Intermediate science knowledge predicts overconfidence

Lackner et al. found science overconfidence peaks at intermediate levels of knowledge. Those with intermediate knowledge also hold the most negative attitudes toward scientists. In doing so, they provide a novel measure of overconfidence that measures the tendency to give incorrect answers as opposed to answering, 'I don't know'.

Cognitive and emotional correlates of belief in political misinformation: Who endorses partisan misbeliefs?

Across two studies, we investigated how much cognitive variables and emotional dynamics anticipated endorsement of politically partisan misbeliefs. In Study 1 (n = 298), those with lower levels of cognitive ability endorsed more political misbeliefs regardless of whether those beliefs aligned with their political preferences. However, emotional investment in political parties and outcomes predicted who endorsed misbeliefs in a partisan manner. In Study 2 (n = 251), asking participants to briefly consider political misinformation as true via social consensus led them to feel dissonance, particularly for incompatible beliefs. Allowing them then to endorse or reject those misbeliefs reduced that dissonance yet maintained feelings of self-validation, particularly as participants rejected beliefs hostile to their political vies. This effect was stronger for emotionally invested participants. These findings suggest that endorsement of divisive partisan misbeliefs is associated with affective partisanship, a feature of the political landscape that is on the rise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Jumping to conclusions: Implications for reasoning errors, false belief, knowledge corruption, and impeded learning

In schizophrenia research, patients who "jump to conclusions" in probabilistic reasoning tasks tend to display impaired decision-making and delusional belief. In five studies, we examined whether jumping to conclusions (JTC) was similarly associated with decision impairments in a nonclinical sample, such as reasoning errors, false belief, overconfidence, and diminished learning. In Studies 1a and 1b, JTC was associated with errors stimulated by automatic reasoning, oddball beliefs such as conspiracy theories, and overconfidence. We traced these deficits to an absence of controlled processing rather than to an undue impact of automatic thinking, while ruling out roles for plausible alternative individual differences. In Studies 2 and 3, JTC was associated with higher confidence despite diminished performance in a novel probabilistic learning task (i.e., diagnosing illnesses), in part because those who exhibited JTC behavior were prone to overly exuberant theorizing, with no or little data, about how to approach the task early on. In Study 4, we adapted intervention materials used in schizophrenia treatment to train participants to avoid JCT. The intervention quelled overconfidence in the probabilistic learning task. In summary, this research suggests that a fruitful crosstalk may exist between research on psychopathology and work on social cognition within the general public. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The anti-scientists bias: The role of feelings about scientists in COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors

Across three studies, we investigated who expresses concern for COVID‐19, or coronavirus, and engages in behaviors that are consistent with slowing the spread of COVID‐19. In Studies 1 and 2 (n = 415, n = 199), those with warmer feelings toward scientists were more concerned and engaged in greater COVID‐preventative behaviors, regardless of partisanship. That is, an anti‐scientists bias was related to lessened concern and toward less preventive behaviors. Furthermore, those who were the most optimistic about hydroxychloroquine, a purported but unproven treatment against the virus, were less likely to engage in behaviors designed to decrease the spread of COVID‐19. In Study 3 (n = 259), asking participants to watch a scientist discuss hydroxychloroquine on Fox News led people to greater endorsement of COVID behaviors. In short, positive feelings toward scientists, rather than political attitudes or knowledge, related to who was concerned and those willing to engage in pandemic reducing behaviors. These behaviors were not immutable and can be changed by scientific out‐reach.

Consistency just feels right: Procedural fluency increases confidence in performance

Incidental features of a stimulus can increase how easily it is processed, which can then increase confidence in task performance. Here, we examine the impact of fluency stemming from procedural features embedded in a task rather than in the features of a stimulus. We propose that manipulating the consistency of procedural features over a series of stimuli can produce procedural fluency, a metacognitive sense of ease in processing that can inflate confidence without boosting accuracy. That is, even superficial consistency within a task can lead people to inaccurately believe they are performing better. As with fluency derived from features of individual stimuli, drawing attention to procedural consistency leads people to discount it, attenuating its impact on confidence. Further, the influence of procedural fluency on confidence relies on individuals' naïve theories about what fluency signals about their performance. Accordingly, manipulating these naïve theories mitigates the effects of procedural fluency on confidence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

