Sometimes inclusion breeds suspicion: Self-uncertainty and belongingness predict belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference

Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes.

You must be myths-taken: Examining belief in falsehoods during the COVID-19 health crisis

The prevalence of health myths is increasing with the rise of Internet use. Left unaddressed, online falsehoods can lead to harmful behaviours. In times of crisis, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the circulation of many myths is exacerbated, often to varying degrees among different cultures. Singapore is a multicultural hub in Asia with Western and Asian influences. Although several studies have examined health myths from a Western or Eastern perspective, little research has investigated online health falsehoods in a population that is culturally exposed to both. Furthermore, most studies examined myths cross-sectionally instead of capturing trends in myth prevalence over time, particularly during crisis situations. Given these literature gaps, we investigated popular myths surrounding the recent COVID-19 pandemic within the multicultural setting of Singapore, by examining its general population. We further examined changes in myth beliefs over the two-year period during the pandemic, and population demographic differences in myth beliefs. Using randomised sampling, two online surveys of nationally representative samples of adults (aged 21-70 years) residing in Singapore were conducted, the first between October 2020 and February 2021 (N = 949), and the second between March and April 2022 (N = 1084). Results showed that 12.7% to 57.5% of the population were unable to identify various myths, such as COVID-19 was manmade, and that three of these myths persisted significantly over time (increases ranging from 3.9% to 9.8%). However, belief in myths varied across population demographics, with ethnic minorities (Indians and Malays), females, young adults and those with lower education levels being more susceptible to myths than their counterparts (p < 0.05). Our findings suggest that current debunking efforts are insufficient to effectively counter misinformation beliefs during health crises. Instead, a post-COVID-19 landscape will require targeted approaches aimed at vulnerable population sub-groups, that also focus on the erroneous beliefs with long staying power.

Experimental manipulation of uncanny feeling does not increase adherence to conspiracy theories

Research over the past decade has shown that endorsement of conspiracy theories (CTs) is shaped by motivated cognition processes. Accordingly, CTs are theorized to stem from compensatory processes, as individuals attempt to cope with existential threats (i.e., uncertainty, loss of control). Based on the meaning maintenance model, we investigated whether this compensatory effect could follow from epistemic threats in domains unrelated to CTs in the form of uncanniness. Feelings of uncanniness were experimentally manipulated through exposure to absurdist art and literature in a set of five studies, followed by a mini meta-analysis (Ntotal  = 1,041). We conducted a final, preregistered sixth study (N = 266) manipulating uncanniness through autobiographical recall. No robust evidence for a compensatory effect was found. We discussed methodological and conceptual limitations of the meaning maintenance model, as well as boundary conditions under which conspiracy theories could have a compensatory function to deal with threats.

Linking paranormal and conspiracy beliefs to illusory pattern perception through signal detection theory

Previous research indicates that irrational beliefs (Paranormal beliefs & conspiracy theory endorsement) are associated with the perception of patterns in noise, but the previous findings do not conclusively describe this relationship. This study aims to disentangle the underlying parameters of this association by applying a signal detection theory approach, thus allowing to distinguish illusory pattern perception (false alarms) from perceptual sensitivity and response tendencies-while also taking base rate information into account. Results from a large sample (N = 723) indicate that paranormal beliefs relate to a more liberal response bias and a lower perceptual sensitivity, and that this relationship is driven by illusory pattern perception. Such a clear pattern could not be observed for conspiracy beliefs, for which the increase in false alarm rates was moderated by the base rate. The associations between irrational beliefs and illusory pattern perception were however less substantial compared to other sources of variance. Implications are discussed.

The explanation-polarisation model: Pseudoscience spreads through explanatory satisfaction and group polarisation

This article presents an integrative model for the endorsement of pseudoscience: the explanation-polarisation model. It is based on a combination of perceived explanatory satisfaction and group polarisation, offering a perspective different from the classical confusion-based conception, in which pseudoscientific beliefs would be accepted through a lack of distinction between science and science mimicry. First, I discuss the confusion-based account in the light of current evidence, pointing out some of its explanatory shortcomings. Second, I develop the explanation-polarisation model, showing its explanatory power in connection with recent research outcomes in cognitive and social psychology.

