Event-related brain potential correlates of visual awareness

Answering questions about consciousness by modeling perception as covert behavior

Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and (ii) the relationship between neural activity and first-person, subjective experience. Here, possible answers are sketched for both of these, by means of a model-based analysis of what is required for one to admit having a conscious experience. To this end, a model is proposed that allows reasoning, albeit necessarily in a simplistic manner, about all of the so called “easy problems” of consciousness, from discrimination of stimuli to control of behavior and language. First, it is argued that current neuroscientific knowledge supports the view of perception and action selection as two examples of the same basic phenomenon, such that one can meaningfully refer to neuronal activations involved in perception as covert behavior. Building on existing neuroscientific and psychological models, a narrative behavior model is proposed, outlining how the brain selects covert (and sometimes overt) behaviors to construct a complex, multi-level narrative about what it is like to be the individual in question. It is hypothesized that we tend to admit a conscious experience of X if, at the time of judging consciousness, we find ourselves acceptably capable of performing narrative behavior describing X. It is argued that the proposed account reconciles seemingly conflicting empirical results, previously presented as evidence for competing theories of consciousness, and suggests that well-defined, experiment-independent NCCs are unlikely to exist. Finally, an analysis is made of what the modeled narrative behavior machinery is and is not capable of. It is discussed how an organism endowed with such a machinery could, from its first-person perspective, come to adopt notions such as “subjective experience,” and of there being “hard problems,” and “explanatory gaps” to be addressed in order to understand consciousness.

Individual variability in perceptual switching behaviour is associated with reversal-related EEG modulations

OBJECTIVE

High individual variability is frequently observed in multistable perception, but few ERP studies have considered this factor. The present investigation evaluates the relation between individual perceptual switching and the modulation of reversal-related ERP components.

METHODS

We used a bistable perception paradigm (Kornmeier and Bach, 2004), consisting of briefly flashed grid of nine Necker cubes, interspersed by a blank screen. The subject's task was to compare the previous stimulus with the latter one. The number of reversal perceptions was used as a measure of individual perceptual switching behaviour.

RESULTS

As in previously reported findings, Reversal Negativity (RN, 180-300 ms) and Late Positive Component (LPC, 350-600 ms) were identified in response to reversal perception. In terms of individual differences, higher reversals were associated with reduced negativity of the RN and enhanced positivity of the LPC.

CONCLUSION

The timing of the present results supports the hypothesis that individual variability in perceptual reversal is associated with different neural activations at later stage of processing, when the neural representation of ambiguous figure must be internalized to produce an appropriate response/behaviour.

SIGNIFICANCE

Multistable perception can reveal crucial mechanisms underlying individual perceptual re-organization when inconsistent or incoherent stimuli come from the environment.

Direct behavioral and neural evidence for an offset-triggered conscious perception

Many previous theories of perceptual awareness assume that a conscious representation of a stimulus is created from sensory information carried by an onset (appearance) of the stimulus. In contrast, here we provide behavioral and neural evidence for a new phenomenon in which conscious perception is directly triggered by an offset (disappearance) of a stimulus. When a stimulus made invisible by inter-ocular suppression physically disappeared from a screen, subjects reported an appearance (not disappearance) of that stimulus, correctly reporting a color of the disappeared stimulus. Measurements of brain activity further confirmed that the physical offset of an invisible stimulus evoked neural activity reflecting conscious perception of that stimulus. Those results indicate a new role of a stimulus offset to facilitate (rather than inhibit) an emergence of consciousness.

Characterizing an ERP correlate of intentions understanding using a sequential comic strips paradigm

Chronometric properties of theory of mind and intentions understanding more specifically are well documented. Notably, it was demonstrated using magnetoencephalography that the brain regions involved were recruited as soon as 200 ms post-stimulus. We used event-related potentials (ERPs) to characterize an electrophysiological marker of attribution of intentions. We also explored the robustness of this ERP signature under two conditions corresponding to either explicit instructions to focus on others' intentions or implicit instructions with no reference to mental states. Two matched groups of 16 healthy volunteers each received either explicit or no instructions about intentions and performed a nonverbal attribution of intentions task based on sequential four-image comic strips depicting either intentional or physical causality. A bilateral posterior positive component, ranging from 250 to 650 ms post-stimulus, showed greater amplitude in intentional than in physical condition (the intention ERP effect). This effect occurs during the third image only, suggesting that it reflects the integration of information depicted in the third image to the contextual cues given by the first two. The intention effect was similar in the two groups of subjects. Overall, our results identify a clear ERP marker of the first hundreds of milliseconds of intentions processing probably related to a contextual integrative mechanism and suggest its robustness by showing its blindness to task demands manipulation.