Attosecond single-cycle undulator light: a review

Research at modern light sources continues to improve our knowledge of the natural world, from the subtle workings of life to matter under extreme conditions. Free-electron lasers, for instance, have enabled the characterization of biomolecular structures with sub-ångström spatial resolution, and paved the way to controlling the molecular functions. On the other hand, attosecond temporal resolution is necessary to broaden our scope of the ultrafast world. Here we discuss attosecond pulse generation beyond present capabilities. Furthermore, we review three recently proposed methods of generating attosecond x-ray pulses. These novel methods exploit the coherent radiation of microbunched electrons in undulators and the tailoring of the emitted wavefronts. The computed pulse energy outperforms pre-existing technologies by three orders of magnitude. Specifically, our simulations of the proposed Soft X-ray Laser at MAX IV (Lund, Sweden) show that a pulse duration of 50-100 as and a pulse energy up to 5 [Formula: see text]J is feasible with the novel methods. In addition, the methods feature pulse shape control, enable the incorporation of orbital angular momentum, and can be used in combination with modern compact free-electron laser setups.

Cultural Patterns Explain the Worldwide Perception/Performance Paradox in Student Self-Assessments of Math and Science Skill

Having skill does not necessarily mean more self-confidence in that skill, as shown in four panels, from 2003 to 2015 ( n ≈ 983,934), of self-assessments by eighth graders in the Trends in International Math and Science Study (TIMSS). Within a given country, self-judgments of math and science skill correlated positively with actual performance, but at the level of country average the correlation flipped. Students in countries with the best average performance held the most negative self-views of their skill, whereas students from nations with lowest average performance tended to hold the most favorable self-views. National differences in long-term orientation (LTO) versus short-term orientation (STO) accounted for this performance/perception paradox. Although LTO was associated with superior TIMSS performance, it also was associated with a general humility about the self. STO was related to lower objective performance but self-aggrandizing opinions of skill. Surprisingly, greater self-accuracy was related to individualism.

Reflections on Self-Reflection: Contemplating Flawed Self-Judgments in the Clinic, Classroom, and Office Cubicle

We reflect back on our 2004 monograph reviewing the implications of faulty self-judgment for health, education, and the workplace. The review proved popular, no doubt because the importance of accurate self-assessment is best reflected in just how broad the literature is that touches on this topic. We discuss opportunities and challenges to be found in the future study of self-judgment accuracy and error, and suggest that designing interventions aimed at improving self-judgments may prove to be a worthwhile but complex and nuanced task.

Hypocognition: Making Sense of the Landscape beyond One's Conceptual Reach

People think, feel, and behave within the confines of what they can conceive. Outside that conceptual landscape, people exhibit hypocognition (i.e., lacking cognitive or linguistic representations of concepts to describe ideas or explicate experiences). We review research on the implications of hypocognition for cognition and behavior. Drawing on the expertise and cross-cultural literatures, we describe how hypocognition impoverishes one's mental world, leaving cognitive deficits in recognition, explanation, and memory while fueling social chauvinism and conflict in political and cultural spheres. Despite its pervasive consequences, people cannot be expected to identify when they are in a hypocognitive state, mistaking what they conceive for the totality of all that there is. To the extent that their channel of knowledge becomes too narrow, people risk submitting to hypocognition's counterpart, hypercognition (i.e., the mistaken overapplication of other available conceptual notions to issues outside their actual relevance).

