Decisions under uncertainty: probabilistic context influences activation of prefrontal and parietal cortices

The neural basis for establishing a focal point in pure coordination games

When making a decision, humans often have to 'coordinate'-reach the same conclusion-as another individual without explicitly communicating. Relatively, little is known about the neural basis for coordination. Moreover, previous fMRI investigations have supported conflicting hypotheses. One account proposes that individuals coordinate using a 'gut feeling' and that this is supported by insula recruitment. Another account proposes that individuals recruit strategic decision-making mechanisms in prefrontal cortex in order to coordinate. We investigate the neural basis for coordination in individuals with behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) who have limitations in social decision-making associated with disease in prefrontal cortex. We demonstrate that bvFTD are impaired at establishing a focal point in a semantic task (e.g. 'Tell me any boy's name') that requires coordination relative to a similar, control semantic task that does not. Additionally, coordination limitations in bvFTD are related to cortical thinning in prefrontal cortex. These findings are consistent with behavioral economic models proposing that, beyond a 'gut feeling', strategic decision-making contributes to the coordination process, including a probabilistic mechanism that evaluates the salience of a response (e.g. is 'John' a frequent boy's name), a hierarchical mechanism that iteratively models an opponent's likely response and a mechanism involved in social perspective taking.

Uncertainty and cognitive control

A growing trend of neuroimaging, behavioral, and computational research has investigated the topic of outcome uncertainty in decision-making. Although evidence to date indicates that humans are very effective in learning to adapt to uncertain situations, the nature of the specific cognitive processes involved in the adaptation to uncertainty are still a matter of debate. In this article, we reviewed evidence suggesting that cognitive control processes are at the heart of uncertainty in decision-making contexts. Available evidence suggests that: (1) There is a strong conceptual overlap between the constructs of uncertainty and cognitive control; (2) There is a remarkable overlap between the neural networks associated with uncertainty and the brain networks subserving cognitive control; (3) The perception and estimation of uncertainty might play a key role in monitoring processes and the evaluation of the "need for control"; (4) Potential interactions between uncertainty and cognitive control might play a significant role in several affective disorders.

Place your bets: psychophysiological correlates of decision-making under risk

Emotions and their psychophysiological correlates are thought to play an important role in decision-making under risk. We used a novel gambling task to measure psychophysiological responses during selection of explicitly presented risky options and feedback processing. Active-choice trials, in which the participant had to select the size of bet, were compared to fixed-bet, no-choice trials. We further tested how the chances of winning and bet size affected choice behavior and psychophysiological arousal. Individual differences in impulsive and risk-taking traits were assessed. The behavioral results showed sensitivity to the choice requirement and to the chances of winning: Participants were faster to make a response on no-choice trials and when the chances of winning were high. In active-choice trials, electrodermal activity (EDA) increased with bet size during both selection and processing of losses. Cardiac responses were sensitive to choice uncertainty: Stronger selection-related heart rate (HR) decelerations were observed in trials with lower chances of winning, particularly on active-choice trials. Finally, betting behavior and psychophysiological responsiveness were moderately correlated with self-reported impulsivity-related traits. In conclusion, we demonstrate that psychophysiological arousal covaries with risk-sensitive decision-making outside of a learning context. Our results further highlight the differential sensitivities of EDA and HR to psychological features of the decision scenario.

Electrophysiological correlates of decision making under varying levels of uncertainty

When making decisions we are often faced with uncertainty about the potential outcomes of a choice. We therefore must rely upon a stimulus-response-outcome (S-R-O) rule learned from previous experiences of gains and losses. Here we report a study that used event-related potentials (ERP) to examine the neural and cognitive mechanisms involved in decision making when S-R-O rules are changing in a volatile manner. Thirty-one participants engaged in a reward-based decision-making task in which two contextual determinants of decision uncertainty were independently manipulated: Volatility (i.e. the frequency of changes in the S-R-O rules) and Feedback validity (i.e. the extent to which an S-R-O rule accurately predicts outcomes). Results of stimulus-locked ERPs showed that volatility of S-R-O rules was associated with two well-known neural signatures of cognitive control processes. First, increased S-R-O volatility in a high FV context was associated with frontally-based N2 (200-350ms) and N400 (350-500ms) components. Second, in a low FV context, volatility was associated with an enhanced late positive complex (LPC, 500-800ms) largest on frontal sites. Feedback-locked ERPs showed an enhanced Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and P300 for losses compared to wins as well as a volatility driven FRN. These results suggest that, in a high FV context, coping with volatility might involve conflict monitoring processes. However, in a low FV context, coping with frequent changes in the S-R-O rule might require greater attentional and working memory (WM) resources.

Reward skewness coding in the insula independent of probability and loss

Rewards in the natural environment are rarely predicted with complete certainty. Uncertainty relating to future rewards has typically been defined as the variance of the potential outcomes. However, the asymmetry of predicted reward distributions, known as skewness, constitutes a distinct but neuroscientifically underexplored risk term that may also have an impact on preference. By changing only reward magnitudes, we study skewness processing in equiprobable ternary lotteries involving only gains and constant probabilities, thus excluding probability distortion or loss aversion as mechanisms for skewness preference formation. We show that individual preferences are sensitive to not only the mean and variance but also to the skewness of predicted reward distributions. Using neuroimaging, we show that the insula, a structure previously implicated in the processing of reward-related uncertainty, responds to the skewness of predicted reward distributions. Some insula responses increased in a monotonic fashion with skewness (irrespective of individual skewness preferences), whereas others were similarly elevated to both negative and positive as opposed to no reward skew. These data support the notion that the asymmetry of reward distributions is processed in the brain and, taken together with replicated findings of mean coding in the striatum and variance coding in the cingulate, suggest that the brain codes distinct aspects of reward distributions in a distributed fashion.