Making sense: Dopamine activates conscious self-monitoring through medial prefrontal cortex

When experiences become meaningful to the self, they are linked to synchronous activity in a paralimbic network of self-awareness and dopaminergic activity. This network includes medial prefrontal and medial parietal/posterior cingulate cortices, where transcranial magnetic stimulation may transiently impair self-awareness. Conversely, we hypothesize that dopaminergic stimulation may improve self-awareness and metacognition (i.e., the ability of the brain to consciously monitor its own cognitive processes). Here, we demonstrate improved noetic (conscious) metacognition by oral administration of 100 mg dopamine in minimal self-awareness. In a separate experiment with extended self-awareness dopamine improved the retrieval accuracy of memories of self-judgment (autonoetic, i.e., explicitly self-conscious) metacognition. Concomitantly, magnetoencephalography (MEG) showed increased amplitudes of oscillations (power) preferentially in the medial prefrontal cortex. Given that electromagnetic activity in this region is instrumental in self-awareness, this explains the specific effect of dopamine on explicit self-awareness and autonoetic metacognition.

Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for fast emergence of visual consciousness

A fundamental unsettled dispute concerns how fast the brain generates subjective visual experiences. Both early visual cortical activation and later activity in fronto-parietal global neuronal workspace correlate with conscious vision, but resolving which of the correlates causally triggers conscious vision has proved a methodological impasse. We show that participants can report whether or not they consciously perceived a stimulus in just over 200 ms. These fast consciousness reports were extremely reliable, and did not include reflexive, unconscious responses. The neural events that causally generate conscious vision must have occurred before these behavioral reports. Analyses on single-trial neural correlates of consciousness revealed that the late cortical processing in fronto-parietal global neuronal workspace (∼300 ms) started after the fastest consciousness reports, ruling out the possibility that this late activity directly reflects the emergence of visual consciousness. The consciousness reports were preceded by a negative amplitude difference (∼160-220 ms) that spread from occipital to frontal cortex, suggesting that this correlate underlies the emergence of conscious vision.

Submillisecond unmasked subliminal visual stimuli evoke electrical brain responses

Subliminal perception is strongly associated to the processing of meaningful or emotional information and has mostly been studied using visual masking. In this study, we used high density 256-channel EEG coupled with an liquid crystal display (LCD) tachistoscope to characterize the spatio-temporal dynamics of the brain response to visual checkerboard stimuli (Experiment 1) or blank stimuli (Experiment 2) presented without a mask for 1 ms (visible), 500 µs (partially visible), and 250 µs (subliminal) by applying time-wise, assumption-free nonparametric randomization statistics on the strength and on the topography of high-density scalp-recorded electric field. Stimulus visibility was assessed in a third separate behavioral experiment. Results revealed that unmasked checkerboards presented subliminally for 250 µs evoked weak but detectable visual evoked potential (VEP) responses. When the checkerboards were replaced by blank stimuli, there was no evidence for the presence of an evoked response anymore. Furthermore, the checkerboard VEPs were modulated topographically between 243 and 296 ms post-stimulus onset as a function of stimulus duration, indicative of the engagement of distinct configuration of active brain networks. A distributed electrical source analysis localized this modulation within the right superior parietal lobule near the precuneus. These results show the presence of a brain response to submillisecond unmasked subliminal visual stimuli independently of their emotional saliency or meaningfulness and opens an avenue for new investigations of subliminal stimulation without using visual masking.

Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes responsible for accessing and reporting one's percept are difficult to distinguish from those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012) and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency posterior ERP negativity (~200–240 ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report (aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b (~380–480 ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240 ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based attention.

