Molecular aspects of avian influenza (H5N1) viruses isolated from humans

Insights into Genetic Characteristics and Virological Features of Endemic Avian Influenza A (H9N2) Viruses in Egypt from 2017-2021

From 2010 to 2013, genotype I avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses of the G1-lineage were isolated from several poultry species in Egypt. In 2014, novel reassortant H9N2 viruses were detected in pigeons designated as genotype II. To monitor the subsequent genetic evolution of Egyptian A(H9N2) viruses, we characterized the full genomes of 173 viruses isolated through active surveillance from 2017 to 2022. In addition, we compared the virological characteristics and pathogenicity of representative viruses. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA indicated that all studied sequences from 2017-2021 were grouped into G1-like H9N2 viruses previously detected in Egypt. Phylogenetic analysis indicated that the Egyptian A(H9N2) viruses had undergone further reassortment, inheriting four genes (PB2, PB1, PA, NS) from genotype II, with their remaining segments deriving from genotype I viruses (these viruses designated as genotype III). Studying the virological features of the two most dominant genotypes (I and III) of Egyptian H9N2 viruses in vitro and in vivo indicated that both replicated well in mammalian cells, but did not show any clinical signs in chickens, ducks, and mice. Monitoring avian influenza viruses through surveillance programs and understanding the genetic and antigenic characteristics of circulating H9N2 viruses are essential for risk assessment and influenza pandemic preparedness.

Genetic and Antigenic Characteristics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Viruses Circulating in Domestic Poultry in Egypt, 2017–2021

In Egypt, the endemicity of avian influenza viruses is a serious concern. Since 2016, several outbreaks of H5N8 have been recorded among domestic poultry in various areas of the country. Active surveillance of domestic poultry across several governorates in Egypt from 2017 to 2021 detected at least six genotypes of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N8 viruses with evidence of partial or complete annual replacement of dominant strains. Although all Egyptian H5N8 viruses had clade 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin (HA) genes, the remaining viral gene segments were from multiple geographic origins, indicating that the H5N8 isolates resulted from multiple introductions. Mutations in the viral proteins associated with pathogenicity and antiviral drug resistance were detected. Some mutations in the HA resulted in antigenic drift. Heterogeneity in circulating H5N8 HPAI threatens poultry production and public health.

In Vivo Therapy with M2e-Specific IgG Selects for an Influenza A Virus Mutant with Delayed Matrix Protein 2 Expression

The ectodomain of matrix protein 2 (M2e) of influenza A viruses is a universal influenza A vaccine candidate. Here, we report potential evasion strategies of influenza A viruses under in vivo passive anti-M2e IgG immune selection pressure in severe combined immune-deficient (SCID) mice. A/Puerto Rico/8/34-infected SCID mice were treated with the M2e-specific mouse IgG monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) MAb 65 (IgG2a) or MAb 37 (IgG1), which recognize amino acids 5 to 15 in M2e, or with MAb 148 (IgG1), which binds to the invariant N terminus of M2e. Treatment of challenged SCID mice with any of these MAbs significantly prolonged survival compared to isotype control IgG treatment. Furthermore, M2e-specific IgG2a protected significantly better than IgG1, and even resulted in virus clearance in some of the SCID mice. Deep sequencing analysis of viral RNA isolated at different time points after treatment revealed that the sequence variation in M2e was limited to P10H/L and/or I11T in anti-M2e MAb-treated mice. Remarkably, in half of the samples isolated from moribund MAb 37-treated mice and in all MAb 148-treated mice, virus was isolated with a wild-type M2 sequence but with nonsynonymous mutations in the polymerases and/or the hemagglutinin genes. Some of these mutations were associated with delayed M2 and other viral gene expression and with increased resistance to anti-M2e MAb treatment of SCID mice. Treatment with M2e-specific MAbs thus selects for viruses with limited variation in M2e. Importantly, influenza A viruses may also undergo an alternative escape route by acquiring mutations that result in delayed wild-type M2 expression. IMPORTANCE Broadly protective influenza vaccine candidates may have a higher barrier to immune evasion compared to conventional influenza vaccines. We used Illumina MiSeq deep sequence analysis to study the mutational patterns in A/Puerto Rico/8/34 viruses that evolve in chronically infected SCID mice that were treated with different M2e-specific MAbs. We show that under these circumstances, viruses emerged in vivo with mutations in M2e that were limited to positions 10 and 11. Moreover, we discovered an alternative route for anti-M2e antibody immune escape, in which a virus is selected with wild-type M2e but with mutations in other gene segments that result in delayed M2 and other viral protein expression. Delayed expression of the viral antigen that is targeted by a protective antibody thus represents an influenza virus immune escape mechanism that does not involve epitope alterations.

