On a confusion about a function of consciousness

Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction

The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems and proposing novel approaches.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Multisensory perceptual awareness: Categorical or graded?

Neural evidence suggests that mechanisms associated with conscious access (i.e., the ability to report on a conscious state) are "all-or-none". Upon crossing some threshold, neural signals are globally broadcast throughout the brain and allow conscious reports. However, whether subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness) is categorical (i.e., transitioning abruptly from unconscious to conscious states) or graded (i.e., characterized by multiple intermediate states) remains an open question. To address this issue, we built a series of artificial neural networks containing distinct feedback connectivity from "multisensory" to "unisensory" cortices. In line with consciousness theories, we operationalized perceptual consciousness by the presence of feedback from higher-order nodes back to unisensory nodes which allow 'neural ignition' - a rapid, non-linear boost in response putatively leading to phenomenal consciousness. When simulating how these networks responded to unisensory and multisensory inputs, we found the fastest responses for multisensory presentations associated with multisensory feedback, and the slowest responses for multisensory presentations without feedback. Most interestingly, despite being built in line with "all-or-none" models of consciousness, multisensory stimuli associated with unisensory feedback (i.e., auditory or visual), and hence consistent with unisensory phenomenology according to theories of consciousness, generated intermediate reaction times. To extend these models to human perception and performance, we conducted extensive psychophysical testing in 29 subjects who each completed 10 h of a multisensory cue-congruency task. Consistent with the modeling results, we found that reaction times to multisensory cues reported as unisensory were intermediate between those of fully aware and fully unaware cues. These results support the existence of graded forms of phenomenological consciousness that can be instantiated by simple neural networks built in line with "all-or-none" models of consciousness.

Systema Temporis: A time-based dimensional framework for consciousness and cognition

This study uses a combined categorical-dimensional approach to depict a hierarchical framework for consciousness similar to, and contiguous with, factorial models of cognition (cf., intelligence). On the basis of the longstanding definition of time consciousness, the analysis employs a dimension of temporal extension, in the same manner that psychology has temporally organised memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, and long-lasting memories). By defining temporal extension in terms of the structure of time perception at short timescales (<100 s), memory and time consciousness are proposed to fit along the same logarithmic dimension. This suggests that different forms of time consciousness (e.g., experience, wakefulness, and self-consciousness) are embedded within, or supported by, the ascending timescales of different modes of memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, etc.). A secondary dimension is also proposed to integrate higher-order forms of consciousness/emotion and memory/cognition. The resulting two-dimensional structure accords with existing theories of cognitive and emotional intelligence.

Testing the Empathy Theory of Dreaming: The Relationships Between Dream Sharing and Trait and State Empathy

In general, dreams are a novel but realistic simulation of waking social life, with a mixture of characters, motivations, scenarios, and positive and negative emotions. We propose that the sharing of dreams has an empathic effect on the dreamer and on significant others who hear and engage with the telling of the dream. Study 1 tests three correlations that are predicted by the theory of dream sharing and empathy: that trait empathy will be correlated with frequency of telling dreams to others, with frequency of listening to others' dreams, and with trait attitude toward dreams (ATD) (for which higher scores indicate positive attitude). 160 participants completed online the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire and the Mannheim Dream Questionnaire. Pearson partial correlations were conducted, with age and sex partialled out. Trait empathy was found to be significantly associated with the frequency of listening to the dreams of others, frequency of telling one's own dreams to others, and attitude toward dreams. Study 2 tests the effects of discussing dreams on state empathy, using an adapted version of the Shen (2010) state empathy scale, for 27 pairs of dream sharers and discussers. Dream discussion followed the stages of the Ullman (1996) dream appreciation technique. State empathy of the dream discusser toward the dream sharer was found to increase significantly as a result of the dream discussion, with a medium effect size, whereas the dream sharer had a small decrease in empathy toward the discusser. A proposed mechanism for these associations and effects is taken from the robust findings in the literature that engagement with literary fiction can induce empathy toward others. We suggest that the dream acts as a piece of fiction that can be explored by the dreamer together with other people, and can thus induce empathy about the life circumstances of the dreamer. We discuss the speculation that the story-like characteristics of adult human dreams may have been selected for in human evolution, including in sexual selection, as part of the selection for emotional intelligence, empathy, and social bonding.