Auditory event-related potentials associated with perceptual reversals of bistable pitch motion

Previous event-related potential (ERP) experiments have consistently identified two components associated with perceptual transitions of bistable visual stimuli, the "reversal negativity" (RN) and the "late positive complex" (LPC). The RN (~200 ms post-stimulus, bilateral occipital-parietal distribution) is thought to reflect transitions between neural representations that form the moment-to-moment contents of conscious perception, while the LPC (~400 ms, central-parietal) is considered an index of post-perceptual processing related to accessing and reporting one's percept. To explore the generality of these components across sensory modalities, the present experiment utilized a novel bistable auditory stimulus. Pairs of complex tones with ambiguous pitch relationships were presented sequentially while subjects reported whether they perceived the tone pairs as ascending or descending in pitch. ERPs elicited by the tones were compared according to whether perceived pitch motion changed direction or remained the same across successive trials. An auditory reversal negativity (aRN) component was evident at ~170 ms post-stimulus over bilateral fronto-central scalp locations. An auditory LPC component (aLPC) was evident at subsequent latencies (~350 ms, fronto-central distribution). These two components may be auditory analogs of the visual RN and LPC, suggesting functionally equivalent but anatomically distinct processes in auditory vs. visual bistable perception.

Gamma band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness

A primary goal in cognitive neuroscience is to identify neural correlates of conscious perception (NCC). By contrasting conditions in which subjects are aware versus unaware of identical visual stimuli, a number of candidate NCCs have emerged; among them are induced gamma band activity in the EEG and the P3 event-related potential. In most previous studies, however, the critical stimuli were always directly relevant to the subjects' task, such that aware versus unaware contrasts may well have included differences in post-perceptual processing in addition to differences in conscious perception per se. Here, in a series of EEG experiments, visual awareness and task relevance were manipulated independently. Induced gamma activity and the P3 were absent for task-irrelevant stimuli regardless of whether subjects were aware of such stimuli. For task-relevant stimuli, gamma and the P3 were robust and dissociable, indicating that each reflects distinct post-perceptual processes necessary for carrying-out the task but not for consciously perceiving the stimuli. Overall, this pattern of results challenges a number of previous proposals linking gamma band activity and the P3 to conscious perception.

Distinct MEG correlates of conscious experience, perceptual reversals and stabilization during binocular rivalry

During binocular rivalry, visual perception alternates spontaneously between two different monocular images. Such perceptual reversals are slowed or halted if stimuli are presented intermittently with inter-stimulus intervals larger than ~ 400 ms — a phenomenon called stabilization. Often, the neural correlates of reversal and stabilization are studied separately, and both phenomena in turn are studied separately from the neural correlates of conscious perception. To distinguish the neural correlates of perceptual content, stabilization and reversal, we recorded MEG signals associated with each in the same group of healthy humans observing repeated trials of intermittent presentation of a dichoptic stimulus. Perceptual content correlated mainly with modulation of stimulus-specific activity in occipital/temporal areas 150–270 ms after stimulus onset, possibly reflecting inhibition of the neural populations representing the suppressed image. Stability of perception reflected a gradual build-up of this modulation across at least 10 trials and was also, to some extent, associated with parietal activity 40–90 ms and 220–270 ms after stimulus onset. Perceptual reversals, in contrast, were associated with parietal (150–270 ms) and temporal (150–210 ms) activity on the trial before the reversal and a gradual change in perception-specific activity in occipital (150–270 ms) and temporal (220–420 ms) areas across at least 10 trials leading up to a reversal. Mechanistically, these findings suggest that stability of perception during rivalry is maintained by modulation of activity related to the two monocular images, and gradual adaptation of neuronal populations leads to instability that is eventually resolved by signals from parietal and late sensory cortices.

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Neural correlates of perception, reversals and stabilization were examined.

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Stability of perception is maintained by modulation stimulus-specific activity.

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Gradual adaptation of this modulation leads to a state of instability.

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Instability is resolved by parietal/temporal sources causing perceptual reversals.

The graded and dichotomous nature of visual awareness

Is our visual experience of the world graded or dichotomous? Opposite pre-theoretical intuitions apply in different cases. For instance, when looking at a scene, one has a distinct sense that our experience has a graded character: one cannot say that there is no experience of contents that fall outside the focus of attention, but one cannot say that there is full awareness of such contents either. By contrast, when performing a visual detection task, our sense of having perceived the stimulus or not exhibits a more dichotomous character. Such issues have recently been the object of intense debate because different theoretical frameworks make different predictions about the graded versus dichotomous character of consciousness. Here, we review both relevant empirical findings as well as the associated theories (i.e. local recurrent processing versus global neural workspace theory). Next, we attempt to reconcile such contradictory theories by suggesting that level of processing is an often-ignored but highly relevant dimension through which we can cast a novel look at existing empirical findings. Thus, using a range of different stimuli, tasks and subjective scales, we show that processing low-level, non-semantic content results in graded visual experience, whereas processing high-level semantic content is experienced in a more dichotomous manner. We close by comparing our perspective with existing proposals, focusing in particular on the partial awareness hypothesis.