The effect of axial and abaxial release on meniscal displacement in the dog

The meniscal release (MR) is used to minimize meniscal pathology after Tibial Plateau Leveling Osteotomy (TPLO) surgery. The purposes of this study were: i) to describe meniscal orientation in a unaltered cadaveric canine stifle, a cruciate deficient stifle, TPLO repaired stifle with and without the MR using magnetic resonance imaging; ii) to determine if the abaxial release is equivalent to the axial release in its ability to affect caudal pole displacement in a TPLO repaired stifle and iii) to evaluate with MRI the effect of MR on the femorotibial articular cartilage contact area in a TPLO repaired stifle. Briefly, cadaver limbs were placed into a jig designed to mimic a weight-bearing stance at 140° and 90° at the stifle. The limbs were sequentially evaluated from the unaltered state; after cranial cruciate ligament transection; after TPLO stabilization; and finally after a meniscal release. No significant difference was found between the intrameniscal area (IMA) of the abaxial and axial meniscal releases although there was an increase in the IMA after the meniscal release compared to the IMA in the normal, cranial cruciate ligament deficient stifle, and TPLO stabilized stifle. In the abaxial release, a meniscal remnant remained in situ and provided a space effect between the femur and the tibial plateau. This is in contrast to the axial meniscal release, where the entire caudal pole of the medial meniscus relocated caudolaterally and consequently permitted more direct femorotibial contact. Overall, however, there was evidence of caudal pole compression of the medial meniscus throughout the MRI series which was ameliorated by either of the MR procedures.

Overconfidence among beginners: Is a little learning a dangerous thing?

Across 6 studies we investigated the development of overconfidence among beginners. In 4 of the studies, participants completed multicue probabilistic learning tasks (e.g., learning to diagnose "zombie diseases" from physical symptoms). Although beginners did not start out overconfident in their judgments, they rapidly surged to a "beginner's bubble" of overconfidence. This bubble was traced to exuberant and error-filled theorizing about how to approach the task formed after just a few learning experiences. Later trials challenged and refined those theories, leading to a temporary leveling off of confidence while performance incrementally improved, although confidence began to rise again after this pause. In 2 additional studies we found a real-world echo of this pattern of overconfidence across the life course. Self-ratings of financial literacy surged among young adults, then leveled off among older respondents until late adulthood, where it begins to rise again, with actual financial knowledge all the while rising more slowly, consistently, and incrementally throughout adulthood. Hence, when it comes to overconfident judgment, a little learning does appear to be a dangerous thing. Although beginners start with humble self-perceptions, with just a little experience their confidence races ahead of their actual performance. (PsycINFO Database Record

Trait Importance and Modifiability as Factors Influencing Self-Assessment and Self-Enhancement Motives

People's search for information about the self is governed by motives of self-enhancement (seeking feedback to the extent that it will be favorable) and self-assessment (seeking accurate feed-back regardless of its favorability). Which motive predominates as an ability under consideration becomes more important? An experiment suggested that both motives are evoked, depending on whether people believe the ability reflects a stable or malleable aspect of personality. When an ability was described as stable, subjects displayed a self-enhancing pattern, showing greater enthusiasm for feedback after success than after failure on an initial test for the trait, but only when the ability was deemed important. In contrast, when the ability was described as malleable, subjects followed a self-assessment pattern, being more solicitous of feedback when the trait was described as important as opposed to inconsequential, regardless of initial success or failure.

The Mixed Blessings of Self-Knowledge in Behavioral Prediction: Enhanced Discrimination but Exacerbated Bias

Four experiments demonstrate that self-knowledge provides a mixed blessing in behavioral prediction, depending on how accuracy is measured. Compared with predictions of others, selfknowledge tends to decrease overall accuracy by increasing bias (the mean difference between predicted behavior and reality) but tends to increase overall accuracy by also enhancing discrimination (the correlation between predicted behavior and reality). Overall, participants’ self-predictions overestimated the likelihood that they would engage in desirable behaviors (bias), whereas peer predictions were relatively unbiased. However, selfpredictions also were more strongly correlated with individual differences in actual behavior (discrimination) than were peer predictions. Discussion addresses the costs and benefits of selfknowledge in behavioral prediction and the broader implications of measuring judgmental accuracy of judgment in terms of bias versus discrimination.

Flawed Self-Assessment

Research from numerous corners of psychological inquiry suggests that self-assessments of skill and character are often flawed in substantive and systematic ways. We review empirical findings on the imperfect nature of self-assessment and discuss implications for three real-world domains: health, education, and the workplace.

In general, people's self-views hold only a tenuous to modest relationship with their actual behavior and performance. The correlation between self-ratings of skill and actual performance in many domains is moderate to meager—indeed, at times, other people's predictions of a person's outcomes prove more accurate than that person's self-predictions. In addition, people overrate themselves. On average, people say that they are “above average” in skill (a conclusion that defies statistical possibility), overestimate the likelihood that they will engage in desirable behaviors and achieve favorable outcomes, furnish overly optimistic estimates of when they will complete future projects, and reach judgments with too much confidence. Several psychological processes conspire to produce flawed self-assessments.

