effects of the number of teammates on the exploratory behavior when comparing 5 vs 7 or 3 vs 7 teammates. These results seem to be independent of the players' level.

Methodological Problems on the Way to Integrative Human Neuroscience

Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary effort to understand the structures and functions of the brain and brain-mind relations. This effort results in an increasing amount of data, generated by sophisticated technologies. However, these data enhance our descriptive knowledge, rather than improve our understanding of brain functions. This is caused by methodological gaps both within and between subdisciplines constituting neuroscience, and the atomistic approach that limits the study of macro- and mesoscopic issues. Whole-brain measurement technologies do not resolve these issues, but rather aggravate them by the complexity problem. The present article is devoted to methodological and epistemic problems that obstruct the development of human neuroscience. We neither discuss ontological questions (e.g., the nature of the mind) nor review data, except when it is necessary to demonstrate a methodological issue. As regards intradisciplinary methodological problems, we concentrate on those within neurobiology (e.g., the gap between electrical and chemical approaches to neurophysiological processes) and psychology (missing theoretical concepts). As regards interdisciplinary problems, we suggest that core disciplines of neuroscience can be integrated using systemic concepts that also entail human-environment relations. We emphasize the necessity of a meta-discussion that should entail a closer cooperation with philosophy as a discipline of systematic reflection. The atomistic reduction should be complemented by the explicit consideration of the embodiedness of the brain and the embeddedness of humans. The discussion is aimed at the development of an explicit methodology of integrative human neuroscience, which will not only link different fields and levels, but also help in understanding clinical phenomena.

The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal-environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

Soft-assembled Multilevel Dynamics of Tactical Behaviors in Soccer

This study aimed to identify the tactical patterns and the timescales of variables during a soccer match, allowing understanding the multilevel organization of tactical behaviors, and to determine the similarity of patterns performed by different groups of teammates during the first and second halves. Positional data from 20 professional male soccer players from the same team were collected using high frequency global positioning systems (5 Hz). Twenty-nine categories of tactical behaviors were determined from eight positioning-derived variables creating multivariate binary (Boolean) time-series matrices. Hierarchical principal component analysis (PCA) was used to identify the multilevel structure of tactical behaviors. The sequential reduction of each set level of principal components revealed a sole principal component as the slowest collective variable, forming the global basin of attraction of tactical patterns during each half of the match. In addition, the mean dwell time of each positioning-derived variable helped to understand the multilevel organization of collective tactical behavior during a soccer match. This approach warrants further investigations to analyze the influence of task constraints on the emergence of tactical behavior. Furthermore, PCA can help coaches to design representative training tasks according to those tactical patterns captured during match competitions and to compare them depending on situational variables.

Sport science integration: An evolutionary synthesis

The aim of the paper is to point out one way of integrating the supposedly incommensurate disciplines investigated in sports science. General, common principles can be found among apparently unrelated disciplines when the focus is put on the dynamics of sports-related phenomena. Dynamical systems approaches that have recently changed research in biological and social sciences among others, offer key concepts to create a common pluricontextual language in sport science. This common language, far from being homogenising, offers key synthesis between diverse fields, respecting and enabling the theoretical and experimental pluralism. It forms a softly integrated sports science characterised by a basic dynamic explanatory backbone as well as context-dependent theoretical flexibility. After defining the dynamic integration in living systems, unable to be captured by structural static approaches, we show the commonalities between the diversity of processes existing on different levels and time scales in biological and social entities. We justify our interpretation by drawing on some recent scientific contributions that use the same general principles and concepts, and diverse methods and techniques of data analysis, to study different types of phenomena in diverse disciplines. We show how the introduction of the dynamic framework in sport science has started to blur the boundaries between physiology, biomechanics, psychology, phenomenology and sociology. The advantages and difficulties of sport science integration and its consequences in research are also discussed.