Impact of Individual Viral Gene Segments from Influenza A/H5N8 Virus on the Protective Efficacy of Inactivated Subtype-Specific Influenza Vaccine

Since its emergence in 2014, the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 virus has continuously and rapidly spread worldwide in the poultry sector resulting in huge economic losses. A typical inactivated H5N8 vaccine is prepared using the six internal genes from A/PR8/1934 (H1N1) and the two major antigenic proteins (HA and NA) from the circulating H5N8 strain with the HA modified to a low pathogenic form (PR8_HA/NA-H5N8). The contribution of the other internal proteins from H5N8, either individually or in combination, to the overall protective efficacy of PR8-based H5N8 vaccine has not been investigated. Using reverse genetics, a set of PR8-based vaccines expressing the individual proteins from an H5N8 strain were rescued and compared to the parent PR8 and low pathogenic H5N8 strains and the commonly used PR8_HA/NA-H5N8. Except for the PR8-based vaccine strains expressing the HA of H5N8, none of the rescued combinations could efficiently elicit virus-neutralizing antibodies. Compared to PR8, the non-HA viral proteins provided some protection to infected chickens six days post infection. We assume that this late protection was related to cell-based immunity rather than antibody-mediated immunity. This may explain the slight advantage of using full low pathogenic H5N8 instead of PR8_HA/NA-H5N8 to improve protection by both the innate and the humoral arms of the immune system.

Mammalian-adaptive mutation NP-Q357K in Eurasian H1N1 Swine Influenza viruses determines the virulence phenotype in mice

It has recently been proposed that the Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (EA H1N1) swine influenza virus (SIV) is one of the most likely zoonotic viruses to cause the next influenza pandemic. Two main genotypes EA H1N1 viruses have been recognized to be infected humans in China. Our study finds that one of the genotypes JS1-like viruses are avirulent in mice. However, the other are HuN-like viruses and are virulent in mice. The molecular mechanism underlying this difference shows that the NP gene determines the virulence of the EA H1N1 viruses in mice. In addition, a single substitution, Q357K, in the NP protein of the EA H1N1 viruses alters the virulence phenotype. This substitution is a typical human signature marker, which is prevalent in human viruses but rarely detected in avian influenza viruses. The NP-Q357K substitution is readily to be occurred when avian influenza viruses circulate in pigs, and may facilitate their infection of humans and allow viruses also carrying NP-357K to circulate in humans. Our study demonstrates that the substitution Q357K in the NP protein plays a key role in the virulence phenotype of EA H1N1 SIVs, and provides important information for evaluating the pandemic risk of field influenza strains.

Genetic and antigenic characterization of avian influenza H9N2 viruses during 2016 in Iraq

Background

Little is known about the antigenic and genetic characteristics of influenza A viruses circulating in poultry in Iraq.

Objective

This study describes the genetic and antigenic characteristics of the detected avian influenza H9N2 viruses in Iraq during 2016.

Methods

Full genome sequences of two H9N2 viruses isolated from chickens in Iraq during 2016 were assembled. Antigenic analyses of Iraqi H9N2 viruses and contemporary H9N2 isolates from Lebanon and Egypt were performed by hemagglutination inhibition assay.

Results

Phylogenetic analysis of surface glycoproteins and internal segments (PB2, PA, NP, M, and NS) indicated that the Iraqi H9N2 viruses were closely related to G1-like lineage of H9N2 viruses isolated from Pakistan and Iran indicating possible epidemiological links. The PB1 segments of the current characterized H9N2 viruses were not related to any of the previously characterized H9N2 viruses and closely similar to H7N7 virus detected in chickens in Germany in 2015. Multiple genetic determinants for virulence and mammalian transmission were characterized in the characterized H9N2 viruses in Iraq. The antigenic analysis showed a close relationship between H9N2 viruses in Iraq and contemporary H9N2 viruses in Egypt and Lebanon. Like H9N2 viruses, Iraqis H9N2 virus bound to human-like receptor rather than avian-like receptor thus represent a public health risk.

Conclusion

Active surveillance of avian influenza virus in poultry and migratory birds should be adopted to monitor the genesis and emergence of new viruses in Iraq.

Isolation and full genome characterization of avian influenza subtype H9N2 from poultry respiratory disease outbreak in Egypt

Low pathogenic avian influenza virus of subtype H9N2 is panzootic in multiple avian species causing respiratory manifestations and severe economic losses. H9N2 co-circulate simultaneously with high pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1 in Egyptian chicken farms suggesting the possibility of reassortment. The aim of the present study was to isolate and characterize H9N2 from the recent outbreaks in chicken farms. Also the diversity of amantadine-resistant mutants among these isolates was tested by in situ ELISA and sequence analysis. Three influenza H9N2 viruses, designated A/chicken/Egypt/SCU8/2014, A/chicken/Egypt/SCU9/2014 and A/chicken/Egypt/SCU20/2014 were isolated from commercial broiler and broiler breeder chickens in specific pathogen free embryonated chicken eggs. The eight gene segments were amplified by RT-PCR, cloned, and subjected to full length sequencing. Phylogenetic analysis of these viruses revealed a close relationship between Egyptian, Middle Eastern and Israel isolates with an average of 96-99 % nucleotide homology and identified an ancestor relationship to low pathogenic H9N2 Quail/HK/G1/1997 prototype. The internal segments of the currently isolated viruses were derived from the same sub-lineage with no new evidence of reassortment. The three isolates were sensitive to amantadine as suggested by absence of mutations of M2 and confirmed by a phenotypic assay. In conclusion, avian influenza H9N2 virus is circulating in Egyptian chicken farms causing respiratory manifestations. Continuous monitoring of the molecular epidemiology and its impact on the virulence as well as emergence of new strains are necessary.