Deconstructing risk: separable encoding of variance and skewness in the brain

Risky choice entails a need to appraise all possible outcomes and integrate this information with individual risk preference. Risk is frequently quantified solely by statistical variance of outcomes, but here we provide evidence that individuals' choice behaviour is sensitive to both dispersion (variance) and asymmetry (skewness) of outcomes. Using a novel behavioural paradigm in humans, we independently manipulated these 'summary statistics' while scanning subjects with fMRI. We show that a behavioural sensitivity to variance and skewness is mirrored in neuroanatomically dissociable representations of these quantities, with parietal cortex showing sensitivity to the former and prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum to the latter. Furthermore, integration of these objective risk metrics with subjective risk preference is expressed in a subject-specific coupling between neural activity and choice behaviour in anterior insula. Our findings show that risk is neither monolithic from a behavioural nor neural perspective and its decomposition is evident both in distinct behavioural preferences and in segregated underlying brain representations.

Bayesian models: the structure of the world, uncertainty, behavior, and the brain

Experiments on humans and other animals have shown that uncertainty due to unreliable or incomplete information affects behavior. Recent studies have formalized uncertainty and asked which behaviors would minimize its effect. This formalization results in a wide range of Bayesian models that derive from assumptions about the world, and it often seems unclear how these models relate to one another. In this review, we use the concept of graphical models to analyze differences and commonalities across Bayesian approaches to the modeling of behavioral and neural data. We review behavioral and neural data associated with each type of Bayesian model and explain how these models can be related. We finish with an overview of different theories that propose possible ways in which the brain can represent uncertainty.

Under pressure: response urgency modulates striatal and insula activity during decision-making under risk

When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum, a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency.

High quality but limited quantity perceptual evidence produces neural accumulation in frontal and parietal cortex

Goal-directed perceptual decisions involve the analysis of sensory inputs, the extraction and accumulation of evidence, and the commitment to a choice. Previous neuroimaging studies of perceptual decision making have identified activity related to accumulation in parietal, inferior temporal, and frontal regions. However, such effects may be related to factors other than the integration of evidence over time, such as changes in the quantity of stimulus input and in attentional demands leading up to a decision. The current study tested an accumulation account using 2 manipulations. First, to test whether patterns of accumulation can be explained by changes in the quantity of sensory information, objects were revealed with a high quality but consistent quantity of evidence throughout the trial. Imaging analysis revealed patterns of accumulation in frontal and parietal regions but not in inferior temporal regions. This result supports a framework in which evidence is processed in sensory cortex and integrated over time in higher order cortical areas. Second, to test whether accumulation signals are driven by attentional demands, task difficulty was increased on some trials. This manipulation did not affect the nature of accumulating functional magnetic resonance imaging signals, indicating that accumulating signals are not necessarily driven by changes in attentional demand.

Neural correlates of local contextual processing deficits in schizophrenic patients

Deficits in processing contextual information are one of the main features of cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia, but the neurophysiologic substrate underlying this dysfunction is poorly understood. We used ERPs to investigate local contextual processing in schizophrenic patients. Local context was defined as the occurrence of a short predictive series of stimuli occurring before delivery of a target event. Response times of predicted targets were faster in controls compared to patients. Schizophrenia patients failed to generate the P3b latency shift between predicted and random targets that was observed in controls and demonstrated a prominent reduction of the peak of an early latency context dependent positivity. The current study provides evidence of contextual processing deficits in schizophrenia patients by demonstrating alteration in the behavioral and neural correlates of local contextual processing.

Attention and cognitive control networks assessed in a dichotic listening fMRI study

A meaningful interaction with our environment relies on the ability to focus on relevant sensory input and to ignore irrelevant information, i.e. top-down control and attention processes are employed to select from competing stimuli following internal goals. In this, the demands for the recruitment of top-down control processes depend on the relative perceptual salience of the competing stimuli. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we investigated the recruitment of top-down control processes in response to varying degrees of control demands in the auditory modality. For this purpose, we tested 20 male and 20 female subjects with a dichotic listening paradigm, in which the relative perceptual salience of two simultaneously presented stimuli was systematically manipulated by varying the inter-aural intensity difference (IID) and asking the subjects to selectively attend to either ear. The analysis showed that the interaction between IID and attentional direction involves two networks in the brain. A fronto-parietal network, including the pre-supplementary motor area, anterior cingulate cortex, inferior frontal junction, insula and inferior parietal lobe, was recruited during cognitively demanding conditions and can thus be seen as a top-down cognitive control network. In contrast, a second network including the superior temporal and the post-central gyri was engaged under conditions with low cognitive control demands. These findings demonstrate how cognitive control is achieved through the interplay of distinct brain networks, with their differential engagement determined as a function of the level of competition between the sensory stimuli.

Are risky choices actually guided by a compensatory process? New insights from FMRI

The dominant theories about risky decision-making assume that decision conflicts are solved by a compensatory process involving a trade-off of probability against payoff, but it is unclear whether these theories actually represent the events that occur when people make a risky decision. By contrasting a preferential choice with a judgment-based choice that required a compensatory process, we explored the mechanisms underlying risky decision-making. First, using parametric analyses, we identified the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) as the specific region in charge of task-related conflict in risky decision-making tasks. We also showed that the dMPFC was activated less when judgment-based choices were being made, implying that the conflict experienced during a judgment-based choice was not as strong as the conflict that was experienced during the preferential choice. Our results provide neural evidence that preferential choice cannot be characterized solely as a compensatory process. Thus, questions were raised about whether existing compensatory theories could adequately describe individual risky decisions.

The neural substrate and functional integration of uncertainty in decision making: an information theory approach

Decision making can be regarded as the outcome of cognitive processes leading to the selection of a course of action among several alternatives. Borrowing a central measurement from information theory, Shannon entropy, we quantified the uncertainties produced by decisions of participants within an economic decision task under different configurations of reward probability and time. These descriptors were used to obtain blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal correlates of uncertainty and two clusters codifying the Shannon entropy of task configurations were identified: a large cluster including parts of the right middle cingulate cortex (MCC) and left and right pre-supplementary motor areas (pre-SMA) and a small cluster at the left anterior thalamus. Subsequent functional connectivity analyses using the psycho-physiological interactions model identified areas involved in the functional integration of uncertainty. Results indicate that clusters mostly located at frontal and temporal cortices experienced an increased connectivity with the right MCC and left and right pre-SMA as the uncertainty was higher. Furthermore, pre-SMA was also functionally connected to a rich set of areas, most of them associative areas located at occipital and parietal lobes. This study provides a map of the human brain segregation and integration (i.e., neural substrate and functional connectivity respectively) of the uncertainty associated to an economic decision making paradigm.