Electrophysiological correlates of the efficient detection of emotional facial expressions

Behavioral studies have shown that emotional facial expressions are detected more rapidly and accurately than are neutral expressions. However, the neural mechanism underlying this efficient detection has remained unclear. To investigate this mechanism, we measured event-related potentials (ERPs) during a visual search task in which participants detected the normal emotional facial expressions of anger and happiness or their control stimuli, termed "anti-expressions," within crowds of neutral expressions. The anti-expressions, which were created using a morphing technique that produced changes equivalent to those in the normal emotional facial expressions compared with the neutral facial expressions, were most frequently recognized as emotionally neutral. Behaviorally, normal expressions were detected faster and more accurately and were rated as more emotionally arousing than were the anti-expressions. Regarding ERPs, the normal expressions elicited larger early posterior negativity (EPN) at 200-400ms compared with anti-expressions. Furthermore, larger EPN was related to faster and more accurate detection and higher emotional arousal. These data suggest that the efficient detection of emotional facial expressions is implemented via enhanced activation of the posterior visual cortices at 200-400ms based on their emotional significance.

Magnetoencephalographic activity related to conscious perception is stable within individuals across years but not between individuals

Studies indicate that conscious perception is related to changes in neural activity within a time window that varies between 130 and 320 msec after stimulus presentation, yet it is not known whether such neural correlates of conscious perception are stable across time. Here, we examined the generalization across time within individuals and across different individuals. We trained classification algorithms to decode conscious perception from neural activity recorded during binocular rivalry using magnetoencephalography (MEG). The classifiers were then used to predict the perception of the same participants during different recording sessions either days or years later as well as between different participants. No drop in decoding accuracy was observed when decoding across years compared with days, whereas a large drop in decoding accuracy was found for between-participant decoding. Furthermore, underlying percept-specific MEG signals remained stable in terms of latency, amplitude, and sources within participants across years, whereas differences were found in all of these domains between individuals. Our findings demonstrate that the neural correlates of conscious perception are stable across years for adults, but differ across individuals. Moreover, the study validates decoding based on MEG data as a method for further studies of correlations between individual differences in perceptual contents and between-participant decoding accuracies.

Electrophysiological evidence for phenomenal consciousness

Abstract Recent evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) lends support to two central theses in Lamme's theory. The earliest ERP correlate of visual consciousness appears over posterior visual cortex around 100-200 ms after stimulus onset. Its scalp topography and time window are consistent with recurrent processing in the visual cortex. This electrophysiological correlate of visual consciousness is mostly independent of later ERPs reflecting selective attention and working memory functions. Overall, the ERP evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness of a visual stimulus emerges earlier than access consciousness, and that attention and awareness are served by distinct neural processes.

Recurrent processing enhances visual awareness but is not necessary for fast categorization of natural scenes

Humans are rapid in categorizing natural scenes. Electrophysiological recordings reveal that scenes containing animals can be categorized within 150 msec, which has been interpreted to indicate that feedforward flow of information from V1 to higher visual areas is sufficient for visual categorization. However, recent studies suggest that recurrent interactions between higher and lower levels in the visual hierarchy may also be involved in categorization. To clarify the role of recurrent processing in scene categorization, we recorded EEG and manipulated recurrent processing with object substitution masking while the participants performed a go/no-go animal/nonanimal categorization task. The quality of visual awareness was measured with a perceptual awareness scale after each trial. Masking reduced the clarity of perceptual awareness, slowed down categorization speed for scenes that were not clearly perceived, and reduced the electrophysiological difference elicited by animal and nonanimal scenes after 150 msec. The results imply that recurrent processes enhance the resolution of conscious representations and thus support categorization of stimuli that are difficult to categorize on the basis of the coarse feedforward representations alone.