Psychological benefits of believing conspiracy theories

Many people believe conspiracy theories, even though such beliefs are harmful to themselves and their social environment. What is the appeal of conspiracy theories? In this contribution, I propose that conspiracy theories have psychological benefits by imbuing perceiver's worldview with meaning and purpose in a rewarding manner. Conspiracy theories enable an alternative reality in which perceivers (a) can defend a fragile ego by perceiving themselves and their groups as important, (b) can rationalize any of their beliefs and actions as legitimate, and (c) are entertained through the opportunity to uncover a mystery in an exciting tale. These are short-term benefits, however, suggesting that conspiracy theories provide people with a form of instant gratification.

The entertainment value of conspiracy theories

Many citizens around the globe believe conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy theories so appealing? Here, we propose that conspiracy theories elicit intense emotions independent of emotional valence. People therefore find conspiracy theories entertaining – that is, narratives that people perceive as interesting, exciting, and attention‐grabbing – and such entertainment appraisals are positively associated with belief in them. Five studies supported these ideas. Participants were exposed to either a conspiratorial or a non‐conspiratorial text about the Notre Dame fire (Study 1) or the death of Jeffrey Epstein (preregistered Study 2). The conspiratorial text elicited stronger entertainment appraisals and intense emotions (independent of emotional valence) than the non‐conspiratorial text; moreover, entertainment appraisals mediated the effects of the manipulation on conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 indicated that participants endorsed stronger conspiracy beliefs when an election event was described in an entertaining rather than a boring manner. Subsequent findings revealed that both organisational (Study 4) and societal conspiracy beliefs (Study 5) are positively associated with sensation seeking – a trait characterised by a preference for exciting and intense experiences. We conclude that one reason why people believe conspiracy theories is because they find them entertaining.

Review: Vaccine Myth-Buster - Cleaning Up With Prejudices and Dangerous Misinformation

Although vaccines have already saved and will continue to save millions of lives, they are under attack. Vaccine safety is the main target of criticism. The rapid distribution of false information, or even conspiracy theories on the internet has tremendously favored vaccine hesitancy. The World Health Organization (WHO) named vaccine hesitancy one of the top ten threats to global health in 2019. Parents and patients have several concerns about vaccine safety, of which the ubiquitous anxieties include inactivating agents, adjuvants, preservatives, or new technologies such as genetic vaccines. In general, increasing doubts concerning side effects have been observed, which may lead to an increasing mistrust of scientific results and thus, the scientific method. Hence, this review targets five topics concerning vaccines and reviews current scientific publications in order to summarize the available information refuting conspiracy theories and myths about vaccination. The topics have been selected based on the author's personal perception of the most frequently occurring safety controversies: the inactivation agent formaldehyde, the adjuvant aluminum, the preservative mercury, the mistakenly-drawn correlation between vaccines and autism and genetic vaccines. The scientific literature shows that vaccine safety is constantly studied. Furthermore, the literature does not support the allegations that vaccines may cause a serious threat to general human life. The author suggests that more researchers explaining their research ideas, methods and results publicly could strengthen the general confidence in science. In general, vaccines present one of the safest and most cost-effective medications and none of the targeted topics raised serious health concerns.

Perceived lack of control and conspiracy theory beliefs in the wake of political strife and natural disaster

While lack of control is one plausible explanation for conspiracy beliefs, the experimental evidence is mixed. We present two naturalistic studies that offer some limited support for the control hypothesis. In the first, Macedonians living in (North) Macedonia (N = 116) completed a conspiracy ideation scale immediately after a national referendum on the country?s name change from ?Macedonia? to ?North Macedonia,? and one year after. The opposition, whose control was lowered after the name change, increased their conspiracy beliefs, but supporters did not. Study 2, conducted with Americans (N = 266) in the wake of a series of devastating tornadoes, replicated and expanded the first study: the effects were evident only for the threatening event-related conspiracy beliefs. These studies suggest a possible link between lack of control and conspiracy beliefs in the real world.

A Comparison of the Predictive Validity of Self-Esteem Level and Directly Measured Self-Esteem Stability in the Temporal Prediction of Psychological Distress

In contrast to the widely used assessment approach in which self-esteem stability is measured as the standard deviation of repeated measurements, direct measurements of self-esteem stability have hardly ever been implemented in longitudinal studies. The primary goal of the present study was to examine the temporal stability and predictive validity of a direct assessment of self-esteem stability compared with the trait level of self-esteem with respect to the prediction of psychological distress (PD). We examined a sample of 136 employees who completed self-report measures of both self-esteem level [Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)] and self-esteem stability [Self-Esteem Stability Scale (SESS)] along with a measure of PD (SCL-90) at two time points across an interval of 1 year. The results underline the relevance of perceived self-esteem stability in the temporal prediction of PD: After controlling for initial PD, we found that self-esteem stability predicted PD better than self-esteem level did. Therefore, we recommend that the RSES be expanded by adding the three SESS items that directly measure the stability of self-esteem.

