Peer discussion affects children's memory reports

Social Anxiety, Stress Type, and Conformity among Adolescents

Social anxiety and stress type can influence strong conformity among adolescents; however, the interaction between them is not clear. In this study, 152 adolescents were recruited and assigned one of two conditions: an interaction and a judgment condition. In the interaction condition, adolescents with high social anxiety (HSA) were less likely to conform when completing a modified Asch task, compared to adolescents who had low social anxiety. In the judgment condition, adolescents with HSA were more likely to conform to the opinions from the unanimous majority. The results suggest that adolescents with HSA may show different styles of strong conformity with the change of stress type. We believe that socially anxious adolescents avoid potential social situations with weaker conformity, while avoiding negative evaluations from others with stronger conformity. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the social dysfunctions among adolescents with HSA and provide a new direction for clinical interventions.

Does Anyone Know the Answer to that Question? Individual Differences in Judging Answerability

Occasionally people may attempt to judge whether a question can be answered today, or if not, if it can be answered in the future. For example, a person may consider whether enough is known about the dangers of living close to a nuclear plant, or to a major electricity cable, for them to be willing to do so, and state-authorities may consider whether questions about the dangers of new technologies have been answered, or in a reasonable future can be, for them to be willing to invest money in research aiming develop such technologies. A total of 476 participants, for each of 22 knowledge questions, either judged whether it was answerable today (current answerability), or judged when it could be answered (future answerability). The knowledge questions varied with respect to the expected consensus concerning their answerability: consensus questions (high expected consensus), non-consensus questions (lower expected consensus), and illusion questions (formulated to appear answerable, but with crucial information absent). The questions’ judged answerability level on the two scales was highly correlated. For both scales, consensus questions were rated more answerable than the non-consensus questions, with illusion questions falling in-between. The result for the illusion questions indicates that a feeling of answerability can be created even when it is unlikely that somebody can come up with an answer. The results also showed that individual difference variables influenced the answerability judgments. Higher levels of belief in certainty of knowledge, mankind’s knowledge, and mankind’s efficacy were related to judging the non-consensus questions as more answerable. Participants rating the illusion questions as answerable rated the other answerability questions as more, or equally, answerable compared to the other participants and showed tendencies to prefer a combination of more epistemic default processing and less intellectual processing.

When Children are the Least Vulnerable to False Memories: A True Report or a Case of Autosuggestion?

In this case report, a legal case revolving around the reliability of statements given by a 6-year-old girl is described. She claimed to have witnessed her mother being murdered by her father. Two psychological experts provided diametrically opposed opinions about the reliability of her statements. One expert, a clinician, opined that the girl's statements were based on autosuggestion whereas the other expert, a memory researcher, stated that autosuggestion was unlikely to have played a role. This case and the analysis of the experts' opinions illustrate what may happen when experts in court are unaware of the recent literature on (false) memory. That is, recent studies show that autosuggestion is less likely to occur in young children than in older children and adults. The current case stresses the importance and implications of relying on memory experts in cases concerning the reliability of eyewitness statements.

Co-witness auditory memory conformity following discussion: a misinformation paradigm

Twenty-four Japanese undergraduate pairs (12 male and 12 female pairs) participated as witnesses to a simulated criminal event. Although the witness pairs watched the same video together, through wireless headphones they experienced two different auditory versions with four differing items without being aware of the discrepancies. After the presentation, the witnesses were led to discuss six items, including two critical ones they had heard differently and another four they had heard in common. Witness memory performance was assessed individually with multiple-choice questionnaires in three sessions: before the discussion, after the discussion, and 1 week later. The results showed that participants tended to conform to their co-witness more often on the discussed items than on the not-discussed items. Source monitoring analyses on the four critical items revealed that even those participants who conformed were mostly cognizant of the source of their information just after the discussion, but they were prone to source-monitoring errors a week later.

Developmental Reversals in False Memory

Classic research that was initiated in response to heavy reliance on children’s evidence in certain types of criminal cases showed that the incidence of false memories declines steadily between childhood and young adulthood. This developmental decline pattern became the centerpiece of much expert testimony, and it has been treated as settled science in court rulings. It is not settled science. A large number of studies have recently appeared on developmental reversals, an opposite pattern in which false memories for events that preserve the gist of experience increase dramatically between early childhood and young adulthood. Developmental reversals challenge the forensic principle that children’s evidence is inherently more infected with false memories than adults’ evidence.

