Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test

Gaze patterns disclose the link between cognitive reflection and sophistication in strategic interaction

In social contexts, we refer to strategic sophistication as the ability to adapt our own behavior based on the possible actions of others. In the current study, we explore the role of other-oriented attention and cognitive reflection in explaining heterogeneity in strategic sophistication. In two eye-tracking experiments, we registered eye movements of participants while playing matrix games of increasing relational complexity (2x2 and 3x3 matrices), and we analyzed individual gaze patterns to reveal the ongoing mechanisms of integration of own and others’ incentives in the current game representation. Moreover, participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), in addition to alternative measures of cognitive ability. In both classes of games, higher cognitive reflection levels specifically predict the ability to incorporate the counterpart’s incentives in the current model of the game, as well as higher levels of strategic sophistication. Conversely, players exhibiting low cognitive reflection tend to pay less attention to relevant transitions between the counterpart’s payoffs, and such incomplete visual analysis leads to out-of-equilibrium choices. Gaze patterns appear to completely mediate the relationship between cognitive reflection and strategic choices. Our results shed new light on the cognitive factors driving heterogeneity in strategic thinking and on theories of bounded rationality.

Effects of perceptual load on eyewitness memory are moderated by individual differences in cognitive ability

Previous research has identified perceptual load - the amount of perceptual processing required by a scene - as a potentially important factor in eyewitness memory. Here, we investigated whether effects of perceptual load on eyewitness memory for a simulated crime are moderated by individual differences in cognitive ability. We presented participants with a video of a simulated crime that imposed either high or low perceptual load, followed by a written narrative which contained a mixture of neutral and misleading descriptions of critical details. We examined the effects of three cognitive variables (working memory capacity, verbal cognitive ability and analytical reasoning) on participants' ability to accurately recall details of the video in both the misinformation and control conditions, and to detect a change in the clothing of a main character. General cognitive ability was associated with improved global memory for details of the event, and enhanced change detection under load. Greater WM capacity and a tendency towards analytical reasoning were both associated with resistance to misinformation under conditions of high perceptual load. We conclude that higher levels of cognitive ability, assessed across a number of domains, may enable eyewitnesses to withstand the effects of perceptual load and preserve the accuracy of their memories.

Moral Foundations Twitter Corpus: A Collection of 35k Tweets Annotated for Moral Sentiment

Research has shown that accounting for moral sentiment in natural language can yield insight into a variety of on- and off-line phenomena such as message diffusion, protest dynamics, and social distancing. However, measuring moral sentiment in natural language is challenging, and the difficulty of this task is exacerbated by the limited availability of annotated data. To address this issue, we introduce the Moral Foundations Twitter Corpus, a collection of 35,108 tweets that have been curated from seven distinct domains of discourse and hand annotated by at least three trained annotators for 10 categories of moral sentiment. To facilitate investigations of annotator response dynamics, we also provide psychological and demographic metadata for each annotator. Finally, we report moral sentiment classification baselines for this corpus using a range of popular methodologies.

Assessing analytic and intuitive reasoning using the cognitive reflection test in young patients with schizophrenia

Cognitive biases may contribute to the formation and maintenance of positive symptoms in patients with schizophrenia. However, cognitive reflection (i.e., the ability to use analytical thinking to override intuitive responses) has not been explicitly examined in schizophrenia patients using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Using the CRT, we examined the degree of analytical and intuitive reasoning employed during problem solving in patients with schizophrenia versus healthy controls. Fifty-eight outpatients with schizophrenia and fifty-eight age- and sex-matched healthy controls (18-35 years of age) participated in this study. In addition to CRT performance, neurocognition, apathy, impulsivity, depression, insight, and clinical symptoms were evaluated. Patients with schizophrenia produced significantly fewer analytical responses (U = 1167.00, p<0.05) and more intuitive responses (U = 1273.50, p<0.05) compared to healthy controls. Patients without significant cognitive impairment also produced fewer analytical responses compared to controls (U = 894.50, p<0.05). Among patients, analytical thinking was positively correlated with working memory (r = 0.27, p<0.05), and affective symptoms (r = 0.31, p<0.05). Analytical reasoning was not significantly correlated with positive symptoms, avolition, or impulsivity. Patients with schizophrenia demonstrate less analytical and more intuitive reasoning while problem solving compared to healthy controls. This reduction in cognitive reflection is not significantly explained by global cognitive impairment or motivational deficits.