Research focusing on health echoes these findings. People are unrealistically optimistic about their own health risks compared with those of other people. They also overestimate how distinctive their opinions and preferences (e.g., discomfort with alcohol) are among their peers—a misperception that can have a deleterious impact on their health. Unable to anticipate how they would respond to emotion-laden situations, they mispredict the preferences of patients when asked to step in and make treatment decisions for them. Guided by mistaken but seemingly plausible theories of health and disease, people misdiagnose themselves—a phenomenon that can have severe consequences for their health and longevity.

Similarly, research in education finds that students' assessments of their performance tend to agree only moderately with those of their teachers and mentors. Students seem largely unable to assess how well or poorly they have comprehended material they have just read. They also tend to be overconfident in newly learned skills, at times because the common educational practice of massed training appears to promote rapid acquisition of skill—as well as self-confidence—but not necessarily the retention of skill. Several interventions, however, can be introduced to prompt students to evaluate their skill and learning more accurately.

In the workplace, flawed self-assessments arise all the way up the corporate ladder. Employees tend to overestimate their skill, making it difficult to give meaningful feedback. CEOs also display overconfidence in their judgments, particularly when stepping into new markets or novel projects—for example, proposing acquisitions that hurt, rather then help, the price of their company's stock. We discuss several interventions aimed at circumventing the consequences of such flawed assessments; these include training people to routinely make cognitive repairs correcting for biased self-assessments and requiring people to justify their decisions in front of their peers.

The act of self-assessment is an intrinsically difficult task, and we enumerate several obstacles that prevent people from reaching truthful self-impressions. We also propose that researchers and practitioners should recognize self-assessment as a coherent and unified area of study spanning many subdisciplines of psychology and beyond. Finally, we suggest that policymakers and other people who makes real-world assessments should be wary of self-assessments of skill, expertise, and knowledge, and should consider ways of repairing self-assessments that may be flawed.

Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence

Successful negotiation of everyday life would seem to require people to possess insight about deficiencies in their intellectual and social skills. However, people tend to be blissfully unaware of their incompetence. This lack of awareness arises because poor performers are doubly cursed: Their lack of skill deprives them not only of the ability to produce correct responses, but also of the expertise necessary to surmise that they are not producing them. People base their perceptions of performance, in part, on their preconceived notions about their skills. Because these notions often do not correlate with objective performance, they can lead people to make judgments about their performance that have little to do with actual accomplishment.

Cognitive Dissonance and the Perception of Natural Environments

Two studies demonstrated that the motivation to resolve cognitive dissonance affects the visual perception of physical environments. In Study 1, subjects crossed a campus quadrangle wearing a costume reminiscent of Carmen Miranda. In Study 2, subjects pushed themselves up a hill while kneeling on a skateboard. Subjects performed either task under a high-choice, low-choice, or control condition. Subjects in the high-choice conditions, presumably to resolve dissonance, perceived the environment to be less aversive than did subjects in the low-choice and control conditions, seeing a shorter distance to travel (Study 1) and a shallower slope to climb (Study 2). These studies suggest that the impact of motivational states extends from social judgment down into perceptual processes.

Beyond the Correlation Coefficient in Studies of Self-Assessment Accuracy: Commentary on Zell & Krizan (2014)

Zell and Krizan (2014, this issue) provide a comprehensive yet incomplete portrait of the factors influencing accurate self-assessment. This is no fault of their own. Much work on self-accuracy focuses on the correlation coefficient as the measure of accuracy, but it is not the only way self-accuracy can be measured. As such, its use can provide an incomplete and potentially misleading story. We urge researchers to explore measures of bias as well as correlation, because there are indirect hints that each respond to a different psychological dynamic. We further entreat researchers to develop other creative measures of accuracy and not to forget that self-accuracy may come not only from personal knowledge but also from insight about human nature more generally.

