Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

Exploring the Impact of Smartphone Addiction on Risk Decision-Making Behavior among College Students Based on fNIRS Technology

Smartphone Addiction is a social issue caused by excessive smartphone use, affecting decision-making processes. Current research on the risky decision-making abilities of smartphone addicts is limited. This study used the functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) brain imaging technique and a Sequential Risk-Taking Task experimental paradigm to investigate the decision-making behavior and brain activity of smartphone addicts under varying risk levels. Using a mixed experimental design, the research assessed decision-making ability and brain activation levels as dependent variables across two groups (addiction and control), two risk amounts (high and low), and two outcomes (gain and loss). The study included 42 participants, with 25 in the addiction group and 17 in the control group. Results indicated that risk level significantly impacted the decision-making ability of smartphone addicts, with high-risk levels leading to weaker decision-making ability and increased risk-taking. However, at low-risk levels, decision-making abilities between addicts and healthy individuals showed no significant difference. Furthermore, brain imaging results using fNIRS revealed stronger brain activation in the dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (dlPFC) region for smartphone addicts under loss outcome conditions, with no significant differences between the two groups in terms of brain activation at varying risk volumes. These findings are critical in promoting healthy smartphone use, guiding clinical treatment, and advancing brain mechanism research.

Are Impulsive Decisions Always Irrational? An Experimental Investigation of Impulsive Decisions in the Domains of Gains and Losses

Intertemporal choices are very prevalent in daily life, ranging from simple, mundane decisions to highly consequential decisions. In this context, thinking about the future and making sound decisions are crucial to promoting mental and physical health, as well as a financially sustainable lifestyle. In the present study, we set out to investigate some of the possible underlying mechanisms, such as cognitive factors and emotional states, that promote future-oriented decisions. In a cross-sectional experimental study, we used a gain and a loss version of an intertemporal monetary choices task. Our main behavioural result indicated that people are substantially more impulsive over smaller and sooner monetary losses compared to equivalent gains. In addition, for both decisional domains, significant individual difference predictors emerged, indicating that intertemporal choices are sensitive to the affective and cognitive parameters. By focusing on the cognitive and emotional individual factors that influence impulsive decisions, our study could constitute a building block for successful future intervention programs targeted at mental and physical health issues, including gambling behaviour.

Age differences in risk taking: now you see them, now you don't

Older age has often, but not always, been associated with less risk taking. Inconsistencies may be due to diversity in the risk-taking measures used and/or individual differences in cognitive abilities. We investigated the robustness of age differences in risk taking across three measures, and tested whether age differences in risk taking remained after accounting for cognitive abilities. Younger (aged 25-36) and older (aged 60+) adults completed behavioral (i.e., Balloon Analogue Risk Task, BART) and self-report (i.e., framing tasks and Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire) measures of risk, as well as several measures of cognitive ability (i.e., analytic thinking, numeracy, processing speed, memory, and attention). Older adults showed significantly less risk taking than younger adults on the behavioral measure of risk, but not on the two self-report measures. Older adults also had significantly lower analytic thinking, slower processing speed, and worse executive control compared to younger adults. Less risk taking on the BART was associated with lower analytic thinking and numeracy, slower processing speed, and worse shifting of attention. Age differences in risk taking on the BART remained after accounting for older adults' lower scores on tests of cognitive abilities. Implications for measuring age differences in risk taking are discussed.

Question framing and sensitivity to consequences in sacrificial moral dilemmas

In sacrificial dilemmas, participants judge the morality of killing one person to save several others. For five sacrificial dilemmas, participants rated on separate unidimensional scales how "morally right" and how "morally wrong" they felt such actions would be under six combinations of beneficiaries (strangers, cousins, one's children) and targets (firefighter, bank robber). Framing a survey question in terms of "morally right" potentially primes prescriptive moral norms, directing attention to the beneficiaries; framing it in terms of "morally wrong" potentially primes proscriptive moral norms, directing attention to the targets. Selective attention induced by a question should heighten sensitivity to changes in levels of the corresponding independent variable. Accordingly, ratings of right changed more than ratings of wrong across beneficiaries; ratings of wrong changed more than ratings of right across targets. Question framing can bias moral appraisal by heightening or attenuating attentiveness to individuals who would benefit or suffer from sacrificial action.

