The inner sense of time: how the brain creates a representation of duration

Modeling circadian and sleep-homeostatic effects on short-term interval timing

Short-term interval timing i.e., perception and action relating to durations in the seconds range, has been suggested to display time-of-day as well as wake dependent fluctuations due to circadian and sleep-homeostatic changes to the rate at which an underlying pacemaker emits pulses; pertinent human data being relatively sparse and lacking in consistency however, the phenomenon remains elusive and its mechanism poorly understood. To better characterize the putative circadian and sleep-homeostatic effects on interval timing and to assess the ability of a pacemaker-based mechanism to account for the data, we measured timing performance in eighteen young healthy male subjects across two epochs of sustained wakefulness of 38.67 h each, conducted prior to (under entrained conditions) and following (under free-running conditions) a 28 h sleep-wake schedule, using the methods of duration estimation and duration production on target intervals of 10 and 40 s. Our findings of opposing oscillatory time courses across both epochs of sustained wakefulness that combine with increasing and, respectively, decreasing, saturating exponential change for the tasks of estimation and production are consistent with the hypothesis that a pacemaker emitting pulses at a rate controlled by the circadian oscillator and increasing with time awake determines human short-term interval timing; the duration-specificity of this pattern is interpreted as reflecting challenges to maintaining stable attention to the task that progressively increase with stimulus magnitude and thereby moderate the effects of pacemaker-rate changes on overt behavior.

Neuronal representation of duration discrimination in the monkey striatum

Functional imaging and lesion studies in humans and animals suggest that the basal ganglia are crucial for temporal information processing. To elucidate neuronal mechanisms of interval timing in the basal ganglia, we recorded single-unit activity from the striatum of two monkeys while they performed a visual duration discrimination task. In the task, blue and red cues of different durations (0.2-2.0 sec) were successively presented. Each of the two cues was followed by a 1.0 sec delay period. The animals were instructed to choose the longer presented colored stimulus after the second delay period. A total of 498 phasically active neurons were recorded from the striatum, and 269 neurons were defined as task related. Two types of neuronal activity were distinguished during the delay periods. First, the activity gradually changed depending on the duration of the cue presented just before. This activity may represent the signal duration for later comparison between two cue durations. The activity during the second cue period also represented duration of the first cue. Second, the activity changed differently depending on whether the first or second cue was presented longer. This activity may represent discrimination results after the comparison between the two cue durations. These findings support the assumption that striatal neurons represent timing information of sensory signals for duration discrimination.

Slow cortical potentials and "inner time consciousness" - A neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about the "width of present"

William James postulated a "stream of consciousness" that presupposes temporal continuity. The neuronal mechanisms underlying the construction of such temporal continuity remain unclear, however, in my contribution, I propose a neuro-phenomenal hypothesis that is based on slow cortical potentials and their extension of the present moment as described in the phenomenal term of "width of present". More specifically, I focus on the way the brain's neural activity needs to be encoded in order to make possible the "stream of consciousness." This leads us again to the low-frequency fluctuations of the brain's neural activity and more specifically to slow cortical potentials (SCPs). Due to their long phase duration as low-frequency fluctuations, SCPs can integrate different stimuli and their associated neural activity from different regions in one converging region. Such integration may be central for consciousness to occur, as it was recently postulated by He and Raichle. They leave open, however, the question of the exact neuronal mechanisms, like the encoding strategy, that make possible the association of the otherwise purely neuronal SCP with consciousness and its phenomenal features. I hypothesize that SCPs allow for linking and connecting different discrete points in physical time by encoding their statistically based temporal differences rather than the single discrete time points by themselves. This presupposes difference-based coding rather than stimulus-based coding. The encoding of such statistically based temporal differences makes it possible to "go beyond" the merely physical features of the stimuli; that is, their single discrete time points and their conduction delays (as related to their neural processing in the brain). This, in turn, makes possible the constitution of "local temporal continuity" of neural activity in one particular region. The concept of "local temporal continuity" signifies the linkage and integration of different discrete time points into one neural activity in a particular region. How does such local temporal continuity predispose the experience of time in consciousness? For that, I turn to phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl and his description of what he calls "inner time consciousness" (Husserl and Brough, 1990). One hallmark of humans' "inner time consciousness" is that we experience events and objects in succession and duration in our consciousness; according to Husserl, this amounts to what he calls the "width of [the] present." The concept of the width of present describes the extension of the present beyond the single discrete time point, such as, for instance, when we perceive different tones as a melody. I now hypothesize the degree of the width of present to be directly dependent upon and thus predisposed by the degree of the temporal differences between two (or more) discrete time points as they are encoded into neural activity. I therefore conclude that the SCPs and their encoding of neural activity in terms of temporal differences must be regarded a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) as distinguished from a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC).