Early visual responses predict conscious face perception within and between subjects during binocular rivalry

Previous studies indicate that conscious face perception may be related to neural activity in a large time window around 170-800 msec after stimulus presentation, yet in the majority of these studies changes in conscious experience are confounded with changes in physical stimulation. Using multivariate classification on MEG data recorded when participants reported changes in conscious perception evoked by binocular rivalry between a face and a grating, we showed that only MEG signals in the 120-320 msec time range, peaking at the M170 around 180 msec and the P2m at around 260 msec, reliably predicted conscious experience. Conscious perception could not only be decoded significantly better than chance from the sensors that showed the largest average difference, as previous studies suggest, but also from patterns of activity across groups of occipital sensors that individually were unable to predict perception better than chance. In addition, source space analyses showed that sources in the early and late visual system predicted conscious perception more accurately than frontal and parietal sites, although conscious perception could also be decoded there. Finally, the patterns of neural activity associated with conscious face perception generalized from one participant to another around the times of maximum prediction accuracy. Our work thus demonstrates that the neural correlates of particular conscious contents (here, faces) are highly consistent in time and space within individuals and that these correlates are shared to some extent between individuals.

Visual evoked potentials for attentional gating in a brain-computer interface

For synchronous brain-computer interface (BCI) paradigms tasks that utilize visual cues to direct the user, the neural signals extracted by the computer are representative of voluntary modulation as well as evoked responses. For these paradigms, the evoked potential is often overlooked as a source of artifact. In this paper, we put forth the hypothesis that cue priming, as a mechanism for attentional gating, is predictive of motor imagery performance, and thus a viable option for self-paced (asynchronous) BCI applications. We approximate attention by the amplitude features of visually evoked potentials (VEP)s found using two methods: trial matching to an average VEP template, and component matching to a VEP template defined using independent component analysis (ICA). Templates were used to rank trials that display high vs. low levels of fixation. Our results show that subject fixation, measured by VEP response, fails as a predictor of successful motor-imagery task completion. The implications for the BCI community and the possibilities for alternative cueing methods are given in the conclusions.

Conscious processing: implications for general anesthesia

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Can a general anesthetic binding to its membrane receptors alter global brain activity to cause loss of consciousness?

RECENT FINDINGS

The identification of the neurobiological mechanisms of conscious processing in awake patients that are altered by general anesthetics and the atomic structure of the general anesthetic's binding site.

SUMMARY

An important feature of general anesthesia is a preferential inhibition of global feedback connectivity when general anesthetics bind to allosteric sites of gamma-aminobutyric acid receptors present in the cerebral cortex.

Activity in the lateral occipital cortex between 200 and 300 ms distinguishes between physically identical seen and unseen stimuli

There is converging evidence that electrophysiological responses over posterior cortical regions in the 200–300 ms range distinguish between physically identical stimuli that reach consciousness or remain unseen. Here, we attempt at determining the sources of this awareness-related activity using magneto-encephalographic (MEG). Fourteen subjects were presented with faint colored gratings at threshold for contrast and reported on each trial whether the grating was seen or unseen. Subjects were primed with a color cue that could be congruent or incongruent with the color of the grating, to probe to what extent two co-localized features (color and orientation) would be bound in consciousness. The contrast between neural responses to seen and unseen physically identical gratings revealed a sustained posterior difference between 190 and 350 ms, thereby replicating prior studies. We further show that the main sources of the awareness-related activity were localized bilaterally on the lateral convexity of the occipito-temporal region, in the Lateral Occipital (LO) complex, as well as in the right posterior infero-temporal region. No activity differentiating seen and unseen trials could be observed in frontal or parietal regions in this latency range, even at lower threshold. Color congruency did not improve grating's detection, and the awareness-related activity was independent from color congruency. However, at the neural level, color congruency was processed differently in grating-present and grating-absent trials. The pattern of results suggests the existence of a neural process of color congruency engaging left parietal regions that is affected by the mere presence of another feature, whether this feature reaches consciousness or not. Altogether, our results reveal an occipital source of visual awareness insensitive to color congruency, and a simultaneous parietal source not engaged in visual awareness, but sensitive to the manipulation of co-localized features.