Sequence and phylogenetic analysis of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses isolated during 2006-2008 outbreaks in Pakistan reveals genetic diversity

BACKGROUND

Since the first outbreak recorded in northern areas of Pakistan in early 2006, highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses were isolated from commercial poultry and wild/domestic birds from different areas of Pakistan up to July 2008. Different isolates of H5N1 were sequenced to explore the genetic diversity of these viruses.

RESULTS

Phylogenetic analysis revealed close clustering and highest sequence identity in all 8 genes to HPAI H5N1 isolates belonging to unified H5 clade 2.2, sub-lineage EMA-3 recovered from Afghanistan during the same time period. Two subgroups within Pakistani H5N1 viruses, from domestic and wild birds, were observed on the basis of their sequence homology and mutations. HPAI motif, preferred receptor specificity for α-(2, 3) linkages, potential N-linked glycosylation sites and an additional glycosylation site at the globular head of HA protein of four Pakistani H5N1 isolates. While, the amino acids associated with sensitivities to various antiviral drugs (Oseltamivir, Zanamivir, Amantadine) were found conserved for the Pakistani H5N1 isolates. Conspicuously, some important mutations observed at critical positions of antigenic sites (S141P, D155S, R162I & P181S) and at receptor binding pocket (A185T, R189K & S217P) of HA-1. A high sequence similarity between Pakistani HP H5N1 and LP H9N2 viruses was also observed. Avian like host specific markers with the exception of E627K in PB2, K356R in PA, V33I in NP, I28V in M2 and L107F in NS2 proteins were also observed.

CONCLUSIONS

Various point mutations in different genes of H5 viruses from Pakistan were observed during its circulation in the field. The outbreaks started in Khyber Pakhtoon Khawa (North West) province in 2006 and spread to the Southern regions over a period of time. Though migratory birds may have a role for this continued endemicity of clade 2.2 H5N1 viruses during 2006-2008 in Pakistan, the possibility of their transmission through legal or illegal poultry trade across the borders cannot be ignored.

Isolation and mutation trend analysis of influenza A virus subtype H9N2 in Egypt

Background

Avian influenza virus H9N2 is a panzootic pathogen that affects poultry causing mild to moderate respiratory distress but has been associated with high morbidity and considerable mortality. Interspecies transmission of H9N2 from avian species to mammalian hosts does occur. The virus possesses human virus-like receptor specificity and it can infect humans producing flu-like illness.

Methods

Recently, mild influenza like symptoms were detected in H5N1 vaccinated flocks. Influenza A subtype H9N2 was isolated from the infected flock. The virus evolution was investigated by sequencing the viral genes to screen the possible virus recombination. The viral amino acid sequences from the isolated H9N2 strains were compared to other related sequences from the flu data base that were used to assess the robustness of the mutation trend. Changes in the species-associated amino acid residues or those that enabled virulence to mammals were allocated.

Results

Phylogenetic analyses of haemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes showed that the recently isolated Egyptian strain belonged to the H9N2 sub-lineage that prevails in Israel. The six internal segments of the isolated virus were found to be derived from the same sub-lineage with no new evidence of reassortment. The results demonstrated conserved genetic and biological constitution of H9N2 viruses in the Middle East. The recently isolated H9N2 virus from chicken in Egypt possessed amino acids that could enable the virus to replicate in mammals and caused severe disease in domestic chickens.

Conclusion

The study highlights the importance of continuous monitoring of the mutations evolved in avian influenza viruses and its impact on virulence to avian species in addition to its importance in the emergence of new strains with the capacity to be a pandemic candidate.

Selection of predicted siRNA as potential antiviral therapeutic agent against influenza virus

Influenza virus A (IVA) infection is responsible for recent death worldwide. Hence, there is a need to develop therapeutic agents against the virus. We describe the prediction of short interfering RNA (siRNA) as potential therapeutic molecules for the HA (Haemagglutinin) and NA (Neuraminidase) genes. We screened 90,522 siRNA candidates for HA and 13,576 for NA and selected 1006 and 1307 candidates for HA and NA, respectively based on the proportion of viral sequences that are targeted by the corresponding siRNA, with complete matches. Further short listing to select siRNA with no off-target hits, fulfilling all the guidelines mentioned in approach, provided us 13 siRNAs for haemagglutinin and 13 siRNAs for neuraminidase. The approach of finding siRNA using multiple sequence alignments of amino acid sequences has led to the identification of five conserved amino acid sequences, three in hemagglutinin i.e. RGLFGAIAGFIE, YNAELLV and AIAGFIE and two in neuraminidase i.e. RTQSEC and EECSYP which on reveres translation provided siRNA sequences as potential therapeutic candidates. The approaches used during this study have enabled us to identify potentially therapeutic siRNAs against divergent IVA strains.