Dissociating movement from movement timing in the rat primary motor cortex

Neural encoding of the passage of time to produce temporally precise movements remains an open question. Neurons in several brain regions across different experimental contexts encode estimates of temporal intervals by scaling their activity in proportion to the interval duration. In motor cortex the degree to which this scaled activity relies upon afferent feedback and is guided by motor output remains unclear. Using a neural reward paradigm to dissociate neural activity from motor output before and after complete spinal transection, we show that temporally scaled activity occurs in the rat hindlimb motor cortex in the absence of motor output and after transection. Context-dependent changes in the encoding are plastic, reversible, and re-established following injury. Therefore, in the absence of motor output and despite a loss of afferent feedback, thought necessary for timed movements, the rat motor cortex displays scaled activity during a broad range of temporally demanding tasks similar to that identified in other brain regions.

Subjective expansion of extended time-spans in experienced meditators

Experienced meditators typically report that they experience time slowing down in meditation practice as well as in everyday life. Conceptually this phenomenon may be understood through functional states of mindfulness, i.e., by attention regulation, body awareness, emotion regulation, and enhanced memory. However, hardly any systematic empirical work exists regarding the experience of time in meditators. In the current cross-sectional study, we investigated whether 42 experienced mindfulness meditation practitioners (with on average 10 years of experience) showed differences in the experience of time as compared to 42 controls without any meditation experience matched for age, sex, and education. The perception of time was assessed with a battery of psychophysical tasks assessing the accuracy of prospective time judgments in duration discrimination, duration reproduction, and time estimation in the milliseconds to minutes range as well with several psychometric instruments related to subjective time such as the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, the Barratt Impulsivity Scale and the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory. In addition, subjective time judgments on the current passage of time and retrospective time ranges were assessed. While subjective judgements of time were found to be significantly different between the two groups on several scales, no differences in duration estimates in the psychophysical tasks were detected. Regarding subjective time, mindfulness meditators experienced less time pressure, more time dilation, and a general slower passage of time. Moreover, they felt that the last week and the last month passed more slowly. Overall, although no intergroup differences in psychophysical tasks were detected, the reported findings demonstrate a close association between mindfulness meditation and the subjective feeling of the passage of time captured by psychometric instruments.

Working memory for time intervals in auditory rhythmic sequences

The brain can hold information about multiple objects in working memory. It is not known, however, whether intervals of time can be stored in memory as distinct items. Here, we developed a novel paradigm to examine temporal memory where listeners were required to reproduce the duration of a single probed interval from a sequence of intervals. We demonstrate that memory performance significantly varies as a function of temporal structure (better memory in regular vs. irregular sequences), interval size (better memory for sub- vs. supra-second intervals), and memory load (poor memory for higher load). In contrast memory performance is invariant to attentional cueing. Our data represent the first systematic investigation of temporal memory in sequences that goes beyond previous work based on single intervals. The results support the emerging hypothesis that time intervals are allocated a working memory resource that varies with the amount of other temporal information in a sequence.