Are co-witnesses special? Comparing the influence of co-witness and interviewer misinformation on eyewitness reports

Although some research suggests that misinformation provided by a co-witness could be more influential than that obtained from other sources, most of this research has compared the effect of co-witness information against non-social forms of misinformation only. To better understand the influence of co-witnesses we compared the influence of co-witness misinformation with the influence of misinformation provided by an interviewer. Across two experiments using the MORI paradigm we found no evidence that a co-witness is particularly influential relative to another social source of post-event misinformation. In fact, the source of the misinformation delivered by our interviewer was less likely to be correctly recalled than the source of the misinformation delivered by a co-witness. There was some evidence that misinformation delivered by both a co-witness and an interviewer has a stronger effect on witnesses' accuracy and confidence than misinformation obtained from either source alone. Finally, our results suggest that the opportunity to provide an early individual memory account might protect against the effect of subsequently-encountered co-witness misinformation. These results have important implications for the way that criminal investigations are conducted.

Children's natural conversations following exposure to a rumor: linkages to later false reports

Previous research has shown that children naturally propagate overheard false rumors and that the circulation of such information can induce children and their peers to wrongly recall actually experiencing rumored-but-nonexperienced events. The current study extends this work by recording 3- to 6-year-olds' naturally occurring conversations following exposure to an erroneous rumor. Results indicate that, compared with children who overhear rumors spread by adults, those who pick up rumors from peers during natural interactions engage in deeper and more inventive rumor mongering. Moreover, the degree and originality of rumor propagation was linked with various qualities of children's subsequent recollections at both 1-week and 4-week delayed interviews. Furthermore, compared with 3- and 4-year-olds, 5- and 6-year-olds naturally transmitted more novel and coherent embellishments of the rumor to their peers, and more of their false narrative reports during the interviews overlapped with their own and their peers' utterances transmitted soon after the rumor was planted.

The response order effect: people believe the first person who remembers an event

When groups of people remember an event, the order in which they discuss their memories is important. In three experiments, a response order effect was shown in which participants believed the first speaker to be more accurate and more confident than a subsequent speaker. Further, participants were more likely to report as their own memory what the first speaker reported than what a subsequent speaker reported. The experiments showed that the response order effect was not due to intrinsic characteristics of what the first speaker said. Even when participants chose the response order themselves and the speakers' dialogue was counterbalanced, participants still believed that the first speaker was more accurate and confident than a subsequent speaker. Because in most situations the person who introduces a particular topic into a discussion is more accurate, people may assume that this is true, even when the response order is random.

Peer influence on event reports among adolescents and young adults

When two or more people witness an event together, the event report from one person can influence others' reports. In the current study we examined the role of age and motivational factors on peer influence regarding event reports in adolescents and young adults. Participants (N=249) watched a short video of a robbery then answered questions with no co-witness information or with information believed to be from a co-witness. Public and private response conditions were included to explore motivations for peer influence. Co-witness information influenced participants' responses, although the effect was equally strong in the private and the public co-witness conditions. Peer influence on event reports was steady across a large age range (11- to 25-year-olds).

False rumors and true belief: memory processes underlying children's errant reports of rumored events

Previous research has shown that overhearing an errant rumor--either from an adult or from peers--about an earlier experience can lead children to make detailed false reports. This study investigates the extent to which such accounts are driven by changes in children's memory representations or merely social demands that encourage the reporting of rumored information. This was accomplished by (a) using a warning manipulation that eliminated social pressures to report an earlier heard rumor and (b) examining the qualitative characteristics of children's false narratives of a rumored-but-nonexperienced event. Findings indicated that overheard rumors can induce sensory and contextual characteristics in memory that can lead children to develop genuine false beliefs in seeing rumored-but-nonexperienced occurrences. Such constructive tendencies were especially likely among 3- and 4-year-olds (relative to 5- and 6-year-olds) and when rumors were picked up from peers during natural social interactions (relative to when they were planted by an adult).