Conceptualizing intellectual attention

Remembering that there’s a difference between intellectual and perceptual attention can help us avoid miscommunication due to meaning different things by the same terms, which has been a particular problem during the last hundred years or so of the study of attention. I demonstrate this through analyzing in depth one such miscommunication that occurred in a philosophical criticism of the influential psychological text, Inattentional Blindness. But after making the distinction between perceptual attention and intellectual attention, and after making an effort to keep this distinction in mind, we are still faced with the problem of specifying what makes intellectual attention distinct from perceptual attention. In the second half of this article, I discuss the range of proposals about how to understand intellectual attention that are present in the literature, and the problems with them. I do this with the aim of stimulating further discussion about how best to conceptualize intellectual attention, although I do not settle that further question within this paper.

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

There are strong reasons to believe that our conscious inner life is structured, suggested both by introspection as well as scientific psychology. One of the most salient structural characteristics of conscious experiences is known as unity of consciousness. In this contribution, we wish to demonstrate how features of experience that pertain to the unity of consciousness could be made precise in terms of mathematical relations that hold between phenomenal objects. Based on phenomenological considerations, we first outline three such features. These are (i) environmental embedding, (ii) the mutual constraint between local and global representations, and (iii) a top-down process of object formation in consciousness. We then introduce a formal model based on the notion of phenomenal space, defined in terms of a set of quasi-elementary and extended entities. We describe the structure of phenomenal space by appealing to mereological and topological concepts, and we outline a projector-based calculus to account for the idea that the structure of phenomenal space is ultimately dynamical. Using the above concepts, one could approach the mind-matter problem by relating environmentally embedded agents to topologically well-defined objects that result from decompositions of phenomenal space. We conclude our discussion by putting it into the context of some recent conceptual questions that appear in cognitive science and consciousness studies. We opt for the possibility to regard the phenomenon of consciousness not in terms of a singular transition that happens between "brain" and "mind" but rather in terms of a series of transitions between structured layers of experience.

Cue awareness in avoiding effortful control

Based on a recent metacognitive account, cognitive effort is the result of an inferential evaluation made over explicitly available cues. Following from this account, we present here a pre-registered experiment that tested the specific hypothesis that explicit awareness of cues that are aligned with cognitive demand is a prerequisite in avoiding effortful lines of action. We attempted to modulate levels of effort avoidance behavior by introducing an incentive (between-subjects) to monitor two lines of action that, unbeknownst to individuals, varied in the probability of a task switch. Importantly, previous research has demonstrated that the difference in these probabilities is relatively opaque to individuals. We did not find strong evidence for our incentive manipulation having an effect on demand avoidance as indexed by individuals' choices in a block of the task where avoiding effort was instructed. However, we do find that being aware of the task-switching cue appears to increase the likelihood of demand avoidance. We consider these results within the context of the metacognition of cognitive effort.

The Universality of Experiential Consciousness

It is argued that of Block’s (On a confusion about a function of consciousness, 1995; The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, 1997) two types of consciousness, namely phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) and access consciousness (a-consciousness), that p-consciousness applies to all living things but that a-consciousness is uniquely human. This differs from Block’s assertion that a-consciousness also applies to some non-human organisms. It is suggested that p-consciousness, awareness, experience and perception are basically equivalent and that human consciousness has in addition to percept-based p-consciousness, concept-based a-consciousness, a verbal and conceptual form of consciousness that can be utilized to coordinate, organize and plan activities for rational decision-making. This argument is based on Logan’s (The Extended Mind: The Emergence of Language, The Human Mind and Culture, 1997) assertion that humans are uniquely capable of reasoning and rationality because they are uniquely capable of verbal language and hence the ability to conceptualize.