Duration estimation entails predicting when

The estimation of duration can be affected by context and surprise. Using MagnetoEncephaloGraphy (MEG), we tested whether increased neural activity during surprise and following neural suppression in two different contexts supported subjective time dilation (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009; Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2012). Sequences of three 300 ms frequency-modulated (FM, control) or pure tones (test) were presented and followed by a fourth FM varying in duration. In test, the last FM was perceived as significantly longer than veridical duration (Tse et al., 2004) but did not differ from the perceived duration in control. Several novel and distinct neural signatures were observed in duration estimation: first, neural suppression of standard stimuli was observed for the onset but not for the offset auditory evoked responses. Second, ramping activity increased with veridical duration in control whereas at the same latency in test, the amplitude of the midlatency response increased with the distance of deviant durations. Third, in both conditions, the amplitude of the offset auditory evoked responses accounted well for participants' performance: the longer the perceived duration, the larger the offset response. Fourth, neural duration demarcated by the peak latencies of the onset and ramping evoked activities indexed a systematic time compression that reliably predicted subjective time perception. Our findings suggest that interval timing undergoes time compression by capitalizing on the predicted offset of an auditory event.

Temporal structure of consciousness and minimal self in schizophrenia

The concept of the minimal self refers to the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience. According to recent studies, disturbances of the minimal self may be a core feature of schizophrenia. They are emphasized in classical psychiatry literature and in phenomenological work. Impaired minimal self-experience may be defined as a distortion of one’s first-person experiential perspective as, for example, an “altered presence” during which the sense of the experienced self (“mineness”) is subtly affected, or “altered sense of demarcation,” i.e., a difficulty discriminating the self from the non-self. Little is known, however, about the cognitive basis of these disturbances. In fact, recent work indicates that disorders of the self are not correlated with cognitive impairments commonly found in schizophrenia such as working-memory and attention disorders. In addition, a major difficulty with exploring the minimal self experimentally lies in its definition as being non-self-reflexive, and distinct from the verbalized, explicit awareness of an “I.” In this paper, we shall discuss the possibility that disturbances of the minimal self observed in patients with schizophrenia are related to alterations in time processing. We shall review the literature on schizophrenia and time processing that lends support to this possibility. In particular we shall discuss the involvement of temporal integration windows on different time scales (implicit time processing) as well as duration perception disturbances (explicit time processing) in disorders of the minimal self. We argue that a better understanding of the relationship between time and the minimal self as well of issues of embodiment require research that looks more specifically at implicit time processing. Some methodological issues will be discussed.

Perceiving the passage of time: neural possibilities

Although the study of time has been central to physics and philosophy for millennia, questions of how time is represented in the brain and how this representation is related to time perception have only recently started to be addressed. Emerging evidence subtly yet profoundly challenges our intuitive notions of time over short scales, offering insight into the nature of the brain's representation of time. Numerous different models, specified at the neural level, of how the brain may keep track of time have been proposed. These models differ in various ways, such as whether time is represented by a centralized or distributed neural system, or whether there are neural systems dedicated to the problem of timing. This paper reviews the insight offered by behavioral experiments and how these experiments refute and guide some of the various models of the brain's representation of time.

The human hippocampus is sensitive to the durations of events and intervals within a sequence

Temporal details are an important facet of our memories for events. Consistent with this, it has been demonstrated that the hippocampus, a key structure in learning and memory, is sensitive to the temporal aspects of event sequences, including temporal order, context, recency and distance. One unexplored issue is whether the hippocampus also responds to the temporal duration characteristics of an event sequence, for example, how long each event lasted for or how much time elapsed between events. To address this, we used a temporal match-mismatch detection paradigm across two functional neuroimaging studies to explore whether the human hippocampus is sensitive to the durations of events and intervals that comprise a sequence lasting on the order of seconds. On each trial participants were shown a series of four scenes during an encoding and a test phase, and had to determine whether the durations of the intervals or events were altered. We observed hippocampal sensitivity to temporal durations within event sequences. Activity was significantly greater when participants detected repeating, in comparison to novel, durations. Moreover, greater functional connectivity was observed between hippocampus and brain regions previously implicated in second and millisecond timing when durations were novel, suggesting that the hippocampus may receive duration information from these areas for use within a mnemonic context rather than generate an independent timing signal. Our novel findings suggest that the hippocampus may integrate temporal duration information when binding event sequences.