The false allure of fast lures

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) allegedly measures the tendency to override the prepotent incorrect answers to some special problems, and to engage in further reflection. A growing literature suggests that the CRT is a powerful predictor of performance in a wide range of tasks. This research has mostly glossed over the fact that the CRT is composed of math problems. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether numerical CRT items do indeed call upon more than is required by standard math problems, and whether the latter predict performance in other tasks as well as the CRT. In Study 1 we selected from a bank of standard math problems items that, like CRT items, have a fast lure, as well as others which do not. A 1-factor model was the best supported measurement model for the underlying abilities required by all three item types. Moreover, the quality of all these items – CRT and math problems alike – as predictors of performance on a set of choice and reasoning tasks did not depend on whether or not they had a fast lure, but rather only on their quality as math items. In other words, CRT items seem not to be a “special” category of math problems, although they are quite excellent ones. Study 2 replicated these results with a different population and a different set of math problems.

Upon Repeated Reflection: Consequences of Frequent Exposure to the Cognitive Reflection Test for Mechanical Turk Participants

Participants from public participant panels, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, are shared across many labs and participate in many studies during their panel tenure. Here, I demonstrate direct and indirect downstream consequences of frequent exposure in three studies (N₁₋₃ = 3, 660), focusing on the cognitive reflection test (CRT), one of the most frequently used cognitive measures in online research. Study 1 explored several variants of the signature bat-and-ball item in samples recruited from Mechanical Turk. Panel tenure was shown to impact responses to both the original and merely similar items. Solution rates were not found to be higher than in a commercial online panel with less exposure to the CRT (Qualtrics panels, n = 1, 238). In Study 2, an alternative test with transformed numeric values showed higher correlations with validation measures than the original test. Finally, Study 3 investigated sources of item familiarity and measured performance on novel lure items.

Graphical Depiction of Statistical Information Improves Gambling-Related Judgments

The domain of gambling is rife with both diagnostic and non-diagnostic information. Previous studies examining scratch card gambling have demonstrated that people are often biased by intuitively appealing, yet non-diagnostic information (i.e., unclaimed prize information). The current study investigated how varying the presentation format of a diagnostic piece of information (i.e., payback percentage) could influence participants’ use of this information when in conflict with unclaimed prize information. We hypothesized that when payback percentage information was presented in a graphical, as opposed to a numerical format, participants would be better at ignoring unclaimed prize information and correspondingly have their preferences become congruent with the true value of the presented scratch cards. In Experiment 1 (N = 201), with payback percentage presented in a numerical format, participants displayed a non-optimal preference for cards with greater numbers of unclaimed prizes and lower payback percentages. This preference was reversed in Experiment 2 (N = 201) when payback percentage was presented in a graphical format. In conclusion, the results of the current study demonstrate how judgments in a scratch card gambling domain can be improved by simply changing the presentation format of a single piece of information.

Cognitive Reflection and General Mental Ability as Predictors of Job Performance

This paper presents a study with four independent samples on the validity of cognitive reflection (CR) for predicting job performance and academic outcomes. The results showed that CR was a valid predictor of academic outcomes (i.e., grades and exam marks) and job performance (i.e., assessment center ratings). The magnitude of the CR validity was similar to the validity of GMA. Moreover, we found that CR and GMA were moderately correlated, and multiple regression analyses showed that CR added a small amount of validity over GMA validity for predicting both types of performance. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings for the theory and practice of predicting performance and organizational sustainability.

Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies

Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorist's claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.

Does expertise moderate the seductive allure of reductive explanations?