Temporal Metacognition as the Decoding of Self-Generated Brain Dynamics

Metacognition, the ability to know about one’s thought process, is self-referential. Here, we combined psychophysics and time-resolved neuroimaging to explore metacognitive inference on the accuracy of a self-generated behavior. Human participants generated a time interval and evaluated the signed magnitude of their temporal production. We show that both self-generation and self-evaluation relied on the power of beta oscillations (β; 15–40 Hz) with increases in early β power predictive of increases in duration. We characterized the dynamics of β power in a low-dimensional space (β state-space trajectories) as a function of timing and found that the more distinct trajectories, the more accurate metacognitive inferences were. These results suggest that β states instantiate an internal variable determining the fate of the timing network’s trajectory, possibly as release from inhibition. Altogether, our study describes oscillatory mechanisms for timing, suggesting that temporal metacognition relies on inferential processes of self-generated dynamics.

Subjective inflation: phenomenology's get-rich-quick scheme

How do we explain the seemingly rich nature of visual phenomenology while accounting for impoverished perception in the periphery? This apparent mismatch has led some to posit that rich phenomenological content overflows cognitive access, whereas others hold that phenomenology is in fact sparse and constrained by cognitive access. Here, we review the Rich versus Sparse debate as it relates to a phenomenon called subjective inflation, wherein minimally attended or peripheral visual perception tends to be subjectively evaluated as more reliable than attended or foveal perception when objective performance is matched. We argue that subjective inflation can account for rich phenomenology without invoking phenomenological overflow. On this view, visual phenomenology is constrained by cognitive access, but seemingly inflated above what would be predicted based on sparse sensory content.

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness

According to a popular distinction proposed by the philosopher Ned Block in 1995, our conscious experience would overflow the very limited set of what we can consciously report to ourselves and to others. He proposed to coin this limited consciousness 'Access Consciousness' (A-Cs) and to define 'Phenomenal Consciousness' as a much richer subjective experience that is not accessed but that would still delineate the extent of consciousness. In this article, I review and develop five major problems raised by this theory, and show how a strict A-Cs theory can account for our conscious experience. I illustrate such an A-Cs account within the global workspace (GW) theoretical framework, and revisit some seminal empirical findings and neuropsychological syndromes. In this strict A-Cs perspective, subjective reports are not conceived as the mere passive broadcasting of information to the GW, but as resulting from a dynamic and active chain of internal processes that notably include interpretative and belief attribution stages. Finally, I list a set of testable predictions, of unsolved questions and of some counterintuitive hypotheses.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

"I" and "Me": The Self in the Context of Consciousness

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as "Me" and the self as "I". This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between "Me" and "I" in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former ("Me") corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter ("I") reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger's (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-"I" [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958)] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.

Unity of consciousness

Although there is much talk in various literatures of streams of consciousness, and most of us have an intuitive understanding of such talk, we are far from having a full grasp of what it is that unifies streams of consciousness, binding together the individual experiences that serve as their constituents. In recent years, discussion of this topic has been principally concerned with synchronic unity of consciousness-the form of unity that is exhibited by momentary states of consciousness, or in other words, by time slices or temporal segments of streams. There are two main questions about synchronic unity. First, what is its scope? Are the simultaneous experiences of a single subject necessarily unified? Generally but not necessarily unified? Sometimes unified? And second, what is the nature of synchronic unity? Is it a fundamental phenomenon, and if not, what are the more basic phenomena that constitute it? This essay reviews recent work on these questions, and provides reasons for preferring some answers to others. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Metaphysics.