When Knowledge Knows No Bounds: Self-Perceived Expertise Predicts Claims of Impossible Knowledge

People overestimate their knowledge, at times claiming knowledge of concepts, events, and people that do not exist and cannot be known, a phenomenon called overclaiming. What underlies assertions of such impossible knowledge? We found that people overclaim to the extent that they perceive their personal expertise favorably. Studies 1a and 1b showed that self-perceived financial knowledge positively predicts claiming knowledge of nonexistent financial concepts, independent of actual knowledge. Study 2 demonstrated that self-perceived knowledge within specific domains (e.g., biology) is associated specifically with overclaiming within those domains. In Study 3, warning participants that some of the concepts they saw were fictitious did not reduce the relationship between self-perceived knowledge and overclaiming, which suggests that this relationship is not driven by impression management. In Study 4, boosting self-perceived expertise in geography prompted assertions of familiarity with nonexistent places, which supports a causal role for self-perceived expertise in claiming impossible knowledge.

Causal trait theories: a new form of person knowledge that explains egocentric pattern projection

Representations of the self and others include not only piecemeal traits but also causal trait theories-explanations for why a person's standing on 1 trait causes or is caused by standings on other traits (Studies 1a-1c). These causal theories help resolve the puzzle of egocentric pattern projection-the tendency for people to assume that traits correlate in the population in the same way they align in the self. Causal trait theories-created to explain trait co-occurrence in a single person-are exported to guide one's implicit personality theories about people in general (Study 2). Pattern projection was found to be largely egocentric (i.e., more strong guided by self- than by social perceptions) for 2 reasons. First, causal trait theories are more numerous for the self. When participants were prompted to generate causal trait theories about someone else, they pattern projected more from that person (Study 3). Second, causal trait theories about the self are more likely to draw on behavioral information from multiple contexts instead of merely seeking to explain why 2 traits co-occur in a single context. Causal trait theories based on trait-relevant behaviors from different contexts, instead of trait co-occurrence within a single context, produce more pattern projection (Study 4). Implications for self and social cognition are discussed.

Self-Affirmations Provide a Broader Perspective on Self-Threat

We present an “affirmation as perspective” model of how self-affirmations alleviate threat and defensiveness. Self-threats dominate the working self-concept, leading to a constricted self disproportionately influenced by the threat. Self-affirmations expand the size of the working self-concept, offering a broader perspective in which the threat appears more narrow and self-worth realigns with broader dispositional self-views (Experiment 1). Self-affirmed participants, relative to those not affirmed, indicated that threatened self-aspects were less all-defining of the self (although just as important), and this broader perspective on the threat mediated self-affirmation’s reduction of defensiveness (Experiment 2). Finally, having participants complete a simple perspective exercise, which offered a broader perspective on the self without prompting affirmational thinking (Experiment 3a), reduced defensiveness in a manner equivalent to and redundant with a standard self-affirmation manipulation (Experiment 3b). The present model offers a unifying account for a wide variety of seemingly unrelated findings and mysteries in the self-affirmation literature.

Trust at zero acquaintance: more a matter of respect than expectation of reward

Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling "excess" of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person's character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person's character is eliminated as an issue.

Emotionally unskilled, unaware, and uninterested in learning more: reactions to feedback about deficits in emotional intelligence

Despite the importance of self-awareness for managerial success, many organizational members hold overly optimistic views of their expertise and performance-a phenomenon particularly prevalent among those least skilled in a given domain. We examined whether this same pattern extends to appraisals of emotional intelligence (EI), a critical managerial competency. We also examined why this overoptimism tends to survive explicit feedback about performance. Across 3 studies involving professional students, we found that the least skilled had limited insight into deficits in their performance. Moreover, when given concrete feedback, low performers disparaged either the accuracy or the relevance of that feedback, depending on how expediently they could do so. Consequently, they expressed more reluctance than top performers to pursue various paths to self-improvement, including purchasing a book on EI or paying for professional coaching. Paradoxically, it was top performers who indicated a stronger desire to improve their EI following feedback.

Behavioral Influences in the Present Tense

Seligman and colleagues importantly ask when behavior is produced by the past or the future, but in doing so forget that it can also be guided by the present. We discuss the distinction between expressive influences (i.e., those that attach to behavioral choices in the present) and instrumental ones (i.e., those attached to potential future outcomes of those choices). We argue that expressive influences play a larger role in decision-making, particularly social decisions about trust, than economists and psychologists recognize. As such, any discussion of the influence of past and future on behavior must also include a treatment of influences that exist in the immediate here and now.

