Reptilian Cognition: A More Complex Picture via Integration of Neurological Mechanisms, Behavioral Constraints, and Evolutionary Context

Living cognition and the nature of organisms

There is no consensus about what cognition is. Different perspectives conceptualize it in different ways. In the same vein, there is no agreement about which systems are truly cognitive. This begs the question, what makes a process or a system cognitive? One of the most conspicuous features of cognition is that it is a set of processes. Cognition, in the end, is a collection of processes such as perception, memory, learning, decision-making, problem-solving, goal-directedness, attention, anticipation, communication, and maybe emotion. There is a debate about what they mean, and which systems possess these processes. One aspect of this problem concerns the level at which cognition and the single processes are conceptualized. To make this scenario clear, evolutionary and self-maintenance arguments are taken. Given the evolutive landscape, one sees processes shared by all organisms and their derivations in specific taxa. No matter which side of the complexity spectrum one favors, the similarities of the simple processes with the complex ones cannot be ignored, and the differences of some complex processes with their simple versions cannot be blurred. A final cognitive framework must make sense of both sides of the spectrum, their differences and similarities. Here, we discuss from an evolutionary perspective the basic elements shared by all living beings and whether these may be necessary and sufficient for understanding the cognitive process. Following these considerations, cognition can be expanded to every living being. Cognition is the set of informational and dynamic processes an organism must interact with and grasp aspects of its world. Understood at their most basic level, perception, memory, learning, problem-solving, decision-making, action, and other cognitive processes are basic features of biological functioning.

Near and Dear? If animal welfare concepts do not apply to species at a great phylogenetic distance from humans, what concepts might serve as alternatives?

A wide range of animal taxa, including vertebrates and invertebrates, are controlled or kept by humans. They may be used as pets, for recreation, sport and hobbies, as working animals, as producers of animal-derived (food) products or as biomedical models in research. There is a need for clear guidance on the treatment of animals, regardless of their phylogenetic distance from humans. Current animal welfare concepts, which emphasise animal sentience and the ability of animals to experience negative or positive mental states, are limited in scope to a small proportion of the animal kingdom, as the vast majority of species are (currently) thought to lack sentience. We discuss four options for addressing the question of which basic concept(s) could be used to derive guidelines for the treatment of animal species, sentient or non-sentient: (1) alternative concepts tailored to specific groups of species; (2) 'welfare' concepts not presupposing sentience; (3) the precautionary principle; or (4) the concept of animal integrity. Since questions regarding the appropriate treatment of animals, including species with a large phylogenetic distance from humans, have an ethical/moral dimension, we also address who counts morally and how much, and how animals should be treated given their moral status. We suggest that the concept of animal integrity, possibly complemented and extended by the concept of habitat/ecosystem integrity, is suitable for application to all species. However, a current concept of animal welfare should serve as the primary basis for guidance on how to treat species that are sentient and capable of experiencing emotions.

Reptilian cognition

Tim Roth and Aaron Krochmal discuss reptile cognition in an integrative and comparative light.

Sex and Season Affect Cortical Volumes in Free-Living Western Fence Lizards, Sceloporus occidentalis

The hippocampus plays an important role in spatial navigation and spatial learning across a variety of vertebrate species. Sex and seasonal differences in space use and behavior are known to affect hippocampal volume. Similarly, territoriality and differences in home range size are known to affect the volume of the reptile hippocampal homologues, the medial and dorsal cortices (MC, DC). However, studies have almost exclusively investigated males and little is known about sex or seasonal differences in MC and/or DC volumes in lizards. Here, we are the first to simultaneously examine sex and seasonal differences in MC and DC volumes in a wild lizard population. In Sceloporus occidentalis, males display territorial behaviors that are more pronounced during the breeding season. Given this sex difference in behavioral ecology, we expected males to have larger MC and/or DC volumes than females and for this difference to be most pronounced during the breeding season when territorial behavior is increased. Male and female S. occidentalis were captured from the wild during the breeding season and the post-breeding season and were sacrificed within 2 days of capture. Brains were collected and processed for histology. Cresyl-violet-stained sections were used to quantify brain region volumes. In these lizards, breeding females had larger DC volumes than breeding males and nonbreeding females. There was no sex or seasonal difference in MC volumes. Differences in spatial navigation in these lizards may involve aspects of spatial memory related to breeding other than territoriality that affect plasticity of the DC. This study highlights the importance of investigating sex differences and including females in studies of spatial ecology and neuroplasticity.