Building Blocks of Psychology: on Remaking the Unkept Promises of Early Schools

The appeal and popularity of "building blocks", i.e., simple and dissociable elements of behavior and experience, persists in psychological research. We begin our assessment of this research strategy with an historical review of structuralism (as espoused by E. B. Titchener) and behaviorism (espoused by J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner), two movements that held the assumption in their attempts to provide a systematic and unified discipline. We point out the ways in which the elementism of the two schools selected, framed, and excluded topics of study. After the historical review, we turn to contemporary literature and highlight the persistence of research into building blocks and the associated framing and exclusions in psychological research. The assumption that complex categories of human psychology can be understood in terms of their elementary components and simplest forms seems indefensible. In specific cases, therefore, reliance on the assumption requires justification. Finally, we review alternative strategies that bypass the commitment to building blocks.

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

There is compelling evidence that the "what it feels like" subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings

We defend a functionalist approach to emotion that begins by focusing on emotions as central states with causal connections to behavior and to other cognitive states. The approach brackets the conscious experience of emotion, lists plausible features that emotions exhibit, and argues that alternative schemes (e.g., focusing on feelings or on neurobiology as the starting point) are unpromising candidates. We conclude with the benefits of our approach: one can study emotions in animals; one can look in the brain for the implementation of specific features; and one ends up with an architecture of the mind in which emotions are fully accommodated through their relations to the rest of cognition. Our article focuses on arguing for this general approach; as such, it is an essay in the philosophy of emotion rather than in the psychology or neuroscience of emotion.

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.

In Situ Representations and Access Consciousness in Neural Blackboard or Workspace Architectures

Phenomenal theories of consciousness assert that consciousness is based on specific neural correlates in the brain, which can be separated from all cognitive functions we can perform. If so, the search for robot consciousness seems to be doomed. By contrast, theories of functional or access consciousness assert that consciousness can be studied only with forms of cognitive access, given by cognitive processes. Consequently, consciousness and cognitive access cannot be fully dissociated. Here, the global features of cognitive access of consciousness are discussed based on neural blackboard or (global) workspace architectures, combined with content addressable or “in situ” representations as found in the brain. These representations allow continuous cognitive access in the form of a process of covert or overt queries and answers that could underlie forms of access consciousness. A crucial aspect of this process is that it is controlled by the activity of the in situ representations themselves and the relations they can initiate, not by an external controller like a CPU that runs a particular program. Although the resulting process of access consciousness is indeed based on specific features of the brain, there are no principled reasons to assume that this process cannot be achieved in robots either.

Minimally conscious state or cortically mediated state?

Durable impairments of consciousness are currently classified in three main neurological categories: comatose state, vegetative state (also recently coined unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) and minimally conscious state. While the introduction of minimally conscious state, in 2002, was a major progress to help clinicians recognize complex non-reflexive behaviours in the absence of functional communication, it raises several problems. The most important issue related to minimally conscious state lies in its criteria: while behavioural definition of minimally conscious state lacks any direct evidence of patient's conscious content or conscious state, it includes the adjective 'conscious'. I discuss this major problem in this review and propose a novel interpretation of minimally conscious state: its criteria do not inform us about the potential residual consciousness of patients, but they do inform us with certainty about the presence of a cortically mediated state. Based on this constructive criticism review, I suggest three proposals aiming at improving the way we describe the subjective and cognitive state of non-communicating patients. In particular, I present a tentative new classification of impairments of consciousness that combines behavioural evidence with functional brain imaging data, in order to probe directly and univocally residual conscious processes.

Associative Attitude Learning: A Closer Look at Evidence and How It Relates to Attitude Models

Associative attitude learning is typically viewed as a low-level process that automatically registers mere co-occurrences between stimuli, independent of their validity and relational meaning. This view invites to critically examine how attitude formation conforms to four operating conditions (i.e., unawareness, efficiency, goal independence, and uncontrollability) and two operating principles (i.e., unqualified registration of mere co-occurrences between stimuli and formation of direct stimulus–response links), which is the main purpose of the present contribution. The general discussion examines how contemporary attitude models endorse these conditions and principles. Overall, this contribution calls for (a) a nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of associative attitude learning, (b) a fine-grained understanding of how contemporary attitude models endorse conditions and principles reviewed here and find them relevant to their theorization of attitude formation, (c) a clarification of how direct and indirect evaluative measures relate to these conditions and principles, and (d) enhanced efforts in specifying contemporary attitude formation models.