Brain structure correlates of individual differences in the acquisition and inhibition of conditioned fear

Research employing aversive conditioning paradigms has elucidated the neurocircuitry involved in acquiring and diminishing fear responses. However, the factors underlying individual differences in fear acquisition and inhibition are not presently well understood. In this study, we explored whether the magnitude of individuals' acquired fear responses and the modulation of these responses via 2 fear reduction methods were correlated with structural differences in brain regions involved in affective processing. Physiological and structural magnetic resonance imaging data were obtained from experiments exploring extinction retention and intentional cognitive regulation. Our results identified 2 regions in which individual variation in brain structure correlated with subjects' fear-related arousal. Confirming previous results, increased thickness in ventromedial prefrontal cortex was correlated with the degree of extinction retention. Additionally, subjects with greater thickness in the posterior insula exhibited larger conditioned responses during acquisition. The data suggest a trend toward a negative correlation between amygdala volume and fear acquisition magnitude. There was no significant correlation between fear reduction via cognitive regulation and thickness in our prefrontal regions of interest. Acquisition and regulation measures were uncorrelated, suggesting that while certain individuals may have a propensity toward increased expression of conditioned fear, these responses can be diminished via both extinction and cognitive regulation.

Risk, unexpected uncertainty, and estimation uncertainty: Bayesian learning in unstable settings

Recently, evidence has emerged that humans approach learning using Bayesian updating rather than (model-free) reinforcement algorithms in a six-arm restless bandit problem. Here, we investigate what this implies for human appreciation of uncertainty. In our task, a Bayesian learner distinguishes three equally salient levels of uncertainty. First, the Bayesian perceives irreducible uncertainty or risk: even knowing the payoff probabilities of a given arm, the outcome remains uncertain. Second, there is (parameter) estimation uncertainty or ambiguity: payoff probabilities are unknown and need to be estimated. Third, the outcome probabilities of the arms change: the sudden jumps are referred to as unexpected uncertainty. We document how the three levels of uncertainty evolved during the course of our experiment and how it affected the learning rate. We then zoom in on estimation uncertainty, which has been suggested to be a driving force in exploration, in spite of evidence of widespread aversion to ambiguity. Our data corroborate the latter. We discuss neural evidence that foreshadowed the ability of humans to distinguish between the three levels of uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the boundaries of human capacity to implement Bayesian learning. We repeat the experiment with different instructions, reflecting varying levels of structural uncertainty. Under this fourth notion of uncertainty, choices were no better explained by Bayesian updating than by (model-free) reinforcement learning. Exit questionnaires revealed that participants remained unaware of the presence of unexpected uncertainty and failed to acquire the right model with which to implement Bayesian updating.

Decision threshold modulation in the human brain

Perceptual decisions are made when sensory evidence accumulated over time reaches a decision threshold. Because decisions are also guided by prior information, one important factor that is likely to shape how a decision is adaptively tuned to its context is the predictability of forthcoming events. However, little is known about the mechanisms underlying this contextual regulation of the perceptual decision-making process. Mathematical models of decision making predict two possible mechanisms supporting this regulation: an adjustment of the distance to the decision threshold, which leads to a change in the amount of accumulated evidence required to make a decision, or a gain control of the sensory evidence, leading to a change in the slope of the sensory evidence accumulation. Here, we show that predictability of the forthcoming event reduces the distance to the threshold of the decision. Then, combining model-driven fMRI and the framework of information theory, we show that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) adjusts the distance to the decision threshold in proportion to the current amount of predictive information and that the dorsolateral cortex (DLPFC) codes the accumulation of sensory evidence. Moreover, the information flow from the ACC to the DLPFC region that accumulates sensory evidence increases when optimal adjustment of the distance to the threshold requires more complex computations, reflecting the increased weight of ACC's regulation signals in the decision process. Our results characterize the respective contributions of the ACC and the DLPFC to contextually optimized decision making.

Separate valuation subsystems for delay and effort decision costs

Decision making consists of choosing among available options on the basis of a valuation of their potential costs and benefits. Most theoretical models of decision making in behavioral economics, psychology, and computer science propose that the desirability of outcomes expected from alternative options can be quantified by utility functions. These utility functions allow a decision maker to assign subjective values to each option under consideration by weighting the likely benefits and costs resulting from an action and to select the one with the highest subjective value. Here, we used model-based neuroimaging to test whether the human brain uses separate valuation systems for rewards (erotic stimuli) associated with different types of costs, namely, delay and effort. We show that humans devalue rewards associated with physical effort in a strikingly similar fashion to those they devalue that are associated with delays, and that a single computational model derived from economics theory can account for the behavior observed in both delay discounting and effort discounting. However, our neuroimaging data reveal that the human brain uses distinct valuation subsystems for different types of costs, reflecting in opposite fashion delayed reward and future energetic expenses. The ventral striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex represent the increasing subjective value of delayed rewards, whereas a distinct network, composed of the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula, represent the decreasing value of the effortful option, coding the expected expense of energy. Together, these data demonstrate that the valuation processes underlying different types of costs can be fractionated at the cerebral level.

Testing the reward prediction error hypothesis with an axiomatic model

Neuroimaging studies typically identify neural activity correlated with the predictions of highly parameterized models, like the many reward prediction error (RPE) models used to study reinforcement learning. Identified brain areas might encode RPEs or, alternatively, only have activity correlated with RPE model predictions. Here, we use an alternate axiomatic approach rooted in economic theory to formally test the entire class of RPE models on neural data. We show that measurements of human neural activity from the striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and posterior cingulate cortex satisfy necessary and sufficient conditions for the entire class of RPE models. However, activity measured from the anterior insula falsifies the axiomatic model, and therefore no RPE model can account for measured activity. Further analysis suggests the anterior insula might instead encode something related to the salience of an outcome. As cognitive neuroscience matures and models proliferate, formal approaches of this kind that assess entire model classes rather than specific model exemplars may take on increased significance.