Electrophysiological correlates of object location and object identity processing in spatial scenes

The ability to quickly detect changes in our surroundings has been crucial to human adaption and survival. In everyday life we often need to identify whether an object is new and if an object has changed its location. In the current event-related potential (ERP) study we investigated the electrophysiological correlates and the time course in detecting different types of changes of an objecṫs location and identity. In a delayed match-to-sample task participants had to indicate whether two consecutive scenes containing a road, a house, and two objects, were either the same or different. In six randomly intermixed conditions the second scene was identical, one of the objects had changed its identity, one of the objects had changed its location, or the objects had switched locations. The results reveal different time courses for the processing of identity and location changes in spatial scenes. Whereas location changes elicited a posterior N2 effect, indicating early mismatch detection, followed by a P3 effect reflecting post-perceptual processing, identity changes elicited an anterior N3 effect, which was delayed and functionally distinct from the N2 effect found for the location changes. The condition in which two objects switched position elicited a late ERP effect, reflected by a P3 effect similar to that obtained for the location changes. In sum, this study is the first to cohesively show different time courses for the processing of location changes, identity changes, and object switches in spatial scenes, which manifest themselves in different electrophysiological correlates.

GABAA Agonist Reduces Visual Awareness: A Masking–EEG Experiment

Consciousness can be manipulated in many ways. Here, we seek to understand whether two such ways, visual masking and pharmacological intervention, share a common pathway in manipulating visual consciousness. We recorded EEG from human participants who performed a backward-masking task in which they had to detect a masked figure form its background (masking strength was varied across trials). In a within-subject design, participants received dextromethorphan (a N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor antagonist), lorazepam (LZP; a GABAA receptor agonist), scopolamine (a muscarine receptor antagonist), or placebo. The behavioral results show that detection rate decreased with increasing masking strength and that of all the drugs, only LZP induced a further decrease in detection rate. Figure-related ERP signals showed three neural events of interest: (1) an early posterior occipital and temporal generator (94–121 msec) that was not influenced by any pharmacological manipulation nor by masking, (2) a later bilateral perioccipital generator (156–211 msec) that was reduced by masking as well as LZP (but not by any other drugs), and (3) a late bilateral occipital temporal generator (293–387 msec) that was mainly affected by masking. Crucially, only the intermediate neural event correlated with detection performance. In combination with previous findings, these results suggest that LZP and masking both reduce visual awareness by means of modulating late activity in the visual cortex but leave early activation intact. These findings provide the first evidence for a common mechanism for these two distinct ways of manipulating consciousness.

Recurrent neural processing and somatosensory awareness

The neural mechanisms of stimulus detection, despite extensive research, remain elusive. The recurrent processing hypothesis, a prominent theoretical account of perceptual awareness, states that, although stimuli might in principle evoke feedforward activity propagating through the visual cortex, stimuli that become consciously detected are further processed in feedforward-feedback loops established between cortical areas. To test this theory in the tactile modality, we applied dynamic causal modeling to electroencephalography (EEG) data acquired from humans in a somatosensory detection task. In the analysis of stimulation-induced event-related potentials (ERPs), we focused on model-based evidence for feedforward, feedback, and recurrent processing between primary and secondary somatosensory cortices. Bayesian model comparison revealed that, although early EEG components were well explained by both the feedforward and the recurrent models, the recurrent model outperformed the other models when later EEG segments were analyzed. Within the recurrent model, stimulus detection was characterized by a relatively early strength increase of the feedforward connection from primary to secondary somatosensory cortex (>80 ms). At longer latencies (>140 ms), also the feedback connection showed a detection-related strength increase. The modeling results on relative evidence between recurrent and feedforward model comparison support the hypothesis that the ERP responses from sensory areas arising after aware stimulus detection can be explained by increased recurrent processing within the somatosensory network in the later stages of stimulus processing.

Against the View that Consciousness and Attention are Fully Dissociable

In this paper, I will try to show that the idea that there can be consciousness without some form of attention, and high-level top-down attention without consciousness, originates from a failure to notice the varieties of forms that top-down attention and consciousness can assume. I will present evidence that: there are various forms of attention and consciousness; not all forms of attention produce the same kind of consciousness; not all forms of consciousness are produced by the same kind of attention; there can be low-level attention (or preliminary attention), whether of an endogenous or exogenous kind, without consciousness; attention cannot be considered the same thing as consciousness.