Molecular evolution of the six internal genes of H5N1 equine influenza A virus

Phylogenetic and evolutionary patterns of the six internal genes of an equine H5N1 influenza A virus isolated in Egypt on 2009 were analyzed using direct sequencing. All of the internal genes of the equine H5N1 strain showed a genetic pattern potentially related to Eurasian lineages. Variable dendrogram topologies revealed an absence of reassortment in the equine strain while confirming its close relatedness to other Egyptian H5N1 strains from human and avian species. The equine strain is characterized by a variety of amino acid substitutions in six internal proteins compared to the available Egyptian H5N1 strains. Interestingly, the equine strain displayed amino acids in the PB2, PA, M2 and NS2 proteins that are unique among the available H5N1 sequences in the flu database, and their potential effect on virulence needs to be further investigated.

PB1-mediated virulence attenuation of H5N1 influenza virus in mice is associated with PB2

H5N1 avian influenza viruses demonstrate different phenotypes, such as pathogenicity after one or serial passages in mammalian hosts or cells. To establish the molecular basis of these phenotypes, we cloned isolates from the lungs of mice infected with human A/Vietnam/1194/2004 (H5N1) influenza virus. Large-plaque isolates were less pathogenic to mice than small-plaque isolates. Genome sequencing revealed that the small-plaque and large-plaque isolates differed in several amino acids. In order to assess their effects on pathogenicity in mice, two amino acid changes common to attenuated isolates, one in PB2 (I63T) and the other in PB1 (T677M), were inserted into a wild-type recombinant virus construct. The PB2 (I63T) or PB1 (T677M) mutations alone did not alter the phenotype of H5N1 virus, whereas recombinant virus with both mutations was less pathogenic than the wild-type recombinant virus. Furthermore, the PB1 (T677M) mutation showed a lower replication efficiency, although it had higher polymerase activity. The recombinant virus with the PB2 (63T) mutation replicated as well as the wild-type recombinant virus. These results suggest that the C terminus of PB1 of H5N1 influenza virus mediates virulence attenuation of H5N1 influenza virus in mice, associating with the N terminus of PB2. However, the role of the N terminus of PB2 in virulence attenuation in mice remains unclear.

Erythrocyte binding preference of 16 subtypes of low pathogenic avian influenza and 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) viruses

All 16 subtypes of avian influenza viruses of low pathogenicity (LPAIV) as well as their hemagglutinin (H) antigens, and four 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus isolates were assayed for hemagglutinating activity against 5 erythrocyte species: goose, guinea pig, human group O, chicken and horse. Of all viruses and antigens assayed, the highest hemagglutination (HA) titers were obtained with goose and guinea pig erythrocytes. Hemagglutinating activity of replicating LPAIV and LPAIV antigens decreased, in order, with chicken and human group O; meanwhile, horse erythrocytes yielded lowest or no HA titer. Moreover, the 2009 pandemic viruses did not agglutinate both horse and chicken erythrocytes. Our study concluded that goose and guinea pig erythrocytes are the best in HA assay for all subtypes of influenza viruses.

Tissue and host tropism of influenza viruses: importance of quantitative analysis

It is generally accepted that human influenza viruses preferentially bind to cell-surface glycoproteins/glycolipids containing sialic acids in alpha2,6-linkage; while avian and equine influenza viruses preferentially bind to those containing sialic acids in alpha2,3-linkage. Even though this generalized view is accurate for H3 subtype isolates, it may not be accurate and absolute for all subtypes of influenza A viruses and, therefore, needs to be reevaluated carefully and realistically. Some of the studies published in major scientific journals on the subject of tissue tropism of influenza viruses are inconsistent and caused confusion in the scientific community. One of the reasons for the inconsistency is that most studies were quantitative descriptions of sialic acid receptor distributions based on lectin or influenza virus immunohistochemistry results with limited numbers of stained cells. In addition, recent studies indicate that alpha2,3- and alpha2,6-linked sialic acids are not the sole receptors determining tissue and host tropism of influenza viruses. In fact, determinants for tissue and host tropism of human, avian and animal influenza viruses are more complex than what has been generally accepted. Other factors, such as glycan topology, concentration of invading viruses, local density of receptors, lipid raft microdomains, coreceptors or sialic acid-independent receptors, may also be important. To more efficiently control the global spread of pandemic influenza such as the current circulating influenza A H1N1, it is crucial to clarify the determinants for tissue and host tropism of influenza viruses through quantitative analysis of experimental results. In this review, I will comment on some conflicting issues related to tissue and host tropism of influenza viruses, discuss the importance of quantitative analysis of lectin and influenza virus immunohistochemistry results and point out directions for future studies in this area, which should lead to a better understanding of tissue and host tropism of influenza viruses.

Detection of mammalian virulence determinants in highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses: multivariate analysis of published data

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus H5N1 infects water and land fowl and can infect and cause mortality in mammals, including humans. However, HPAI H5N1 strains are not equally virulent in mammals, and some strains have been shown to cause only mild symptoms in experimental infections. Since most experimental studies of the basis of virulence in mammals have been small in scale, we undertook a meta-analysis of available experimental studies and used Bayesian graphical models (BGM) to increase the power of inference. We applied text-mining techniques to identify 27 individual studies that experimentally determined pathogenicity in HPAI H5N1 strains comprising 69 complete genome sequences. Amino acid sequence data in all 11 genes were coded as binary data for the presence or absence of mutations related to virulence in mammals or nonconsensus residues. Sites previously implicated as virulence determinants were examined for association with virulence in mammals in this data set, and the sites with the most significant association were selected for further BGM analysis. The analyses show that virulence in mammals is a complex genetic trait directly influenced by mutations in polymerase basic 1 (PB1) and PB2, nonstructural 1 (NS1), and hemagglutinin (HA) genes. Several intra- and intersegment correlations were also found, and we postulate that there may be two separate virulence mechanisms involving particular combinations of polymerase and NS1 mutations or of NS1 and HA mutations.