Visual awareness negativity is an early neural correlate of awareness: A preregistered study with two Gabor sizes

Electrophysiological recordings are commonly used to study the neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Previous research is inconsistent as to whether awareness can be indexed with visual awareness negativity (VAN) at about 200 ms or if it occurs later. The present study was preregistered with two main aims: First, to provide independent evidence for or against the presence of VAN, and second, to study whether stimulus size may account for the inconsistent findings. Subjects were shown low-contrast Gaussian filtered gratings (Gabor patches) in the four visual quadrants. Gabor size (large and small) was varied in different sessions and calibrated to each subject's threshold of visual awareness. Event-related potentials were derived from trials in which subjects localized the Gabors correctly to capture the difference between trials in which they reported awareness versus no awareness. Bayesian analyses revealed very strong evidence for the presence of VAN for both Gabor sizes. However, there was no evidence for or against an effect of stimulus size. The present findings provide evidence for VAN as an early neural correlate of awareness.

Humanoid Cognitive Robots That Learn by Imitating: Implications for Consciousness Studies

While the concept of a conscious machine is intriguing, producing such a machine remains controversial and challenging. Here, we describe how our work on creating a humanoid cognitive robot that learns to perform tasks via imitation learning relates to this issue. Our discussion is divided into three parts. First, we summarize our previous framework for advancing the understanding of the nature of phenomenal consciousness. This framework is based on identifying computational correlates of consciousness. Second, we describe a cognitive robotic system that we recently developed that learns to perform tasks by imitating human-provided demonstrations. This humanoid robot uses cause–effect reasoning to infer a demonstrator’s intentions in performing a task, rather than just imitating the observed actions verbatim. In particular, its cognitive components center on top-down control of a working memory that retains the explanatory interpretations that the robot constructs during learning. Finally, we describe our ongoing work that is focused on converting our robot’s imitation learning cognitive system into purely neurocomputational form, including both its low-level cognitive neuromotor components, its use of working memory, and its causal reasoning mechanisms. Based on our initial results, we argue that the top-down cognitive control of working memory, and in particular its gating mechanisms, is an important potential computational correlate of consciousness in humanoid robots. We conclude that developing high-level neurocognitive control systems for cognitive robots and using them to search for computational correlates of consciousness provides an important approach to advancing our understanding of consciousness, and that it provides a credible and achievable route to ultimately developing a phenomenally conscious machine.

The Confluence of Perceiving and Thinking in Consciousness Phenomenology

The processual relation of thinking and perceiving shall be examined from a historical perspective as well as on the basis of methodically conducted first-person observation. Historically, these two psychological aspects of human knowledge and corresponding philosophical positions have predominant alternating phases. At certain historical points, thinking and perceiving tend to converge, while in the interim phases they seem to diverge with an emphasis on one of them. While at the birth of modern science, for instance, these two forms of mental life were deeply interlinked, today they seem to be separated more than ever before - as a number of scientific crises have shown. Turning from the outer to the inner aspect of this issue, a phenomenological view becomes relevant. In terms of the consciousness phenomenology developed by Steiner (1861-1925) and Witzenmann's (1905-1988) Structure Phenomenology, this article will show how a methodical integration of thinking and perceiving can be carried out on the basis of first-person observation. In the course of a skilled introspective or meditative self-observation the individual's own mental micro-actions of separating and integrating come into view, jointly constituting what we usually call thinking and perceiving. Consequently, this approach includes a conceptual as well as a perceptual dimension the experimental confluence of which ties in with the methodological core principle of modern natural science. At the same time, making this principle explicit may open the way to a further development of human consciousness and its scientific delineation.