Differentiable neural substrates for learned and described value and risk

Studies of human decision making emerge from two dominant traditions: learning theorists [1-3] study choices in which options are evaluated on the basis of experience, whereas behavioral economists and financial decision theorists study choices in which the key decision variables are explicitly stated. Growing behavioral evidence suggests that valuation based on these different classes of information involves separable mechanisms [4-8], but the relevant neuronal substrates are unknown. This is important for understanding the all-too-common situation in which choices must be made between alternatives that involve one or another kind of information. We studied behavior and brain activity while subjects made decisions between risky financial options, in which the associated utilities were either learned or explicitly described. We show a characteristic effect in subjects' behavior when comparing information acquired from experience with that acquired from description, suggesting that these kinds of information are treated differently. This behavioral effect was reflected neurally, and we show differential sensitivity to learned and described value and risk in brain regions commonly associated with reward processing. Our data indicate that, during decision making under risk, both behavior and the neural encoding of key decision variables are strongly influenced by the manner in which value information is presented.

Face recognition under ambiguous visual stimulation: fMRI correlates of "encoding styles"

Object categorization during ambiguous sensory stimulation generally depends on the activity of extrastriate sensory areas as well as top-down information. Both reflect internal representations of prototypical object knowledge against which incoming sensory information is compared. However, besides these general mechanisms, individuals might differ in their readiness to impose internal representations onto incoming ambiguous information. These individual differences might be based on what was referred to as "Schema Instantiation Threshold" (SIT; Lewicki et al. [1992]: Am Pshycol 47:796-801), defining a continuum from very rapid (low threshold) to a rather controlled application of internal representations (high threshold). We collected fMRI scans while subjects with low SIT ("internal encoders") and subjects with high SIT ("external encoders") made gender categorizations of ambiguous facial images. Internal encoders made faster gender decisions during high sensory ambiguity, showed higher fusiform activity, and had faster BOLD responses in the fusiform (FFA) and occipital face area (OFA) indicating a faster and stronger application of face-gender representations due to a low SIT threshold. External encoders made slower gender decisions and showed increased medial frontal activity, indicating a more controlled strategy during gender categorizations and increased decisional uncertainties. Internal encoders showed higher functional connectivity of the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) to seed activity in the FFA which might indicate both more readily generated predictive classificatory guesses and the subjective impressions of accurate classifications. Taken together, an "internal encoding style" is characterized by the fast, unsupervised and unverified application of primary object representations, whereas the opposite seems evident for subjects with an "external encoding style".

Physical temperature effects on trust behavior: the role of insula

Trust lies at the heart of person perception and interpersonal decision making. In two studies, we investigated physical temperature as one factor that can influence human trust behavior, and the insula as a possible neural substrate. Participants briefly touched either a cold or warm pack, and then played an economic trust game. Those primed with cold invested less with an anonymous partner, revealing lesser interpersonal trust, as compared to those who touched a warm pack. In Study 2, we examined neural activity during trust-related processes after a temperature manipulation using functional magnetic resonance imaging. The left-anterior insular region activated more strongly than baseline only when the trust decision was preceded by touching a cold pack, and not a warm pack. In addition, greater activation within bilateral insula was identified during the decision phase followed by a cold manipulation, contrasted to warm. These results suggest that the insula may be a key shared neural substrate that mediates the influence of temperature on trust processes.

Updating beliefs for a decision: neural correlates of uncertainty and underconfidence

Some decisions are made after obtaining several pieces of information, whereas others are reached quickly. Such differences may depend on the quality of information acquired, as well as individual variability in how cautiously evidence is evaluated. The current study examined neural activity while subjects accumulated sequential pieces of evidence and then made a decision. Uncertainty was updated with each piece of evidence, with individual ratings of subjective uncertainty characterizing underconfidence when observing evidence. Increased uncertainty during evidence accumulation was associated with activity in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, whereas greater uncertainty when executing a decision uniquely elicited lateral frontal and parietal activity. Greater underconfidence when observing evidence correlated with activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that neural mechanisms of uncertainty depend on the stage of decision-making (belief updating vs decision) and that greater subjective uncertainty when evaluating evidence is associated with activity in ventromedial brain regions, even in the absence of overt risk.

Contextual processing deficits in Parkinson's disease: the role of the frontostriatal system

OBJECTIVE

We investigated the role of the frontostriatal system in contextual processing, by examining neural correlates of local contextual processing in Parkinson's disease (PD). Local context was defined as the occurrence of a short predictive series of visual stimuli occurring before delivery of a target event.

METHODS

EEG was recorded in eight PD patients and eight controls. Recording blocks consisted of targets preceded by randomized sequences of standards and by sequences including a predictive sequence signaling the occurrence of a subsequent target event. Subjects pressed a button in response to targets. Peak P3b amplitude and latency were evaluated for targets after predictive and non-predictive sequences.

RESULTS

Behavioral and electrophysiological measures showed that controls processed predicted and random targets differentially, while PD patients processed these similarly. Reaction times were shorter for predictable than for random targets in controls but not in patients. PD patients failed to generate the expected P3b latency shift between predicted and random targets, which is observed in controls.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings show that predictive local context effects on target detection are altered in PD patients.

SIGNIFICANCE

The findings suggest a key role for the frontostriatal system in contextual processing.

Mal-adaptation of event-related EEG responses preceding performance errors

Recent EEG and fMRI evidence suggests that behavioral errors are foreshadowed by systematic changes in brain activity preceding the outcome by seconds. In order to further characterize this type of error precursor activity, we investigated single-trial event-related EEG activity from 70 participants performing a modified Eriksen flanker task, in particular focusing on the trial-by-trial dynamics of a fronto-central independent component that previously has been associated with error and feedback processing. The stimulus-locked peaks in the N2 and P3 latency range in the event-related averages showed expected compatibility and error-related modulations. In addition, a small pre-stimulus negative slow wave was present at erroneous trials. Significant error-preceding activity was found in local stimulus sequences with decreased conflict in the form of less negativity at the N2 latency (310–350 ms) accumulating across five trials before errors; concomitantly response times were speeding across trials. These results illustrate that error-preceding activity in event-related EEG is associated with the performance monitoring system and we conclude that the dynamics of performance monitoring contribute to the generation of error-prone states in addition to the more remote and indirect effects in ongoing activity such as posterior alpha power in EEG and default mode drifts in fMRI.