Non-experts are unduly attracted to explanations of scientific phenomena that contain irrelevant reductive language (e.g., explanations of biological phenomena that mention chemistry; Hopkins, Weisberg, & Taylor, 2016). To determine if expertise would reduce this reasoning error, the current study recruited individuals with graduate-level training in six scientific fields and in philosophy (N = 580) and asked them to judge explanations for phenomena from those fields. Like the novices in Hopkins et al. (2016), scientists' ratings of bad explanations were influenced by reductive information when viewing phenomena from outside their field of expertise, but they were less likely to show this bias when reasoning about their own field. Higher levels of educational attainment did improve detection of bad explanations. These results indicate that advanced training in science or logic can lead to more accurate reasoning about explanations, but does not mitigate the reductive allure effect.

Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

Effect of response format on cognitive reflection: Validating a two- and four-option multiple choice question version of the Cognitive Reflection Test

The Cognitive Reflection Test, measuring intuition inhibition and cognitive reflection, has become extremely popular because it reliably predicts reasoning performance, decision-making, and beliefs. Across studies, the response format of CRT items sometimes differs, based on the assumed construct equivalence of tests with open-ended versus multiple-choice items (the equivalence hypothesis). Evidence and theoretical reasons, however, suggest that the cognitive processes measured by these response formats and their associated performances might differ (the nonequivalence hypothesis). We tested the two hypotheses experimentally by assessing the performance in tests with different response formats and by comparing their predictive and construct validity. In a between-subjects experiment (n = 452), participants answered stem-equivalent CRT items in an open-ended, a two-option, or a four-option response format and then completed tasks on belief bias, denominator neglect, and paranormal beliefs (benchmark indicators of predictive validity), as well as on actively open-minded thinking and numeracy (benchmark indicators of construct validity). We found no significant differences between the three response formats in the numbers of correct responses, the numbers of intuitive responses (with the exception of the two-option version, which had a higher number than the other tests), and the correlational patterns of the indicators of predictive and construct validity. All three test versions were similarly reliable, but the multiple-choice formats were completed more quickly. We speculate that the specific nature of the CRT items helps build construct equivalence among the different response formats. We recommend using the validated multiple-choice version of the CRT presented here, particularly the four-option CRT, for practical and methodological reasons. Supplementary materials and data are available at https://osf.io/mzhyc/ .

A developmental study of the bat/ball problem of CRT: How to override the bias and its relation to executive functioning

In two experiments, we explored the nature of the bias observed in the bat/ball problem of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005, J. Econ. Perspect., 19, 25), how to override it, and its relation to executive functioning. Based on the original bat/ball problem, we designed two additional isomorphic items. In Experiment 1, for four age groups, including 7-, 11-, and 15-year-olds and adults, we determined that the bias is related to the System 1 intervention; the performance in this item was not a matter of mathematical ability and it could be facilitated by changing the order in which the problems were presented. In Experiment 2, we determined that for 15-year-olds, good and bad performances in the item were related to executive functioning, particularly response-distractor inhibition, updating information in working memory, and the regulation of attention; however, subtle differences were identified when the problem was performed in a facilitative context compared with a non-facilitative context. The results indicated that cognitive abilities are a necessary but non-sufficient condition to resolve the problem.

Who falls for fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking

OBJECTIVE

Fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. We investigate the psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news.

METHOD

We recruited 1,606 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk for three online surveys.

RESULTS

The tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences-pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity-correlates positively with perceptions of fake news accuracy, and negatively with the ability to differentiate between fake and real news (media truth discernment). Relatedly, individuals who overclaim their level of knowledge also judge fake news to be more accurate. We also extend previous research indicating that analytic thinking correlates negatively with perceived accuracy by showing that this relationship is not moderated by the presence/absence of the headline's source (which has no effect on accuracy), or by familiarity with the headlines (which correlates positively with perceived accuracy of fake and real news).

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims. This tendency, which we refer to as reflexive open-mindedness, may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.