Preliminary Data about the Validation of a Self-Report for the Assessment of Interpersonal Guilt: The Interpersonal Guilt Rating Scales-15s (IGRS-15s)

The aim of this article is to present validation data about a self-report rating scale for the assessment of interpersonal guilt according to Control-Mastery Theory (CMT; Silbershatz, 2005; Weiss, 1993; Weiss, Sampson, & The Mount Zion Psychotherapy Research Group, 1986), the Interpersonal Guilt Rating Scale-15s (IGRS-15s). In order to perform the validation of this tool in an Italian sample we have collected a sample of 645 nonclinical subjects. They had to complete the IGRS-15s, the Scale for the Measurement of the Impending Punishment (SMIP; Caprara et al., 1990), the Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire-67 (IGQ-67; O'Connor et al., 1997), the Psychological General Well-Being Index (PGWBI; Dupuy, 1984), and the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales (ANPS; Davis, Panksepp, & Normansell, 2003), together with an ad-hoc questionnaire for collecting demographic data, the Socio-Demographical Schedule. We have performed a confirmatory factor analysis to verify if the four-factor solution based on CMT and replicated in previous research (Gazzillo et al., 2017) was confirmed. Then, we checked the retest reliability of IGRS-15s after four weeks in a random subsample of 54 subjects. In order to assess its concurrent and discriminant validity, we calculated the correlations between IGRS-15s assessment and SMIP and IGQ-67. Finally, to test its construct validity, we assessed the relationships between the IGRS-15s and the affective systems using the ANPS and the wellbeing assessed with the PGWBI. The data collected support the retest reliability and the concurrent and discriminant validity of the measure, and we have collected preliminary data about its construct validity. Examples of the possible clinical and research applications of this tool are discussed.

Practical Implications of the Minimally Conscious State Diagnosis in Adults

This article addresses questions surrounding the minimally conscious state (MCS) from the perspective of adult clinical ethics. It describes the background of the MCS diagnosis, analyzes phenomenological ambiguities inherent in the nature of MCS, and raises epistemological concerns surrounding its diagnosis. It argues that in many cases, the burdens of prolonging treatment for people who have sustained certain severe brain injuries (SBI) outweigh the benefits, even if they are in or have the prospect of entering into MCS. It also argues that often such long-term measures are problematic from the perspective of patient preferences and stewardship of resources. Consequently, it suggests that the delineation of MCS as a distinct neurological state, along with research that seeks to expand how MCS is diagnosed, poses ethical difficulties for families and providers making decisions for affected patients.

Piercing of Consciousness as a Threshold-Crossing Operation

Many decisions arise through an accumulation of evidence to a terminating threshold. The process, termed bounded evidence accumulation (or drift diffusion), provides a unified account of decision speed and accuracy, and it is supported by neurophysiology in human and animal models. In many situations, a decision maker may not communicate a decision immediately and yet feel that at some point she had made up her mind. We hypothesized that this occurs when an accumulation of evidence reaches a termination threshold, registered, subjectively, as an “aha” moment. We asked human participants to make perceptual decisions about the net direction of dynamic random dot motion. The difficulty and viewing duration were controlled by the experimenter. After indicating their choice, participants adjusted the setting of a clock to the moment they felt they had reached a decision. The subjective decision times (t_SDs) were faster on trials with stronger (easier) motion, and they were well fit by a bounded drift-diffusion model. The fits to the t_SDs alone furnished parameters that fully predicted the choices (accuracy) of four of the five participants. The quality of the prediction provides compelling evidence that these subjective reports correspond to the terminating process of a decision rather than a post hoc inference or arbitrary report. Thus, conscious awareness of having reached a decision appears to arise when the brain’s representation of accumulated evidence reaches a threshold or bound. We propose that such a mechanism might play a more widespread role in the “piercing of consciousness” by non-conscious thought processes.

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Perceptual decisions can arise through an accumulation of evidence to a threshold

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After a stimulus, participants set a clock to the moment they had reached a decision

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An evidence accumulation model fit to these times allowed predictions of accuracy

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The sense of having decided is mediated by a threshold on accumulated evidence

The Five Marks of the Mental

The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.

Higher and Lower Pleasures Revisited: Evidence from Neuroscience

This paper discusses J.S. Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures, and suggests that recent neuroscientific evidence counts against it.

