Ideological prejudice is stronger in ideological extremists (vs. moderates)

The agency–beliefs–communion (ABC) model and worldview conflict research show that people rate groups as more moral and likable if they rate their ideology as more similar to the ideology of the self. This paper refers to this effect as ideological prejudice. There is a debate whether ideology moderates the effect size of ideological prejudice. Through three observational studies ( NS1 = 700, NS2 = 974, NS3 = 633), this paper contributes to this debate in three ways. First and primarily, the paper shows that ideological prejudice is stronger in conservatives and progressives compared to people with more moderate ideological beliefs. Second, stronger ideological prejudice in ideological extremists (vs. moderates) holds when controlling for stronger ingroup favoritism in ideological extremists (vs. moderates). And third, the paper suggests that higher importance of own ideology in ideological extremists (vs. moderates) may explain why ideological prejudice is stronger in ideological extremists (vs. moderates). These findings develop a part of the ABC model of stereotypes, contribute to worldview conflict research, and help to explain why ideological polarization is divisive.

The Role of Political Ideology and Open-Minded Thinking Style in the (in)Accuracy of Factual Beliefs

The paper investigates the role of political ideology and an open-minded thinking style (i.e., the tendency to reason based on rules of inference rather than intuitive heuristics) with respect to the accuracy of factual beliefs. In line with political asymmetry theory, we assumed that right-wing beliefs, in contrast to left-wing beliefs, are associated with more inaccurate factual beliefs. We also expected that the open-minded thinking style acts as a buffer against inaccurate factual beliefs among people with right-wing (but not left-wing) political affinities. To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies (total N = 1120) in which participants holding right- and left-wing beliefs, and displaying differing degrees of the open-minded thinking style (as measured by the Active Open-minded Thinking Style questionnaire), assessed policy-relevant facts congenial to left- as well as right-wing beliefs. The results of the study confirm the hypotheses proposed. The paper's findings contribute to the ongoing discussion around the ideological underpinnings of (un)biased cognition and the controversies concerning the role of cognitive factors in ideological polarization.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09789-z.

Political beliefs and the acceptance of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic restrictions. The case of Poland

We investigated the relationships between political beliefs regarding two aspects of the right-left distinction (cultural and economic) and the acceptance of the pandemic restrictions using variable-centred and person-centred approaches. The community sample consisted of 305 participants. Four groups of the restrictions were considered. Religious fundamentalism predicted positively the acceptance of the restrictions associated with the limitations of labour rights and those limiting civil rights without a direct impact on safety. Anti-welfare negatively predicted the acceptance of the restrictions regarding social distancing and those limiting civil rights and increasing safety. These associations were discussed in relation to basic needs and values which motivate persons who endorse right-wing or left-wing political views. The latent profile analysis revealed three profiles of political beliefs, which were termed “Conservative Statists,” “Liberal Laissez-fairists,” and “Conservative Laissez-fairists.” The profiles differed in terms of acceptance of the pandemic restrictions, and the patterns of these relationships were different for particular groups of restrictions.

The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology

Research over the last fifty years has suggested that political attitudes and values around the globe are shaped by two ideological dimensions, often referred to as economic and social conservatism. However, it remains unclear why this ideological structure exists. Here we highlight the striking concordance between these dual dimensions of ideology and independent convergent evidence for two key shifts in the evolution of human group living. First, humans began to cooperate more and across wider interdependent networks. Second, humans became more group-minded, conforming to social norms in culturally marked groups and punishing norm-violators. We propose that fitness trade-offs and behavioural plasticity have maintained functional variation in willingness to cooperate and conform within modern human groups, naturally giving rise to the two dimensions of political ideology. Supported by evidence from across the behavioural sciences, this evolutionary framework provides insight into the biological and cultural basis of political ideology.

Studying a heterogeneous array of target groups can help us understand prejudice

Prejudice can be expressed towards a wide array of target groups, but it is often operationalized as expressed towards a narrower array of groups. By studying a heterogeneous array of target groups we can draw broader conclusions about prejudice writ large. We describe our research which seeks to understand constructs that consistently predict prejudice across a wide array of groups (consistent predictors), as well as those constructs that only predict prejudice for some types of groups (inconsistent predictors). For inconsistent predictors, we can also identify the perceived characteristics of the target groups (e.g., status, ideology) that are associated with expressed prejudice. Studying a heterogenous array of target groups opens up new questions related to morality, cognitive processing, and perceived discrimination, but also suggests that prejudice, depending on the group, can be a motivating force preserving the status quo or prompting social change.