Wishful Seeing

People assume that they perceive the world as it really is. In this article, we review research that questions this assumption and instead suggests that people see what they want to see. We discuss classic and current research demonstrating wishful seeing across two perceptual tasks, showing that people categorize ambiguous visual information and represent their environments in ways that align with their desires. Further, we outline when and how wishful seeing occurs. We suggest directions for future research in light of historical trends and contemporary revisions of the study of wishful seeing.

The influence of high intensity terahertz radiation on mammalian cell adhesion, proliferation and differentiation

Understanding the influence of exposure of biological systems to THz radiation is becoming increasingly important. There is some evidence to suggest that THz radiation can influence important activities within mammalian cells. This study evaluated the influence of the high peak power, low average power THz radiation produced by the ALICE (Daresbury Laboratory, UK) synchrotron source on human epithelial and embryonic stem cells. The cells were maintained under standard tissue culture conditions, during which the THz radiation was delivered directly into the incubator for various exposure times. The influence of the THz radiation on cell morphology, attachment, proliferation and differentiation was evaluated. The study demonstrated that there was no difference in any of these parameters between irradiated and control cell cultures. It is suggested that under these conditions the cells are capable of compensating for any effects caused by exposure to THz radiation with the peak powers levels employed in these studies.

Affective signals of threat increase perceived proximity

Do stimuli appear to be closer when they are more threatening? We tested people's perceptions of distance to stimuli that they felt were threatening relative to perceptions of stimuli they felt were disgusting or neutral. Two studies demonstrated that stimuli that emitted affective signals of threat (e.g., an aggressive male student) were seen as physically closer than stimuli that emitted affective signals of disgust (e.g., a repulsive male student) or no affective signal. Even after controlling for the direct effects of physiological arousal, object familiarity, and intensity of the negative emotional reaction, we found that threatening stimuli appeared to be physically closer than did disgusting ones (Study 2). These findings highlight the links among biased perception, action regulation, and successful navigation of the environment.

The effect of leg length discrepancy on pelvis and spine kinematics during gait

There are assumptions that leg length discrepancy (LLD) may cause low back pain by creating pelvis obliquity and lumbar scoliosis. Although individuals with LLD develop compensatory movements in the lower limbs and pelvis during walking, few investigations have attempted to identify kinematic variables of the upper body. This study aims to gain an understanding of how simulated LLD influences three-dimensional motion of the pelvis and spine. Seven male participants were required to walk barefoot at a preferred speed. Three LLD conditions (1, 2, and 3cm) were simulated using modified pieces of high density EVA attached to the right foot. An optoelectronic motion analysis system was used to record kinematic data of the pelvis and spine (lumbar, lower and upper thoracic segments) for each condition. Differences in range of motion and patterns of movement for the pelvis and lumbar spine were minimal between barefoot and LLD conditions. These observations could be attributed to various kinematic compensatory strategies within the lower limbs which require further in-depth investigation.

Age differences in temporal discounting: the role of dispositional affect and anticipated emotions

We examined age differences in temporal discounting, the tendency to devalue delayed outcomes relative to immediate ones, with particular emphasis on the role of affective responses. A life-span sample completed an incentive-compatible temporal discounting task involving both monetary gains and losses. Covariates included demographic characteristics, cognitive functioning, personality traits, affective responses, and subjective health. Advanced age was associated with a lower tendency to discount the future, but this effect reached statistical significance only for the discounting of delayed gains. An examination of covariates suggested that age effects were associated with age differences in mental health and affective responses rather than demographic or cognitive variables.

Being All That You Can Be

An accurate assessment of an individual often requires taking their potential into account. Across six studies the authors found that people are more inclined to do so when evaluating themselves than when evaluating others, such that people credit themselves for their perceived potential more than they credit others for theirs. Participants rated potential as a more telling component of the self than of others, and the importance participants placed on their own potential led to attentional biases toward information about their own future potential that did not apply to information about the potential of others. Furthermore, when assessing themselves and other people, participants required more tangible proof that someone else has a given level of potential than they required of themselves, and they relied more on how they would ideally perform in self-assessment but more on how others actually performed in judging them.