The Differential Effects of Good Luck Belief on Cognitive Performance in Boys and Girls

There is evidence that inducing a luck-related superstition leads to better performance on a variety of motor dexterity and cognitive tasks. However, some replication efforts have failed to succeed. At the same time, our previous findings suggest that the effect of good luck belief on cognitive performance interacts with gender. The present research aimed at replicating the study with a sample of adolescents among whom the superstitious beliefs are particularly prevalent. The participants (N = 99) were allocated to either a control or experimental group, and were asked to solve eight problems focused on cognitive reflection, conjunction fallacy, denominator neglect, and probabilistic reasoning. The experimental manipulation negatively affected boys' performance. Yet, it facilitated performance in girls via increase in their self-efficacy, measured as subjective estimate of future success in the tasks. Thus, gender seems to moderate the effect of luck-related belief on solutions to cognitive problems, which are an important part of our day-to-day decisions. Given initial gender gap in the present tasks, the crucial question to be addressed in future research is possibility of gender being a proxy for prior competence. It would imply that good luck beliefs might help low scorers, for instance in becoming less anxious and more confident, but could be harmful for high scorers.

A Cue for Rational Reasoning: Introducing a Reference Point in Cognitive Reflection Tasks

The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our “adaptive toolbox”. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items.

The cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a widely used measure of the propensity to engage in analytic or deliberative reasoning in lieu of gut feelings or intuitions. CRT problems are unique because they reliably cue intuitive but incorrect responses and, therefore, appear simple among those who do poorly. By virtue of being composed of so-called "trick problems" that, in theory, could be discovered as such, it is commonly held that the predictive validity of the CRT is undermined by prior experience with the task. Indeed, recent studies have shown that people who have had previous experience with the CRT score higher on the test. Naturally, however, it is not obvious that this actually undermines the predictive validity of the test. Across six studies with ~ 2,500 participants and 17 variables of interest (e.g., religious belief, bullshit receptivity, smartphone usage, susceptibility to heuristics and biases, and numeracy), we did not find a single case in which the predictive power of the CRT was significantly undermined by repeated exposure. This occurred despite the fact that we replicated the previously reported increase in accuracy among individuals who reported previous experience with the CRT. We speculate that the CRT remains robust after multiple exposures because less reflective (more intuitive) individuals fail to realize that being presented with apparently easy problems more than once confers information about the task's actual difficulty.

Finding meaning in the clouds: Illusory pattern perception predicts receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit

Previous research has demonstrated a link between illusory pattern perception and various irrational beliefs. On this basis, we hypothesized that participants who displayed greater degrees of illusory pattern perception would also be more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. We find support for this prediction across three experiments (N = 627) and four distinct measures of pattern perception. We further demonstrate that this observed relation is restricted to illusory pattern perception, with participants displaying greater endorsement of non-illusory patterns being no more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. Additionally, this relation is not a product of a general proclivity to rate all statements as profound and is not accounted for by individual differences in analytic thinking. Overall, we demonstrate that individuals with a tendency to go beyond the available data such that they uncritically endorse patterns where no patterns exist are also more likely to create and endorse false-meaning in meaningless pseudo-profound statements. These findings are discussed in the context of a proposed framework that views individuals’ receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit as, in part, an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive process: that of pattern perception.

Individual Differences in Anchoring Effect: Evidence for the Role of Insufficient Adjustment

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor's direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.

Oh, the things you don't know: awe promotes awareness of knowledge gaps and science interest

Awe is described as an a "epistemic emotion" because it is hypothesised to make gaps in one's knowledge salient. However, no empirical evidence for this yet exists. Awe is also hypothesised to be an antecedent to interest in science because science is one way to fill those knowledge gaps. Results from four pre-registered studies (N = 1518) indicate that manipulating awe through online (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c) and virtual reality (Study 2) videos, led to greater awareness of knowledge gaps. Awareness of knowledge gaps was consistently associated with greater science interest and to choosing tickets to a science museum over tickets to an art museum (Study 1b). These effects were not consistently observed on, nor moderated by, other measures related to cognition, religion, and spirituality. However, exploratory analyses showed that science interest was better predicted by positive emotions than by awe. Still, these results provide the first empirical evidence of awe as an "epistemic emotion" by demonstrating its effects on awareness of knowledge gaps. These findings are also extended to the effects of awe on science interest as one possible outcome of awareness of knowledge gaps.