Visual Processing of Contour Patterns under Conditions of Inattentional Blindness

An inattentional blindness paradigm was adapted to measure ERPs elicited by visual contour patterns that were or were not consciously perceived. In the first phase of the experiment, subjects performed an attentionally demanding task while task-irrelevant line segments formed square-shaped patterns or random configurations. After the square patterns had been presented 240 times, subjects' awareness of these patterns was assessed. More than half of all subjects, when queried, failed to notice the square patterns and were thus considered inattentionally blind during this first phase. In the second phase of the experiment, the task and stimuli were the same, but following this phase, all of the subjects reported having seen the patterns. ERPs recorded over the occipital pole differed in amplitude from 220 to 260 msec for the pattern stimuli compared with the random arrays regardless of whether subjects were aware of the patterns. At subsequent latencies (300–340 msec) however, ERPs over bilateral occipital-parietal areas differed between patterns and random arrays only when subjects were aware of the patterns. Finally, in a third phase of the experiment, subjects viewed the same stimuli, but the task was altered so that the patterns became task relevant. Here, the same two difference components were evident but were followed by a series of additional components that were absent in the first two phases of the experiment. We hypothesize that the ERP difference at 220–260 msec reflects neural activity associated with automatic contour integration whereas the difference at 300–340 msec reflects visual awareness, both of which are dissociable from task-related postperceptual processing.

Attentional routes to conscious perception

The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception.

Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness

Solving the problem of consciousness remains one of the biggest challenges in modern science. One key step towards understanding consciousness is to empirically narrow down neural processes associated with the subjective experience of a particular content. To unravel these neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) a common scientific strategy is to compare perceptual conditions in which consciousness of a particular content is present with those in which it is absent, and to determine differences in measures of brain activity (the so called "contrastive analysis"). However, this comparison appears not to reveal exclusively the NCC, as the NCC proper can be confounded with prerequisites for and consequences of conscious processing of the particular content. This implies that previous results cannot be unequivocally interpreted as reflecting the neural correlates of conscious experience. Here we review evidence supporting this conjecture and suggest experimental strategies to untangle the NCC from the prerequisites and consequences of conscious experience in order to further develop the otherwise valid and valuable contrastive methodology.

Chronometry of word and picture identification: common and modality-specific effects

Based on a previous fMRI connectivity analysis, we previously proposed that long-distance connections between left inferior frontal sulcus and left occipitotemporal sulcus mediate access to visual short-term memory both for written words and pictures enhancing conscious perception and successful encoding in an amodal manner. Using a 64-channel event-related potential electrode system in 19 young cognitively intact volunteers, we determined the chronometry of common and input-modality specific effects of word and picture identification and subsequent memory retrieval. Stimulus durations were calibrated per subject, modality and run so as to reach a 50% positive identification report. The earliest main effect of a positive identification report occurred between 180 and 200 ms, was common for both input-modalities, had a positive polarity and was located at around CPz. This effect was followed between 270 and 450 ms by additional common positive-polarity effects at centrofrontal electrode sites and by common negative effects at P7/P8, TP7/TP8 and T8. Each of the later effects was closely associated not only with identification but also with subsequent memory retrieval. The earliest input-modality specific effect of conscious identification that we detected occurred from 280 till 440 ms at P8. Our findings are in line with a model where the initial stages of perceptual identification and visual short-term memory access rely on long-distance connections that are shared between written words and pictures.

Insights from intermittent binocular rivalry and EEG

Novel stimulation and analytical approaches employed in EEG studies of ambiguous figures have recently been applied to binocular rivalry. The combination of intermittent stimulus presentation and EEG source imaging has begun to shed new light on the neural underpinnings of binocular rivalry. Here, we review the basics of the intermittent paradigm and highlight methodological issues important for interpreting previous results and designing future experiments. We then outline current analytical approaches, including EEG microstates, event-related potentials, and statistically based source estimation, and propose a neural model of the sequence of brain events that may underlie different aspects of binocular rivalry. Finally, we discuss the advantages and limitations of using binocular rivalry as a tool to investigate the neural basis of perceptual awareness.