Overlooked and Under-Studied: A Review of Evidence-Based Enrichment in Varanidae

Enrichment has become a key aspect of captive husbandry practices as a means of improving animal welfare by increasing environmental stimuli. However, the enrichment methods that are most effective varies both between and within species, and thus evaluation underpins successful enrichment programs. Enrichment methods are typically based upon previously reported successes and those primarily with mammals, with one of the main goals of enrichment research being to facilitate predictions about which methods may be most effective for a particular species. Yet, despite growing evidence that enrichment is beneficial for reptiles, there is limited research on enrichment for Varanidae, a group of lizards known as monitor lizards. As a result, it can be difficult for keepers to implement effective enrichment programs as time is a large limiting factor. In order for appropriate and novel enrichment methods to be created, it is necessary to understand a species’ natural ecology, abilities, and how they perceive the world around them. This is more difficult for non-mammalian species as the human-centered lens can be a hinderance, and thus reptile enrichment research is slow and lagging behind that of higher vertebrates. This review discusses the physiological, cognitive, and behavioral abilities of Varanidae to suggest enrichment methods that may be most effective.

Identification of Animal-Based Welfare Indicators in Captive Reptiles: A Delphi Consultation Survey

There is an increasing focus on evidence-based welfare assessment by animal care staff in zoos, along with a strong interest in animal welfare by the zoo-visiting public, to the extent that this can influence their choice of institutions to visit. Regulatory oversight of animal welfare standards continues to strengthen across many jurisdictions. Zoos are increasingly formalizing their practices with the development and refinement of evidence-based welfare assessment tools. There has been a drive for welfare assessment tools to comprise both resource-based and animal-based measures. However, animal-based indicators are not always well characterized, in terms of their nature and whether they infer a positive or negative affective state. This is especially so for reptiles, which are often considered behaviorally inexpressive and are under-researched. In this study, a Delphi consultation approach was used to gather expert opinion on the suitability of potential animal-based indicators of welfare for inclusion in a welfare assessment tool across four families of reptiles: Agamidae, Chelidae, Pythonidae, and Testudinidae. Two rounds of online surveys were conducted eliciting responses from a global group of professionals who work with reptiles. In the first survey, respondents were provided with an author-derived list of potential animal-based indicators for consideration of their validity and practicality as welfare indicators. The indicators were refined for the second survey including only those indicators that were considered valid or practical on the first survey (≥4 on a 5-point Likert scale), and that achieved ≥70% consensus amongst experts. In the second survey, respondents were asked to re-evaluate the reliability and practicality of the indicators and to rank them on these facets. Eight to ten assessment indicators for each family of reptiles were identified from Survey 2. These indicators were often health related, for example, presence of oculo-nasal discharge or wounds. However, some true behavioral indicators were identified, such as showing species-specific interest and alertness. These indicators should now be incorporated into taxon-tailored welfare assessment tools for trial and validation in captive reptile populations. This study provides a next step towards developing reptile-specific animal welfare assessment tools for these often-overlooked animals.

Cognitive Enrichment in Practice: A Survey of Factors Affecting Its Implementation in Zoos Globally

Simple Summary

Cognitive enrichment gives animals the opportunity to challenge themselves and control aspects of their environment through problem solving. Despite the known benefits of giving captive animals cognitive enrichment, not much is known about how it is used in zoos. This survey found that staff within zoos think that cognitive enrichment is very important for the welfare of animals. However, its use is not widespread. While some animal groups like carnivores commonly receive cognitive enrichment, animals like fish and reptiles are overlooked. Time and financial support were found to be common factors that had a high impact on the use of cognitive enrichment, while zookeeper interest was said to be important for its success. Findings suggest that animal keepers, who are most often involved in enrichment programs, need to be better supported to deliver cognitive enrichment. Enrichment programs need to be prioritized with the creation of job roles specifically for enrichment or increased time and training given to keepers to carry out these duties.

Abstract

Information on the practical use of cognitive enrichment in zoos is scarce. This survey aimed to identify where cognitive enrichment is being used while identifying factors that may limit its implementation and success. Distributed in eight languages to increase global range, responses to this survey (n = 177) show that while agreement on what constitutes cognitive enrichment is poor, it is universally perceived as very important for animal welfare. Carnivores were the animal group most reported to receive cognitive enrichment (76.3%), while amphibians and fish the least (16.9%). All animal groups had a percentage of participants indicating animal groups in their facility were not receiving cognitive enrichment when they believe that they should (29.4–44.6%). On average, factors relating to time and finance were rated most highly in terms of effect on cognitive enrichment use, and keeper interest was the highest rated for effect on success. Results of this study indicate that cognitive enrichment is perceived as important. However, placing the responsibility of its development and implementation on animal keepers who are already time-poor may be impeding its use. A commitment to incorporating cognitive enrichment into routine husbandry, including financial support and investment into staff is needed from zoos to ensure continued improvement to captive animal welfare.

A fully segmented 3D anatomical atlas of a lizard brain

As the relevance of lizards in evolutionary neuroscience increases, so does the need for more accurate anatomical references. Moreover, the use of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in evolutionary neuroscience is becoming more widespread; this represents a fundamental methodological shift that opens new avenues of investigative possibility but also poses new challenges. Here, we aim to facilitate this shift by providing a three-dimensional segmentation atlas of the tawny dragon brain. The tawny dragon (Ctenophorus decresii) is an Australian lizard of increasing importance as a model system in ecology and, as a member of the agamid lizards, in evolution. Based on a consensus average 3D image generated from the MRIs of 13 male tawny dragon heads, we identify and segment 224 structures visible across the entire lizard brain. We describe the relevance of this atlas to the field of evolutionary neuroscience and propose further experiments for which this atlas can provide the foundation. This advance in defining lizard neuroanatomy will facilitate numerous studies in evolutionary neuroscience. The atlas is available for download as a supplementary material to this manuscript and through the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/UJENQ ).