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus: cause of the next pandemic?

Since 1997, when human infections with a highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza A virus (AIV) subtype H5N1 - previously infecting only birds - were identified in a Hong Kong outbreak, global attention has focused on the potential for this virus to cause the next pandemic. From December 2003, an unprecedented H5N1 epizootic in poultry and migrating wild birds has spread across Asia and into Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Humans in close contact with sick poultry and on rare occasion with other infected humans, have become infected. As of early March 2007, 12 countries have reported 167 deaths among 277 laboratory-confirmed human infections to WHO. WHO has declared the world to be in Phase 3 of a Pandemic Alert Period. This paper reviews the evolution of HP AIV H5N1, molecular changes that enable AIVs to infect and replicate in human cells and spread efficiently from person-to-person, and strategies to prevent the emergence of a pandemic virus.

Human infection with highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus

Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A viruses have spread relentlessly across the globe since 2003, and they are associated with widespread death in poultry, substantial economic loss to farmers, and reported infections of more than 300 people with a mortality rate of 60%. The high pathogenicity of H5N1 influenza viruses and their capacity for transmission from birds to human beings has raised worldwide concern about an impending human influenza pandemic similar to the notorious H1N1 Spanish influenza of 1918. Since many aspects of H5N1 influenza research are rapidly evolving, we aim in this Seminar to provide an up-to-date discussion on select topics of interest to influenza clinicians and researchers. We summarise the clinical features and diagnosis of infection and present therapeutic options for H5N1 infection of people. We also discuss ideas relating to virus transmission, host restriction, and pathogenesis. Finally, we discuss vaccine development in view of the probable importance of vaccination in pandemic control.

Comparative phyloinformatics of virus genes at micro and macro levels in a distributed computing environment

Background

Preparedness for a possible global pandemic caused by viruses such as the highly pathogenic influenza A subtype H5N1 has become a global priority. In particular, it is critical to monitor the appearance of any new emerging subtypes. Comparative phyloinformatics can be used to monitor, analyze, and possibly predict the evolution of viruses. However, in order to utilize the full functionality of available analysis packages for large-scale phyloinformatics studies, a team of computer scientists, biostatisticians and virologists is needed – a requirement which cannot be fulfilled in many cases. Furthermore, the time complexities of many algorithms involved leads to prohibitive runtimes on sequential computer platforms. This has so far hindered the use of comparative phyloinformatics as a commonly applied tool in this area.

Results

In this paper the graphical-oriented workflow design system called Quascade and its efficient usage for comparative phyloinformatics are presented. In particular, we focus on how this task can be effectively performed in a distributed computing environment. As a proof of concept, the designed workflows are used for the phylogenetic analysis of neuraminidase of H5N1 isolates (micro level) and influenza viruses (macro level). The results of this paper are hence twofold. Firstly, this paper demonstrates the usefulness of a graphical user interface system to design and execute complex distributed workflows for large-scale phyloinformatics studies of virus genes. Secondly, the analysis of neuraminidase on different levels of complexity provides valuable insights of this virus's tendency for geographical based clustering in the phylogenetic tree and also shows the importance of glycan sites in its molecular evolution.

Conclusion

The current study demonstrates the efficiency and utility of workflow systems providing a biologist friendly approach to complex biological dataset analysis using high performance computing. In particular, the utility of the platform Quascade for deploying distributed and parallelized versions of a variety of computationally intensive phylogenetic algorithms has been shown. Secondly, the analysis of the utilized H5N1 neuraminidase datasets at macro and micro levels has clearly indicated a pattern of spatial clustering of the H5N1 viral isolates based on geographical distribution rather than temporal or host range based clustering.

Origin of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus in China and genetic characterization of donor and recipient viruses

Genetic analysis of all eight genes of two Nanchang avian influenza viruses, A/Duck/Nanchang/1681/92 (H3N8-1681) and A/Duck/Nanchang/1904/92 (H7N1-1904), isolated from Jiangxi province, China, in 1992, showed that six internal genes of H3N8-1681 virus and five internal (except NS gene) genes of H7N1-1904 virus were closely similar to A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (H5N1) virus, the first highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of subtype H5N1 isolated in Asia. The neuraminidase (NA) gene of Gs/Gd/1/96 had the highest genetic similarity with A/Duck/Hokkaido/55/96 (H1N1-55) virus. The haemagglutinin (HA) gene of Gs/Gd/1/96 virus might have originated as a result of mutation of H5 HA gene from A/Swan/Hokkaido/51/96 (H5N3-51)-like viruses. The PA gene of H5N3-51 virus had the highest similarity with Gs/Gd/1/96. This study explains the origin of first Asian HPAI H5N1 virus in Guangdong by the reassortment of Nanchang (close to Guangdong) and Hokkaido (Japan) (H1N1-55 and H5N3-51) viruses. Genetic characteristics of donor and recipient viruses were also studied.