Pre-start timing information is used to set final linear speed in a C-start manoeuvre

In their unique hunting behaviour, archerfish use a complex motor decision to secure their prey: based solely on how dislodged prey initially falls, they select an adapted C-start manoeuvre that turns the fish right towards the point on the water surface where their prey will later land. Furthermore, they take off at a speed that is set so as to arrive in time. We show here that the C-start manoeuvre and not subsequent tail beating is necessary and sufficient for setting this adaptive level of speed. Furthermore, the C-start pattern is adjusted to independently determine both the turning angle and the take-off speed. The selection of both aspects requires no a priori information and is done based on information sampled from the onset of target motion until the C-start is launched. Fin strokes can occur right after the C-start manoeuvre but are not required to fine-tune take-off speed, but rather to maintain it. By probing the way in which the fish set their take-off speed in a wide range of conditions in which distance from the later catching point and time until impact varied widely and unpredictably, we found that the C-start manoeuvre is programmed based on pre-C-start estimates of distance and time until impact. Our study hence provides the first evidence for a C-start that is fine-tuned to produce an adaptive speed level.

Attention and working memory: two basic mechanisms for constructing temporal experiences

Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously relive past events – episodic memory – and conceive future events, entails an active process of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language, and conscious thinking. This article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how it works. The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed.

Time-based event expectations employ relative, not absolute, representations of time

When the timing of an event is predictable, humans automatically form implicit time-based event expectations. We investigated whether these expectations rely on absolute (e.g., 800 ms) or relative (e.g., a shorter duration) representations of time. In a choice-response task with two different pre-target intervals, participants implicitly learned that targets were predictable by interval durations. In a test phase, the two intervals were either considerably shortened or lengthened. In both cases, behavioral tendencies transferred from practice to test according to relative, not absolute, interval duration. We conclude that humans employ relative representations of time periods when forming time-based event expectations. These results suggest that learned time-based event expectations (e.g., in communication and human-machine interaction) should transfer to faster or slower environments if the relative temporal distribution of events is preserved.

Time perception and dynamics of facial expressions of emotions

Two experiments were run to examine the effects of dynamic displays of facial expressions of emotions on time judgments. The participants were given a temporal bisection task with emotional facial expressions presented in a dynamic or a static display. Two emotional facial expressions and a neutral expression were tested and compared. Each of the emotional expressions had the same affective valence (unpleasant), but one was high-arousing (expressing anger) and the other low-arousing (expressing sadness). Our results showed that time judgments are highly sensitive to movements in facial expressions and the emotions expressed. Indeed, longer perceived durations were found in response to the dynamic faces and the high-arousing emotional expressions compared to the static faces and low-arousing expressions. In addition, the facial movements amplified the effect of emotions on time perception. Dynamic facial expressions are thus interesting tools for examining variations in temporal judgments in different social contexts.

Cannabinoid receptor activation shifts temporally engendered patterns of dopamine release

The ability to discern temporally pertinent environmental events is essential for the generation of adaptive behavior in conventional tasks, and our overall survival. Cannabinoids are thought to disrupt temporally controlled behaviors by interfering with dedicated brain timing networks. Cannabinoids also increase dopamine release within the mesolimbic system, a neural pathway generally implicated in timing behavior. Timing can be assessed using fixed-interval (FI) schedules, which reinforce behavior on the basis of time. To date, it remains unknown how cannabinoids modulate dopamine release when responding under FI conditions, and for that matter, how subsecond dopamine release is related to time in these tasks. In the present study, we hypothesized that cannabinoids would accelerate timing behavior in an FI task while concurrently augmenting a temporally relevant pattern of dopamine release. To assess this possibility, we measured subsecond dopamine concentrations in the nucleus accumbens while mice responded for food under the influence of the cannabinoid agonist WIN 55,212-2 in an FI task. Our data reveal that accumbal dopamine concentrations decrease proportionally to interval duration--suggesting that dopamine encodes time in FI tasks. We further demonstrate that WIN 55,212-2 dose-dependently increases dopamine release and accelerates a temporal behavioral response pattern in a CB1 receptor-dependent manner--suggesting that cannabinoid receptor activation modifies timing behavior, in part, by augmenting time-engendered patterns of dopamine release. Additional investigation uncovered a specific role for endogenous cannabinoid tone in timing behavior, as elevations in 2-arachidonoylglycerol, but not anandamide, significantly accelerated the temporal response pattern in a manner akin to WIN 55,212-2.