Unconscious High-Level Information Processing

Theories about the neural correlates and functional relevance of consciousness have traditionally assigned a crucial role to the prefrontal cortex in generating consciousness as well as in orchestrating high-level conscious control over behavior. However, recent neuroscientific findings show that prefrontal cortex can be activated unconsciously. The depth, direction, and scope of these activations depend on several top-down factors such as the task being probed (task-set, strategy) and on (temporal/spatial) attention. Regardless, such activations—when mediated by feedforward activation only—do not lead to a conscious sensation. Although unconscious, these prefrontal activations are functional, in the sense that they are associated with behavioral effects of cognitive control, such as response inhibition, task switching, conflict monitoring, and error detection. These findings challenge the pivotal role of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness. Instead, it appears that specific brain areas (or cognitive modules) may support specific cognitive functions but that consciousness is independent of this. Conscious sensations arise only when the brain areas involved engage in recurrent interactions enabling the long-lasting exchange of information between brain regions. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that also the state of consciousness, for example, in vegetative state patients or during sleep and anesthesia, is closely related to the scope and extent of residual recurrent interactions among brain regions.

Pre-stimulus alpha phase-alignment predicts P1-amplitude

Since years there is a hotly discussed dispute whether event-related potentials are either generated by an evoked component or by resetting of ongoing phase. We argue that phase-reset must not be proven in order to accept the general involvement of phase in ERP-generation as it is only one of several possible mechanisms influencing or generating certain ERP-components. Supporting data are presented showing that positive peaks of ongoing pre-stimulus alpha activity are not randomly distributed in time across trials. Most importantly, we found that a certain kind of pre-stimulus phase concentration that represents a continuous development of an alpha wave up to the time window where the P1 is generated is associated with an enlarged event-related component. We conclude that ongoing oscillations cannot be considered random background noise (even before stimulus onset) and that there are probably more phase-mechanisms that can contribute to the ERP-generation.

Expectations change the signatures and timing of electrophysiological correlates of perceptual awareness

Previous experience allows the brain to predict what comes next. How these expectations affect conscious experience is poorly understood. In particular, it is unknown whether and when expectations interact with sensory evidence in granting access to conscious perception, and how this is reflected electrophysiologically. Here, we parametrically manipulate sensory evidence and expectations while measuring event-related potentials in human subjects to assess the time course of evoked responses that correlate with subjective visibility, the properties of the stimuli, and/or perceptual expectations. We found that expectations lower the threshold of conscious perception and reduce the latency of neuronal signatures differentiating seen and unseen stimuli. Without expectations, this differentiation occurs ∼300 ms and with expectations ∼200 ms after stimulus in occipitoparietal sensors. The amplitude of this differentiating response component (P2) decreases as visibility increases, regardless of whether this increase is attributable to enhanced sensory evidence and/or the gradual buildup of perceptual expectations. Importantly, at matched performance levels, responses to seen and unseen stimuli differed regardless of the physical stimulus properties. These findings indicate that the latency of the neuronal correlates of access to consciousness depend on whether access is driven by stimulus saliency or by a combination of expectations and sensory evidence.

Relationship between visual binding, reentry and awareness

Visual feature binding has been suggested to depend on reentrant processing. We addressed the relationship between binding, reentry, and visual awareness by asking the participants to discriminate the color and orientation of a colored bar (presented either alone or simultaneously with a white distractor bar) and to report their phenomenal awareness of the target features. The success of reentry was manipulated with object substitution masking and backward masking. The results showed that late reentrant processes are necessary for successful binding but not for phenomenal awareness of the bound features. Binding errors were accompanied by phenomenal awareness of the misbound feature conjunctions, demonstrating that they were experienced as real properties of the stimuli (i.e., illusory conjunctions). Our results suggest that early preattentive binding and local recurrent processing enable features to reach phenomenal awareness, while later attention-related reentrant iterations modulate the way in which the features are bound and experienced in awareness.

Reversal negativity and bistable stimuli: Attention, awareness, or something else?

Ambiguous (or bistable) figures are visual stimuli that have two mutually exclusive perceptual interpretations that spontaneously alternate with each other. Perceptual reversals, as compared with non-reversals, typically elicit a negative difference called reversal negativity (RN), peaking around 250 ms from stimulus onset. The cognitive interpretation of RN remains unclear: it may reflect either bottom-up processes, attentional processes that select between the alternative views of the stimulus, or it may reflect the change in the contents of subjective awareness. In the present study, event-related potentials in response to endogenous unilateral and bilateral reversals of two Necker lattices were compared with exogenously induced reversals of unambiguous lattices. The RN neither resembled the attention-related N2pc response, nor did it correlate with the content of subjective visual awareness. Thus, we conclude that RN is a non-attentional ERP correlate of the changes in the perceptual configuration of the presented object.