What motivates the adolescent? Brain regions mediating reward sensitivity across adolescence

The relation between brain development across adolescence and adolescent risky behavior has attracted increasing interest in recent years. It has been proposed that adolescents are hypersensitive to reward because of an imbalance in the developmental pattern followed by the striatum and prefrontal cortex. To date, it is unclear if adolescents engage in risky behavior because they overestimate potential rewards or respond more to received rewards and whether these effects occur in the absence of decisions. In this study, we used a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm that allowed us to dissociate effects of the anticipation, receipt, and omission of reward in 10- to 12-year-old, 14- to 15-year-old, and 18- to 23-year-old participants. We show that in anticipation of uncertain outcomes, the anterior insula is more active in adolescents compared with young adults and that the ventral striatum shows a reward-related peak in middle adolescence, whereas young adults show orbitofrontal cortex activation to omitted reward. These regions show distinct developmental trajectories. This study supports the hypothesis that adolescents are hypersensitive to reward and adds to the current literature in demonstrating that neural activation differs in adolescents even for small rewards in the absence of choice. These findings may have important implications for understanding adolescent risk-taking behavior.

Assessing the neural basis of uncertainty in perceptual category learning through varying levels of distortion

The formation of new perceptual categories involves learning to extract that information from a wide range of often noisy sensory inputs, which is critical for selecting between a limited number of responses. To identify brain regions involved in visual classification learning under noisy conditions, we developed a task on the basis of the classical dot pattern prototype distortion task [M. I. Posner, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68, 113-118, 1964]. Twenty-seven healthy young adults were required to assign distorted patterns of dots into one of two categories, each defined by its prototype. Categorization uncertainty was modulated parametrically by means of Shannon's entropy formula and set to the levels of 3, 7, and 8.5 bits/dot within subsets of the stimuli. Feedback was presented after each trial, and two parallel versions of the task were developed to contrast practiced and unpracticed performance within a single session. Using event-related fMRI, areas showing increasing activation with categorization uncertainty and decreasing activation with training were identified. Both networks largely overlapped and included areas involved in visuospatial processing (inferior temporal and posterior parietal areas), areas involved in cognitive processes requiring a high amount of cognitive control (posterior medial wall), and a cortico-striatal-thalamic loop through the body of the caudate nucleus. Activity in the medial prefrontal wall was increased when subjects received negative as compared with positive feedback, providing further evidence for its important role in mediating the error signal. This study characterizes the cortico-striatal network underlying the classification of distorted visual patterns that is directly related to decision uncertainty.

Anterior insula reactivity during certain decisions is associated with neuroticism

Neuroticism is a core personality trait that profoundly affects how individuals interpret and interact with their environment. Understanding neuroticism at a neurobiological level will be an important step toward identifying novel vulnerability factors for psychiatric illnesses such as depression and anxiety. Along these lines, recent work has identified neural activation patterns within the right anterior insula that correlates with an individual's degree of neuroticism. The present study aims to further characterize the circumstances under which neuroticism modulates insular activity. Sixteen healthy participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while playing a card game with varying degrees of outcome uncertainty. Activation within the bilateral anterior insula was found during all decisions, irrespective of uncertainty. However, a significant positive correlation between neuroticism and anterior insula activity was found only during 'certain decisions' (i.e. situations where the most probable outcome was clearly evident). Moreover, an increase in the right anterior insula activity during certain decisions was related to a behavioral mirroring effect such that the response latency for certain decisions approached the response latency for uncertain decisions. These findings suggest that increasing levels of neuroticism modulate neural activation in such a way that the brain interprets certainty as uncertain.

Neural processing of risk

In our everyday life, we often have to make decisions with risky consequences, such as choosing a restaurant for dinner or choosing a form of retirement saving. To date, however, little is known about how the brain processes risk. Recent conceptualizations of risky decision making highlight that it is generally associated with emotions but do not specify how emotions are implicated in risk processing. Moreover, little is known about risk processing in non-choice situations and how potential losses influence risk processing. Here we used quantitative meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments on risk processing in the brain to investigate (1) how risk processing is influenced by emotions, (2) how it differs between choice and non-choice situations, and (3) how it changes when losses are possible. By showing that, over a range of experiments and paradigms, risk is consistently represented in the anterior insula, a brain region known to process aversive emotions such as anxiety, disappointment, or regret, we provide evidence that risk processing is influenced by emotions. Furthermore, our results show risk-related activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex in choice situations but not in situations in which no choice is involved or a choice has already been made. The anterior insula was predominantly active in the presence of potential losses, indicating that potential losses modulate risk processing.

Risk and risk prediction error signals in anterior insula

Most accounts of the function of anterior insula in the human brain refer to concepts that are difficult to formalize, such as feelings and awareness. The discovery of signals that reflect risk assessment and risk learning, however, opens the door to formal analysis. Hitherto, activations have been correlated with objective versions of risk and risk prediction error, but subjective versions (influenced by pessimism/optimism or risk aversion/tolerance) exist. Activation in closely related cortical structures has been found to be both objective (anterior cingulate cortex) and subjective (inferior frontal gyrus). For this quantitative analysis of uncertainty-induced neuronal activation to further understanding of insula's role in feelings and awareness, however, formalization and documentation of the relation between uncertainty and feelings/awareness will be needed. One obvious starting point is the link with failure anxiety and error awareness.