Bird flu: if or when? Planning for the next pandemic

Avian influenza or "bird flu" is causing increasing concern across the world as experts prepare for the possible occurrence of the next human influenza pandemic. Only influenza A has ever been shown to have the capacity to cause pandemics. Currently A/H5N1, a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, is of particular concern. Outbreaks of this disease in birds, especially domestic poultry, have been detected across Southeast Asia at regular intervals since 2003, and have now affected parts of Africa and Europe. Many unaffected countries across the world are preparing for the possible arrival of HPAI A/H5N1 in wild birds and poultry within their territories. All such countries need to prepare for the rare possibility of a small number of human cases of HPAI A/H5N1, imported through foreign travel. Although it is by no means certain that HPAI A/H5N1 will be the source of the next pandemic, many countries are also preparing for the inevitable occurrence of human pandemic influenza.

Generation of an attenuated H5N1 avian influenza virus vaccine with all eight genes from avian viruses

In the face of disease outbreaks in poultry and the potential pandemic threat to humans caused by the highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of H5N1 subtype, improvement in biosecurity and the use of inactivated vaccines are two main options for the control of this disease. Vaccine candidates of influenza A viruses of H5N1 subtype have been generated in several laboratories by plasmid-based reverse genetics with hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from the epidemic strains of avian viruses in a background of internal genes from the vaccine donor strain of human strains, A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (PR8). These reassortant viruses containing genes from both avian and human viruses might impose biosafety concerns, also may be do if C4/F AIV would be a live attenuated vaccine or cold-adaptive strain vaccine. In order to generate better and safer vaccine candidate viruses, we genetically constructed attenuated reassortant H5N1 influenza A virus, designated as C4/F AIV, by plasmid-based reverse genetics with all eight genes from the avian strains. The C4/F AIV virus contained HA and NA genes from an epidemic strain A/Chicken/Huadong/04 (H5N1) (C4/H5N1) in a background of internal genes derived from a low pathogenic strain of A/Chicken/F/98(H9N2). The reassortant virus was attenuated by removal of the multibasic amino acid motif in the HA gene by mutation and deletion (from PQRERRRKKR (downward arrow) G to PQIETR (downward arrow) G). The intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of C4/F AIV virus was 0, whereas that of the donor virus C4/H5N1 was 3.0. The virus HA titer of C4/H5N1 in the allantoic fluid from infected embryonated eggs was as high as 1:2048. The inactivated vaccine prepared from the reassortant virus C4/F AIV-induced high HI titer in vaccinated chickens and gave 100% protection when challenged with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of H5N1 subtype.

Pathogenic and molecular characterization of the H5N1 avian influenza virus isolated from the first human case in Zhejiang province, China

Since the reemergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1, it caused disease in 20 people with 13 deaths in mainland of China. On February 21, 2006, the first suspected human case in Zhejiang province was reported. Pathogenic analyses, including reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), real-time RT-PCR, and virus isolation, were carried out to confirm the pathogen from tracheal aspirate specimen. In addition, antibody in serum sample was detected using hemagglutination-inhibition (HI). Results revealed that nucleic acid extracted from the tracheal aspirate specimen was positive for H5N1 avian influenza virus and influenza virus type A. The H5N1 virus strain named A/Zhejiang/16/06 (H5N1) was isolated. The titers of HI antibody for H5N1 avian influenza virus were 1:320 and 1:640, respectively. The sequenced genes were all avian origin. Phylogenetic analyses between the A/Zhejiang/16/06 and other H5N1 influenza viruses were also included.

Differential onset of apoptosis in influenza A virus H5N1- and H1N1-infected human blood macrophages

Pathogenesis of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/Hong Kong/483/97 (H5N1/97) remains to be investigated. It was demonstrated recently that H5N1 dysregulation of proinflammatory cytokines in human macrophages is a p38-kinase-dependent process. The results indicated that macrophages may play a role in disease severity. To investigate cellular responses to H5N1 infection further, apoptosis and its related pathways were studied in primary blood macrophages. Here, it is shown that the H5N1/97 virus triggered apoptosis, including caspases and PARP activation, in infected macrophages with a delayed onset compared with H1N1 counterparts. Similar results were also found in human macrophages infected by precursors of the H5N1/97 virus. Thus, these results showed that the delay in apoptosis onset in macrophages infected by H5N1/97 and its related precursor subtypes may be a means for the pathogens to have longer survival in the cells; this may contribute to the pathogenesis of H5N1 disease in humans.