How much time has passed? Ask your heart

Internal signals like one's heartbeats are centrally processed via specific pathways and both their neural representations as well as their conscious perception (interoception) provide key information for many cognitive processes. Recent empirical findings propose that neural processes in the insular cortex, which are related to bodily signals, might constitute a neurophysiological mechanism for the encoding of duration. Nevertheless, the exact nature of such a proposed relationship remains unclear. We aimed to address this question by searching for the effects of cardiac rhythm on time perception by the use of a duration reproduction paradigm. Time intervals used were of 0.5, 2, 3, 7, 10, 14, 25, and 40 s length. In a framework of synchronization hypothesis, measures of phase locking between the cardiac cycle and start/stop signals of the reproduction task were calculated to quantify this relationship. The main result is that marginally significant synchronization indices (SIs) between the heart cycle and the time reproduction responses for the time intervals of 2, 3, 10, 14, and 25 s length were obtained, while results were not significant for durations of 0.5, 7, and 40 s length. On the single participant level, several subjects exhibited some synchrony between the heart cycle and the time reproduction responses, most pronounced for the time interval of 25 s (8 out of 23 participants for 20% quantile). Better time reproduction accuracy was not related with larger degree of phase locking, but with greater vagal control of the heart. A higher interoceptive sensitivity (IS) was associated with a higher synchronization index (SI) for the 2 s time interval only. We conclude that information obtained from the cardiac cycle is relevant for the encoding and reproduction of time in the time span of 2-25 s. Sympathovagal tone as well as interoceptive processes mediate the accuracy of time estimation.

Ongoing behavior predicts perceptual report of interval duration

The ability to estimate the passage of time is essential for adaptive behavior in complex environments. Yet, it is not known how the brain encodes time over the durations necessary to explain animal behavior. Under temporally structured reinforcement schedules, animals tend to develop temporally structured behavior, and interval timing has been suggested to be accomplished by learning sequences of behavioral states. If this is true, trial to trial fluctuations in behavioral sequences should be predictive of fluctuations in time estimation. We trained rodents in an duration categorization task while continuously monitoring their behavior with a high speed camera. Animals developed highly reproducible behavioral sequences during the interval being timed. Moreover, those sequences were often predictive of perceptual report from early in the trial, providing support to the idea that animals may use learned behavioral patterns to estimate the duration of time intervals. To better resolve the issue, we propose that continuous and simultaneous behavioral and neural monitoring will enable identification of neural activity related to time perception that is not explained by ongoing behavior.

Effects of emotional valence and arousal on acoustic duration reproduction assessed via the "dual klepsydra model"

We report results of an acoustic duration reproduction task with stimulus duration of 2, 4, and 6 s, using 45 emotionally negative, positive, and neutral sounds from the International Affective Digitized Sounds System, in a sample of 31 young healthy participants. To investigate the influence of induced emotions on perceived duration, the effects of emotional modulation were quantified in two ways: (1) via model-free indices (aggregated ratios of reproduced times), and (2) via dual klepsydra model (dkm)-based estimates of parameters of internal time representation. Both data-analytic approaches reveal an effect of emotional valence/arousal, namely, a significantly longer reproduction response for emotional stimuli than for the neutral stimuli. The advantage of the dkm-based approach is its ability to disentangle stimulus-related effects, which are represented by "flow intensities," from general effects which are due to the lossy character of temporal integration. We explain the rationale of the dkm-based strategy and interpret the observed effect within the dkm-framework as transient increase of internal "flows." This interpretation is in line with recent conceptualizations of an "embodiment" of time where the model-posited flows correspond to the ongoing stream of interoceptive (bodily) neural signals. Neurophysiological findings on correlations between the processing of body signals and the perception of time provide cumulative evidence for this working hypothesis.

Time models and cognitive processes: a review

The sense of time is an essential capacity of humans, with a major role in many of the cognitive processes expressed in our daily lifes. So far, in cognitive science and robotics research, mental capacities have been investigated in a theoretical and modeling framework that largely neglects the flow of time. Only recently there has been a rather limited, but constantly increasing interest in the temporal aspects of cognition, integrating time into a range of different models of perceptuo-motor capacities. The current paper aims to review existing works in the field and suggest directions for fruitful future work. This is particularly important for the newly developed field of artificial temporal cognition that is expected to significantly contribute in the development of sophisticated artificial agents seamlessly integrated into human societies.