Recurrent, robust and scalable patterns underlie human approach and avoidance

BACKGROUND

Approach and avoidance behavior provide a means for assessing the rewarding or aversive value of stimuli, and can be quantified by a keypress procedure whereby subjects work to increase (approach), decrease (avoid), or do nothing about time of exposure to a rewarding/aversive stimulus. To investigate whether approach/avoidance behavior might be governed by quantitative principles that meet engineering criteria for lawfulness and that encode known features of reward/aversion function, we evaluated whether keypress responses toward pictures with potential motivational value produced any regular patterns, such as a trade-off between approach and avoidance, or recurrent lawful patterns as observed with prospect theory.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Three sets of experiments employed this task with beautiful face images, a standardized set of affective photographs, and pictures of food during controlled states of hunger and satiety. An iterative modeling approach to data identified multiple law-like patterns, based on variables grounded in the individual. These patterns were consistent across stimulus types, robust to noise, describable by a simple power law, and scalable between individuals and groups. Patterns included: (i) a preference trade-off counterbalancing approach and avoidance, (ii) a value function linking preference intensity to uncertainty about preference, and (iii) a saturation function linking preference intensity to its standard deviation, thereby setting limits to both.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

These law-like patterns were compatible with critical features of prospect theory, the matching law, and alliesthesia. Furthermore, they appeared consistent with both mean-variance and expected utility approaches to the assessment of risk. Ordering of responses across categories of stimuli demonstrated three properties thought to be relevant for preference-based choice, suggesting these patterns might be grouped together as a relative preference theory. Since variables in these patterns have been associated with reward circuitry structure and function, they may provide a method for quantitative phenotyping of normative and pathological function (e.g., psychiatric illness).

An integrative cognitive neuroscience theory of social reasoning and moral judgment

Cognitive neuroscience has made considerable progress in understanding the involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in social cognition and moral judgment. Accumulating evidence suggests that representations within the lateral PFC enable people to orchestrate their thoughts and actions in concert with their intentions to support goal-directed social behavior. Despite the pivotal role of this region in guiding social interactions, remarkably little is known about the functional organization and forms of social knowledge mediated by the lateral PFC. Here, we review recent theoretical developments in evolutionary psychology and emerging evidence from the social and decision neuroscience literatures demonstrating the importance of the lateral PFC for orchestrating behavior on the basis of evolutionarily adaptive social norms for obligatory, prohibited, and permissible courses of action. WIREs Cogn Sci 2011 2 55-67 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.84 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Aging and decision making under uncertainty: behavioral and neural evidence for the preservation of decision making in the absence of learning in old age

Decision making under uncertainty is an essential component of everyday life. Recent psychological studies suggest that older adults, despite age-related neurological decline, can make advantageous decisions when information about the contingencies of the outcomes is available. In this study, a two-choice prediction paradigm has been used, in conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to investigate the effects of normal aging on neural substrates underlying uncertain decision making in the absence of learning that have not been addressed in previous neuroimaging studies. Neuroimaging results showed that both the healthy older and young adults recruited a network of brain regions comprising the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral inferior parietal lobule, medial frontal cortex, and right lateral orbitofrontal cortex during the prediction task. As was hypothesized, the performance of older adults in the prediction task was not impaired compared to young adults. Although no significant age-related increases in brain activity have been found, we observed an age-related decrease in activity in the right inferior parietal lobule. We speculate that the observed age-related decrease in parietal activity could be explained by age-related differences in decision making behavior revealed by questionnaire results and maximizing scores. Together, this study demonstrates behavioral and neural evidence for the preservation of decision making in older adults when information about the contingencies of the outcome is available.

Decision neuroscience: neuroeconomics

Few aspects of human cognition are more personal than the choices we make. Our decisions-from the mundane to the impossibly complex-continually shape the courses of our lives. In recent years, researchers have applied the tools of neuroscience to understand the mechanisms that underlie decision making, as part of the new discipline of decision neuroscience. A primary goal of this emerging field has been to identify the processes that underlie specific decision variables, including the value of rewards, the uncertainty associated with particular outcomes, and the consequences of social interactions. Recent work suggests potential neural substrates that integrate these variables, potentially reflecting a common neural currency for value, to facilitate value comparisons. Despite the successes of decision neuroscience research for elucidating brain mechanisms, significant challenges remain. These include building new conceptual frameworks for decision making, integrating research findings across disparate techniques and species, and extending results from neuroscience to shape economic theory. To overcome these challenges, future research will likely focus on interpersonal variability in decision making, with the eventual goal of creating biologically plausible models for individual choice. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 854-871 This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition.

Neural processing of reward and loss in girls at risk for major depression

CONTEXT

Deficits in reward processing and their neural correlates have been associated with major depression. However, it is unclear if these deficits precede the onset of depression or are a consequence of this disorder.

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether anomalous neural processing of reward characterizes children at familial risk for depression in the absence of a personal history of diagnosable disorder.

DESIGN

Comparison of neural activity among children at low and high risk for depression as they process reward and loss.

SETTING

University functional magnetic resonance imaging facility.

PARTICIPANTS

Thirteen 10- to 14-year-old never-disordered daughters of mothers with recurrent depression ("high risk") and 13 age-matched never-disordered daughters with no family history of depression ("low risk"). Main Outcome Measure Neural activity, as measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging, in key reward and attention neural circuitry during anticipation and receipt of reward and loss.

RESULTS

While anticipating gains, high-risk participants showed less activation than did their low-risk counterparts in the putamen and left insula but showed greater activation in the right insula. When receiving punishment, high-risk participants showed greater activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus than did low-risk participants, who showed greater activation in the caudate and putamen.

CONCLUSIONS

Familial risk for depression affects neural mechanisms underlying the processing of reward and loss; young girls at risk for depression exhibit anomalies in the processing of reward and loss before the onset of depressive symptoms. Longitudinal studies are needed to examine whether these characteristics predict the subsequent onset of depression.

Dynamic coding of events within the inferior frontal gyrus in a probabilistic selective attention task

Besides the fact that RTs in cognitive tasks are affected by the specific demands of a trial, the context in which this trial occurs codetermines the speed of the response. For instance, invalid spatial cues generally prolong RTs to targets in the location-cueing paradigm, whereas the magnitude of these RT costs additionally varies as a function of the preceding trial types so that RTs for invalid trials may be increased when preceded by valid rather than invalid trials. In the present fMRI study, we investigated trial sequence effects in a combined oddball and location-cueing paradigm. In particular, we tested whether RTs and neural activity to infrequent invalid or deviant targets varied as a function of the number of preceding valid standard trials. As expected, RTs in invalid and deviant trials were significantly slower when more valid standard trials had been presented beforehand. This behavioral effect was reflected in the neural activity of the right inferior/middle frontal gyrus where the amplitude of the hemodynamic response in invalid and deviant trials was positively related to the number of preceding valid standard trials. In contrast, decreased activity (i.e., a negative parametric modulation effect) was observed when more valid standard trials were successively presented. Further positive parametric effects for the number of preceding valid standard trials were observed in the left caudate nucleus and lingual gyrus. The data suggest that inferior frontal cortex extracts both event regularities and irregularities in event streams.