The cultural dimension of intergroup conspiracy theories

Although conspiracy theories are ubiquitous across times and cultures, research has not investigated how cultural dimensions may predict conspiracy beliefs. The present research examined intergroup conspiracy beliefs in United States and Chinese samples at the peak of the trade war. In two studies (one pre‐registered; total N = 1,092), we asked US participants to what extent they believed Chinese institutions and companies were conspiring against the United states and Chinese participants to what extent they believed US institutions and companies were conspiring against China. Results revealed that such beliefs were stronger among Chinese than US participants due to higher power distance values and vertical collectivism. In particular, these cultural dimensions were associated with increased psychological involvement in intergroup conflict (as reflected by higher levels of collective narcissism and perceived outgroup threat), which in turn predicted intergroup conspiracy beliefs. Exploratory analyses suggested that particularly power distance values mediate these effects. We conclude that cultural dimensions that promote hierarchy in society are associated with increased intergroup conspiracy beliefs.

Psychometric assessment of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale

The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) is the most widely used measure of general belief in conspiracy theories. The scale comprises five related but distinct factors (Government Malfeasance, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Personal Wellbeing, and Control of Information). Despite this, investigators have typically treated the GCBS as unidimensional by referencing only overall total. Although, the GCBS possesses established psychometric properties, critics question its factorial structure, suggest alternative models, and recommend routine examination of GCBS dimensions as part of analysis. Through two studies, the present paper assessed GCBS factorial structure, internal reliability, convergent validity, and invariance. This involved comparing the original five-factor solution with alternative one, two, and three-factor models. To ensure that the best fitting model was robust, the authors conducted analysis in two independent samples (Study one, N = 794, UK university-based sample; and Study two, N = 418, UK respondents collected via a market research company). Results in both studies indicated superior fit for the correlated five-factor solution. This solution demonstrated invariance across gender, and samples (Study one and two). Furthermore, the total scale and five subfactors evinced good alpha and omega total reliability. Convergent validity testing exhibited associations of an expected strength between conspiracist beliefs, reality testing, and cognitive insight. Large intercorrelations existed among GCBS subfactors, suggesting that the measure reflects a narrow set of interrelated conspiracist assumptions. These findings support the use of overall scale scores as an index of belief in conspiracy theories.

Resolving the Puzzle of Conspiracy Worldview and Political Activism: Belief in Secret Plots Decreases Normative but Increases Nonnormative Political Engagement

It is a hitherto open and debated question whether the belief in conspiracies increases or attenuates the willingness to engage in political action. In the present article, we tested the notion, whether (a) the relation between belief in conspiracies and general political engagement is curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) and (b) there may be opposing relations to normative versus nonnormative forms of political engagement. Two preregistered experiments ( N = 194, N = 402) support both propositions and show that the hypothetical adoption of a worldview that sees the world as governed by secret plots attenuates reported intentions to participate in normative, legal forms of political participation but increases reported intentions to employ nonnormative, illegal means of political articulation. These results provide first evidence for the notion that political extremism and violence might seem an almost logical conclusion when seeing the world as governed by conspiracies.

Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Following Ostracism

Four studies (total valid N = 643) examined whether ostracism increases people's political conspiracy beliefs through heightened vulnerability and whether self-affirmation intervention counteracts the effect of ostracism on conspiracy beliefs. Compared with their nonostracized counterparts, ostracized participants were more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs related to different political issues (Studies 1-3). Moreover, heightened vulnerability mediated the link between ostracism and conspiracy beliefs (Studies 1-3). Offering ostracized participants an opportunity to reaffirm values important to them could reduce their political conspiracy beliefs (Study 4). Taken together, our findings highlight the crucial role of vulnerability in understanding when and why ostracism increases conspiracy beliefs and how to ameliorate this relationship. Our findings also provide novel insights into how daily interpersonal interactions influence people's political beliefs and involvement.

An Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories

Abstract. People endorse conspiracy theories particularly when they experience existential threat, that is, feelings of anxiety or uncertainty often because of distressing societal events. At the same time, such feelings also often lead people to support groups frequently implicated in conspiracy theories (e.g., the government). The present contribution aims to resolve this paradox by proposing an Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories, which stipulates under what conditions existential threat does versus does not stimulate conspiracy theories. The model specifically illuminates that feelings of existential threat increase epistemic sense-making processes, which in turn stimulate conspiracy theories only when antagonistic outgroups are salient. Moreover, once formed conspiracy theories are not functional to reduce feelings of existential threat; instead, conspiracy theories can be a source of existential threat in itself, stimulating further conspiracy theorizing and contributing to a generalized conspiracist mindset. In the discussion, I discuss implications of the model, and illuminate how one may base interventions on the model to breaks this cyclical process and reduce conspiracy beliefs.

Does uncertainty breed conviction? On the possible role of compensatory conviction in jumping to conclusions and overconfidence in psychosis

Background: Jumping to conclusions (JTC) and overconfidence in errors are well established in individuals with a liability to psychosis. Experimental research suggests that subjecting individuals to dilemmas and doubt prompts a subsequent hardening of attitudes and may foster delusion-like convictions. For the present study, we examined whether this compensatory conviction process is exaggerated in individuals with a liability to psychosis and might in part explain JTC and overconfidence. Methods: A large sample of participants from the general population were screened for psychotic experiences with the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences scale (CAPE) and then randomly allocated to either a condition in which they should experience doubt or a control condition. Participants (final sample, n = 650) were then tested on JTC and overconfidence. Results: Participants who scored high on the positive subscale of the CAPE made fewer draws to decision, showed greater confidence, and made more errors relative to low scorers. Yet, none of the parameters was modulated by experimental condition. Conclusions: Our results at present do not support the idea that JTC is elevated by a prior experience of a dilemma or doubt. Yet, this possibility should not be entirely dismissed as the presumed process may take time to evolve and perhaps needs to be more pervasive.

Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain

In this introduction to the EJSP Special Issue on conspiracy theories as a social psychological phenomenon, we describe how this emerging research domain has developed over the past decade and distill four basic principles that characterize belief in conspiracy theories. Specifically, conspiracy theories are consequential as they have a real impact on people's health, relationships, and safety; they are universal in that belief in them is widespread across times, cultures, and social settings; they are emotional given that negative emotions and not rational deliberations cause conspiracy beliefs; and they are social as conspiracy beliefs are closely associated with psychological motivations underlying intergroup conflict. We then discuss future research and possible policy interventions in this growing area of enquiry.

Conspiracy Theories: Evolved Functions and Psychological Mechanisms

Belief in conspiracy theories—such as that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inside job or that the pharmaceutical industry deliberately spreads diseases—is a widespread and culturally universal phenomenon. Why do so many people around the globe believe conspiracy theories, and why are they so influential? Previous research focused on the proximate mechanisms underlying conspiracy beliefs but ignored the distal, evolutionary origins and functions. We review evidence pertaining to two competing evolutionary hypotheses: (a) conspiracy beliefs are a by-product of a suite of psychological mechanisms (e.g., pattern recognition, agency detection, threat management, alliance detection) that evolved for different reasons, or (b) conspiracy beliefs are part of an evolved psychological mechanism specifically aimed at detecting dangerous coalitions. This latter perspective assumes that conspiracy theories are activated after specific coalition cues, which produce functional counterstrategies to cope with suspected conspiracies. Insights from social, cultural and evolutionary psychology provide tentative support for six propositions that follow from the adaptation hypothesis. We propose that people possess a functionally integrated mental system to detect conspiracies that in all likelihood has been shaped in an ancestral human environment in which hostile coalitions—that is, conspiracies that truly existed—were a frequent cause of misery, death, and reproductive loss.

Are “they” out to get me? A social identity model of paranoia

This research tests a social identity model of paranoia, building on work showing that identification with social groups is associated with less paranoid thinking. Studies 1 ( N = 800) and 2 ( N = 779) supported this model, showing that national group identification is associated with lower paranoia. Study 3 ( N = 784) added to the literature by probing the mechanisms underlying these relationships, and found that it is through enhanced control and trust that identification is associated with better mental health. Studies 4 ( N = 390) and 5 ( N = 904) manipulated identification to provide evidence of causality. A minimeta analysis revealed a robust association between national identification and paranoia across the studies, although no association emerged between political identification and paranoia. The results point to the role that lack of social connections can play in underpinning paranoid thinking, and suggest that, as with other mental health issues, the problems caused by paranoia may have a social cure.