Genomic analysis of influenza A viruses, including avian flu (H5N1) strains

This study was designed to conduct genomic analysis in two steps, such as the overall relative synonymous codon usage (RSCU) analysis of the five virus species in the orthomyxoviridae family, and more intensive pattern analysis of the four subtypes of influenza A virus (H1N1, H2N2, H3N2, and H5N1) which were isolated from human population. All the subtypes were categorized by their isolated regions, including Asia, Europe, and Africa, and most of the synonymous codon usage patterns were analyzed by correspondence analysis (CA). As a result, influenza A virus showed the lowest synonymous codon usage bias among the virus species of the orthomyxoviridae family, and influenza B and influenza C virus were followed, while suggesting that influenza A virus might have an advantage in transmitting across the species barrier due to their low codon usage bias. The ENC values of the host-specific HA and NA genes represented their different HA and NA types very well, and this reveals that each influenza A virus subtype uses different codon usage patterns as well as the amino acid compositions. In NP, PA and PB2 genes, most of the virus subtypes showed similar RSCU patterns except for H5N1 and H3N2 (A/HK/1774/1999) subtypes which were suspected to be transmitted across the species barrier, from avian and porcine species to human beings, respectively. This distinguishable synonymous codon usage patterns in non-human origin viruses might be useful in determining the origin of influenza A viruses in genomic levels as well as the serological tests. In this study, all the process, including extracting sequences from GenBank flat file and calculating codon usage values, was conducted by Java codes, and these bioinformatics-related methods may be useful in predicting the evolutionary patterns of pandemic viruses.

New genotype of avian influenza H5N1 viruses isolated from tree sparrows in China

The 2004 outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 disease in China led to a great poultry loss and society attention. A survey of avian influenza viruses was conducted on tree sparrows (Passer montanus) collected in China in 2004. Four viruses were isolated from free-living tree sparrows. The results of the whole-genome analysis indicated that an H5N1 virus with a new genotype is circulating among tree sparrows. The hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of the new genotype were derived from Gs/Gd/96-like viruses and the nuclear protein gene descended from the 2001 genotype A H5N1 viruses, while the other inner genes originated from an unknown influenza virus. In experimental infection, all four viruses were highly pathogenic to chickens but not pathogenic to ducks or mice. The four tree sparrow viruses were different from the 2003 tree sparrow strain (genotype Z) in Hong Kong. The results suggested that H5N1 viruses might be distributed widely in tree sparrows.

Molecular characterization of the complete genome of human influenza H5N1 virus isolates from Thailand

The complete genomes of three human H5N1 influenza isolates were characterized, together with the haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from two additional human isolates and one chicken isolate. These six influenza isolates were obtained from four different provinces of Thailand during the avian influenza outbreak in Asia from late 2003 to May 2004. All six Thailand isolates contained multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site in the HA gene. Amino acid residues at the receptor-binding site of the five human viruses were similar to those of the chicken virus and other H5N1 viruses from Hong Kong. The presence of amantadine resistance in the Thailand viruses isolated during this outbreak was suggested by a fixed mutation in M2 and confirmed by a phenotypic assay. All genomic segments of the Thailand viruses clustered with the recently described genotype Z. The Thailand viruses contained more avian-specific residues than the 1997 Hong Kong H5N1 viruses, suggesting that the virus may have adapted to allow a more efficient spread in avian species.

Evaluation of a genetically modified reassortant H5N1 influenza A virus vaccine candidate generated by plasmid-based reverse genetics

Avian influenza A H5N1 viruses similar to those that infected humans in Hong Kong in 1997 continue to circulate in waterfowl and have reemerged in poultry in the region, raising concerns that these viruses could reappear in humans. The currently licensed trivalent inactivated influenza vaccines contain hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase genes from epidemic strains in a background of internal genes derived from the vaccine donor strain, A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (PR8). Such reassortant candidate vaccine viruses are currently not licensed for the prevention of human infections by H5N1 influenza viruses. A transfectant H5N1/PR8 virus was generated by plasmid-based reverse genetics. The removal of the multibasic amino acid motif in the HA gene associated with high pathogenicity in chickens, and the new genotype of the H5N1/PR8 transfectant virus, attenuated the virus for chickens and mice without altering the antigenicity of the HA. A Formalin-inactivated vaccine prepared from this virus was immunogenic and protected mice from subsequent wild-type H5N1 virus challenge. This is the first successful attempt to develop an H5N1 vaccine seed virus resembling those used in currently licensed influenza A vaccines with properties that make it a promising candidate for further evaluation in humans.

Unconventional biological threats and the molecular biological response to biological threats

This article concludes this symposium on potential agents of warfare and terrorism with discussion of 3 topics. First, influenza A virus is discussed as a potential biological weapon. Although it does not receive much attention in this role, the potential for mass casualties and public panic certainly exist if an epidemic of a virulent influenza A virus were initiated. Second, agroterrorism, terrorism directed at livestock or poultry or crops, is briefly discussed. Finally, the potential role of techniques of modern molecular biology to create new agents for bioterrorism or enhance the terrorist potential of available agents, and the known roles of these techniques in defense against biological warfare or terrorism are discussed.