Remember the Source: Dissociating Frontal and Parietal Contributions to Episodic Memory

Event-related fMRI studies reveal that episodic memory retrieval modulates lateral and medial parietal cortices, dorsal middle frontal gyrus (MFG), and anterior PFC. These regions respond more for recognized old than correctly rejected new words, suggesting a neural correlate of retrieval success. Despite significant efforts examining retrieval success regions, their role in retrieval remains largely unknown. Here we asked the question, to what degree are the regions performing memory-specific operations? And if so, are they all equally sensitive to successful retrieval, or are other factors such as error detection also implicated? We investigated this question by testing whether activity in retrieval success regions was associated with task-specific contingencies (i.e., perceived targetness) or mnemonic relevance (e.g., retrieval of source context). To do this, we used a source memory task that required discrimination between remembered targets and remembered nontargets. For a given region, the modulation of neural activity by a situational factor such as target status would suggest a more domain-general role; similarly, modulations of activity linked to error detection would suggest a role in monitoring and control rather than the accumulation of evidence from memory per se. We found that parietal retrieval success regions exhibited greater activity for items receiving correct than incorrect source responses, whereas frontal retrieval success regions were most active on error trials, suggesting that posterior regions signal successful retrieval whereas frontal regions monitor retrieval outcome. In addition, perceived targetness failed to modulate fMRI activity in any retrieval success region, suggesting that these regions are retrieval specific. We discuss the different functions that these regions may support and propose an accumulator model that captures the different pattern of responses seen in frontal and parietal retrieval success regions.

Alterations of decision making and underlying neural correlates after resection of a mediofrontal cortical dysplasia: A single case study

We investigated the impact of a congenital prefrontal lesion and its resection on decision making under risk and under ambiguity in a patient with right mediofrontal cortical dysplasia. Both kinds of decision making are normally associated with the medial prefrontal cortex. We additionally studied pre- and postsurgical fMRI activations when processing information relevant for risky decision making. Results indicate selective impairments of ambiguous decision making pre- and postsurgically. Decision making under risk was intact. In contrast to healthy subjects the patient exhibited no activation within the dysplastic anterior cingulate cortex but left-sided orbitofrontal activation on the fMRI task suggesting early reorganization processes.

The role of the dorsal anterior cingulate in evaluating behavior for achieving gains and avoiding losses

Effective goal-directed behavior relies on a network of regions including anterior cingulate cortex and ventral striatum to learn from negative outcomes in order to improve performance. We employed fMRI to determine if this frontal-striatal system is also involved in instances of behavior that do not presume negative circumstances. Participants performed a visual target/nontarget search game in which they could optionally abort a trial to avoid errors or receive extra reward for highly confident responses. Anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex were equally activated for error avoidance and high reward trials but were not active on error trials, demonstrating their primary involvement in self-initiated behavioral adjustment and not error detection or prediction. In contrast, the insula and the ventral striatum were responsive to the high reward trials. Differential activation patterns across conditions for the nucleus accumbens, insula, and prefrontal cortex suggest distinct roles for these structures in the control of reward-related behavior.

The impact of prior risk experiences on subsequent risky decision-making: the role of the insula

Risky decision-making is significantly affected by homeostatic states associated with different prior risk experiences, yet the neural mechanisms have not been well understood. Using functional MRI, we examined how gambling decisions and their underlying neural responses were modulated by prior risk experiences, with a focus on the insular cortex since it has been implicated in interoception, emotion and risky decision-making. Fourteen healthy young participants were scanned while performing a gambling task that was designed to simulate daily-life risk taking. Prior risk experience was manipulated by presenting participants with gambles that they were very likely to accept or gambles that they were unlikely to accept. A probe gamble, which was sensitive to individual's risk preference, was presented to examine the effect of prior risk experiences (Risk vs. Norisk) on subsequent risky decisions. Compared to passing on a gamble (Norisk), taking a gamble, especially winning a gamble (Riskwin), was associated with significantly stronger activation in the insular and dorsal medial prefrontal cortices. Decision making after Norisk was more risky and more likely to recruit activation of the insular and anterior cingulate cortices. This insular activity during decision making predicted the extent of risky decisions both within- and across-subjects, and was also correlated with an individual's personality trait of urgency. These findings suggest that the insula plays an important role in activating representations of homeostatic states associated with the experience of risk, which in turn exerts an influence on subsequent decisions.

Neural correlates of top-down letter processing

This fMRI study investigated top-down letter processing with an illusory letter detection task. Participants responded whether one of a number of different possible letters was present in a very noisy image. After initial training that became increasingly difficult, they continued to detect letters even though the images consisted of pure noise, which eliminated contamination from strong bottom-up input. For illusory letter detection, greater fMRI activation was observed in several cortical regions. These regions included the precuneus, an area generally involved in top-down processing of objects, and the left superior parietal lobule, an area previously identified with the processing of valid letter and word stimuli. In addition, top-down letter detection also activated the left inferior frontal gyrus, an area that may be involved in the integration of general top-down processing and letter-specific bottom-up processing. These findings suggest that these regions may play a significant role in top-down as well as bottom-up processing of letters and words, and are likely to have reciprocal functional connections to more posterior regions in the word and letter processing network.