The interplay between the importance of a decision and emotion in decision-making

Decision-making literature has demonstrated that individuals' preferences are strongly affected by the way in which choices are presented. This cognitive bias, termed the framing effect, is influenced by the importance of the possible outcomes that a decision can have. However, the direction of this influence remains poorly understood. The aim of this paper was to examine the role of the importance of a decision in framing susceptibility and to explore a potential mechanism underlying this influence. Our first study revealed that participants display a framing effect when their decision implies a high importance outcome, but resist framing manipulation when their decision implies a low importance outcome. Our second study confirmed that an increase in the importance of a decision is associated with increasing framing susceptibility. Moreover, a moderated mediation analysis revealed that the more a decision was important, the more the gain and loss frames aroused opposite emotions, and this accounted for the increase in framing susceptibility. The results of these two studies confirmed that an increase in the importance of a decision is associated with increasing framing susceptibility and suggest that this influence on framing susceptibility is underpinned by emotion. Implications and direction for future studies are discussed.

Framing Effects in Narrative and Non-Narrative Risk Messages

Narrative messages are increasingly popular in health and risk campaigns, yet gain/loss framing effects have never been tested with such messages. Three experiments examined framing in narrative messages. Experiment 1 found that only the character's decision, not framing, influenced judgments about characters in a narrative derived from a prospect theory context. Experiment 2 found that a framing effect that occurred when presented in a decision format did not occur when the same situation was presented as a narrative. Using a different story/decision context, Experiment 3 found no significant difference in preference for surgery over radiation therapy in a narrative presentation compared to a non-narrative presentation. The results suggest that health and risk campaigns cannot assume that framing effects will be the same in narrative messages and non-narrative messages. Potential reasons for these differences and suggestions for future research are discussed.

To admit or not to admit? The effect of framing on risk assessment decision making in psychiatrists

BACKGROUND

The way that information is presented is well known to induce a range of biases in human decision tasks. Little research exists on framing effects in psychiatric decision making, but it is reasonable to assume that psychiatrists are not immune and, if so, there may be implications for the welfare of patients, staff and the general public.

AIMS

To investigate whether presentation of risk information in different formats (frequency, percentage and semantic) influences inpatient admission decisions by psychiatrists.

METHODS

Six-hundred seventy-eight general adult psychiatrists read a short clinical vignette presenting a case scenario of a patient presenting for inpatient admission. One of four condition questions followed the vignette, incorporating either numerical or percentage probabilities and the semantic labels "high" and "low" risk. In each condition, the actual risk was identical, but the way it was presented varied. The decision to admit the patient or not was recorded and compared across conditions.

RESULTS

More individuals chose to admit the patient when risk information was presented in numerical form (X2 = 7.43, p = 0.006) and with the semantic label "high" (X2 = 7.27, p = 0.007).

CONCLUSIONS

Presentation of risk information may influence decision making in psychiatrists. This has important implications for mental health clinical practice where clinicians are required to interpret probabilistic information within their daily work.

Why or why not? A qualitative analysis of low-income parents' reasons for accepting or rejecting simulated research enrollment for their children

A simulation of enrollment in a high- or low-risk research study was conducted with low-income, mostly minority parents. Simulation participants were provided scenarios based on actual low-risk research involving premature babies or actual high-risk research involving devices designed as bridges to heart transplants when all other therapies had failed. Their understanding of the procedures, risks, and benefits was based only the information gained from consent materials for the high- or low-risk protocol. After reviewing the consent information, participants were asked to state their own decision as to whether to enroll their simulated child in the described study. The low-income sample of parents who participated in this simulation were overwhelmingly positive about enrolling a child in the two studies; 66% of those considering the high-risk study and 91% in the low-risk study indicated they would enroll a child. Parents in both conditions cited the value of learning ways to improve the health care of others as a primary reason for agreeing; they also valued knowledge for its own sake. Reasons for refusal varied according to the risk level. Many were unwilling to accept the risks involved in the high-risk study; parents considering the low-risk study of premature infants were concerned about possible discomforts for the infant. More of them also cited the length of the study and the need for repetitious follow-up visits. Information gained from the stated rationales gives insights into ways that researchers can enhance consent materials and the recruitment process.

Decision-making heuristics and biases across the life span

We outline a contextual and motivational model of judgment and decision-making (JDM) biases across the life span. Our model focuses on abilities and skills that correspond to deliberative, experiential, and affective decision-making processes. We review research that addresses links between JDM biases and these processes as represented by individual differences in specific abilities and skills (e.g., fluid and crystallized intelligence, executive functioning, emotion regulation, personality traits). We focus on two JDM biases-the sunk-cost fallacy (SCF) and the framing effect. We trace the developmental trajectory of each bias from preschool through middle childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and later adulthood. We conclude that life-span developmental trajectories differ depending on the bias investigated. Existing research suggests relative stability in the framing effect across the life span and decreases in the SCF with age, including in later life. We highlight directions for future research on JDM biases across the life span, emphasizing the need for process-oriented research and research that increases our understanding of JDM biases in people's everyday lives.