Deliberate reasoning is not affected by language

BACKGROUND

Millions of people use a second language every day. Does this have an effect on their decision-making? Are decisions in a second language more deliberate? Two mechanisms have been proposed: reduced emotionality or increased deliberation. Most studies so far used problems where both mechanisms could contribute to a foreign language effect. Here, we aimed to identify whether deliberate reasoning increases for problems that are devoid of any emotional connotation when using a second language or having to switch between native and second language.

METHOD

We measured deliberate reasoning with items from the cognitive reflection test, ratio bias, a probability matching task, and base rate neglect items. We recruited over 500 participants from Norway and the Netherlands that had English as their second language. Participants were randomly assigned to either the native, switching or second language condition. We measured: number of correctly answered items-deliberate reasoning score, perceived effort, perceived accuracy or confidence, and language proficiency.

RESULTS

Deliberate reasoning was not increased when using a second language or when having to switch between native and second language. All three groups performed equally well. Significant predictors of deliberate reasoning were age, gender, education, perceived effort, and confidence but not the language context. Participants with low English proficiency spent more time reading compared to more fluent speakers.

CONCLUSION

There is no advantage of second language on deliberate reasoning in the absence of time pressure. Deliberation was not increased by providing items in a second language, but through the willingness to spend cognitive effort and time to read carefully.

Water supplementation after dehydration improves judgment and decision-making performance

Previous research has shown that dehydration and water supplementation affect mood and cognitive performance in both adults and children on a variety of tasks that assess memory, attention, executive function, and speeded responses. Given the varied effects of water on cognition, this study explored potential effects of water supplementation, hydration status, and thirst on thinking and decision-making tasks. 29 adult participants undertook a battery of cognitive tests on two separate occasions after having fasted from the previous night. On one occasion, they were offered 500 ml of water to drink prior to testing. Measures of urine osmolality confirmed the group-level effectiveness of the dehydration manipulation. Water supplementation was found to improve performance on tasks measuring cognitive reflection in judgement and decision-making. This increase in performance was associated with differences in tasks implicated in inhibition processes. Drinking water after a 12-h dehydration period increased performance in judgement and decision-making tasks, and this was not explained by differences in subjective thirst or attentiveness.

Thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection performance in schizotypy

Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10, Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition (FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets and refinements for cognitive therapies.

Diversity may help the uninterested: Evidence that exposure to counter-stereotypes promotes cognitive reflection for people low (but not high) in need for cognition

Previous theorizing and research has linked exposure to counter-stereotypical diversity (e.g., an Oxford-educated bricklayer) to enhanced cognitive performance and creativity. However, it is unclear whether people’s motivation to cognitively engage with the counter-stereotypical information (i.e., need for cognition [NFC]) influences this effect. Across three experiments ( N = 887) we found consistent support for the idea that exposure to counter-stereotypes (CSTs) promotes cognitive reflection for people low in NFC ( d+ = .34). In contrast, people high in NFC showed decreased cognitive reflection after being exposed to CSTs ( d+ = −.18), although the evidence for the latter effect was weak. These findings suggest that exposure to CSTs can promote cognitive reflection unless people have a strong desire to understand and predict outcomes and events, in which case exposure to CSTs may backfire. Taken together, we conclude that motivation to engage in cognitive activity may be an important consideration for research and interventions involving social and cultural diversity.

Effects of Thinking Dispositions, General Ability, Numeracy, and Instructional Set on Judgments and Decision-Making

To explore hypotheses based on Stanovich’s proposal that analytic processing comprises a reflective-level, an algorithmic level, and specific mindware, 342 participants completed measures of thinking dispositions, general ability (GA), numeracy, and probabilistic and nonprobabilistic reasoning. In a control condition, numeracy predicted probabilistic reasoning at high levels of both thinking dispositions and GA, and GA predicted nonprobabilistic reasoning at high levels of thinking dispositions. In a logic instruction condition, numeracy predicted probabilistic reasoning when GA was high, and GA affected nonprobabilistic reasoning directly. Thinking dispositions moderated neither relationship. Instead, instructions facilitated reasoning for low thinking disposition/high-ability participants, suggesting that logic instructions cued low thinking disposition individuals to engage in higher order reflective processing. The evidence is consistent with the proposals that reflective processes are essential to the allocation of algorithmic resources, and algorithmic resources are necessary for effective mindware implementation.