Learning in non-avian reptiles 40 years on: advances and promising new directions

Recently, there has been a surge in cognition research using non-avian reptile systems. As a diverse group of animals, non-avian reptiles [turtles, the tuatara, crocodylians, and squamates (lizards, snakes and amphisbaenids)] are good model systems for answering questions related to cognitive ecology, from the role of the environment on the brain, behaviour and learning, to how social and life-history factors correlate with learning ability. Furthermore, given their variable social structure and degree of sociality, studies on reptiles have shown that group living is not a pre-condition for social learning. Past research has demonstrated that non-avian reptiles are capable of more than just instinctive reactions and basic cognition. Despite their ability to provide answers to fundamental questions in cognitive ecology, and a growing literature, there have been no recent systematic syntheses of research in this group. Here, we systematically, and comprehensively review studies on reptile learning. We identify 92 new studies investigating learning in reptiles not included in previous reviews on this topic - affording a unique opportunity to provide a more in-depth synthesis of existing work, its taxonomic distribution, the types of cognitive domains tested and methodologies that have been used. Our review therefore provides a major update on our current state of knowledge and ties the collective evidence together under nine umbrella research areas: (i) habituation of behaviour, (ii) animal training through conditioning, (iii) avoiding aversive stimuli, (iv) spatial learning and memory, (v) learning during foraging, (vi) quality and quantity discrimination, (vii) responding to change, (viii) solving novel problems, and (ix) social learning. Importantly, we identify knowledge gaps and propose themes which offer important future research opportunities including how cognitive ability might influence fitness and survival, testing cognition in ecologically relevant situations, comparing cognition in invasive and non-invasive populations of species, and social learning. To move the field forward, it will be immensely important to build upon the descriptive approach of testing whether a species can learn a task with experimental studies elucidating causal reasons for cognitive variation within and among species. With the appropriate methodology, this young but rapidly growing field of research should advance greatly in the coming years providing significant opportunities for addressing general questions in cognitive ecology and beyond.

Peeking Inside the Lizard Brain: Neuron Numbers in Anolis and Its Implications for Cognitive Performance and Vertebrate Brain Evolution

Studies of vertebrate brain evolution have mainly focused on measures of brain size, particularly relative mass and its allometric scaling across lineages, commonly with the goal of identifying the substrates that underly differences in cognition. However, recent studies on birds and mammals have demonstrated that brain size is an imperfect proxy for neuronal parameters that underly function, such as the number of neurons that make up a given brain region. Here we present estimates of neuron numbers and density in two species of lizard, Anolis cristatellus and A. evermanni, representing the first such data from squamate species, and explore its implications for differences in cognitive performance and vertebrate brain evolution. The isotropic fractionator protocol outlined in this article is optimized for the unique challenges that arise when using this technique with lineages having nucleated erythrocytes and relatively small brains. The number and density of neurons and other cells we find in Anolis for the telencephalon, cerebellum, and the rest of the brain (ROB) follow similar patterns as published data from other vertebrate species. Anolis cristatellus and A. evermanni exhibited differences in their performance in a motor task frequently used to evaluate behavioral flexibility, which was not mirrored by differences in the number, density, or proportion of neurons in either the cerebellum, telencephalon, or ROB. However, the brain of A. evermanni had a significantly higher number of nonneurons and a higher nonneuron to neuron ratio across the whole brain, which could contribute to the observed differences in problem solving between A. cristatellus and A. evermanni. Although limited to two species, our findings suggest that neuron number and density in lizard brains scale similarly to endothermic vertebrates in contrast to the differences observed in brain to body mass relationships. Data from a wider range of species are necessary before we can fully understand vertebrate brain evolution at the neuronal level.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition"

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

Neural architecture of the vertebrate brain: implications for the interaction between emotion and cognition

Cognition is considered a hallmark of the primate brain that requires a high degree of signal integration, such as achieved in the prefrontal cortex. Moreover, it is often assumed that cognitive capabilities imply "superior" computational mechanisms compared to those involved in emotion or motivation. In contrast to these ideas, we review data on the neural architecture across vertebrates that support the concept that association and integration are basic features of the vertebrate brain, which are needed to successfully adapt to a changing world. This property is not restricted to a few isolated brain centers, but rather resides in neuronal networks working collectively in a context-dependent manner. In different vertebrates, we identify shared large-scale connectional systems involving the midbrain, hypothalamus, thalamus, basal ganglia, and amygdala. The high degree of crosstalk and association between these systems at different levels supports the notion that cognition, emotion, and motivation cannot be separated - all of them involve a high degree of signal integration.