Exploring the neural correlates of dream phenomenology and altered states of consciousness during sleep

The science of dreaming constitutes a relevant topic in modern-day neuroscientific research and provides major insights into the study of human consciousness. Linking specific, universal, and regularly occurring stages of sleep with dreaming encourages the direct and systematic investigation of a topic that has fascinated humankind for centuries. In this review, we explore to what extent individuals dream during periods of rapid eye movement and non-rapid eye movement sleep, and we introduce research on lucid dreaming. We then discuss how dreaming during different stages of sleep varies in terms of phenomenological characteristics, and to what extent individuals are conscious throughout the sleep cycle. Finally, we provide a synopsis of the previous literature on brain activity during sleep, and we aim to clarify how the neurofunctional changes observed throughout sleep may lead to changes in phenomenological aspects of dreams, and in the domain of consciousness.

A Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations-their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability-and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

The Emergence of Visual Awareness: Temporal Dynamics in Relation to Task and Mask Type

One aspect of consciousness phenomena, the temporal emergence of visual awareness, has been subject of a controversial debate. How can visual awareness, that is the experiential quality of visual stimuli, be characterized best? Is there a sharp discontinuous or dichotomous transition between unaware and fully aware states, or does awareness emerge gradually encompassing intermediate states? Previous studies yielded conflicting results and supported both dichotomous and gradual views. It is well conceivable that these conflicting results are more than noise, but reflect the dynamic nature of the temporal emergence of visual awareness. Using a psychophysical approach, the present research tested whether the emergence of visual awareness is context-dependent with a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. During backward masking of word targets, it was assessed whether the relative temporal sequence of stimulus thresholds is modulated by the task (stimulus presence, letter case, lexical decision, and semantic category) and by mask type. Four masks with different similarity to the target features were created. Psychophysical functions were then fitted to the accuracy data in the different task conditions as a function of the stimulus mask SOA in order to determine the inflection point (conscious threshold of each feature) and slope of the psychophysical function (transition from unaware to aware within each feature). Depending on feature-mask similarity, thresholds in the different tasks were highly dispersed suggesting a graded transition from unawareness to awareness or had less differentiated thresholds indicating that clusters of features probed by the tasks quite simultaneously contribute to the percept. The latter observation, although not compatible with the notion of a sharp all-or-none transition between unaware and aware states, suggests a less gradual or more discontinuous emergence of awareness. Analyses of slopes of the fitted psychophysical functions also indicated that the emergence of awareness of single features is variable and might be influenced by the continuity of the feature dimensions. The present work thus suggests that the emergence of awareness is neither purely gradual nor dichotomous, but highly dynamic depending on the task and mask type.

Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies).

Attentional Modulation of Change Detection ERP Components by Peripheral Retro-Cueing

Change detection is essential for visual perception and performance in our environment. However, observers often miss changes that should be easily noticed. A failure in any of the processes involved in conscious detection (encoding the pre-change display, maintenance of that information within working memory, and comparison of the pre and post change displays) can lead to change blindness. Given that unnoticed visual changes in a scene can be easily detected once attention is drawn to them, it has been suggested that attention plays an important role on visual awareness. In the present study, we used behavioral and electrophysiological (ERPs) measures to study whether the manipulation of retrospective spatial attention affects performance and modulates brain activity related to the awareness of a change. To that end, exogenous peripheral cues were presented during the delay period (retro-cues) between the first and the second array using a one-shot change detection task. Awareness of a change was associated with a posterior negative amplitude shift around 228–292 ms (“Visual Awareness Negativity”), which was independent of retrospective spatial attention, as it was elicited to both validly and invalidly cued change trials. Change detection was also associated with a larger positive deflection around 420–580 ms (“Late Positivity”), but only when the peripheral retro-cues correctly predicted the change. Present results confirm that the early and late ERP components related to change detection can be functionally dissociated through manipulations of exogenous retro-cueing using a change blindness paradigm.