Exploring relationships between problem gambling, scratch card gambling, and individual differences in thinking style

BACKGROUND AND AIMS

Scratch cards are a popular form of lottery gambling available in many jurisdictions. However, there is a paucity of research that examines associations between individual differences in thinking style, participation in scratch card gambling, and problem gambling severity.

METHODS

In three studies, we sought to examine the relationships among these variables in large, online samples of participants. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, and self-reported their frequency of scratch card gambling.

RESULTS

Throughout all three studies, specific associations were reliably established. Specifically, negative associations were observed between participants' CRT and PGSI scores, as well as between participants' CRT scores and scratch card gambling frequency. In addition, we found a positive association between problem gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency. Finally, problem gambling severity was shown to correlate positively with participants' willingness to pay for irrelevant information in a scratch card gambling scenario.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, we observed that problem gambling severity is associated with an individuals' thinking style and scratch card gambling behavior. This study adds to the existing literature examining problem gambling, and highlights the role of thinking style in understanding gambling behavior and problematic gambling.

Syllogistic reasoning reveals reduced bias in people with higher autistic-like traits from the general population

Recent theories of autism have emphasised the cognitive strengths and weaknesses in those with autism, which are also seen to some degree in non-clinical samples with higher autistic-like traits. The dual process theory of autism proposes that people with autism and non-clinical people with a higher degree of autistic-like traits have a propensity to show reduced intuitive processing (automatic and typically faster) alongside enhanced propensity towards deliberative processing (dependent on general cognitive ability and typically slower). This study aimed to further test the dual process theory of autism by investigating syllogistic reasoning (whether a conclusion can be logically deduced from two propositions) in addition to the cognitive reflection test (correct responses to which reflect deliberative processing over-riding intuitive processing) with respect to the degree of autistic-like traits and general cognitive ability in a non-clinical sample of 189 adults. Results showed that higher levels of autistic-like traits were related to lower levels of intuitive processing and higher levels of deliberative processing, which was found across both the syllogistic reasoning and cognitive reflection test measures - over and above the effect of general cognitive ability. The findings are consistent with the dual process theory of autism, and implications for autism are discussed.

Performance Under Stress: An Eye-Tracking Investigation of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)

Stress pervades everyday life and impedes risky decision making. The following experiment is the first to examine effects of stress on risky decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), while measuring inspection time and conscious awareness of deck contingencies. This was original as it allowed a fine grained rigorous analysis of the way that stress impedes awareness of, and attention to maladaptive financial choices. The extended Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) further afforded examination of the impact of impaired reflective thinking on risky decision making. Stressed participants were slower to avoid the disadvantageous decks and performed worse overall. They inspected disadvantageous decks for longer than the control condition and were slower in developing awareness of their poor deck quality compared to the control condition. Conversely, in the control condition greater inspection times for advantageous decks were observed earlier in the task, and better awareness of the deck contingencies was shown as early as the second block of trials than the stress condition. Path analysis suggested that stress reduced IGT performance by impeding reflective thinking and conscious awareness. Explicit cognitive processes, moreover, were important during the preliminary phase of IGT performance-a finding that has significant implications for the use of the IGT as a clinical diagnostic tool. It was concluded that stress impedes reflective thinking, attentional disengagement from poorer decks, and the development of conscious knowledge about choice quality that interferes with performance on the IGT. These data demonstrate that stress impairs risky decision making performance, by impeding attention to, and awareness of task characteristics in risky decision making.