Framing of health information messages

BACKGROUND

The same information about the evidence on health effects can be framed either in positive words or in negative words. Some research suggests that positive versus negative framing can lead to different decisions, a phenomenon described as the framing effect. Attribute framing is the positive versus negative description of a specific attribute of a single item or a state, for example, "the chance of survival with cancer is 2/3" versus "the chance of mortality with cancer is 1/3". Goal framing is the description of the consequences of performing or not performing an act as a gain versus a loss, for example, "if you undergo a screening test for cancer, your survival will be prolonged" versus "if you don't undergo screening test for cancer, your survival will be shortened".

OBJECTIVES

To evaluate the effects of attribute (positive versus negative) framing and of goal (gain versus loss) framing of the same health information, on understanding, perception of effectiveness, persuasiveness, and behavior of health professionals, policy makers, and consumers.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL, The Cochrane Library, issue 3 2007), MEDLINE (Ovid) (1966 to October 2007), EMBASE (Ovid) (1980 to October 2007), PsycINFO (Ovid) (1887 to October 2007). There were no language restrictions. We reviewed the reference lists of related systematic reviews, included studies and of excluded but closely related studies. We also contacted experts in the field.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized controlled trials, quasi-randomised controlled trials, and cross-over studies with health professionals, policy makers, and consumers evaluating one of the two types of framing.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors extracted data in duplicate and independently. We graded the quality of evidence for each outcome using the GRADE approach. We standardized the outcome effects using standardized mean difference (SMD). We stratified the analysis by the type of framing (attribute, goal) and conducted pre-planned subgroup analyses based on the type of message (screening, prevention, and treatment). The primary outcome was behaviour. We did not assess any adverse outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 35 studies involving 16,342 participants (all health consumers) and reporting 51 comparisons.In the context of attribute framing, participants in one included study understood the message better when it was framed negatively than when it was framed positively (1 study; SMD -0.58 (95% confidence interval (CI) -0.94 to -0.22); moderate effect size; low quality evidence). Although positively-framed messages may have led to more positive perception of effectiveness than negatively-framed messages (2 studies; SMD 0.36 (95% CI -0.13 to 0.85); small effect size; low quality evidence), there was little or no difference in persuasiveness (11 studies; SMD 0.07 (95% CI -0.23 to 0.37); low quality evidence) and behavior (1 study; SMD 0.09 (95% CI -0.14 to 0.31); moderate quality evidence).In the context of goal framing, loss messages led to a more positive perception of effectiveness compared to gain messages for screening messages (5 studies; SMD -0.30 (95% CI -0.49 to -0.10); small effect size; moderate quality evidence) and may have been more persuasive for treatment messages (3 studies; SMD -0.50 (95% CI -1.04 to 0.04); moderate effect size; very low quality evidence). There was little or no difference in behavior (16 studies; SMD -0.06 (95% CI -0.15 to 0.03); low quality evidence). No study assessed the effect on understanding.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to commonly held beliefs, the available low to moderate quality evidence suggests that both attribute and goal framing may have little if any consistent effect on health consumers' behaviour. The unexplained heterogeneity between studies suggests the possibility of a framing effect under specific conditions. Future research needs to investigate these conditions.

Dual Processes in Decision Making and Developmental Neuroscience: A Fuzzy-Trace Model

From Piaget to the present, traditional and dual-process theories have predicted improvement in reasoning from childhood to adulthood, and improvement has been observed. However, developmental reversals-that reasoning biases emerge with development -have also been observed in a growing list of paradigms. We explain how fuzzy-trace theory predicts both improvement and developmental reversals in reasoning and decision making. Drawing on research on logical and quantitative reasoning, as well as on risky decision making in the laboratory and in life, we illustrate how the same small set of theoretical principles apply to typical neurodevelopment, encompassing childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and to neurological conditions such as autism and Alzheimer's disease. For example, framing effects-that risk preferences shift when the same decisions are phrases in terms of gains versus losses-emerge in early adolescence as gist-based intuition develops. In autistic individuals, who rely less on gist-based intuition and more on verbatim-based analysis, framing biases are attenuated (i.e., they outperform typically developing control subjects). In adults, simple manipulations based on fuzzy-trace theory can make framing effects appear and disappear depending on whether gist-based intuition or verbatim-based analysis is induced. These theoretical principles are summarized and integrated in a new mathematical model that specifies how dual modes of reasoning combine to produce predictable variability in performance. In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making-prospect theory-can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim-based) and intuitive (gist-based) processes.