An evolutionarily adaptive neural architecture for social reasoning

Recent progress in cognitive neuroscience highlights the involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in social cognition. Accumulating evidence demonstrates that representations within the lateral PFC enable people to coordinate their thoughts and actions with their intentions to support goal-directed social behavior. Despite the importance of this region in guiding social interactions, remarkably little is known about the functional organization and forms of social inference processed by the lateral PFC. Here, we introduce a cognitive neuroscience framework for understanding the inferential architecture of the lateral PFC, drawing upon recent theoretical developments in evolutionary psychology and emerging neuroscience evidence about how this region can orchestrate behavior on the basis of evolutionarily adaptive social norms for obligatory, prohibited and permissible courses of action.

Multimodal effects of local context on target detection: evidence from P3b

We used the P300 component to investigate how changes in local context influenced the ability to detect target stimuli. Local context was defined as the occurrence of a short predictive series of stimuli before delivery of a target event. EEG was recorded in 12 subjects during auditory and visual sessions. Stimuli were presented in the center of the auditory and visual field and consisted of 15% targets (1000 Hz tone or downward facing triangle) and 85% of equal amounts of three types of standards (1500, 2000, and 2500 Hz tones or triangles facing left, upward, and right). Recording blocks consisted of targets preceded by either randomized sequences of standards or by sequences including a three-standard predictive sequence signaling the occurrence of a subsequent target event. Subjects pressed a button in response to targets. Peak target P300 (P3b) amplitude and latency were evaluated for targets after predictive and nonpredictive sequences using conventional averaging and a novel single-trial analysis procedure. Reaction times were shorter for predictable targets than for nonpredicted targets. P3b latency was shorter for predicted targets than for nonpredictive targets, and there were no significant P3b amplitude differences between predicted and random targets, as determined by both conventional averaging and single-trial analysis. Comparable effects on amplitude and latency were observed in both the auditory and visual modalities. The results indicate that local context has differential effects on P3b amplitude and latency, and exerts modality-independent effects on cognitive processing.

At the heart of the ventral attention system: the right anterior insula

The anterior insula has been hypothesized to provide a link between attention-related problem solving and salience systems during the coordination and evaluation of task performance. Here, we test the hypothesis that the anterior insula/medial frontal operculum (aI/fO) provides linkage across systems supporting task demands and attention systems by examining the patterns of functional connectivity during word recognition and spatial attention functional imaging tasks. A shared set of frontal regions (right aI/fO, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior cingulate) were engaged, regardless of perceptual domain (auditory or visual) or mode of response (word production or button press). We present novel evidence that: (1) the right aI/fO is functionally connected with other frontal regions implicated in executive function and not just brain regions responsive to stimulus salience; and (2) that the aI/fO, but not the ACC, exhibits significantly correlated activity with other brain regions specifically engaged by tasks with varying perceptual and behavioral demands. These results support the hypothesis that the right aI/fO aids in the coordination and evaluation of task performance across behavioral tasks with varying perceptual and response demands.

Taking a gamble or playing by the rules: dissociable prefrontal systems implicated in probabilistic versus deterministic rule-based decisions

A decision may be difficult because complex information processing is required to evaluate choices according to deterministic decision rules and/or because it is not certain which choice will lead to the best outcome in a probabilistic context. Factors that tax decision making such as decision rule complexity and low decision certainty should be disambiguated for a more complete understanding of the decision making process. Previous studies have examined the brain regions that are modulated by decision rule complexity or by decision certainty but have not examined these factors together in the context of a single task or study. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study, both decision rule complexity and decision certainty were varied in comparable decision tasks. Further, the level of certainty about which choice to make (choice certainty) was varied separately from certainty about the final outcome resulting from a choice (outcome certainty). Lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and bilateral anterior insula were modulated by decision rule complexity. Anterior insula was engaged more strongly by low than high choice certainty decisions, whereas ventromedial prefrontal cortex showed the opposite pattern. These regions showed no effect of the independent manipulation of outcome certainty. The results disambiguate the influence of decision rule complexity, choice certainty, and outcome certainty on activity in diverse brain regions that have been implicated in decision making. Lateral prefrontal cortex plays a key role in implementing deterministic decision rules, ventromedial prefrontal cortex in probabilistic rules, and anterior insula in both.

Sequential effects in two-choice reaction time tasks: decomposition and synthesis of mechanisms

Performance on serial tasks is influenced by first- and higher-order sequential effects, respectively, due to the immediately previous and earlier trials. As response-to-stimulus interval (RSI) increases, the pattern of reaction times transits from a benefit-only mode, traditionally ascribed to automatic facilitation (AF), to a cost-benefit mode, due to strategic expectancy (SE). To illuminate the sources of such effects, we develop a connectionist network of two mutually inhibiting neural decision units subject to feedback from previous trials. A study of separate biasing mechanisms shows that residual decision unit activity can lead to only first-order AF, but higher-order AF can result from strategic priming mediated by conflict monitoring, which we instantiate in two distinct versions. A further mechanism mediates expectation-related biases that grow during RSI toward saturation levels determined by weighted repetition (or alternation) sequence lengths. Equipped with these mechanisms, the network, consistent with known neurophysiology, accounts for several sets of behavioral data over a wide range of RSIs. The results also suggest that practice speeds up all the mechanisms rather than adjusting their relative strengths.

A neurochemical approach to valuation sensitivity over gains and losses

Prospect theory proposes the hypothesis that people have diminishing sensitivity in valuing increases in the size of monetary outcomes, for both gains and losses. For decision-making under risk, this implies a tendency to be risk-tolerant over losses while being generally risk averse over gains. We offer a neurochemistry-based model of the diminishing valuation sensitivity hypothesis. Specifically, we propose that dopamine tone modulates the sensitivity towards valuation of gains while serotonin tone modulates the sensitivity towards valuation of losses. Consequently, higher dopamine tone would yield a more concave valuation function over gains while higher serotonin tone would yield a more convex valuation function over losses. Using a neurogenetics strategy to test our neurochemical model, we find that subjects with the 9-repeat allele of DAT1 (lower DA tone) are more risk-tolerant over gains than subjects with the 10-repeat allele, and that subjects with the 10-repeat allele of STin2 (higher 5HT tone) are more risk-tolerant over losses than subjects with the 12-repeat allele. Overall, our results support the implications of our model and provide the first neurogenetics evidence that risk attitudes are partially hard-wired in differentiating between gain- and loss-oriented risks.