Decoupling interval timing and climbing neural activity: a dissociation between CNV and N1P2 amplitudes

It is often argued that climbing neural activity, as for example reflected by the contingent negative variation (CNV) in the electroencephalogram, is the signature of the subjective experience of time. According to this view, the resolution of the CNV coincides with termination of subjective timing processes. Paradoxically, behavioral data indicate that participants keep track of timing even after the standard interval (SI) has passed. This study addresses whether timing continues after CNV resolution. In Experiment 1, human participants were asked to discriminate time intervals while evoked potentials (EPs) elicited by the sound terminating a comparison interval (CI) were measured. As the amplitude of N1P2 components increases as a function of the temporal distance from the SI, and the latency of the P2 component followed the hazard rate of the CIs, timing processes continue after CNV resolution. Based on a novel experimental paradigm, statistical model comparisons and trial-by-trial analyses, Experiment 2 supports this finding as subjective time is more accurately indexed by the amplitude of early EPs than by CNV amplitude. These results provide the first direct evidence that subjective timing of multisecond intervals does not depend on climbing neural activity as indexed by the CNV and that the subjective experience of time is better reflected by distinct features of post-CI evoked potentials.

Temporally specific sensory signals for the detection of stimulus omission in the primate deep cerebellar nuclei

The cerebellum is implicated in sensory prediction in the subsecond range. To explore how neurons in the cerebellum encode temporal information for the prediction of sensory events, we trained monkeys to make a saccade in response to either a single omission or deviation of isochronous repetitive stimuli. We found that neurons in the cerebellar dentate nucleus exhibited a gradual elevation of the baseline firing rate as the repetition progressed. Most neurons showed a transient suppression for each stimulus, and this firing modulation also increased gradually, opposed to the sensory adaptation. The magnitude of the enhanced sensory response positively correlated with interstimulus interval. Furthermore, when stimuli appeared unexpectedly earlier than the regular timing, the neuronal modulation became smaller, suggesting that the sensory response depended on the time elapsed since the previous stimulus. The enhancement of neuronal modulation was context dependent and was reduced or even absent when monkeys were unmotivated to detect stimulus omission. A significant negative correlation between neuronal activity at stimulus omission and saccade latency suggested that the timing of each stimulus was predicted by the amount of recovery from the transient response. Because inactivation of the recording sites delayed the detection of stimulus omission but only slightly altered the detection of stimulus deviation, these signals might be necessary for the prediction of stimulus timing but may not be involved only in the generation of saccades. Our results demonstrate a novel mechanism for temporal prediction of upcoming stimuli that accompanies the time-dependent modification of sensory gain in the cerebellum.

EEG investigations of duration discrimination: the intermodal effect is induced by an attentional bias

Previous studies indicated that empty time intervals are better discriminated in the auditory than in the visual modality, and when delimited by signals delivered from the same (intramodal intervals) rather than from different sensory modalities (intermodal intervals). The present electrophysiological study was conducted to determine the mechanisms which modulated the performances in inter- and intramodal conditions. Participants were asked to categorise as short or long empty intervals marked by auditory (A) and/or visual (V) signals (intramodal intervals: AA, VV; intermodal intervals: AV, VA). Behavioural data revealed that the performances were higher for the AA intervals than for the three other intervals and lower for inter- compared to intramodal intervals. Electrophysiological results indicated that the CNV amplitude recorded at fronto-central electrodes increased significantly until the end of the presentation of the long intervals in the AA conditions, while no significant change in the time course of this component was observed for the other three modalities of presentation. They also indicated that the N1 and P2 amplitudes recorded after the presentation of the signals which delimited the beginning of the intervals were higher for the inter- (AV/VA) compared to the intramodal intervals (AA/VV). The time course of the CNV revealed that the high performances observed with AA intervals would be related to the effectiveness of the neural mechanisms underlying the processing of the ongoing interval. The greater amplitude of the N1 and P2 components during the intermodal intervals suggests that the weak performances observed in these conditions would be caused by an attentional bias induced by the cognitive load and the necessity to switch between modalities.