A re-examination of the effect of contextual group size on people’s attitude to risk

Using Kahneman and Tversky’s life-death decision paradigm, Wang and colleagues (e.g., Wang & Johnston, 1995; Wang, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2008; Wang et al., 2001) have shown two characteristic phenomena regarding people’s attitude to risk when the contextual group size is manipulated. In both positive and negative frames, people tend to take greater risks in life-death decisions as the contextual group size becomes smaller; this risk-seeking attitude is greater when framed positively than negatively. (This second characteristic often leads to the disappearance of the framing effect in small group contexts comprising of 6 or 60 people.) Their results could shed new light on the effect of contextual group size on people’s risk choice. However these results are usually observed in laboratory experiments with university student samples. This study aims to examine the external validity of these results through different ways of experimentation and with a different sample base. The first characteristic was replicated in both a face-to-face interview with a randomly selected sample of the Japanese general public, and a web-based experiment with a non-student sample, but not the second.

Thoughtful days and valenced nights: How much will you think about the problem?

Considerable research has pointed towards processing differences as a viable means for understanding the strength and likelihood of a framing effect. In the current study we explored how differences in processing may emerge through diurnal patters in circadian rhythm, which varies across individuals. We predicted that during circadian off-times, participants would exhibit stronger framing effects whereas framing effects would be relatively weaker during on-times. Six-hundred and eighty five individuals took part in the study; the findings supported our hypothesis, revealing a diurnal pattern of risk responding that varies across the 24-hour circadian cycle.

Framing effects: behavioral dynamics and neural basis

This study examined the neural basis of framing effects using life-death decision problems framed either positively in terms of lives saved or negatively in terms of lives lost in large group and small group contexts. Using functional MRI we found differential brain activations to the verbal and social cues embedded in the choice problems. In large group contexts, framing effects were significant where participants were more risk seeking under the negative (loss) framing than under the positive (gain) framing. This behavioral difference in risk preference was mainly regulated by the activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus, including the homologue of the Broca's area. In contrast, framing effects diminished in small group contexts while the insula and parietal lobe in the right hemisphere were distinctively activated, suggesting an important role of emotion in switching choice preference from an indecisive mode to a more consistent risk-taking inclination, governed by a kith-and-kin decision rationality.

Framing effect debiasing in medical decision making

OBJECTIVE

Numerous studies have demonstrated the robustness of the framing effect in a variety of contexts. The present study investigated the effects of a debiasing procedure designed to prevent the framing effect for young adults who made decisions based on hypothetical medical decision-making vignettes.

METHODS

The debiasing technique involved participants listing advantages and disadvantages of each treatment prior to making a choice. One hundred and two undergraduate students read a set of three medical treatment vignettes that presented information in terms of different outcome probabilities under either debiasing or control conditions.

RESULTS

The framing effect was demonstrated by the control group in two of the three vignettes. The debiasing group successfully avoided the framing effect for both of these vignettes.

CONCLUSION

These results further support previous findings of the framing effect as well as an effective debiasing technique. This study improved upon previous framing debiasing studies by including a control group and personal medical scenarios, as well as demonstrating debiasing in a framing condition in which the framing effect was demonstrated without a debiasing procedure.

PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS

The findings suggest a relatively simple manipulation may circumvent the use of decision-making heuristics in patients.

Group size and the framing effect:

Past research provides conflicting evidence for the role of value in the appearance of framing effects. In this study, the effects of frame and group size were examined using scenarios about less valuable and more valuable groups (animal vs. human). In addition, two picture manipulations, intended to increase the value of the group, were presented. Choice patterns differed for the human and animal groups, with participants exhibiting greater risk seeking overall for the human scenario and showing a framing effect for humans but not animals when no pictures were presented. A small group size increased the proportion of risky choices for both the animal and human scenarios. Presenting pictures with names did lead to framing effects for animals, but providing pictures or pictures and names eliminated framing effects for the human scenario. These findings suggest that the relationship between value and framing effects is a matter of degree.

Framing effects in younger and older adults

A growing literature on decision making in older adults suggests that they are more likely to use heuristic processing than are younger adults. We assessed this tendency in the context of a framing effect, a decision-making phenomenon whereby the language used to describe options greatly influences the decision maker's choice. We compared decision making under a standard ("heuristic") condition and also under a "justification" condition known to reduce reliance on heuristics. In the standard condition, older adults were more susceptible than younger adults to framing but the two groups did not differ when participants were asked to provide a justification. Thus, although older adults may spontaneously rely more on heuristic processing than younger adults, they can be induced to take a more systematic approach to decision making.