Influenza Aviária: Uma Revisão dos Últimos Dez Anos

A influenza aviária é doença exótica no Brasil. O sistema de vigilância implementado pelo Programa Nacional de Sanidade Avícola (PNSA) mantém monitoração permanente das aves das principais espécies domésticas, tanto do material genético importado para a indústria avícola, por exemplo, da espécie das galinhas (Gallus gallus formadomestica), perus (Meleagris gallopavo formadomestica), codornas (Coturnix coturnix japonica), patos (Anas), primários (elite), bisavós e avós para postura ou corte, como aves de espécies de exploração mais recente, exóticas, por exemplo avestruzes (Struthio camelus) ou nativas, por exemplo emas (Rhea americana). Os plantéis de reprodutores em produção são também acompanhados por amostragens periódicas, conforme previsto no PNSA, além da monitoração das respostas aos programas de vacinação, por exemplo, contra bronquite infecciosa e doença infecciosa bursal. O PNSA estabelece as normas de atuação para o controle e erradicação da doença de Newcastle (ND) e Influenza Aviária (AI) (Projeto de Vigilância, 2001), a saber: I - Notificação de focos da doença (e confirmação laboratorial no LARA-Campinas); II - Assistência a focos; III - Medidas de desinfecção; IV - Sacrifício sanitário; V - Vazio sanitário; VI - Vacinação dos plantéis ou esquemas emergenciais; VII - Controle e fiscalização dos animais susceptíveis; VIII - Outras medidas sanitárias; A vigilância e atenção ao foco exige o diagnóstico laboratorial e diferencial de AI e ND, que segue as normas do PNSA, conforme o sumário abaixo: 1- Interdição e coleta de materiais para exame laboratorial oficial; 2- Registro das aves: espécie(s), categoria(s), número(s), manutenção de aves; utensílios e produtos no local; proibição de trânsito de e para a(s) propriedade(s) em um raio de 10 km; controle de todos os animais e materiais possíveis fontes de propagação; desinfecção de vias de entradas e saídas à(s) propriedade(s); inquérito epidemiológico. 3- Confirmação laboratorial: isolamento de agente letal hemaglutinante em ovos embrionados de galinhas SPF, não inibido (inibição da hemaglutinação) ou não neutralizado (soroneutralização) por soro específico para o vírus da doença de Newcastle; caracterização do agente como vírus da influenza aviária (AIV) por detecção de antígenos da nucleoproteína e/ou matriciais de AIV e de seu subtipo por ensaios específicos para a caracterização da hemaglutinina e neuraminidase (imunodifusão, imunoenzimáticos ou moleculares). 4- Abate e destruição imediata (cremação) de todas as aves, resíduos, carnes e ovos da(s) propriedade(s) atingida(s) e vizinhas (raio de 3 km); limpeza e desinfecção das instalações; vazio sanitário (mínimo 21 dias); 5- Permitir o transporte para o abate ou incubação dentro da zona de vigilância (raio de 10 km). 6- Proibir feiras, exposições, mercados na zona de vigilância (10 km). 7- Aplicar estas medidas por mínimo de 21 dias após a destruição das fontes de propagação e desinfecção das instalações, proibir a retirada de aves e produtos na zona de proteção (3 km) por 21 dias e 15 dias na zona de vigilância (10 km). A certificação de área livre segue as normas da OIE e PNSA, considerando AI exótica no Brasil (país livre), e exige: 1- AI de alta patogenicidade não diagnosticada pelo sistema de vigilância pelos últimos 3 anos; 2- Um período de 6 meses após o abate, destruição das aves e resíduos e desinfecção após surto; O sistema de criação da avicultura predominante no Brasil (galinhas e perus) emprega a mais atual tecnologia e conhecimento científico na produção, no qual os plantéis são gerenciados com biossegurança, avaliação permanente dos pontos críticos, sistema de qualidade total e programas de vacinações que garantem a prevenção de inúmeros problemas sanitários. A prevenção de influenza aviária é especialmente favorecida por essas características. O sistema e tipo de construção (galpões) para o alojamento dos plantéis dessas espécies dificultam também o desafio eventualmente imposto pelas aves de vida livre. A localização geográfica da avicultura nacional, localizada fora das rotas migratórias das aves-reservatório, pode também exercer papel importante na ausência de focos de influenza no Brasil. Além disso, o baixo índice de replicação dos AIV nas aves migratórias durante a estada na região subtropical também influi para a menor ocorrência. As espécies de aves domésticas de importância comercial mais sensíveis à infecção e potencialmente envolvidas no papel de fonte de infecção, conforme citadas na literatura internacional, perus e patos, são mantidas em galpões industriais com sistema de biossegurança e de distribuição geográfica bastante restrita, em contraste com as criações dos países com relatos permanentes de surtos, em que se associam as condições de desafio naturais geográficas ditadas pelas rotas migratórias, mais alta replicação na ave na estação (países temperados) e a criação em campo aberto.

Planning for the next pandemic of influenza

Worldwide influenza pandemics have occurred at irregular and unpredictable intervals throughout history and it is confidently expected that they will continue to occur in the future. It is now recognised that these pandemics result when avian influenza A viruses succeed in adaptation to and transmission between humans. The impact of pandemic influenza is substantial in terms of morbidity, mortality and economic cost and there is the potential for serious social disruption. Influenza vaccines remain the most effective defence against influenza but will be in short supply during a pandemic, as will the new specific anti-influenza drugs, due to the lead-time required for production and rapid spread of the virus. To minimise the impact of pandemics it is imperative to maximise the availability of both vaccines and antivirals and to ensure that they are used optimally. This requires planning at both the international and national levels. The World Health Organization has, therefore, developed a staged plan for responding to a pandemic threat which is based principally on its surveillance program. It has also prepared guidelines to assist national agencies in their planning. However, there may be further options for increasing our preparedness which should also be considered.