Cultural Affordances: Scaffolding Local Worlds Through Shared Intentionality and Regimes of Attention

In this paper we outline a framework for the study of the mechanisms involved in the engagement of human agents with cultural affordances. Our aim is to better understand how culture and context interact with human biology to shape human behavior, cognition, and experience. We attempt to integrate several related approaches in the study of the embodied, cognitive, and affective substrates of sociality and culture and the sociocultural scaffolding of experience. The integrative framework we propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to provide (i) an expanded concept of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural forms of life, and (ii) a multilevel account of the socioculturally scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the transmission of affordances in patterned sociocultural practices and regimes of shared attention. This framework provides an account of how cultural content and normative practices are built on a foundation of contentless basic mental processes that acquire content through immersive participation of the agent in social practices that regulate joint attention and shared intentionality.

The Primacy of Skilled Intentionality: on Hutto & Satne's the Natural Origins of Content

Following a brief reconstruction of Hutto & Satne's paper we focus our critical comments on two issues. First we take up H&S's claim that a non-representational form of ur-intentionality exists that performs essential work in setting the scene for content-involving forms of intentionality. We will take issue with the characterisation that H&S give of this non-representational form of intentionality. Part of our commentary will therefore be aimed at motivating an alternative account of how there can be intentionality without mental content, which we have called skilled intentionality. Skilled intentionality is the individual's selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances. A second issue we take up concerns the distinction between ur-intentionality and content-involving intentionality. We will argue that our notion of skilled intentionality as it is found in humans cuts across these two categories. Instead of distinguishing between different forms of intentionality we recommend focusing on how skilled intentionality takes different forms in different forms of life.

Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the Lived Experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients: In-Depth Interviews with 18 Patients

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes that OCD patients experience during DBS treatment. For that purpose we conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 OCD patients. In this paper, we present the results from this qualitative study. We list the changes grouped in four domains: with regard to (a) person, (b) (social) world, (c) characteristics of person-world interactions, and (d) existential stance. We subsequently provide an interpretation of these results. In particular, we suggest that many of these changes can be seen as different expressions of the same process; namely that the experience of anxiety and tension gives way to an increased basic trust and increased reliance on one's abilities. We then discuss the clinical implications of our findings, especially with regard to properly informing patients of what they can expect from treatment, the usefulness of including CBT in treatment, and the limitations of current measures of treatment success. We end by making several concrete suggestions for further research.

Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case for direct perception

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasello's, we present an alternative DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agent's field of affordances. Coordination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another person's actions influence one's own perceived field of affordances.

The embodied brain: towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience

In this programmatic paper we explain why a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience is needed. We argue for such a claim based on problems that have arisen in cognitive neuroscience for the project of localizing function to specific brain structures. The problems come from research concerned with functional and structural connectivity that strongly suggests that the function a brain region serves is dynamic, and changes over time. We argue that in order to determine the function of a specific brain area, neuroscientists need to zoom out and look at the larger organism-environment system. We therefore argue that instead of looking to cognitive psychology for an analysis of psychological functions, cognitive neuroscience should look to an ecological dynamical psychology. A second aim of our paper is to develop an account of embodied cognition based on the inseparability of cognitive and emotional processing in the brain. We argue that emotions are best understood in terms of action readiness (Frijda, 1986, 2007) in the context of the organism's ongoing skillful engagement with the environment (Rietveld, 2008; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015, forthcoming). States of action readiness involve the whole living body of the organism, and are elicited by possibilities for action in the environment that matter to the organism. Since emotion and cognition are inseparable processes in the brain it follows that what is true of emotion is also true of cognition. Cognitive processes are likewise processes taking place in the whole living body of an organism as it engages with relevant possibilities for action.

Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the Lived Experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients: In-Depth Interviews with 18 Patients

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes that OCD patients experience during DBS treatment. For that purpose we conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 OCD patients. In this paper, we present the results from this qualitative study. We list the changes grouped in four domains: with regard to (a) person, (b) (social) world, (c) characteristics of person-world interactions, and (d) existential stance. We subsequently provide an interpretation of these results. In particular, we suggest that many of these changes can be seen as different expressions of the same process; namely that the experience of anxiety and tension gives way to an increased basic trust and increased reliance on one's abilities. We then discuss the clinical implications of our findings, especially with regard to properly informing patients of what they can expect from treatment, the usefulness of including CBT in treatment, and the limitations of current measures of treatment success. We end by making several concrete suggestions for further research.