The relationship between schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs via cognitive processes

This study sought to replicate previous work showing relationships between components of schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs, and extend it by examining the mediating role of cognitive processes. An international online sample of 411 women and men (mean age = 35.41 years) completed measures of the schizotypal facets of Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference, conspiracist beliefs, and cognitive processes related to need for cognition, analytic thinking, and cognitive insight. Path analysis confirmed the associations between both schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs in the present sample. Confirmatory evidence was found for the association between analytic thinking and conspiracist beliefs, and results also suggested an association between cognitive insight and conspiracist beliefs. Cognitive insight also mediated the link between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference with conspiracist beliefs. However, analytic thinking provided a mediating link to conspiracy ideation for Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and not Ideas of Reference. Finally, there was an association between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and need for cognition, but this path did not extend to conspiracist beliefs. These results suggest possible mediating roles for analytic thinking and self-certainty between schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs.

Connecting the dots: Illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural

A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.

Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations

In the present contribution, we examine the link between societal crisis situations and belief in conspiracy theories. Contrary to common assumptions, belief in conspiracy theories has been prevalent throughout human history. We first illustrate historical incidents suggesting that societal crisis situations-defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls established power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups into question-have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories. We then review the psychological literature to explain why this is the case. Evidence suggests that the aversive feelings that people experience when in crisis-fear, uncertainty, and the feeling of being out of control-stimulate a motivation to make sense of the situation, increasing the likelihood of perceiving conspiracies in social situations. We then explain that after being formed, conspiracy theories can become historical narratives that may spread through cultural transmission. We conclude that conspiracy theories originate particularly in crisis situations and may form the basis for how people subsequently remember and mentally represent a historical event.

Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories

People with high education are less likely than people with low education to believe in conspiracy theories. It is yet unclear why these effects occur, however, as education predicts a range of cognitive, emotional, and social outcomes. The present research sought to identify mediators of the relationship between education and conspiracy beliefs. Results of Study 1 revealed three independent mediators of this relationship, namely, belief in simple solutions for complex problems, feelings of powerlessness, and subjective social class. A nationally representative sample (Study 2) replicated these findings except for subjective social class. Moreover, variations in analytic thinking statistically accounted for the path through belief in simple solutions. I conclude that the relationship between education and conspiracy beliefs cannot be reduced to a single mechanism but is the result of the complex interplay of multiple psychological factors that are associated with education. © 2016 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Organizational Conspiracy Beliefs: Implications for Leadership Styles and Employee Outcomes

PURPOSE

Belief in conspiracy theories about societal events is widespread among citizens. The extent to which conspiracy beliefs about managers and supervisors matter in the micro-level setting of organizations has not yet been examined, however. We investigated if leadership styles predict conspiracy beliefs among employees in the context of organizations. Furthermore, we examined if such organizational conspiracy beliefs have implications for organizational commitment and turnover intentions.

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

We conducted a survey among a random sample of the US working population (N = 193).

FINDINGS

Despotic, laissez-faire, and participative leadership styles predicted organizational conspiracy beliefs, and the relations of despotic and laissez-faire leadership with conspiracy beliefs were mediated by feelings of job insecurity. Furthermore, organizational conspiracy beliefs predicted, via decreased organizational commitment, increased turnover intentions.

IMPLICATIONS

Organizational conspiracy beliefs matter for how employees perceive their leaders, how they feel about their organization, and whether or not they plan to quit their jobs. A practical implication, therefore, is that it would be a mistake for managers to dismiss organizational conspiracy beliefs as innocent rumors that are harmless to the organization.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

Three novel conclusions emerge from this study. First, organizational conspiracy beliefs occur frequently among employees. Second, participative leadership predicts decreased organizational conspiracy beliefs; despotic and laissez-faire leadership predict increased organizational conspiracy beliefs due to the contribution of these destructive leadership styles to an insecure work environment. Third, organizational conspiracy beliefs harm organizations by influencing employee commitment and, indirectly, turnover intentions.