The efficiency of a group-specific mandated benefit revisited: the effect of infertility mandates

Employer-sponsored health insurance and labor market outcomes for men in same-sex couples: Evidence from the advent of pre-exposure prophylaxis

In the United States, the cost of providing employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) varies for employers based on the medical expenditures of their employees, a practice known as "experience rating". Experience rating increases the cost of employing workers who have greater medical expenditures, one example being men in same-sex couples. To study whether ESI affects labor market outcomes for men in same-sex couples, I use the 2012 advent of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), a $24,000 per year drug that effectively prevents Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) acquisition. Using American Community Survey data and a difference-in-difference empirical approach - comparing post-PrEP changes in earnings among men who have ESI - I find that annual earnings for men in same-sex couples decline by $2,650 (approximately 3.9%) relative to comparable men after PrEP becomes available. For those who are most likely to be taking Truvada (the brand name for PrEP), such as young men and white men, effects on earnings are considerably larger. I also observe a 3.7 percentage point (4.6%) decline in ESI prevalence and a 0.8 percentage point (10.7%) increase in part-time employment among men in same-sex couples. Event studies provide support for a causal interpretation for my findings. My estimates are also robust to placebo analyses, various specification permutations, and a range of sensitivity checks.

Impact of in vitro fertilization state mandates for third party insurance coverage in the United States: a review and critical assessment

The American Society for Reproductive Medicine estimates that fewer than a quarter of infertile couples have sufficient access to infertility care. Insurers in the United States (US) have long considered infertility to be a socially constructed condition, and thus in-vitro fertilization (IVF) an elective intervention. As a result, IVF is cost prohibitive for many patients in the US. State infertility insurance mandates are a crucial mechanism for expanding access to fertility care in the US in the absence of federal legislation. The first state insurance mandate for third party coverage of infertility services was passed by West Virginia in 1977, and Maryland passed the country's first IVF mandate in 1985. To date, twenty states have passed legislation requiring insurers to cover or offer coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility. Ten states currently have "comprehensive" IVF mandates, meaning they require third party coverage for IVF with minimal restrictions to patient eligibility, exemptions, and lifetime limits. Several studies analyzing the impact of infertility and IVF mandates have been published in the past 20 years. In this review, we characterize and contextualize the existing evidence of the impact of state insurance mandates on access to infertility treatment, IVF practice patterns, and reproductive outcomes. Furthermore, we summarize the arguments in favor of insurance coverage for infertility care and assess the limitations of state insurance mandates as a strategy for increasing access to infertility treatment. State mandates play a key role in the promotion of evidence-based practices and represent an essential and impactful strategy for the advancement of gender equality and reproductive rights.

State Health Insurance Benefit Mandates and Health Care Affordability

Every US state requires private health insurers to cover certain conditions, treatments, and providers. These benefit mandates were rare as recently as the 1960s, but the average state now has more than forty. These mandates are intended to promote the affordability of necessary health care. This study aims to determine the extent to which benefit mandates succeed at this goal. Using fixed effects and difference-in-difference research designs with data from the restricted Medical Expenditure Panel Survey—Household Component (MEPS-HC), it provides the first empirical estimates of how health insurance benefit mandates affect out-of-pocket costs and total spending on health care. Both strategies find that mandates significantly reduce out-of-pocket spending, but they are divided on whether mandates also reduce overall health care spending and spending by private insurers.

The incidence of the healthcare costs of chronic conditions

Who pays for the costs of chronic conditions? In this paper, we examine whether 50-64-year old workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance bear healthcare costs of chronic conditions in the form of lower wages. Using a difference-in-differences approach with data from the Health and Retirement Study, we find that workers with chronic diseases receive significantly lower wages than healthy workers when they are covered by employer-sponsored insurance. Our findings suggest that higher healthcare costs of chronic conditions can explain the substantial part of the wage gap between workers with and without chronic diseases.

Are the costs of employer-sponsored health insurance passed on to workers at the individual level?

Because employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) is experience rated, employers have an incentive to try to offset its cost by paying lower wages to employees who have greater medical expenditures. The existing evidence on this topic, however, illustrates only that ESI is associated with lower wages for groups of workers who are costlier to cover. In contrast, I use the variation provided by the Affordable Care Act's employer mandate to examine if differences in medical expenditures are passed on to workers at the individual level. My estimates rely on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data in a dose response difference-in-difference framework that examines how wages change for workers with varying medical expenditures when they must soon be offered ESI. I find that each $1 difference in medical expenditures is associated with a $0.35 to $0.51 wage offset after the employer mandate's announcement wherever ESI must soon be offered to workers. Placebo analyses, focusing on workers whose employers are not affected by the mandate, provide support for a causal interpretation. I also show that my findings are not sensitive to sample selection or data reliability issues and that they cannot be explained by the effects of the Great Recession, demographic characteristics that correlate with medical expenditures, or location- or industry-specific idiosyncratic shocks.

Who pays for the medical costs of obesity? New evidence from the employer mandate

Theory suggests that the medical costs of obesity should be passed on to obese workers, in the form of lower wages, whenever health coverage is a part of employee compensation. In contrast to existing work on this topic, this paper illustrates that the medical expenditures caused by obesity among working adults are relatively small and that wage offsets should therefore be difficult to detect. The paper supports this claim by exploiting the variation provided by the Affordable Care Act's employer mandate. Findings suggest that obese workers tend to bear the approximate cost of their medical expenditures via lower wages. However, the observed effects are often insignificantly different from zero.

The spillover effects of health insurance benefit mandates on public insurance coverage: Evidence from veterans

This study examines how regulations in private health insurance markets affect coverage of public insurance. We focus on mental health parity laws, which mandate private health insurance to provide equal coverage for mental and physical health services. The implementation of mental health parity laws may improve a quality dimension of private health insurance but at increased costs. We graphically develop a conceptual framework and then empirically examine whether the regulations shift individuals from private to public insurance. We exploit state-by-year variation in policy implementation in 1999-2008 and focus on a sample of veterans, who have better access to public insurance than non-veterans. Using data from the Current Population Survey, we find that the parity laws reduce employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) coverage by 2.1% points. The drop in ESI is largely offset by enrollment gains in public insurance, namely through the Veterans Affairs (VA) benefit and Medicaid/Medicare programs.

Heterogeneity and the effect of mental health parity mandates on the labor market

Health insurance benefit mandates are believed to have adverse effects on the labor market, but efforts to document such effects for mental health parity mandates have had limited success. I show that one reason for this failure is that the association between parity mandates and labor market outcomes vary with mental distress. Accounting for this heterogeneity, I find adverse labor market effects for non-distressed individuals, but favorable effects for moderately distressed individuals and individuals with a moderately distressed family member. On net, I conclude that the mandates are welfare increasing for moderately distressed workers and their families, but may be welfare decreasing for non-distressed individuals.

Did the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate increase premiums?

We investigate the impact of the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate on insurance premiums. The expansion of dependent coverage under the ACA allows young adults to remain on their parent's private health insurance plans until the age of 26. We find that the mandate has led to a 2.5-2.8 percent increase in premiums for health insurance plans that cover children, relative to single-coverage plans. We are able to conclude that employers did not pass on the entire premium increase to employees through higher required plan contributions.