Cognitive Style and Frame Susceptibility in Decision-Making

The susceptibility of decision-makers' choices to variations in option framing has been attributed to individual differences in cognitive style. According to this view, individuals who are prone to a more deliberate, or less intuitive, thinking style are less susceptible to framing manipulations. Research findings on the topic, however, have tended to yield small effects, with several studies also being limited in inferential value by methodological drawbacks. We report two experiments that examined the value of several cognitive-style variables, including measures of cognitive reflection, subjective numeracy, actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition, and hemispheric dominance, in predicting participants' frame-consistent choices. Our experiments used an isomorph of the Asian Disease Problem and we manipulated frames between participants. We controlled for participants' sex and age, and we manipulated the order in which choice options were presented to participants. In Experiment 1 (N = 190) using an undergraduate sample and in Experiment 2 (N = 316) using a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, we found no significant effect of any of the cognitive-style measures taken on predicting frame-consistent choice, regardless of whether we analyzed participants' binary choices or their choices weighted by the extent to which participants preferred their chosen option over the non-chosen option. The sole factor that significantly predicted frame-consistent choice was framing: in both experiments, participants were more likely to make frame-consistent choices when the frame was positive than when it was negative, consistent with the tendency toward risk aversion in the task. The present findings do not support the view that individual differences in people's susceptibility to framing manipulations can be substantially accounted for by individual differences in cognitive style.

Cognitive Reflection and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

We present a large exploratory study ( N = 15,001) investigating the relationship between cognitive reflection and political affiliation, ideology, and voting in the 2016 Presidential Election. We find that Trump voters are less reflective than Clinton voters or third-party voters. However, much (although not all) of this difference was driven by Democrats who chose Trump. Among Republicans, conversely, Clinton and Trump voters were similar, whereas third-party voters were more reflective. Furthermore, although Democrats/liberals were somewhat more reflective than Republicans/conservatives overall, political moderates and nonvoters were least reflective, whereas libertarians were most reflective. Thus, beyond the previously theorized correlation between analytic thinking and liberalism, these data suggest three additional consequences of reflectiveness (or lack thereof) for political cognition: (a) facilitating political apathy versus engagement, (b) supporting the adoption of orthodoxy versus heterodoxy, and (c) drawing individuals toward candidates who share their cognitive style and toward policy proposals that are intuitively compelling.

The Reflective Mind: Examining Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Base Rate Neglect with fMRI

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.

Meta-ethics and the mortality: Mortality salience leads people to adopt a less subjectivist morality

Although lay notions in normative ethics have previously been investigated within the framework of the dual-process interpretation of the terror management theory (TMT), meta-ethical beliefs (subjective vs. objective morality) have not been previously investigated within the same framework. In the present research, we primed mortality salience, shown to impair reasoning performance in previous studies, to see whether it inhibits subjectivist moral judgments in three separate experiments. In Experiment 3, we also investigated whether impaired reasoning performance indeed mediates the effect of mortality salience on subjectivism. The results of the three experiments consistently showed that people in the mortality salience group reported significantly less subjectivist responses than the control group, and impaired reasoning performance partially mediates it. Overall, the results are consistent with the dual-process interpretation of TMT and suggest that not only normative but also meta-ethical judgments can be explained by this model.

Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning

Why do people believe blatantly inaccurate news headlines ("fake news")? Do we use our reasoning abilities to convince ourselves that statements that align with our ideology are true, or does reasoning allow us to effectively differentiate fake from real regardless of political ideology? Here we test these competing accounts in two studies (total N = 3446 Mechanical Turk workers) by using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as a measure of the propensity to engage in analytical reasoning. We find that CRT performance is negatively correlated with the perceived accuracy of fake news, and positively correlated with the ability to discern fake news from real news - even for headlines that align with individuals' political ideology. Moreover, overall discernment was actually better for ideologically aligned headlines than for misaligned headlines. Finally, a headline-level analysis finds that CRT is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively implausible (primarily fake) headlines, and positively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively plausible (primarily real) headlines. In contrast, the correlation between CRT and perceived accuracy is unrelated to how closely the headline aligns with the participant's ideology. Thus, we conclude that analytic thinking is used to assess the plausibility of headlines, regardless of whether the stories are consistent or inconsistent with one's political ideology. Our findings therefore suggest that susceptibility to fake news is driven more by lazy thinking than it is by partisan bias per se - a finding that opens potential avenues for fighting fake news.

Dunning-Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

The Dunning-Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning-Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their "need for cognition" (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning-Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.